论人道主义干涉及其严格限制--一种侧重于伦理和法理的阐析

人道主义干涉往往成为大国霸权主义的政治工具,所以必须对这类干涉予以符合伦理和法理的严格限制.本文认为,一项人道主义干涉要能够是合理与合法的,就须同时具备至少六项限制性的先决条件,特别是必须有严格限定的正当理由,必须由联合国作为唯一合法的国际干涉权威来发动、进行或监管,必须仅仅将武力的使用当作不得已的最后手段,而其使用方式和预期后果必须是适当的.     

浅议人道主义干预的立法规制

在国际伦理上 ,人道主义干预是有其存在意义的 ,但在现实中它却与强权扩张结下不解之缘 ,被称作“潘多拉的盒子”。理想与现实冲突的困境 ,根源于人道主义干预的制度化缺失。本文针对学界研究的薄弱之处 ,着墨于现行国际法框架下的人道主义干预的立法规制 ;主张将人道主义干预纳入联合国集体安全机制 ,明确规定单方面人道主义干预的非法性 ,并从原则、实施条件、程序设计三个层次对立法规制进行探讨 ,其中对个别程序作出设计 ;试图在理想与现实的夹缝里寻求一条将人道主义干预引向理性与制度化的道路。     

Going Global: Islamist Competition in Contemporary Civil Wars

The global landscape of modern jihad is highly diverse and wrought with conflict between rival Islamist factions. Within this inter-Islamist competition, some factions prove to be more robust and durable than others. This research proposes that the adoption of a global identity allows an Islamist group to better recruit and expand their domestic political power across ethnic and tribal divisions without being constrained by local politics. Islamists that rely on an ethnic or tribal identity are more prone to group fragmentation, whereas global Islamists are better able to retain group cohesion by purging their ranks of dissenters. To examine these two processes, I present original field research and primary source analysis to examine Islamist in-fighting in Somalia from 2006–2014 and then expand my analysis to Iraq and Syria, Pakistan, and Mali.     

Moral Agency and Moral Responsibility in Humanitarian Intervention

This paper sets out a preliminary taxonomy of potential collective moral agents in humanitarian intervention, based on six recent cases involving international organisations. The settings for the cases are Northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Rwanda, and Kosovo. Attributing moral responsibility to a group actor requires first discovering whether its characteristics are enough like an individual moral agent's to support an analogy. Groups in humanitarian intervention that appear to choose between one course of action and another, and have a clear structure of leadership and a capacity to control their collective activities, meet criteria that characterise individual moral agents. If they can also distinguish between policies using the language of morality we can call them collective moral agents, and hence subject to some moral responsibilities.     

Soldiers,Civilians, and Multilateral Humanitarian Intervention

Approval from the United Nations or NATO appears to have become a necessary condition for US humanitarian military intervention. Conventional explanations emphasizing the pull of legitimacy cannot fully account for this given that US policymakers vary considerably in their attachment to multilateralism. This article argues that America's military leaders, who are consistently skeptical about humanitarian intervention and tend to emphasize its costs, play a central role in making multilateral approval necessary. As long as top-ranking generals express strong reservations about intervention and no clear threat to US national security exists, they can veto the use of force. In such circumstances, even heavyweight “humanitarian hawks” among the civilian leadership, who initially may have wanted to bypass multilateral bodies to maximize US freedom of action, can be expected to recognize the need for UN or NATO approval—if only as a means of mollifying the generals by reassuring them about the prospect of sustained multilateral burden sharing. Two case studies drawing on interviews with senior civilian and military officials illustrate and probe the plausibility of the argument.     

Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

This paper examines the conditions under which warring parties will accept an outside party's offer to mediate. Specifically, we explore variation in the incentives for accepting third-party offers in interstate conflicts as compared to civil wars. We argue that since mediation in civil wars transfers legitimacy to the non-state actor and can generate a precedent of exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, the political cost associated with accepting international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars compared to international conflicts. States should therefore only accept mediation in the most serious disputes, or when the costs of legitimizing an opponent are outweighed by the benefits of conflict resolution. Building on this theoretical reasoning, the paper analyzes the implications of differences in incentive structures between inter- and intrastate conflicts for offer and acceptance of mediation. We find an empirical discrepancy between interstate and civil wars in regard to demand-side (acceptance) of mediation, and to a somewhat lesser extent the supply-side (offer) of international mediation. In line with our argument, we find that the historical ties between the potential intermediary and at least one of the disputants play different roles in regard to acceptance of mediation in interstate compared to civil wars. This is important to take into consideration in the emerging debate on mediation bias.     

委内瑞拉公民社会新发展:从社区自治会到公社

委内瑞拉总统查韦斯在执政期间积极推动建立参与式民主,并探索发展人民参与的有效途径。在这一过程中,社区自治会和公社相继建立,成为委内瑞拉参与式民主的主要载体。作为地方自治机构,社区自治会和公社体现1999年宪法倡导的政治参与,意在体现人民权力,表达人民意愿。这一机制为公民有效参与公共事务、进入公共领域开辟渠道,使他们对国家的发展方向享有较以往更大的发言权。社区自治会和公社对于委内瑞拉公民社会的成长发挥着重要的促进作用。它们的稳步发展将产生自下而上的推力,推动国家政治转型的实现,使委内瑞拉从国家集权控制转变为真正的公民治理。     

Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities

The theory of humanitarian intervention has received new attention since the humanitarian crises of the 1990s and the United States’ becoming the world's sole superpower. The actual practice of humanitarian intervention, however, has declined. It is difficult to forge the political will for it when the countries composing the global organizations that could provide the political legitimacy disagree on an intervention, and with so few countries—mainly the United States and Great Britain—capable of providing the required expeditionary forces. Moreover, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have diminished the United States’ political will, military capability, and diplomatic credibility to conduct future humanitarian interventions. In particular, those wars precluded its intervention in the current genocide in Darfur. Regional bodies such as the African Union may be the only entities that can, with aid and training, undertake effective interventions.     

现代强权政治背景下的人道主义干涉

干涉主义的“复兴”作为苏联权力集团突然解体的结果 ,世界地缘政治版图发生了深刻变化。以相互威慑保持军事力量平衡为特征的两极体系 ,转变成一种美国作为唯一超级大国的单极秩序。在 2 1世纪开始时 ,一国拥有不受挑战的全球霸主地位的全球秩序已经成形。这种情形导致大国统治的复兴。行使“帝国”权力重新成为现实 ,以帝国规则为特征的意识形态概念即19世纪的“人道主义干涉”概念遂得以复兴。在一种帝国规则体系中———以完全缺乏权力分配为特征 ,霸主可以在不受潜在竞争者挑战的情况下追求其利益 ,创造它自己的意识形态 ,并借这种意识…     

Resource Curse in Reverse: How Civil Wars Influence Natural Resource Production

Conflict scholars have argued that natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, and gemstones, may increase the chances for civil wars because rebels can sustain their organizations by looting resources and because certain types of resources, such as oil, create weaker state governments that are less capable of putting down insurgencies. Natural resources like oil also raise the value of capturing the state through war. However, empirical studies typically treat natural resources as exogenous variables, failing to consider the possibility that war alters the production levels of various natural resources. This endogenous relationship may help to explain the inconsistent empirical results linking natural resources and civil war onset. This article examines the two-way relationship between natural resources and civil war, focusing on oil, diamonds, and fisheries. The empirical findings suggest that most of the relationships run in the direction from war to resources, with no significant effects of resources on the onset of civil war. States with civil wars experience lower oil and diamond production, while marine fisheries production recovers in civil war–torn states.     

Military Culture and Restraint toward Civilians in War: Examining the Ugandan Civil Wars

What explains armed-group conduct toward civilians in war? The National Resistance Army (NRA) of Uganda demonstrated notable restraint toward civilians during its wars in northern Uganda in the 1980s, restraint that is puzzling given the overdetermined predictions for mass atrocity under rationalist, identity, and regime-type theories. Instead, the NRA case demonstrates that military culture—the organizational norms underlying combatant socialization—is a primary determinant of armed-group behavior, influencing combatant conduct in ways not conceptualized under existing theories of victimization. This review of the NRA case, based on field interviews with Ugandan military officers and examinations of Ugandan documentary archives, reveals three key points regarding the role of military culture in effecting restraint. First, the NRA case shows that organizational factors like military culture can determine military behavior toward civilians. Second, it reveals that theories of military culture, incorporating both formal and informal mechanisms of combatant socialization, can provide a more complete theoretical account than existing theories of armed-group conduct. Finally, the NRA provides potential hypotheses for mechanisms through which culture influences military behavior. I analyze the effect of culture on the NRA's conduct as a plausibility probe, generating inductive insights drawn from detailed field research to shed light on the organizational drivers of armed-group restraint. The NRA case thus points the way to a reconceptualization of military culture and the role of organizational factors that influence conflict behavior.     

Humanitarian Intervention in the 19th Century: The Heyday of a Controversial Concept

This article dwells on the state of play of armed humanitarian intervention in the long 19^th century. It starts with the birth of the idea in previous centuries by jurists of the naturalist school. It then presents the behaviour of the great powers in three celebrated humanitarian cases of the 19^th century (the Greek independence struggle, the Lebanon-Syria massacres and the Bulgarian atrocities)with emphasis on their initial reluctance to intervene and their motives for intervening, as well as the role of public opinion in spurring intervention. The overall situation will be appraised with emphasis on the Christian bias and the Orientalist approach towards the Ottoman Empire. Then the views of international jurists (publicists) will be presented, followed by the attitude of major political philosophers. The overall picture that emerges in the 19^th century is one of striking relevance to today's concerns as seen by six concluding propositions.