A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism

Neoclassical realism is often criticized by non-realists for being an ad hoc and theoretically degenerative effort to explain away anomalies for neorealism. In this paper, I argue instead that neoclassical realism is a logical extension and necessary part of advancing neorealism. Structural realism argues that the system constrains but does not determine state action and where foreign policy departs from what would be ideal behavior given a state's structural position, domestic politics and ideas are generally the cause. This focus on mistakes and maladaptive behavior, seen in such neoclassical realist concepts as over-or under-balancing, is necessary to avoid falling into the trap of merely using domestic politics and ideas to make neorealism more determinate and explain residual variance in foreign policy choice unaccounted for by structure. The article attempts to correct the mistaken presumption that particular paradigms own domestic politics and ideas, asserting instead that each paradigm has access to these variables but must make them their own.     

Time Remembered: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction

Over time, states form relationships. These relationships, mosaics of past interactions, provide political leaders with information about how states are likely to behave in the future. Although intuitive, this claim holds important implications for the manner in which we construct and evaluate empirically our expectations about interstate behavior. Empirical analyses of interstate relations implicitly assume that the units of analysis are independent. Theories of interstate interaction are often cast in the absence of historical context. In this article we construct a dynamic model of interstate interaction that we believe will assist scholars in empirical and theoretical studies by incorporating a substantively interpretable historical component into their models of interstate relations. Our conceptual model includes both conflictual and cooperative components, and exhibits the basic properties of growth and decay that characterize dyadic relationships. In an empirical exposition, we derive a continuous measure of interstate conflict from the conflictual component of the model. We rely on Oneal and Russett's (1997) analysis of dyadic conflict for the period 1950–1985 as a benchmark, and examine whether the inclusion of our measure of interstate conflict significantly improves our ability to predict militarized conflict. We find empirical support for this hypothesis, indicating that our continuous measure of interstate conflict significantly augments a well-known statistical model of dyadic militarized conflict. Our findings reinforce the assertion that historical processes in interstate relationships represent substantively important elements in models of interstate behavior rather than econometric nuisances.     

A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's version of an expected utility theory of war has become one of the most widely cited theories of international conflict. However, the testing of the theory has lagged behind its theoretical development. In its most sophisticated formulation, the theory has been tested on only 707 dyad-years, all drawn from Europe between 1816 and 1970. We present a test of the expected utility theory of war (as developed in War and Reason ) on the international system from 1816 to 1984. Specifically, we examine the relationship between the main equilibrium variables derived under the "domestic variant" of the international interaction game and behavioral outcomes using multinomial logit. We find that the equilibria correlate with actual behavior in both the set of all dyads and a subset of politically relevant dyads, even after including a set of control variables. The relationship is somewhat less clear among the population of all interstate-directed dyads, however, with key equilibrium variables having smaller effects at increasing the odds of interstate conflict among all dyads. We also present a new software program, EUGene , which generates expected utility data and can serve as an important data management tool for international relations researchers.     

Dangerous Days: The Impact of Nationalism on Interstate Conflict

Does an upsurge in nationalism make interstate conflict more likely? This article gives evidence to suggest that spikes in nationalism do have a direct impact on the likelihood of disputes between states. In it, I use national days or anniversaries as occasions that increase the salience of a national identity and its historical wars. I show that in the two months following national days, conflict is markedly higher than would be expected—almost 30 percent more likely than the rest of the year—and particularly likely for states who initiate conflict or who have revisionist intentions. I demonstrate further how nationalist sentiment can increase international tensions with a case study of national anniversaries in China and Japan. Together, this evidence suggests that the increase in nationalism around national days provides both risks and opportunities to regimes and shapes when they choose conflict over cooperation in international relations.     

The social construction of international institutions: the case of ASEAN + 3

Slowly but steadily, a new international institution is emergingin East Asia: the ASEAN + 3 forum, comprising the ten membersof the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China,Japan and South Korea. ASEAN + 3 is an interesting case of institution-buildingin that it is constructed around the core of an already existinginstitution, ASEAN, which was founded in 1967. The followinganalysis of this multilateral forum seeks to answer two theoreticalquestions: (i) Why do states cooperate? (ii) What happens totheir interests and identities once they communicate with eachother? In view of this task, I will offer a social constructivistvariant of international relations theory to explain the instigationof the process on the one hand and the processual constructionof the institution on the other. The underlying belief is thatnot only do states influence the development of internationalinstitutions, but that institutions can also exert influenceon foreign policy behaviour. The approach introduced here acknowledges that internationalreality is a social construction driven by collective understandingsemerging from social interaction. This approach to the explanationof the initiation and the subsequent development of an institutionrecognizes the existence of both material and normative groundsof foreign policy action. It differs from neoliberal institutionalismbecause in this theory as well as in realism collective interestis assumed as pre-given and hence exogenous to social interaction.In contrast, we suppose that social interaction ultimately doeshave transformative effects on interests and identity, becausecontinuous cooperation is likely to influence intersubjectivemeanings. This method of analysis corresponds with Moravscik'stripartite analysis of integration decisions: while the initialphase refers to the formation of state preferences, the secondand third involve the dynamic aspect of ‘constructing’international institutions: the outcomes of interstate bargainingand the subsequent choice of the institutional design.     

De Facto States in International Politics (1945–2011): A New Data Set

Sovereign states remain the primary units of analysis in conflict research. Yet, the empirical record suggests that the international system includes a wider range of actors whose behavior is relevant for conflict outcomes. This article introduces De Facto States in International Politics (1945–2011), a new data set dedicated to understanding the behavior of de facto states—separatist statelike entities such as Abkhazia. I begin by explaining why de facto states deserve attention. Further, I provide a definition of the de facto state that separates it from cognate phenomena. Thereafter, I offer an overview of the data set and illustrate its utility by demonstrating how it contributes to the literatures on war and state making, civil war, and rebel governance.     

Uneven and combined development: a fusion of Marxism and structural realism

Although Justin Rosenberg's academic writings have from the very beginning attempted to provide an alternative to neorealism in the form of Trotsky's theory of uneven and combined development (U&CD), his attempts at actually replacing it with a general theory of his own have been relatively recent. His initial attempts raised much interest and several responses. In his latest paper, ‘Basic problems in the theory of uneven and combined development, part II: unevenness and political multiplicity’ (Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 23:1, 2010, 165–189), Rosenberg acknowledges that in actual fact, despite his attempts to provide an alternative to neorealism, his own theory presupposed political multiplicity, and therefore in his latest article he has sought to rectify this by providing an account of the emergence of ‘politically fragmented space’ which is explicitly grounded in historical materialism (Pozo-Martin, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20:4, 2007, 554). As such, it is to be welcomed. However, this article argues that if we are to accept Rosenberg's theory of the emergence of multiplicity then it must provide a better explanation than other competing accounts. By using an alternative explanation of the rise of the international, this article demonstrates that Rosenberg's paper has failed to do this, and instead argues for the existence of a transhistorical anarchic environment arising from social rather than political multiplicity. However, U&CD is then used to explain both the intra- and inter-societal stratifications (the latter in terms of distributional structure) that arise. Associated with these stratifications is the inextricable intertwining of the modes of production and modes of inter-state competition. From this combination emerges the general tendencies of societal development, which then need to be applied to the concrete circumstances of history. In so doing, we need to account for the different analytical registers of genesis, structure, epoch and conjuncture and the unique concatenation of factors that pertain for each of these (Callinicos, International Politics, 6:3, 2005, 362).     

Discourse,genealogy and methods of text selection in international relations

Abstract

Discourse analysis, once the purview of critical theories of international politics, has emerged as a mainstream methodology for understanding international relations. While interest in such perspectives has enriched international relations theory, much about the nature of methods—that is, specific empirical processes for the gathering and analysis of evidence—is left ambiguous in this scholarship. Which texts should discourse analyses focus on? And, more practically, how should those texts be chosen? Building on discussions of case study methodology from both qualitative and interpretive social science, this article contributes to theoretical and empirical projects within discourse theory by suggesting a method for text selection: the random selection of texts. I argue that random selection processes are beneficial for discourse analyses that aim to study broad cultural patterns, such as genealogy. Random selection is not simply a means of choosing texts, but also a more comprehensive logic for thinking about the purpose of texts in discourse analysis.     

When Do States Say Uncle? Network Dependence and Sanction Compliance

In this article we address the long-debated question of when and why states comply with sanctions. While the literature remains indeterminate as to whether the key mechanisms driving sanction compliance are tied to interstate relations, intrastate constraints, or a dynamic combination of the two, our theoretical framework and methodological approach provide a novel perspective that incorporates insights drawn from network theory to explain the time until countries comply. Specifically, we argue that reciprocity, a concept with deep roots in both network theory and international relations, has largely been overlooked in the study of sanction compliance. Though often ignored, this concept captures an essential aspect of how cooperation is fostered in the international system and allows us to better analyze the strategic environment underlying sanctioning behavior. Given the theoretical importance of reciprocity in understanding interstate relations, we provide an approach that integrates estimations of this type of network interdependency into extant frameworks for modeling the time until countries comply with sanctions. Our results highlight that reciprocity not only has a substantive effect in explaining the duration of sanctions but that models excluding this concept from their specifications do notably worse in terms of their predictive performance.     

Democratising Transitional Justice: Transitional Trade-offs and Constituting the Demos

I argue that transitional justice should be democratised and to realise this goal I propose a method by which people can be enfranchised to make such choices. By showing that transitional justice options often involve trade-offs, I lay the groundwork for my democratic account of transitional justice. This article balances three democratic principles, including collective self-determination, the all affected interests principle and the protection of individual rights that are necessary to vote, to argue that victims and potential victims should constitute the transitional justice demos. I propose a new institution that would balance international and local control of transitional justice decision making, and choose the demos. This article does not attempt to construct a theory of how to resolve tensions in transitional justice decisions. Conversely, exactly because these tensions are often present, I develop a theory of who should be empowered to make transitional justice decisions and how their powers should be constrained.     

Civil war mediation and integration into global value chains

How does the globalization of production affect interstate behavior? While scholars have paid significant attention to the effect of global value chains on trade and political economy, there has been substantially less focus on the interaction between globalized production and conflict behavior. However, the changing economic landscape has the potential to alter the decision calculus of leaders on a variety of issues, including conflict mediation. In this research note, I argue that when deciding how to allocate scarce mediation resources, major powers pay attention to the position of potential beneficiaries in the global production network. In particular, among states involved in intrastate conflicts, those that are more heavily involved in the production and sale of intermediate inputs are more likely to receive mediation from major powers. I test this argument using data on intermediate trade and civil war mediation between 1991 and 2011. The results of the analysis are consistent with the theory, suggesting that major powers are more likely to provide mediation for producers of intermediate goods, but not for consumers.     

When can external actors influence democratization? Leverage,linkages, and gatekeeper elites

This article engages in the flourishing debate on the external dimension of democratization by proposing a theoretical model of when external actors can influence democratization. The argument takes its departure in a critical assessment of existing structural contributions. It is argued that structural approaches are useful in explaining interregional differences in external influence, but have difficulties coping with cases that do not adhere to the overall structural pattern – that is, with intraregional differences. To deal with these problems, I turn to Levitsky and Way's renowned framework of leverage and linkage, and argue that their theory, giving primacy to structures, is not entirely valid. The structural determinants (linkages) that constitute the basis of their explanation are not non-amenable as they claim, but can be influenced to a great extent by what I term the gatekeeper elites of the target country. That is, I claim that domestic elites should not only be perceived as mere objects of external influence, as they are in the structural accounts, but rather as gatekeepers that actively facilitate or constrain ties to external actors. Hence, to fully understand when external actors can influence democratization, we need to breathe dynamism into the structural accounts by carefully evaluating, not just leverage and linkages, but also elite agency.     

Between Accommodation and Opportunism: Explaining the Growing Influence of Small Gulf States in the Middle East

Abstract

Smaller members of the Gulf Cooperation Council defied theoretical and practical expectations as they were able to enlarge their international influence during the years of the Arab Spring. They adopted markedly different foreign policy strategies, which can be seen as stances lying between accommodation and opportunism, depending on the extent to which they respected the security concerns of their geopolitical patron, Saudi Arabia. The mainstream schools of IR theory – neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism – offer different explanations for these phenomena. Although none of the three schools can provide a completely exhaustive explanation, neoliberalism seems to offer the most comprehensive framework for analysis.     

Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations

This article examines the role of state actors, organization agencies, and individual agents in diplomatic interactions and negotiations. States as diplomatic actors, organizations as diplomatic agencies, and individuals as diplomatic agents enter into complex and interdependent relationships. Proposing a three‐level analysis of interstate interactions and diplomatic negotiations, I argue that no diplomatic negotiation happens without interactions between parties at the state, organizational, and individual levels. The agency–structure paradigm provides a conceptual framework for understanding behavioral and structural properties of international interactions and their influence on diplomatic negotiations. Diplomatic negotiation employs specific forms of interaction, using a distinct language, protocol norms, symbols, ceremonies, and rituals. The state's “self” (as a social conception of its identity, values, and interests) affects the process of diplomatic negotiation. By managing, organizing, and improving international interactions at the actor, agency, and agent levels, negotiating parties can advance the process and effectiveness of diplomatic negotiation.     

The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory has long been criticized, with several recent critiques of applications in political science in general and international relations in particular. In this paper, I seek to clarify discussion about rationality in several ways. I discuss the role of assumptions in theory and the assumption of rationality in rational choice theory. I demonstrate that many critiques of rational choice theory have been misguided , since instrumental rationality-the rationality of rational choice theory-is applicable to a wide variety of social situations, including situations where various psychological, informational, and structural factors claimed to interfere with rational decision-making are present. I also focus on three applications of rational choice theory in international relations that demonstrate ways that rational choice theorists have potentially added to confusion about the rationality assumption and created disillusionment in others about the rational choice enterprise. Finally, I point out that, since rational choice theory is not a single theory, critics' claims about the non-falsifiability of rational choice are immaterial. An understanding of these issues facilitates movement by the international relations community away from argument over the assumption of rationality and on to more productive and integrative theory building.     

The structure of the international telecommunications regime in transition: A network analysis of international organizations 1

This paper examines the structure of the international telecommunications regime in terms of networks of social interaction and institutional affiliation among international actors. Social interaction and overlapping membership data of 69 international telecommunications organizations in the Yearbook of International Organizations 1994/1995 are analyzed to describe the social structure of the international telecommunications system through network analysis. The analysis reveals a center‐periphery structure with the Western industrial countries at the center and the less developed countries at the periphery. The international telecommunications system is also regionally structured suggesting influence by geopolitical and cultural proximity. The results indicate that inter‐governmental global organizations such as the ITU and UNESCO play intermediate and coordinating roles at the central linking‐pin positions (or cut‐points) in the international telecommunications regime. In summary, this research shows that transitional trends in international telecommunications have affected the interaction patterns of international actors.     

The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the First World War

The belief that globalization enhances peace, a central tenet of liberal theory, enjoys substantial support in recent scholarship on trade and conflict. To conclude that liberalism is right, however, is premature and wrong. Liberal theory is not sufficiently grounded in international trade theory to show how globalization generates constraints on military force, nor does it adequately link these constraints to strengthened peace. This article uses the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade to connect globalization's economic effects to increased constraints on military force and then explores how, in the nineteenth century, globalization affected European peace. As liberal theory predicts, globalization generated substantial constraints on military force in prewar Europe. Yet there are important flaws in liberalism's logic linking these constraints to strengthened international peace. Contrary to liberal theory, globalization did not strengthen prospects for peace in prewar Europe but was a major cause of the First World War.     

US Aid and gender equality: social movement vs civil society models of funding

Despite the fact that the assumed link between women’s empowerment, peace, and democratization has taken a firm hold in both theory and practice, the effectiveness of funding empowerment remains highly contested in the literature on gender, war, and democratic transformations. Drawing upon over a decade of fieldwork, this article offers lessons from the Balkans for funding women’s empowerment, with a particular focus on postconflict political transitions. I argue that there are two fundamentally different approaches to funding women’s empowerment, what I call the civil society model and the social movement model, and I lay out theoretical reasons why the social movement model is more likely to achieve enduring political change. I then provide a case study of how the United States government promoted elements of the social movement model in Croatia and Serbia as part of its democratization assistance, focusing on the challenges and promise of this approach.     

Negotiating Military Alliances: Legal Systems and Alliance Formation

Do domestic legal systems affect states' propensity to form military alliances? This article, building upon the existing research in international relations, adopts a socio-legal approach to understanding international treaty making. By focusing on the essence of international negotiations—communication between states' representatives—I argue that negotiating parties who share a common legal language have a common a priori understanding concerning concepts under discussion. Domestic laws operating within states impact the process of creation of international law embodied in treaties. Empirical analyses show that states with similar legal systems are more likely to form military alliances with one another. Additionally, domestic legal systems influence the way that states design their alliance commitments. In general, my findings suggest that the influence of domestic laws does not stop at “the water's edge.” It permeates the interstate borders and impacts the relations between states, especially the treaty negotiating and drafting process. International negotiators bring their legal backgrounds to the negotiating table, which influences both their willingness to sign treaties and the design of the resulting agreements.     

Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation

I propose that special interests are particularly influential in international cooperation because they are able to enact pressure on the government already during the negotiations while the issue is not yet salient for the general public. In my formal model, special interests can offer political support to the government in exchange for a discriminatory implementation commitment that benefits them. The government colludes with the special interests if the value of political support exceeds the cost. However, if the government colludes with special interests in country A, the payoff to the government and special interests in country B also decreases because the probability of successful international cooperation decreases. In equilibrium, special interests create a collective-action problem that complicates international cooperation. In addition to providing a new explanation for the power of special interests in international cooperation, the article illuminates how international negotiations and domestic treaty implementation interact. The analysis also reveals a new dimension of flexibility in international cooperation.