Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism,and the War in Iraq

This paper proposes a model for explaining shifts and variations in U.S. grand strategy. The model is based on a distinction between four ideal-type grand strategies or ideational approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the U.S. policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions—namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat—that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. Great power parity is conducive to realist approaches. In contrast, a situation of hegemony encourages the emergence of ideological grand strategies, which focus on ideology promotion, according to the ideology of the hegemon. In the case of a liberal hegemon, such as the United States, liberal approaches are likely to emerge as dominant. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in two cases of the two most recent shifts in U.S. grand strategy following 1991. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of the Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies. In the benign environment of the 1990s the dominant strategy was defensive liberalism, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.     

Reflections on Producing Security

Whether China's strategic culture is offensive or defensive in nature is an interesting question in understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior. Alastair Johnston argues for a parabellum culture of offensive realism that leads to a pattern of Chinese aggressive behavior. But China's behavior in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnam War shows a defensive pattern that Johnston's analysis cannot fully explain. By analyzing the operational code of Mao Zedong's public foreign policy speeches, using the automated Verbs in Context System (VICS) of content analysis, this article attempts to determine whether Mao's belief system reflected the influence of a defensive or an offensive strategic culture, and compares the results to Johnston's analysis. The results indicate that Johnston's cultural realist argument is only partially correct and needs to be qualified in important respects. The operational-code analysis of Mao Zedong reveals a more complex reality than did Johnston's analysis. The results partly support Johnston's claim about Mao as an offensive realist, but this result cannot be generalized across situations, as the operational code analysis shows that strategic beliefs are not static. Mao's beliefs were also the product of his personality and of the international historical setting.     

Against Food Security: On Forms of Care and Fields of Violence

This article addresses recent changes to the policy landscape on global food security. It argues that a new consensus is emerging on how to tackle (or more hubristically “end”) global hunger and spur agricultural development. The consensus I speak of is evident in recent briefings by the World Economic Forum (especially its “New Vision for Agriculture”), the “New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition”, initiated by the G-8 (now G-7), the Grow Africa network, the US government's “Feed the Future” programme, the philanthropy-led Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, not to mention the many flagship reports emanating from the international financial institutions as well as key statements from global food retailers and leading agribusinesses. The article argues that this “new vision” for global agriculture is deeply problematic. Indeed, the projected “solutions”—in so far as they aim to radically transform agricultural life, especially in Africa—may well cause more harm than good. To put this argument more forcefully: what today is commonly called “food security” is perhaps better seen as a way of subjugating the poor under the pretence of doing them good.     

“Exporting Democracy”? Neoconservatism and the Limits of Military Intervention, 1989–2008

This article challenges the almost universal consensus that post–Cold War neoconservative foreign policy has been characterised by the objective of “exporting democracy” abroad for strategic or moral reasons or both. Instead, the article contends that the touchstone of neoconservatism was the attempt to preserve America's so-called “unipolar moment”—its apparent position as the single pole of power in every region of the world. Moving beyond the abstract and grandiose rhetoric employed by many neocons, the article points out that neocons made a distinction between the respective uses of military and non-military power, arguing that the former should be reserved only for situations where strategic interests were at stake rather than for the sake of ideals. The article goes on to argue that this focus on strategic interests facilitated a close alliance with other conservative nationalists who were also dedicated to maintaining America's position as the single pole of world power. Thus neoconservatism should be analysed and evaluated—by both conservatives and liberal interventionists alike—on the basis that it was a strategy dedicated primarily to preserving American unipolarity, not to the promotion of ideals.     

Governing migration from a distance: interactions between climate,migration, and security in the South Mediterranean

Links between security and migration are well established and are associated with the meaning, status, and practice of borders in the international political system. This article assesses how and with what effects the effects of environmental and climate change have entered this relationship between migration and security. It does so by assessing the EU’s external governance of migration in “South Mediterranean Partner Countries” (SMPCs): Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia. It is argued that a focus on promoting “adaptation” and building “resilience” has developed that is consistent with the logic of governing migration from a distance. However, the article challenges ideas that environmental/climate change act as simple migration “triggers” and instead explores implications of movement towards and not away from risk, as well as the potential for populations to be trapped in areas that expose them to risk. It is shown that both have important implications for the relationship between migration, environmental/climate change, and security in SMPCs.     

Globalization,Systems Integration,and the Future of Great Power War

Contemporary economic globalization differs from past increases in global commerce, especially because modern foreign direct investment and systems integration techniques allow factories in different countries to specialize in the design and production of parts rather than complete products. Stephen Brooks has argued, based on both liberal and realist logics, that this new form of globalization might bring a “commercial peace,” at least among the great powers. But economic globalization did not simply appear by itself. Firms and governments made conscious decisions through a process of systems integration and strategic planning that led to a wide variety of international economic relationships. That diversity of economic connections combines with the variety of strategic situations in the international environment—variations in geography, national intentions, policy history, etc.—to suggest a range of possible constraints on countries' offensive capability and on the prospects for economic gains from conquest. As has always been the case, conquest in the future will sometimes prove valuable and other times will not. Globalization does not imply the dawn of an era of commercial peace.     

印度的战略文化和国际行为(英文)

There is a strong interconnection between India's strategic culture and There and its strategic choices and security behavior. India's strategic culture, which comprises both offensive and defensive initiatives, has formed a "magnetic field" of social culture for its strategic decisions and security behavior, which has played the role of defining the scope of India's strategic choices and the manner of international behaviors, even though it has not produced the explicitly causal or logical results.     

The Complexity of Global Security Governance: An Analytical Overview

By suggesting predictable and controllable patterns of development, the literature on global governance seems to simplify the world for decision-making tractability. In this respect, security narratives often remain analytically frozen, while the dynamics of global life are not. Relying on complexity thinking, this article both comments on the construction and potential reconstruction of the concept of security as it relates to the question of global governance and engages with the cognitive multiplicity of the notion of global security governance. Such an exploration suggests the need for the complexification of the discourses and practices of security governance through the adaptive contingency of “security as resilience”, which rejects the detachment between human and natural systems and the ability of the former to control the latter. The argument is that the logic of “security as resilience” is more appropriate than the conventional logic of “security as control”. In policy terms, therefore, the complexity of global security governance intimates an ability to cope with vulnerabilities, defy adversity and construct a new proficiency in response to the uncertainty, cognitive challenges, complex unbounded risks and the need for continuing adaptation prompted by the alterations in global life.     

Foreign policy in the Muslim world: A dialogue between state and society

In the wake of the demise of communism and the advent of the 1990–1991 Gulf War, there is concern among some Western elites about a possible Islamic challenge to the prevailing international order. This paper explores the validity of that concern by looking at patterns of interaction and the notion of foreign‐policy change in four countries in the Muslim world—Iran, Egypt, Algeria, and Indonesia, as well as some developments in the larger Muslim world. Juxtaposing social change on foreign policy, the article postulates that economic realism is the definitive force in the international relations of these states; “militant Islam” is more a tool of radical diplomacy than a manifestation of transnationalism; and ties between states in the Muslim world display a regional regime‐style orientation. Domestic Islamization is found to be a force, which, overall, is contributing to accountability and, therefore, rationalization in the foreign‐policy realm.     

Contemplating Peace between India and Pakistan

India-Pakistan relations are at an inflection point with India’s dramatic revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy and its desired objective to transform the nature of the Kashmir conflict from a “bilateral” (involving Pakistan) to a “unilateral” status (excluding Pakistan). Pakistan, on the other hand, has embarked on a diplomatic offensive making the case against India’s majoritarian politics in Kashmir as detrimental not only to the Kashmiris but also to the strategic stability between the two rivals. This article reasons that India’s and Pakistan’s dominant zero-sum strategies—premised on winning while ensuring the other’s loss—are least likely to come to fruition. Given the present nature of ties, the way forward is for the two states to engage in a minimalist framework where mutual interests, as opposed to dominant positions, are put forth as a basis for engagement. Second, engagement more than agreement should be the short- to medium-term goal. Finally, any talk during this time on freezing the Kashmir conflict is least likely to bring any long-term dividends for peace and stability between the two regional adversaries.     

Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern East Asia

The East Asian “tribute system” from 1368 to 1841 comprised an enduring, stable, and hierarchic system, with China clearly the hegemon, in which cultural achievement was as important as economic or military prowess. Most significant is the recognition that the Chinese tributary order was in fact a viable and recognized international system with military, cultural, and economic dimensions that all intersected to create a very interesting and stable security system. Recently it has become fashionable in historical circles to question the viability of the tributary system in part because scholars have become increasingly aware of the realties behind Chinese rhetoric. However, more nuanced studies and new interpretations only serve to underscore the centrality of the system for its participants. This paper demonstrates that there is a hierarchical relationship—generated by a common culture defined by a Confucian worldview—in place in the context of China and the East Asian states and helps clarify the distinction between an international system based on polarity and an international society based on culture.     

Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War

While realism has recently been subjected to intense examination with regard to its theoretical coherence, liberalism—often thought to be the bookend to realism—has so far escaped such scrutiny. Liberalism is generally defined in one of two ways, each faulty. The first definition is in terms of the dependent variable as any argument that expects growing cooperation and progress in international affairs, understood as increased peace and prosperity, seizing for liberalism any independent variable found important for potentially promoting international cooperation. Second, liberalism is defined in terms of the units of analysis as any argument that disaggregates the state into smaller units. This equates liberalism with an entire level of analysis. This strategy of appropriation is inappropriate. Approaches to international relations need a core logic in order to justify the inclusion of particular independent variables or the use of a particular level of analysis. Since so many other paradigms also lay claim to those same entities, we are left wondering if anybody is not a liberal. Appropriation leads us to miss crucial distinctions between alternative explanations of the same outcomes, such as the “liberal” phenomena of the democratic peace and the transformative effects of international organizations.     

The EU,Russia and the Manichean Trap

Conceptualizing the EU as a postmodern cooperative power that “transcends realism” provides ideological scaffolding for an exclusive conception of “Europe” and veils a zero-sum geopolitical project as “European integration”. Neoclassical realism considers assigning morally opposite political identities to the EU and Russia to be “rational” to the extent it strengthens internal cohesion and mobilizes resources to enhance security in accordance with the balance of power logic. Yet, the artificial binary construction can also produce a Manichean Trap when compromises required to enhance security are depicted as a betrayal of indispensable virtues and “Europe”. The ability to harmonize competing security interests diminishes as the conceptual space for comparing the EU and Russia is de-constructed. Competition is framed in uncompromising terms as “European integration” versus Russian “spheres of influence” and democracy versus authoritarianism.     

Power,Patterns, and Process in European Union History

Sebastian Rosato's admirably provocative Europe United retells the origins of the European Union (EU) as a realist story of the balance of power. While he deserves praise for a bold attempt to extend offensive realism into history's greatest instance of international cooperation, the book ultimately reads as a cautionary methodological tale about how not to support a realist argument. Realist theory has been influential mainly because it offers strong expectations about major patterns in the world—relatively unitary decision-making within states and specific kinds of foreign policies between them—but Rosato's evidence focuses on a thin version of process. He selectively cites leaders' statements about their policy choices across the story, providing no leverage on how these statements related to patterned interests within or across countries. Interestingly, a similar error weakens work by the most salient IR scholar writing on EU history, Andrew Moravcsik. Their shared problems hint at a pattern of IR scholars overlooking patterns in historical evidence.     

Damned If You Do,Damned If You Don't: Performative Power and the Strategy of Conventional and Nuclear Defusing

This article seeks to initiate a new round of strategic intellectual innovation in an era when threats posed by non-state terrorist organizations and their state supporters do not resemble Cold War threats. Based on an interpretative sociological reading of the concepts of power, security, and rationality, it argues that a “damned if you do, damned if you don't” dilemma is to the post-Cold War era what the danger of surprise attack or unintended nuclear war was to the Cold War: the defining structural threat of international politics. The dilemma leaves states confronting asymmetrical warfare with the choice of reacting with force to a terrorist act or practicing appeasement. Neither approach, however, can achieve the goal of putting an end to terrorism. Deterrence sustains the dilemma by providing a rationale for why force should be used and why self-restraint is irrational. This article proposes a third option, defusing, which may be accomplished by denial (preventing provocateurs from dragging states into the use of force) and restructuration (transforming the structure and rules of the situation). Defusing relies on “performative power”—the capacity to project a dramatic and credible performance on the world stage and to decouple social actors, their audiences, and their most deeply held strategic beliefs. The force of the argument is illustrated by examples from the global “war on terror,” the 2006 Lebanon War, the 2008–09 operation “Cast Lead” in Gaza, and the Iranian nuclear crisis.     

India and the dialectics of domestic and international “land grabbing”: Historical perspectives,current debates,and the case of Ethiopia

International land “acquisition” or land “grabbing” has become a global phenomenon in which India plays an increasingly important role. While there is a critical domestic debate regarding land deals within India — especially pertaining to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 2014 — there is practically no such debate regarding international land deals by Indian companies in Sub-Saharan Africa. By applying a two-level discourse analysis, this article argues that the land discourse within India can be understood as a strategy of exclusion. By linking land issues with questions of “development,” the discursive strategies of powerful actors lead to the exclusion of the arguments of NGOs and others opposed to the land deals from the discourse within India. This strategy of exclusion is then taken to the extreme with the strategy of securitization outside India: land deals are linked to “food security,” as the example of Ethiopia highlights.     

State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State

Neorealist theory holds that the international system compels states to adopt similar adaptive strategies—namely, balancing and emulation—or risk elimination as independent entities. Yet states do not always emulate the successful practices of the system's leading states in a timely and uniform fashion. Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and unit-level variables: a “resource-extraction” model of the state in neoclassical realism. External vulnerability provides incentives for states to emulate the practices of the system's leading states or to counter such practices through innovation. Neoclassical realism, however, suggests that state power—the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society—shapes the types of internal balancing strategies that countries are likely to pursue. State power, in turn, is a function of the institutions of the state, as well as of nationalism and ideology. The experiences of six rising or declining great powers over the past three hundred years—China, France, Great Britain, Japan, Prussia (later Germany), and the United States—illustrate the plausibility of these hypotheses.     

Security and Power through Interdependence: On the Morality of Globalisation

Rising wealth—the progress from a “state of nature”—is contingent upon an ever wider division of labour. The web of mutual dependence and co-operation thus created has since long transgressed state borders. But as of late this global net of interdependence has become tightly woven. Being thus dependent on others seems at odds with the prime aim of national security, which is to preserve identity and full freedom of action. However, this definition of national security is no longer functional in this era of globalisation. Broad and useful interaction with others enhances national security; while isolation undermines it. There is a moral aspect to this: “identity” demands the “significant other”; and a diversified and wider identity thus calls for a wide interface with many such “others”. Wide interaction is also contingent on the participants being seen as trustworthy. It thus depends on—and creates—a culture of mutual responsibility.     

Vulnerable warriors: the atmospheric marketing of military and policing equipment before and after 9/11

In this article, we analyse changes in the circulation of advertisements of policing products at security expos between 1995 and 2013. While the initial aim of the research was to evidence shifts in terrorist frames in the marketing of policing equipment before and after 9/11, our findings instead suggested that what we are seeing is the rise of marketing to police as “vulnerable warriors”, law enforcement officers in need of military weapons both for their offensive capabilities and for the protection they can offer to a police force that is always under threat.     

Editor's note

This article examines the argument that the ability of a government to generate “audience costs”—to create a situation, that is, in which it would pay a domestic political price for backing down—plays a key role in determining how international crises run their course. It does this by looking at a dozen great power crises to see how well various aspects of the audience costs argument hold up in the light of the historical evidence. The audience costs mechanism, it turns out, does not play a major role in any of those crises—a conclusion which, the author claims, has certain important methodological implications.