The primacy of political security: contentious politics and insecurity in the Tunisian revolution

The removal of Ben Ali's regime in Tunisia signalled the start of the Arab Spring. The abrupt nature of the regime change raises questions about why it happened in the way it did. This article examines the contextual factors that precipitated the regime change through the lens of political security. The aim is to examine how political insecurity in society led to the emergence of opposition sufficiently organized to unseat Ben Ali. The paper develops a framework to consider how the loss of legitimacy by the regime opened the space for opposition. Attempts to restrict opposition failed to address underlying claims, leaving the way open for the opposition to unite following the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi.     

Authoritarian backsliding and the concentration of political power

This article introduces the concept of authoritarian backsliding as a class of strategies for the concentration of incumbent political power in hybrid regimes. Such actions include manipulating elections, violating civil liberties, creating an extremely uneven playing field for the opposition, and reducing the institutional constraints on executive power. While often falling short of a full regime change, backsliding can significantly alter the level of political competition in a country and reduce the quality of its political life. This article develops a theoretically-grounded strategy to identify and measure backsliding events since 1989, showing that they have been much more common than is typically appreciated. The article also shows the utility of the concept of backsliding for better understanding regime stability. Using cross-national analysis of backsliding events from 1989–2004, we find that threats such as opposition electoral gains or economic crises in resource-dependent regimes create incentives for authoritarian backsliding.     

Fragmenting states,new regimes: militarized state violence and transition in the Middle East

Scholars working in the transitology tradition assume that authoritarian breakdown leads to movement towards democratization after an initial period of uncertainty. If a transition falls short of democratization, there is an assumption that a return to authoritarian normalcy has transpired. Yet, whether one looks at Egypt, Libya, Syria, or Bahrain, the emergent trend is neither democratization, a return to the old authoritarian order, or a delayed transition. Rather, the weakening and fragmenting of regimes by popular mobilizations stimulated elites’ militarization of the state apparatus and unprecedented levels of state violence against ordinary citizens in a process of regime re-making.     

Cycles of war: Historical speculations on future international violence

The paper offers a historical approach to the problem of future international violence. It begins by arguing that the past can be used to predict the future. The modern European state system (since the fifteenth century) is designated both as an appropriate model and as the background to the present global state system. The history of the European state system reveals periods of war which are designated as probing (low level violence), adjusting (middle level violence) and hegemonic (high level violence); these periods appear to recur in cycles. The paper offers a number of explanations for these cycles and suggests that violence may be functional in the state system as a means of accomodating changes in power. The duration of these cycles may be interpreted as the time required for such power changes to occur. War would appear necessary in a state system which combines moderate change with moderate stability; it might be avoided only if the system were to move to the extremes of non‐change or continual change, the first risking stagnation, the second chaos. A projection of these cycles into the future implies that the last quarter of the twentieth century will be characterized by adjusting wars, followed by a generation of probing wars, then a generation of hegemonic wars, etc. Although mixed and difficult to evaluate, some signs may confirm this prediction. Thus the historical record may indicate that international violence is likely to increase in the last quarter of the twentieth century.     

Interpretations of political violence in ethnically divided societies

This article challenges traditional interpretations of political violence in Northern Ireland. Based on a series of ethnographic studies undertaken in republican and loyalist communities in Belfast, Northern Ireland, I argue that it is the question of state legitimacy, not materialism, culture or religion, that is core to understanding the underpinnings and history of political violence in Northern Ireland. Research findings suggest that communal support for and tolerance of paramilitary groups and their tactics are underpinned by security‐related concerns and a crisis of legitimacy which renders the state unable to claim a monopoly on the use of force. In contradistinction to counter‐insurgency theorists, I argue that the basis for paramilitarism is not created by fear of reprisal or intimidation. Rather, intra‐communal fears of identity loss and threats (both perceived and real) from the outgroup have created a space for republicanism and loyalism in both its political and paramilitary forms.     

Small wars in Marsabit County: devolution and political violence in northern Kenya

Abstract

When the elections of 2013 devolved budgetary and legislative powers to 47 counties in Kenya, there was nationwide relief when they passed off peacefully. The new county governments settled down to bargaining over local powers and appointments, delivering on their new institutional mandates, spending money and dealing with recentralisation manoeuvres. Now with the 2017 elections looming, the question has been raised, will there be violence? Based on qualitative interviews with citizens of the northern town of Marsabit shortly after the 2013 elections, this article presents citizens’ views on how devolution affected political competition, including how familiar repertoires of violence were used to influence not only the vote but also the construction of the new country government. To explain what concerned voters in the newly devolved county, the article explores the role played by colonially constituted ‘ethnicity’ in control of land and citizenship in the pastoralist north of Kenya and in the evolution of politics and the state after independence. It shows how the new configuration of power brought by devolution in 2013 has not yet resolved people’s feelings of deep insecurity over territorial tenure. It offers insight into the task faced by devolved institutions in relation to land, adding texture to current literature on the politics of devolution.     

Explaining violence after recent elections in Ethiopia and Kenya

A comparison of recent contested elections in Kenya and Ethiopia points to divergences in the forms of political violence. While both countries saw the use of excessive force by members of the security services, Kenya experienced more widespread and deadly inter-ethnic violence than Ethiopia. This article considers these two countries in light of competing explanations for inter-ethnic violence, and concludes that variation in the extent of constitutional reforms is critical in influencing citizens’ responses to close electoral contests. In Kenya, there has been a lack of meaningful constitutional and institutional reform since the introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s. By contrast, Ethiopia has seen extensive and substantive constitutional reform in a similar period, but without a negotiated pact among political elites. In both cases, electoral procedures have heightened the stakes of politics and therefore led to significant and escalating political violence, but in unforeseen ways. The important electoral issue of regionalism or devolution in both countries is also briefly considered here. The violence surrounding the elections raises concerns about how to sustain citizen engagement with elections and other democratization activities when these fail to meet voter expectations over several electoral cycles.     

Political Violence and Regime Change in Argentina: 1965-1976

Argentina, from 1965 to 1976, experienced three major changes of power, two of which were regime changes. What caused all the instability in such a short period of time? The tranquility of the early sixties was shattered by political violence. In 1965, there were fewer than ten incidents per month. By June 1976, before the last military coup, there were over 300 incidents per month. With historical and quantitative data, this analysis will show how political violence can undermine regime stability. Original data were generated to study the consequences of political violence during this period, based on Argentine news sources.     

Defensive development,combative contradictions: towards an international political sociology of global militarism in Africa

ABSTRACT

Drawing on international political sociology, this article shows how the merger of development and security has become part of the ideational architecture that facilitates a new ‘feel-good’ militarism in Africa. Contemporary international reform efforts are designed to restrain military power in the name of development, democracy and civilian oversight, but also to strengthen the coercive capacities of African security institutions and make them more efficient in the global fight against violent extremism. Such defensive development efforts have implications for the historically problematic relationship of the African state with modern forms of organised force, reconfiguring and recalibrating relations and dynamics between the state, military forces and external actors. The article concludes that defensive development is fraught with combative contradictions and risks becoming the handmaiden not only of increased militaristic violence, but also of oppression and the restriction of freedom and democracy.     

Was Idi Amin's Government a Terrorist Regime?

What does state terrorism look like? How do we distinguish it from other forms of mass state violence, such as repression or genocide? Based on the developing literature on state terrorism, this study presents three expectations that violence perpetrated by the state should meet if it is to be classified as state terrorism: these are (a) that the violence is perpetrated by agents of the state, (b) that the violence is visible, and (c) that state terrorism focused against a state's own citizens will be carried out by an autocratic, personalistic regime. Drawing substantially on a series of primary sources, this study demonstrates that Idi Amin's regime in Uganda from 1971 to 1979 did engage in state terrorism against its own citizens.     

是战略继承还是策略调整?——日本民主党政府东北亚安全政策述评

"战略是一个国家或政府对全局性、高层次的重大问题的筹划与指导"。[1]而政策则是"国家或政党为实现一定历史时期的路线而制定的行动准则。"[2]日本民主党上台执政后,面对东北亚地区不断变化的新的地区安全环境,对于一个没有执政经验的新政党来说,其采取的各项政策在战略层面上只能是原自民党政府的继承和延续,不会因新政党上台执政而发生战略性"急变"。2011年以后,东北亚地区形势因朝鲜半岛局势、中日关系摩擦加深以及日俄在解决领土问题上的新纠纷等等,而增加了不确定性,使民主党政府的东北亚安全政策面临着新难题和新挑战,也逼迫其在安全政策上作出新调整。但这些调整仅仅是根据新形势变化作出的政策对应,多属于"策略"层面。野田首相其人、性格及处事方式的圆滑,为日本走出东北亚地区安全"困局"多少会增加一些新变量。     

The transnational political engagements of refugees: Remittance sending practices amongst Somalis in Norway

This article aims to provide insight into the transnational political engagements of Somalis in Norway, and focuses mainly on their financial contributions. Such an aim is inspired by the increased interest in the transnational political engagements of diaspora groups, which has not yet been matched by sufficient empirical research on the topic. The Somali case is particularly interesting, considering the effective state collapse and ongoing civil war as well as the salience of local level security providing mechanisms. The first part of the article comprises an overview of different types of political transnational activities refugees engage in and the second part discusses the empirical study. Interestingly, though not surprisingly, the main political engagements of the Somali community in Norway do not take place through interaction with ‘the state’ or transitional state institutions; rather, they occur on a sub-national level, not only in the political domain but also through humanitarian initiatives.     

Politics and Threat Perception: Explaining Pakistani Military Strategy on the North West Frontier

Abstract

Analysts and policymakers agree that the Pakistani military has engaged in selective repression of and collusion with armed groups. Yet beyond this general observation, fine-grained theory and evidence do not exist to systematically explain patterns of military strategy across groups and over time. This paper provides a theoretical framework for explaining regime perceptions of armed groups and the strategies state security managers pursue toward different types of groups. It then probes this framework using a combination of new medium-N data on military offensives, peace deals, and state–group alliances in Pakistan’s North West and four comparative case studies from North and South Waziristan. We argue that the Pakistani military—the key state institution in this context—has assigned armed groups to different political roles reflecting both their ideological affinity with the military and the operational benefits they can provide to the army. This mixture of instrumental and ideological motivations has created a complex blend of regime threat perceptions and state–group interactions across space and time. A clearer understanding of how the military views Pakistan’s armed political landscape can inform policy debates about the nature of Pakistani counterinsurgency, as well as broader theoretical debates about order and violence.     

Democratization and War in Political Science

This article explores what political science literature has to say about the promises and perils of expanding democratic governance. International relations literature and comparative politics literature both deal with the claim that stable democracies do not fight each other. However, these two strands of literature only to a minor extent exchange research findings on the causes of war. International relations scholars are well aware of the fact that the early stages of democratization in particular may trigger conflict, and they explain that they are referring to the size of a country's power and the distribution of capabilities among the major powers, among other factors. In contrast, comparativists focus on the opening of domestic political space. In a transitional state, open political space fosters elite competition, which cannot be regulated by weak political institutions and therefore may cause civil war. They are less aware of the fact that these internal dynamics may even enhance the risk of political violence beyond territorial borders. Both of these approaches must be used to focus on the consequences of democratization on a regional scale. In ‘bad neighbourhoods’, including the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Great Lakes in Africa, democratization can trigger conflict beyond state frontiers by altering the incentives and opportunities of political actors.     

Violent Monks in Myanmar: Scapegoating and the Contest for Power

This article seeks to understand why monks played a central role in anti-Muslim violence in transitional Myanmar (2013–2014). We argue that scapegoating is one of many strategies used by monks to gain visibility, to strengthen their autonomous networks, and to increase their social credentials. By analyzing two episodes of monks' participation in religious violence (1930s and 2013–2014), we identify two factors that make scapegoating strategies more likely: (a) decentralized religions foster a multiplicity of organizations and provide incentives for leaders to be entrepreneurial and compete for followers; while (b) the rapid pluralization of the public sphere explains the timing, because it intensifies competition among religious leaders and between religious and secular leaders for social ascendency and power.     

Globalisation,Transnational Political Mobilisation,and Networks of Violence

This article examines how globalisation processes provide new incentives and opportunities for non-state political entrepreneurs to build transnational political movements. Drawing on the literatures on non-violent social movements and transnational networks, the article examines terrorism and political violence as components of the ‘repertoires of contention’ used by radical transnational groups seeking political change. Examples from both the pre- and post-9/11 periods are provided, and the implications for traditional models of state security are discussed. The article concludes by contending that the combination of increased levels of globalisation and the emergence of new networks of violence is creating a fundamental shift in the international security environment, in which the distinction between internal and external security threats is increasingly blurred. While state security strategies are reflecting these changes, less attention has been paid to the political implications of these changes. New security responses need to also be matched by new sets of political strategies at the global level.     

Reassessing the focus of transitional justice: the need to move structural and cultural violence to the centre

After over six decades of evolution, transitional justice remains focused on courts and commissions, evidenced by the allocation of international attention and resources. This is understandable given that courts and commissions are ideal platforms to hold perpetrators to account. While violent individuals and events can be addressed through courts and commission, what cannot be adequately addressed is the structural and cultural violence that makes mass atrocities possible, and remains intact in spite of truth and accountability. Structural and cultural violence manifests as systemic vulnerability and dehumanization, and it is this type of built-in violence that continues to plague countries where transitional justice has been pursued, for example the criminalization and repression of communities in South Africa, or the forced evictions that occur daily throughout Cambodia. This article argues that it is this type of violence which should become the central focus of transitional justice.     

Securitisation from below: the relationship between immigration and foreign policy in South Africa's approach to the Zimbabwe crisis

The political and economic debacle in Zimbabwe has led to a large-scale influx of Zimbabweans into neighbouring South Africa. This article argues that there is a complex and significant link between the domestic response to this immigration influx and South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. South Africa's foreign and security policy elite preferred to use an immigration approach of benign neglect as a tool to promote its ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach towards the Zimbabwean regime, treating the influx as a ‘non-problem’. But increased xenophobic violence, vigilantism and protests in townships and informal settlements against Zimbabwean and other African immigrants, culminating in widespread riots across the country in 2008, contributed to a change not only in immigration policy but also in the mediation efforts towards the Zimbabwean parties. I argue that this foreign policy change was pushed by a process of ‘securitisation from below’, where the understanding of Zimbabwean immigrants as a security threat were promoted not by traditional security elites but by South Africa's marginalised urban poor.     

Breaking the cycle of violence: applying conflict sensitivity to transitional justice

The legacies of mass violence can, if left unaddressed, fuel future conflicts. Transitional justice seeks to address the legacies of large-scale past abuses. Despite the sensitive nature of transitional justice and recognition that initiatives can adversely influence conflict-affected contexts, there has been limited attempt to extend the application of conflict sensitivity to transitional justice. Conflict sensitivity is an approach and tool to help aid actors to understand the unintended consequences of aid and to act to minimise harm and achieve positive outcomes. Transitional justice initiatives can exacerbate tensions by replicating existing tensions; introducing resources that become a struggle for control; or challenging power and vested interests. This article argues that conflict sensitivity should be applied to transitional justice; and identifies tools and factors that could contribute to conflict sensitive transitional justice. They include promoting: broad-based participation; resonance with local actors; social cohesion; public outreach; collaboration with other sectors; and appropriate sequencing.     

Adapting violence for state survival and legitimacy: the resilience and dynamism of political repression in a democratizing South Korea*

Capacity in violence and its utilization is generally understood to be a first-order condition of the state-building process. As capacity increases and a state gains supremacy over would-be competitors, the use of violence by the state is hypothesized to decline, especially in polities that have made the democratic transition. However, we here demonstrate theoretically and empirically that the conventional wisdom is inadequate. We argue that political violence ubiquitously evolves according to the changing socio-political environment and varying tasks of the state.

Using the case of South Korea, a high-capacity, consolidated democracy, as a prism for theory building and corroboration, this study chronicles the evolution of political violence from the state’s explicit mobilization of thugs to suppress opposition at the early stage of state building through its collaboration with criminal organizations for developmental projects to the manipulation of quasi-governmental organizations after democratization in the late 1980s, coeval with the traditional use of public sources of force. We specifically look at how political development, that is, democratization, has produced new demands for – and constraints on – political violence and how post-authoritarian governments have responded.