北约环境安全战略的历史与特点

当前,随着生态问题、气候问题等环境安全议题的重要性日益凸显,环境问题政治化、安全化的趋势日益加强,北约在改善生态环境、维护环境安全方面采取的战略、政策及付诸实施的各种具体努力愈来愈多,影响也愈来愈大.     

欧洲安全战略的政策史透析

2003年出台的欧洲安全战略不仅仅是基于冷战后欧洲新的安全环境的现实背景,它更是欧洲一体化进程中欧盟政策(特别是共同外交与安全政策)及其政策资源在长期量的积累基础上引发的适时质变的产物.它延续了欧盟共同外交与安全政策的政策内涵,又在欧盟政策的程序性框架下得以成型,同时,"9·11"事件以后的政策环境又为其出台营造了独特的政治氛围,因此,透析欧洲安全战略的政策发展脉络对于把握和理解该战略的内在意涵有着重要意义.     

Intelligence and Grand Strategy

Elegant strategies can be constructed without reference to intelligence but persuading policymakers to implement them without knowing what intelligence might have to say about their likely efficacy and unintended consequences would be exceedingly difficult. Intelligence-derived information and insights should not dictate the goals of grand strategy, but they should inform decisions about what to do, how to do it, and what to look for in order to assess how well or badly the strategy is working.     

国家大战略:目标与途径

国家大战略的构成要素主要有战略目标、战略实力和战略途径。关于战略实力,中国学术界论述较多,而对于战略目标和战略途径涉及较少。本文首先对战略目的、战略目标和战略任务三个概念进行了区分。在此基础上,作者对大战略的目标进行了确定,认为应该是防止外部威胁、控制外部威胁和化解外部威胁,并提出了实现战略目标的几种途径。     

国家大战略:概念与原则

本文主要对大战略的概念进行了廓清。认为大战略不同于国家战略和国家安全战略。战略是讲求原则的,认为大战略的原则主要有四条。指出大战略重视间接战略,实施大战略首选的是间接战略。     

Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations

Grand or national strategy has emerged as a critical issue in security studies. Adam Garfinkle recently opined that American grand strategy has died a silent death. Too much attention has been devoted to definitions, or debates over the utility of strategy. Not enough consideration has been given to the complexities of actually building a robust strategy amidst that effectively integrates all elements of national power within a complex bureaucracy. Oddly, the exclusion of politics contradicts our understanding of war and conflict. Likewise, not enough attention has been applied to the fundamental components of building a competitive strategy that can be sustained over time. This essay offers an introductory discussion of the basic considerations or components of national strategy.     

Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy

The George W. Bush administration embraced a particularly aggressive counter-terrorist and counter-proliferation strategy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The “Bush Doctrine,” as it became known, reflects a “primacist” approach to grand strategy that aims not only to eliminate global terrorist networks and cowl rogue state proliferators, but also to dissuade potential near-peer competitors from challenging the American-centred international system. Critics expect that this ambitious approach to strategic affairs has become unsustainable in the face of the growing quagmire in Iraq. But “security addiction” in the post-9/11 environment has instead created conditions for a bipartisan consensus on the overall direction, if not the particular modalities, of “primacist” grand strategies. Despite the unpopularity of the Bush administration and significant American commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is highly unlikely that President Barack Obama will heed calls for military retrenchment or strategic restraint.     

国家大战略理论与中国的大战略实践

经过两战之间时期里的理论生成铺垫 ,国家大战略作为一个单独和自觉的理论领域到 2 0世纪五六十年代明确出现 ,90年代开始扩散和发展。然而 ,予以重要补充、拓展和深化仍然必要 ,而尚存问题分布于大战略目的、目的与手段之间关系、手段及其资源基础、决策机制和体制这四大方面。国家大战略理论可以成为一种基本框架和有力工具 ,用于考察、构思、论证和表述中国远期和近期的对外大战略主要内容 ,及其较具体的中国对外战略和政策的各主要分支性课题。     

大战略调整背景下的战略不确定性——特朗普对朝政策与半岛安全形势演进

特朗普就任以来,在朝核问题上以极限施压与接触取代奥巴马的战略忍耐,对朝政策出现重大调整。在过去近两年时间里,美国分阶段、有重点、同时亦极其灵活地运用军事威胁、经济施压、言语挑衅和外交劝服等多重手段,推动了半岛安全形势的新发展。特朗普对朝政策调整,无论是直接发出战争威胁,或是与朝鲜领导人的历史性会晤,均源自一种简单化思维,体现出对所谓战略不确定性的极度运用,可以看作是美国应对大国竞争战略的组成部分,存在战略遏阻中国的考虑。极限施压与接触战略并不足以决定性改变朝核问题的实质,更勿论破除半岛安全的根本症结。半岛形势很可能再次回到外交角力与多方博弈、周期性的紧张和缓和循环当中。中国需在深入分析把握美国对朝、半岛和对华政策逻辑、实质的基础上,进一步清晰中国相关政策的优先次序及时间和空间节点,助力实现半岛形势的总体战略稳定。     

Grand Strategy after the Vietnam War

The perceived history of the Vietnam War profoundly influenced American discussions on grand strategy during the postwar period. The two largest schools of thought, one favoring confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other favoring engagement, drew lessons from the war based upon differing historical interpretations and used those lessons as support beams in constructing grand strategy. Compelling world events during the Carter presidency caused only a few individuals to shift positions in the debate, but one of those individuals was Jimmy Carter himself. Subsequent discoveries by historians indicate that the confrontation school understood the war's history and the postwar world better than did the engagement school and consequently crafted a superior grand strategy. The post-Vietnam debate contains numerous parallels to present-day discussions of grand strategy and offers a variety of lessons salient to contemporary strategic formulation.     

Grand Strategy for the Next Administration

With the current administration's attention, resources and reputation so tied to Iraq, the prospect for significant changes in American foreign policy are limited in George W. Bush's remaining months in office. A new administration coming into power in January 2009, however, gives the United States a chance to revisit the changes to American foreign policy implemented after 9/11, as well as to consider any needed course corrections. The opportunity such changes in administration offers is a major strength of the American political system. Clearly, now is the time to start thinking about such issues.     

On Strategy,Grand and Mundane

Is “grand strategy” a useful concept? What is it, and how is it different from “strategy”? Some definitions of grand strategy—as an all-encompassing idea for coordinating the resources of an entire nation to achieve its ultimate goals—are unachievable, overly focused on strategy as a master concept, could unintentionally militarize domestic policy, and blur the lines between strategy and policy. The concept is salvageable. Grand strategy is best thought of as both the intellectual framework or master concept that ties together whole-of-government (but not whole-of-nation) planning, and the long-term pattern of behavior that reveals states’ behaviors and priorities in action.     

Reviving the Rhetoric of Realism: Politics and Responsibility in Grand Strategy

In both disciplinary history and contemporary methodology, realism is conventionally cast as the antithesis of rhetoric. Born in reaction against the empty liberal rhetoric of interwar liberalism and espousing a robust materialism and rigorous rationalism, realism often seems the obstacle that rhetoric's focus on language, narrative, and social construction must inevitably confront and the challenge around which debates must again inevitably revolve. This article challenges this vision of the relationship between rhetoric and realism. Returning to the birth of international relations in the immediate post-war era, we demonstrate that early realists perceived rhetoric as central to action in domestic as well as international politics and that it was particularly important in the United States. This realist rhetoric is marked by an engagement with grand politics, with the relationship between rhetoric, political identity, social mobilization, political leadership, and foreign policy. Rather than taking either the American state or its national interest for granted, post-war realists sought to counter the dangers of the dominant historical rhetorics of American foreign policy and to develop an alternative rhetoric that could insulate American democracy from destructive tensions and provide the basis for robust and responsible action in world affairs. Recovering the relationship between realism and rhetoric is important not only in challenging disciplinary and methodological orthodoxies that obstruct creative theorizing, but also for its incisive contributions to thinking about American foreign policy amidst the profound changes and challenges it confronts today.     

结构理论、地理政治与大战略

本文认为,当今大战略研究长期以来一直都深受结构理论的重大影响,这种影响主要体现在当今大战略研究一般都是以国际体系中的权力分布作为主要的自变量,尽管在具体研究中技术因素和地理因素都可以作为干扰性变量,但这些变量并不影响到结构理论的内在逻辑.本文指出,以结构理论为基础的当代大战略研究的主要弊病在于,忽视了技术因素与地理因素的相互作用对大战略运行环境的潜在含义,而对此种相互作用的探讨可在很大程度上向人们提示以其作为主要考察对象的地理政治视角对大战略研究具有的重要意义.     

Rhetoric,Legitimation, and Grand Strategy

This introductory framing paper theorizes the role of legitimation—the public justification of policy—in the making of grand strategy. We contend that the process of legitimation has significant and independent effects on grand strategy's constituent elements and on how grand strategy is formulated and executed. Legitimation is integral to how states define the national interest and identify threats, to how the menu of policy options is constituted, and to how audiences are mobilized. Second, we acknowledge that legitimation matters more at some times than others, and we develop a model specifying the conditions under which it affects political processes and outcomes. We argue that the impact of legitimation depends on the government's need for mobilization and a policy's visibility, and from the intersection of these two factors we derive five concrete hypotheses regarding when legitimation is most likely to have an impact on strategy. Finally, we explore who wins: why legitimation efforts sometimes succeed in securing public assent, yet at other times fall short. Our framework emphasizes what is said (the content of legitimation), how it is said (technique), and the context in which it is said. We conclude by introducing the papers in this special issue, revisiting the larger theoretical stakes involved in studying rhetoric and foreign policy, and speculating about how changes in the technologies and sites of communication have, or have not, transformed legitimation and leadership in world politics.     

Roosevelt, Truman and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy

After its victory in World War II, it was clear that United States should move beyond the disastrous policies of the 1930s, but it was less clear how. Ultimately, a lasting postwar strategy was forged under President Truman. Appreciating how Truman moved well beyond Roosevelt's guiding assumptions is essential to understanding the evolution of American grand strategy. One sees that wartime planning and grand strategy formulation can prove quite inadequate for dealing with postwar challenges. An administration cannot be locked into assumptions, but must constantly test them. Thus, the Truman administration eventually developed and adopted containment and moved far beyond FDR's approach. More substantively, the fundamental geopolitical lesson of World War II and the early Cold War was that the United States must assume the essential balancing role relative to other major powers.     

Grand Strategy of ‘Restrainment’

With the end of the Cold War, the subsequent global war on terror, the global economic recession, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, one would think that the United States would have formulated a grand strategy for dealing with these problems. This, however, is not the case. This article advances a grand strategy of “restrainment,” as a guiding concept for our approach to international politics. It builds from the principle that U.S. policy must seek to restrain—individually and collectively—those forces, ideas, and movements in international politics that create instability, crises, and war.     

伊拉克战争与美国的大战略失误

美国发动对伊战争有着长远的战略考虑,但伊拉克战争本身在目标和手段上都无助于实现或推进美国在“9.11”事件后所确立的大战略目标。美国在伊拉克战争期间的大战略失误,突出地表现为大战略目标与单个军事行动目标之间的模糊和抵触,大战略目标与手段之间严重失衡。长远地看,如果美国偏重于单边主义和军事力量,其巩固“单极”世界的图谋会遇到更大的国际障碍。     

China's Power and Will: The PRC's Military Strength and Grand Strategy

China's international behavior exhibits elements of both threat and peaceful intentions. Greatly increased defense budgets, the acquisition for more advance weapons systems, and certain pronouncements of the leadership argue for the threat scenario. Beijing's efforts to enhance the PRC's soft power, its more active participation in international problem-solving activities, and certain pronouncements of other leaders can be taken as evidence for more peaceful intentions. Even assuming that the leadership's motives are not benign, a combination of domestic weaknesses and foreign resistance could thwart them. The future is not predictable.