Outsourcing Public Service Delivery: Management Responses in Noncompetitive Markets

Capturing the benefits of competition is a key argument for outsourcing public services, yet public service markets often lack sufficient competition. The authors use survey and interview data from U.S. local governments to explore the responses of public managers to noncompetitive markets. This research indicates that competition is weak in most local government markets (fewer than two alternative providers on average across 67 services measured), and that the relationship between competition and contracting choice varies by service type. Public managers respond to suboptimal market competition by intervening with strategies designed to create, sustain, and enhance provider markets. In monopoly service markets, managers are more likely to use intergovernmental contracting, while for‐profit contracting is more common in more competitive service markets. The strategies that public managers employ to build and sustain competition for contracts often require tangible investments of administrative resources that add to the transaction costs of contracting in noncompetitive markets.     

Managing Markets for Public Service: The Role of Mixed Public–Private Delivery of City Services

The privatization experience of U.S. municipalities shows declining use of complete contracts and a dramatic rise in mixed public–private delivery (joint contracting) of city services. The analysis here shows that city managers have recognized the need to move beyond a simple dichotomy between market delivery and public planning to an approach that balances concerns with efficiency, market management, and citizen satisfaction. The New Public Management stresses the importance of competition and efficiency, transaction costs economics emphasizes the challenges of contract management, and New Public Service assigns primary concern to citizen engagement. Nonetheless, city managers see the need to balance all three. The analysis shows the evolution of a middle position where city managers integrate markets with public delivery and give greater attention to citizen satisfaction in the service delivery process.     

Contracting for management: Assessing management capacity under alternative service delivery arrangements

Contracting critics suggest that when governments outsource, they reduce their capacity to produce services and manage service delivery. In this paper, we decompose the service delivery decision into service production and service management components. When governments contract for service production, they may also choose to contract for a portion of service delivery management. Studies that only compare the management activities of contracting and direct service delivery governments, without examining the management activities contracted to vendors, are likely to be incomplete and biased. Drawing on a unique survey of governmental refuse collection service directors, matched with a survey of refuse collection vendors operating under municipal contracts, we show that the vendors' management activities offset the decline in management capacity that occurs when governments contract for service delivery for this particular service. Governments can “buy” management activities when contracting for service production. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Moving Toward Mixed Service Delivery: The Growth in Schools Run by Non-Governmental Providers in Ten Cities

ABSTRACT

The delivery of public services by a mix of government and non-governmental organizations can offer many public policy benefits. When direct governmental provision has predominated, however, achieving these benefits requires building the supply of non-governmental service providers, which requires understanding how to improve their availability and quality. Integrating the literature on contracting and mixed delivery, this article specifies three categories of supply-building tactics: creating markets, buying smart, and managing markets. We then report on 10 cities that have nurtured the supply of schools run by non-governmental organizations. We find that cities’ supply-building efforts fall along a continuum from passive to active, and they employ some types of tactics (creating markets, buying smart) more than others (managing markets). Differential changes in market share across the cities we studied suggest a relationship between supply-building activities and movement from exclusive governmental provision toward the mixed delivery of schools. These findings suggest hypotheses for future research on governmental efforts to build the supply and capabilities of non-governmental service providers in order to pursue mixed service delivery.     

Government-to-Government Contracting: Stewardship,Agency, and Substitution

ABSTRACT

This paper provides empirical evidence detailing the distinctive nature of service delivery provided through contracts with other governments. The results of a survey of Ohio city and county managers both confirm and stand in contrast to implications derived from stewardship theory. Consistent with stewardship, our data demonstrate that contracts with public sector service partners generate less intensive monitoring by contracting governments than do services contracted with private entities. In contrast to stewardship theory, we find that contracting governments do not use other governments for services requiring intensive monitoring. In an era of accountability and results-oriented management, reliance on trust may not satisfy constituents who seek evidence of effective service delivery. The inability of the contracting government to affect another government's service delivery reduces the attractiveness of that government as a contracting partner. If the tools of stewardship prove to be inadequate, the imposition of carrots and sticks appropriate for a principal-agent relationship could undermine the trust central to stewardship. Given these tensions, it is not surprising that governments are contracting less with other governments.     

Citizens' Blame of Politicians for Public Service Failure: Experimental Evidence about Blame Reduction through Delegation and Contracting

Theories of blame suggest that contracting out public service delivery reduces citizens’ blame of politicians for service failure. The authors use an online experiment with 1,000 citizen participants to estimate the effects of information cues summarizing service delivery arrangements on citizens’ blame of English local government politicians for poor street maintenance. Participants were randomized to one of four cues: no information about service delivery arrangements, politicians’ involvement in managing delivery, delegation to a unit inside government managing delivery, and delegation through a contract with a private firm managing delivery. The politicians managing delivery cue raises blame compared to citizens having no information. However, the contract with a private firm cue does not reduce blame compared to either no information or the politicians managing delivery cue. Instead, the delegation to a unit inside government cue reduces blame compared to politicians managing delivery, suggesting that delegation to public managers, not contracting, reduces blame in this context.     

Managing Public Service Contracts: Aligning Values, Institutions, and Markets

The contracting of public services has been an integral part of public managers’ work for a long time, and it is here to stay. This essay sums up current research on the topic for busy practitioners and scholars. Where are we today with respect to the problems and pitfalls of contracting out, from balancing equity with efficiency to confronting the frequent problem of imperfect markets?     

Reassessing Privatization Strategies 25 Years Later: Revisiting Perry and Babitsky's Comparative Performance Study of Urban Bus Transit Services

Privatization appeals to citizen and politician desires for more cost-effective methods of service delivery. For this reason, it is important for public administrators to know when gains can be made by contracting out or privatizing services and when it is better to keep service provision in house. This article assesses the viability of contracting out and privatization of transit services. Following up on the 1986 work of James Perry and Timlynn Babitsky, which used data from the early 1980s, the authors revisit whether certain service delivery arrangements are more efficient and effective than others in the provision of transit services. Twenty-five years later, they find results similar to those of Perry and Babitsky's original study. Neither the type of government nor whether an agency contracts out has much impact on the efficiency and performance of urban bus services. The main difference between the two studies is that private transit agencies are no longer more efficient or effective than public providers.     

Is There a Future for Contracting in the Australian Public Sector?

Contracting has moved from the margins to the centre of public management. Significant sections of the public workforce, from benefits delivery to corporate services, now find their functions open to tender. Governments prefer to concentrate on policy analysis and development, leaving service delivery to the market. As purchasers rather than providers, governments are redefining the role and scope of the state. But are Australian governments ready for this shift to contracting? Do they possess the full array of control and reporting mechanisms necessary if contracting is to deliver its promised benefits? There are significant difficulties finding evidence that answers such questions. Yet on the basis of concerns discussed across Australian jurisdictions, it appears contracting has developed so quickly it outstrips the capacity of government to monitor what is happening, and so learn from mistakes. In time governments will become better at maintaining accountability for contracted functions, because experience reduces the risks of moral hazard.     

Transformational Leadership and Public Service Motivation: Driving Individual and Organizational Performance

Despite growing evidence about prosocial motivations and their effects on employee behavior, how can new public service motivation research translate into more effective management practices—which, so far, regrettably remain underdeveloped? Increasingly, public service motivation studies have moved from understanding what motivates public servants to exploring how public service motives influence performance. Similarly, greater attention is now paid to the practices of transformational leadership. Drawing on concepts from transformational leadership, this essay explores how managers can harness the positive aspects of public service motivation to enhance employee and organizational performance and outlines strategies that can help managers incorporate public service motivation values across management systems.     

Extending urban services in developing countries: Policy options and organizational choices

Governments in developing countries will face serious problems in extending basic social services, public facilities and infrastructure for their rapidly growing urban populations during the next decade. The steadily increasing concentration of the poor in cities will exacerbate already severe strains on urban services. Innovative solutions will be needed to meet the growing demands for urban services. In addition to expanding national and municipal efforts, governments in developing countries must also explore alternative policies and organizational arrangements for meeting the basic needs of their urban population. Among the potential alternatives are: using market surrogates to improve service delivery; lowering the costs of service provision through changes in regulations and controls on urban development; actively supporting self-help and service upgrading schemes by the poor; promoting public-private co-operation and private sector participation in service delivery; increasing effective demand for services by promoting employment and higher incomes; and enacting and implementing policies that attempt to redistribute migration to small and intermediate-sized cities. Each alternative has advantages and limitations that planners and policy-makers must take into consideration in forging effective urban development strategies.     

新农村建设中政府公共服务能力的限制因素及其对策

社会主义新农村建设是一个系统工程,仅靠市场机制的自发调节是无法完成的。政府必须承担起相应的责任,然而,政府责任不在于直接参与市场竞争,而在于提供公共服务。政府公共服务能力直接影响一个国家公共服务的总体水平。因此,政府必须强化农村公共服务职能,提升公共服务能力,提高公共服务水平。     

US state government privatization: Implications for social equity and inequality?

Privatization of state government services is commonplace, but our understanding of its effects is limited by data availability. We study the relationship between American state government contracting and public sector wages. Governments have used public sector employment to support a variety of goals, including social equity and economic development, but privatization, as a new public management (NPM) reform, may shift the focus. Our empirical analysis shows that state privatization of service delivery is associated with decreases in the public sector wage premium, but that these effects are not driven by gender, race, or low-levels of educational attainment. The fidelity of the implementation to NPM values conditions these effects. We also find that contracting service delivery is associated with a lower public sector wage premium for middle-class workers.     

Rediscovering Implementation: Public Sector Contracting and Human Services

There is vast literature on how to implement public policies, with endless case studies emphasising a few key lessons. The drive to contracting in the public sector raises familiar threats to coherent program implementation, and adds those of control and incentives. Contracting fragments program responsibility among multiple contractors, and separates policy agencies from service delivery contractors. It raises questions about political control and accountability, and the prospect of gaps between intention and outcome. This paper 'rediscovers implementation' by reviewing the practical difficulties of constructing public-private relationships which can deliver quality human services. After considering broad arguments about the efficacy of contracting, the paper turns to the provision of human services by examining the contracting out of welfare services and the Job Network. Our argument is modest: that public sector contracting fails if the challenges of implementation are not addressed explicitly, since service delivery through the private sector can falter for exactly the same reasons as traditional public bureaucracies.     

Reconstructing Citizens as Consumers: Implications for New Modes of Governance

This article examines the relationship between government and the public within a producer–consumer market exchange. Four conceptual problems are identified in relation to the application of market models to the relationship between government and citizen. These types of models fail to account for the essentially political engagement between government and citizens, the collective responsibilities of government, the absence of markets in many areas of government service delivery and the complexity of relations between government and citizens.     

How Best‐Practice Public Administration is Quietly Transforming Victoria

Drawing on interviews with nine Victorian Fellows of the Institute of Public Administration Australia, this article documents examples of successful public sector reforms in Victoria. Examples include the following: a reduction in road fatalities, a reduction in household water consumption, securing Melbourne's liveability despite significant population growth, service and infrastructure delivery, and improved collaboration aimed at addressing family violence and emergency management. The interviews also pointed to promising early commissioning work, designing and creating new markets. Bipartisan support was common to most of the examples, which involve both market and non‐market approaches. The reforms documented in this article make it clear that public servants are contributing to making Victoria a better place.     

Complex Contracting: Management Challenges and Solutions

Governments at all levels buy mission‐critical goods and services whose attributes and performance requirements are hard to define and produce. Many governments—and the public managers who lead them—lack experience and knowledge about how to contract for complex products. The contract management counsel provided to public managers is thin. Missing is a conceptual managerial framework to guide purchasing the complex products that are often so critical to public organizations' core missions. Drawing on perspectives from across the social sciences, the framework presented in this article provides guidance on how managers can harness the upsides of complex contracting while avoiding its pitfalls. The framework helps identify conditions that increase the likelihood of positive outcomes for the purchasing government and the vendor—the win‐win. To illustrate the framework, the article provides examples of successful and failed acquisitions for complex products such as transportation projects, social service systems, and information technology systems.     

Core Concepts and Key Ideas for Understanding Public Sector Organizational Networks: Using Research to Inform Scholarship and Practice

This article provides an overview of the key research findings and core concepts on the topic of organizational networks. The primary focus is on goal‐directed “whole” service delivery networks, which are prevalent in the public and nonprofit sectors. The findings and ideas presented are especially salient for helping public managers build, maintain, operate, and govern multiorganizational networks in ways that will enhance their effectiveness. Because research and theory on networks extend well beyond the boundaries of public management and administration, the authors draw on thinking from a number of fields, providing a broad understanding of public networks and network functioning. The article is intended to provide usable information on networks for both practitioners and students, as well as to suggest directions for future research for the many public management scholars who now study organizational networks.     

Parkinson's Law and the New Public Management? Contracting Determinants and Service‐Quality Consequences in Public Education

Why is contracting used more frequently under some circumstances than others? What is its impact on spending for core mission and on service quality? These questions are explored with data from more than 1,000 Texas school districts. The evidence for a recent three‐year period shows that contracting is negatively related to spending on school districts' central task and is not positively associated with district performance. Why, then, do districts contract? While several variables are associated with the degree of contracting, the most interesting is the relative size of a district's bureaucratic staff. Furthermore, the relationship between contracting and bureaucracy is reciprocal: Each is associated with subsequent growth in the other. The dynamic suggests an updated version of Parkinson's law. These findings indicate the need for researchers to probe the causes and consequences of contracting more thoroughly to help public managers assess this important option.     

Principles for Public Management Practice: From Dichotomies to Interdependence

In this essay we explore the relationship between management practices and a basic governance dilemma: how to manage flexibly and accountably. The challenge is both practical and theoretical. Managers must respond flexibly to the changing demands and expectations of the public and the ever-changing nature of public problems, yet they must do so in a manner that provides accountability to the public and political overseers. A dichotomous approach to the study of leadership as management action and the governance structures within which managers operate has inhibited the search for a public management theory that reconciles the dilemma. Emphasis upon managers as leaders typically focuses on the flexible actions managers might take to overcome structural "barriers," while emphasis upon governance structures typically focuses on the essential role of structure in ensuring accountability and restraining or motivating particular management efforts. The practicing manager, however, cannot deal with these aspects of the work separately. Managers must attend to demands for both flexible leadership action and structures that promise accountability. Anecdotal evidence provides illustrations of some of the ways that managers can integrate these demands. We suggest that these efforts point to an alternative theoretical framework that understands action and structure as mutually constitutive, creating a dynamic tension in which attention to one requires attention to the other.