The contract theory of patents

Two distinct theories of patents, the “reward theory” and the “contract theory,” are customarily adopted by the courts to justify the patent system. The reward theory maintains that the function of the patent system is to remunerate successful innovators so as to encourage R&D effort. In contrast, the contract theory holds that the function of the patent system is to promote the diffusion of innovative knowledge. Assuming that in the absence of patent protection innovators would rely on trade secrecy, it views patents as a contract between innovators and society whereby a property right is granted in exchange for disclosure.This paper develops an economic analysis of the contract theory of patents. To disentangle the disclosure from the reward motive for granting patents, we assume that the innovation process is entirely serendipitous, so that R&D effort is not a concern. Our main finding is that the disclosure motive alone suffices to justify the grant of patents. The optimal patent duration should strike a balance between the incentive to induce disclosure and the aim of limiting the monopoly distortion induced by patents.     

The political morality of convergence in contract

One of the most interesting recent developments in contract law has been an academic and political effort to integrate private law. The proposed Common European Sales Law was ultimately withdrawn, and a series of setbacks, including the British referendum to exit the EU, has recast the politics of convergence. But it remains an objective for many European scholars. This essay considers the wisdom of convergence on a single law of transactions from the perspective of philosophical contract theory. The essay proceeds by disaggregating the rights at stake in contract law. It characterises the formal right to contract and describes its moral impetus as one that should underwrite contract law in all states, especially liberal states. But the essay argues that the legitimate contours of the formal right are contingent on tenets of political culture that vary across Member States. Similarly, substantive regulation of contract is morally compulsory and serves universal interests; the essay takes regulation of permissible work and remuneration for work as examples. But the rules and standards that best advance those moral interests depend on economic facts specific to individual political communities. The essay concludes by arguing that contract law is a poor tool by which to accelerate political and economic convergence.     

The risks of contract law

The economic analysis of law may be able to provide some reason why it is efficient to enforce wholly executory contracts, but (I submit) it has not done so.     

The limits of contract law harmonization

Contract law harmonization in the European Union has met with some significant but limited success. This Essay explores some of the psychological and political forces that can complicate or even hinder law reform efforts. Even when there is a general institutional drive for law reform, as there is in the EU, scarce reform resources force attention to be focused on salient issues, while a status quo bias in individual member states by government officials can provide a braking inertia regarding nonsalient legal reforms. This braking influence can be seized upon and enhanced by interest groups that oppose reforms, especially where there is an alternative to proposed law reforms for private entities. In the case of contract law harmonization, contract doctrine that is not focused on providing consumer protections remain nonsalient, commercial entities can solve the confusion of diverse laws by choosing their own, and interest groups in nations whose laws and dispute resolution forums are commonly chosen will oppose harmonization. Thus, the current state of affairs may prove relatively difficult to alter.     

论行政合同的基本特性

行政合同是行政主体为直接实现行政的目的或单纯为行政事务与他方订立的合同。在行政主体合同权利的限制、行政主体在合同中的特权、合同的瑕疵与救济方面,行政合同均存在有别于普通合同的特性。这些特性意味着行政合同具备自身存在的理论基础和实践价值。     

房屋买卖合同中的陷阱及法律救济

开发商和购房人之间的权利义务关系规定在购房合同中。由开发商单方面提供的格式合同已提前确定了本应由双方协商的合同条款。本文以某房屋买卖合同为例，指出在房屋买卖合同中常见的不公平、不舍法条款，针对房屋买卖合同中的陷阱提出法律救济途径。     

行政契约的司法救济

随着经济的进一步发展,行政管理理念的转变,行政契约发挥着越来越巨大的作用。但行政契约的救济制度一直都不甚完善。这导致行政相对人对行政契约的参与性、民主性的信心下降,进而影响行政契约制度的进一步发展。这一方面是由于我国学者对行政契约理论的认识还不统一,它徘徊于民事契约和行政契约之间。另一方面,行政契约的双方性使我国行政诉讼法的受案范围限制了其进入诉讼途径的可能。理论上为行政契约找一个合理的且与现行体制不相冲突的诉讼途径是十分必要的。     

Absolute liability in contract

Kingship, Law and Society: Criminal Justice in the Reign of Henry V. Edward Powell. Oxford. 1989. Clarendon Press, xii + 319 pp. (incl. index). £35.00 cased.

Sir Henry Maine: A Study of Victorian Jurisprudence. R.C.J. Cocks. Cambridge. 1988. Cambridge University Press, viii + 224 pp. (incl. index). £25/$49.50 cased.

The Birth of the English Common Law (2nd ed). R. C. Van Caenegem. Cambridge. 1988. Cambridge University Press, xviii + 160 pp. (incl. index). £27.50/ $39.50 cased, £9.50/$13.95 limp.

Inventing the Industrial Revolution. The English Patent System 1660–1800. Christine Macleod. Cambridge. 1988. Cambridge University Press, xii + 302 pp. £25 cased.

The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany. D.P. KOMMERS. Duke University Press. 1990. xxxvi + 590 pp. (incl. index). £29.25 paperback.

Sokrates. Johannes Irmscher. (3rd ed.) Leipzig. 1989. Verlag Phillip Reclam jr. 120 pp. (inch index).

The Welsh Laws. T.M. Charles‐Edwards. Cardiff. 1990. The University of Wales Press for the Welsh Arts Council. 106pp. £3.50 limp.     

国家干预在我国劳动合同立法中的体现

劳动合同属于兼有当事人意思自治和国家干预性质的特殊合同.本文探讨了国家干预劳动合同立法的合理性和必要性,阐述了我国在劳动合同立法过程中,国家干预起到了积极的重要作用并具体地体现在了<劳动合同法>中.