The Bologna Process: From a European Law Perspective

The Bologna Process, an intergovernmental process of voluntary policy convergence towards a common higher education structure, poses several concerns from a European law perspective. The Bologna Process takes place outside the institutional framework of the EU, while there would have been legal competence to enact the content of the Bologna Declaration as a Community measure. Hence it could be argued that Member States have straddled the borders of loyal cooperation by avoiding the institutional framework of the EC with its built‐in checks and balances. They have obstructed the Community in the attainment of its tasks, which stands in tense relation to Article 10 EC. Moreover, there exist several other objections against the Bologna Process, particularly in terms of democracy, transparency and efficiency. The Bologna Process resembles a deal done in a smoke‐filled room, and its voluntary character combined with a lack of coordination prevents its effective implementation.     

Energy Security and the Division of Competences between the European Community and its Member States

Abstract: Securing energy supply for Europe has been for decades at the forefront of the energy policies of individual European Community member countries. However, dealing with energy issues in general and securing energy supply in particular is a new phenomenon within the EU's regulatory framework. One important issue which has not yet been discussed by legal scholars and which has been questioned repeatedly by energy experts, is the question who is actually responsible to guarantee security of energy supply in Europe? Is it the European Community alone? Is it the Member States alone? Or is it both? This question cannot be answered without a detailed legal analysis of the EU law in general, and EU law on division of competences between the Community and the Member States in particular. This article seeks to highlight the complications of this area of law within the EU and expand it to cover the energy sector in order to determine who and under what circumstances is responsible for guaranteeing security of energy supply for the consumers within the EU borders.     

The European Charter of Fundamental Rights A Changed Political Opportunity Structure and its Normative Consequences

The European Community is about to enlarge its de facto constitution by a fundamental rights charter. It is intended to become legally binding, at least in the long run. If it is, it will profoundly change the political opportunity structure between the Community and its Member States, among the Member States, among the organs of the Community and in relation to outside political actors. When assessing the new opportunities, one has to keep in mind the weak democratic legitimation of European policy making and its multi‐level character. The article sketches the foreseeable effects and draws consequences from these insights for the dogmatics of the new fundamental rights, their relation to (other) primary Community law and to other fundamental rights codes. It ends with a view to open flanks that cannot be closed by the dogmatics of the freedoms themselves, but call for an appropriate design of the institutional framework.     

Smuggling of Migrants, Trafficking in Human Beings and Irregular Migration on a Comparative Perspective

Abstract:  The European Union aims to develop a European criminal justice to combat cross-border crimes of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings. This article focuses its attention on European Community/European Union (EC/EU) law and on two Member States, Italy and the United Kingdom (UK). The findings show that there are diversities and ambiguities in the definition of irregular migration. On the contrary, the EU and Member States should concentrate their efforts on the two crimes of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings rather than criminalising irregular migration.     

Resolving Incompatibilities of Bilateral Investment Treaties of the EU Member States with the EC Treaty: Individual and Collective Options

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) concluded by the EU Member States contain substantially similar clauses, including free movement of capital and investor‐to‐state dispute resolution. Article 307 EC provides for the primacy of pre‐accession treaties over the EC Treaty and simultaneously requires the Member States to eliminate their mutual incompatibilities. The European Court of Justice has declared that free movement of capital clauses of Austrian and Swedish pre‐accession extra‐EU BITs are incompatible with the EC Treaty as they will impede any restrictions on the movement of capital imposed as future Community legislation. A similar ‘free movement of capital’ clause is present in all extra‐EU BITs of the Member States, whether pre‐ or post‐accession. Article 307, however, does not apply to the post‐accession treaties which are equally capable of contriving the same consequences of impeding the application of the EC Treaty. In addition, the application of intra‐EU BITs provides investors from BIT party states access to the investor‐to‐state dispute resolution which is not available to investors from the Member States who do not have BITs with those Member States. This is discrimination and may distort the principle of equal treatment within the EU. Furthermore, the newly acceding EU States are facing extensive arbitral claims for carrying out the BIT‐EU conflicting obligations within their respective territories.     

Bringing European Democracy Back In—Or How to Read the German Constitutional Court's Lisbon Treaty Ruling

This article critically examines the democratic theory that informs the German Federal Constitutional Court's Lisbon Treaty ruling. This is needed because the ruling is ambiguous with regard to which type of democracy applies to which type of Union. In order to analyse the ruling we establish three models of what European democracy possibly can amount to: audit democracy based on the EU as a derivative of the Member States; a multinational federal state; or a regional cosmopolitan polity? The court's depiction of the EU does not fit as well as we would expect when labeled as a derivative entity due to the important legislative role of the European Parliament. The EU's legal supranationalism points in the direction of a federation, but the court's argumentation does not lend support to this notion. The court models democracy on a rather specific set of institutional presuppositions that are derived from the parliamentary model of democracy associated with the sovereign nation state. At the same time, the court operates with a conception of a changing state sovereignty that unfolds more in line with cosmopolitan rather than with classical Westphalian statist principles.     

欧盟商标法律制度的协调机制及其对我国的启示

在欧盟,既有各成员国国内的商标法律制度,又有欧盟的跨国商标法律制度即共同体商标条例,并设有将这两种商标法律制度协调运行的机制。该机制的核心主要有三个方面：一是优先注册权制度,即在一成员国有效的商标,或者同时又是共同体商标,权利人可以享有将同一商标在相同商品或服务上优先注册共同体商标的权利,或者优先注册其他成员国国内商标的权利;二是转换申请制度,即共同体商标的申请人或所有人在其申请失败或其商标失效时请求将该申请或商标转换成国内商标申请的情况;三是共同体商标特有的诉讼管辖和法律适用制度。欧盟所建立的这种复式商标法律制度及其协调机制,对于“一国两制”下的中国大陆、香港、澳门和台湾四法域商标法律制度的协调具有重要的借鉴作用。     

The Impact of the EU Enlargement on Economic and Monetary Union: What Lessons Can Be Learnt From the Differentiated Integration Mechanisms in an Enlarged Europe?*

Abstract: Within the context of balancing the issues stemming from a widening and deepening of the European Union, differentiated integration mechanisms are taking shape as new organisational concepts for Community integration. Yet the increasing leverage granted to them from an institutional perspective could jeopardise the unity of the Community legal order . . . unless differentiated integration is regarded as a means and not as an end in itself; as such its success therefore depends on its ability to maintain the long‐term interests of all the Members States to go further in the EU integration. Faced with its own enlargement problems, EMU has demonstrated an aptitude to some extent for absorbing the non‐participating States. Four distinct legal reasons have emerged from research into its functioning and relations between the different categories of Member States to justify its attractive force. An assessment of the current and future enhanced cooperation frameworks using these four elements demonstrates the existence of essentially cooperative systems, whilst their appeal is only modest.     

Buy baby: the European Union and regulation of human reproduction

In its decision in ex parte Blood the Court of Appeal relied on European Community (EC) law to hold that the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority had acted unlawfully in taking its decision to prevent Mrs Blood from exporting sperm taken from her dying husband without his written consent. The Blood case raises the issue of the extent to which EC law may affect the regulation of human reproduction in the Member States. Responding to fears that such national regulation might be 'swept away' by the commodifying nature of EC law, this article considers the scope of the potential application of EC law to regulation of human reproduction. The cautious conclusion is that, while there may be some increase in deregulatory pressures, the 'vertical relationship' of supreme EC law to national law may turn out to be less significant than 'horizontal relationships' between policy-makers within and between the EU and its Member States.     

An American Looks at the European Union

Abstract: Anyone who has followed the evolution of six European nations from a simple Coal and Steel Community to the current twenty‐five Member State European Union (EU), has witnessed a truly remarkable passage. Nonetheless, the EU remains a decidedly jerrybuilt affair. Through numerous enlargements, increased competences, changes in structure and operation, the Union has been bedevilled by the fact that it is neither a simple international treaty with 25 signatories, nor a truly federal union. Rather, the EU has operated, sometimes effectively, often shakily, between these two extremes; exhibiting a sort of ‘fear of federalism’. From a US perspective, this article looks at the present state of the European Union and asks why it has met its potential in some ways, but has fallen so far short in others. Obviously, the tension between the Member States and the Community institutions is one reason. The article asks why do the states compete so much with one another, when their true competition is often with non‐European entities? Why does the European Council never seem to act in a timely manner? Why do euro‐citizens have so poor of an appreciation of what the Community does for them? Why does the Common Agricultural Policy, which contributes such a small amount to European gross domestic product, so dominate the EU budget and agenda? Can the euro, clearly the world's second currency after the US dollar, ever win over its doubters and harmonise European financial service markets? Does enlargement improve or threaten the future of the Community? And can its Common Foreign and Security Policy ever be successful if it is forced to compete with parallel politics in the Member States? All of these questions are addressed in this article with the hope that, through an external critique, the EU will live up to its potential both at home and abroad.     

Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States?

Against the background of recent developments in Hungary, the article discusses the question whether the European Union ought to play a role in protecting liberal democracy in Member States. First, it is argued that the EU has the authority to do so, both in a broad normative sense and in a narrower legal sense (though the latter is more likely to be disputed). The article then asks whether the EU has the capacity to establish a supranational militant democracy; here it is argued that at the moment both appropriate legal instruments and plausible political strategies are missing. To remedy this situation, the article proposes a new democracy watchdog, analogous to, but more powerful than, the Venice Commission. Finally, it is asked whether EU interventions would provoke a nationalist backlash. There is insufficient evidence to decide this question, but the danger of such a backlash probably tend to be overestimated.     

Holding to Account a Possible European Public Prosecutor Supranational Governance and Accountability Across Diverse Legal Traditions

The Lisbon Treaty provides a legal basis for the Member States of the European Union (EU) to establish a European Public Prosecutor (EPP) with competence to prosecute, in the courts of the Member States, crimes against the financial interests of the Union. Article 86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, provides that the Member States may unanimously, or through flexible cooperation where nine Member States agree, establish such a European-level prosecution body, with the possibility for its powers to be extended by unanimity to include serious crime having a cross border dimension or affecting more than one Member State. Within the legal traditions of the Member States, means of holding prosecution authorities to account vary considerably. Probably the strongest form of accountability exists in the civil law tradition of Member States that permit appeals to judicial bodies for decisions not to prosecute, which contrasts with the traditional common law reluctance to even give reasons for not prosecuting. Similarly, the ways in which prosecution authorities interact or overlap with police functions, and thus with general mechanisms of police and/or bureaucratic accountability, differ. Some of the particular features of EU cooperation suggest additional accountability issues, notably, questions concerning competence spill-over and problems of remoteness. This paper seeks to address how to conceptualise governance and accountability of a possible EPP outside of the context of a trial (the latter entailing a type of open legal accountability that can be studied in its own right) and including the question of the definition of competences.     

Foreign Investors in the EU—Which ‘Best Treatment’? Interactions Between Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law

Abstract: This article discusses the main interactions between bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and EU law. The European Commission identified a number of incompatibilities in BITs signed by eight recent Member States with the USA, proposing solutions for their adjustment in conformity with EU law, but was this step sufficient? The risk of disputes remains, as long as the proposed adjustments do not achieve legal force and as long as other BITs still need to be harmonised with EU law. Moreover, provisions in BITs that are not in conflict with EU law could still be challenged if the application of certain EU requirements by Member States interferes with foreign investors' rights. To avoid such risks, coherence between different commitments and practices of the Member States is needed and coordination at the EU level is highly desirable.     

Democracy in Europe: Why the Development of the EU into a Transnational Democracy Is Necessary and How It Is Possible

Can the process of European unification lead to a form of democracy that is at once supranational and situated above the organisational level of a state? The supranational federation should be constructed in such a way that the heterarchical relationship between the Member States and the federation remains intact. The author finds the basis for such an order in the idea of the EU constituted by a ‘doubled’ sovereign—the European citizens and the European peoples (the States). In order to sustain such an order, reforms of the existing European treaties are needed. It is necessary to eliminate the legitimation deficits of the EU in a future Euro‐Union—that is, a more closely integrated core Europe. The European Parliament would have to gain the right to take legislative initiatives, and the so‐called ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, which requires the approval of both chambers, would have to be extended to all policy fields.     

Preserving the Identity Crisis: Autonomy,System and Sovereignty in European Law

This article uses Hans Kelsen's theory of a legalsystem to take a fresh look at European Community law,and the relationship between the European Community,its Member States, and international law. It arguesthat the basis of the Community's legal legitimacy isindeterminate, and offers a model to accommodate thatindeterminacy. This model is founded on aconstructivist approach suggested to be particularlyuseful in the EC context. Using this approach, it isargued that the concepts of system, autonomy andsovereignty in the Community can only be understoodthrough the recognition of a plurality of viewpoints,and that it is crucial, in describing the Community,to distinguish between a concept per se and thechoice to adopt that concept.     

EU Citizenship without Duties

Many believe that duties should be at the essence of citizenship. This paper dismisses this view, using EU law as the main context of analysis, by making five interrelated claims. (1) There are no empirically observable duties of EU citizenship; (2) such duties would lack any legal‐theoretical foundation, if the contrary were true; (3) legal‐theoretical foundations of the duties of citizenship are lacking also at the Member State level; (4) EU law plays an important role in undermining the ability of the Member States where residual duties remain to enforce them; (5) this development is part of a greater EU input into the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the Member States and reflects a general trend of de‐dutification of citizenship around the democratic world. If these conclusions are correct, it is time to stop categorising EU citizenship duties among the desiderata of EU law.     

Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity

It is a common place of academic and political discourse that the EC/EU, being neither a parliamentary democracy nor a separation‐of‐powers system, must be a sui generis polity. Tocqueville reminds us that the pool of original and historically tested constitutional models is fairly limited. But however limited, it contains more than the two systems of rule found among today's democratic nation states. During the three centuries preceding the rise of monarchical absolutism in Europe, the prevalent constitutional arrangement was ‘mixed government’—a system characterised by the presence in the legislature of the territorial rulers and of the ‘estates’ representing the main social and political interests in the polity. This paper argues that this model is applicable to the EC, as shown by the isomorphism of the central tenets of the mixed polity and the three basic Community principles: institutional balance, institutional autonomy and loyal cooperation among European institutions and Member States. The model is then applied to gain a better understanding of the delegation problem. As is well known, a crucial normative obstacle to the delegation of regulatory powers to independent European agencies is the principle of institutional balance. By way of contrast, separation‐of‐powers has not prevented the US Congress from delegating extensive rule‐making powers to independent commissions and agencies. Comparison with the philosophy of mixed government explains this difference. The same philosophy suggests the direction of regulatory reform. The growing complexity of EC policy making should be matched by greater functional differentiation, and in particular by the explicit acknowledgement of an autonomous ‘regulatory estate’. At a time when the Commission aspires to become the sole European executive, as in a parliamentary system, it is particularly important to stress the importance of separating the regulatory function from general executive power. The notion of a regulatory estate is meant to emphasise this need.     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.     

欧洲共同体竞争法实施过程中面临的冲突及对策

竞争法是欧共体法律体系中影响较大的一个部门。它的形成与发展,使共同体内并存着两种相互独立的竞争法及其执行机制。因此,竞争法在实施过程中,出现了一系列的冲突和矛盾。共同体通过二次立法,采取了一系列相应的措施:重新调整竞争法主管机构的权限,平衡竞争法管辖上的矛盾;确立共同体竞争法的效力优于成员国竞争法的原则,协调共同体竞争法适用上的冲突;加强竞争法实施的国际合作,化解欧共体竞争法域外适用过程中产生的困难。这些措施有效地清除了竞争法实施的障碍,推动了欧洲经济一体化的进程。     

Tailoring Representative Democracy to the European Union: Does the European Constitution Reduce the Democratic Deficit?

Abstract Even if the institutions of representative democracy that have developed in the nation‐state context cannot be simply transposed to the European Union, for practical and normative reasons they do provide the main starting point for any reflection on the EU's ‘democratic deficit’. This article draws upon the Constitution prepared by the European Convention to reconstruct the concept of representative democracy in the EU. Drawing on the proposals put forward, it identifies two distinctive challenges that need to be overcome if the concept of representative democracy is to be successfully applied to the EU: the multilevel character of the polity and the shift of the centre of political gravity from legislative to executive politics. The article then examines the extent to which the institutional proposals contained in the Constitution go to meet these two challenges and also highlights some aspects in which these proposals fall short.