Ethics,terrorism and counter‐terrorism

Traditionally, the Talmudic Orthodoxy always postulated the reestablishing of a Jewish state only by an act of God's grace at messianic times. The establishment of Israel by secular Jews thus caused real consternation among Orthodox sects. Ultra Orthodox sects did not even recognize Israel as a Jewish entity. However, the occupation of the West Bank, the site of the ancient Jewish kingdoms, in 1967 was seen by many Orthodox Jews as a sign of redemption and also an opportunity to take an active, even a leading, role in a “true Zionist” enterprise of fulfilling God's promise to Abraham that the whole land will belong to his offspring. The settling of the West Bank was congruent with the government's political aims. This led the government to provide deep financial and massive military support to settlers, both the religious population that follows a radical nationalistic policy enveloped with messianic motifs, and other settlers, attracted by the substantial perks. The violent conduct of the militant religious sector among the settlers provides a radical threat to Israel's character, and even its existence. Above and beyond that provided by the military and economic burden of the West Bank settlements themselves.     

Is Unilateralism Always Bad? Negotiation Lessons from Israel's “Unilateral” Gaza Withdrawal

Using the 2005 unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as a case study, this article exposes an apparent paradox: circumstances may exist in which an outcome that serves the interests of parties to a conflict cannot be achieved through bilateral negotiation but can be achieved by unilateral action. Although the withdrawal was seen at the time as serving the interests of both the Israeli government and the Palestinians, we argue that the same result could not have been achieved through bilateral negotiations. “Behind‐the‐table” internal conflicts on each side would have made it impossible for the leaders to agree on the scope of these negotiations. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's success in implementing his Gaza withdrawal was attributable in significant measure to his ability to maintain ambiguity about his long‐run plans for the West Bank. Only by focusing attention on Gaza was he able to build the necessary coalition to implement the controversial move. The Palestinian leaders, on the other hand, could never have agreed to come to the table to negotiate about Gaza alone — they would have insisted that the scope of any negotiations address a broad range of final status issues. In this article, we identify some of the lessons that the Gaza example teaches regarding the utility and limits of unilateralism as well as the benefits and potential costs of employing ambiguity as a strategy to help accomplish a controversial move. Finally, we also explore the aftermath of the withdrawal and its many missed opportunities for improving the outcome. We suggest that, even when acting unilaterally, leaders should carefully consider the probable impact of their actions on the internal conflicts of their adversaries.     

Religious and Ideological Dimensions of the Israeli Settlements Issue: Reframing the Narrative?

Whether or not it will be possible to relocate settlers from the "territories" depends not just on the willingness of the relevant Israeli officials to authorize evacuation of some or all of the West Bank and Gaza given the violence it may cause, but especially on the thinking and the changing attitudes of the settlers themselves. Only by understanding the views of the current settlers — their motivations, their beliefs, and the differences among them — will it be possible to formulate a sensible relocation strategy. That was the focus of the conference's first panel.     

Old (Molotov) cocktails in new bottles? “Price-tag” and settler violence in Israel and the West Bank

In the early morning of July 31, 2015, masked attackers threw firebombs into two Palestinian homes in the West Bank village of Duma, south of Nablus, killing three Palestinian civilians. Contrary to claims by Israeli and Palestinian politicians, this attack was neither an isolated anomaly nor just another incident of settler violence. Instead, it was the latest attack in an important but largely unknown phenomenon called “price-tag,” in which a loosely connected group of young Israelis called “hilltop youth” burn Palestinian mosques and destroy property in hundreds of attacks accompanied by threatening graffiti that references Israeli settlers, outposts, and anti-Arab slogans. Using an original dataset of price-tag incidents and interviews with key actors, we demonstrate that the perpetrators, targets, and strategies of price-tag are different than previous patterns of settler violence. Whereas previous settlers saw the Israeli state as legitimate and largely decided to cooperate with it, the hilltop youth have decided to confront it by using price-tag attacks to deter settlement withdrawals and chain-gang the state into a conflict with the Palestinians. This analysis of the strategic logic of price-tag reveals its potential to shift the political landscape within and between Israelis and Palestinians.     

The intifada: Palestinian adaptation to Israeli counterinsurgency tactics

In December 1987 the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip significantly changed the nature of the Palestinian threat to Israel and pushed the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians into the forefront of the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict. This article examines the effects of the Israeli counterinsurgency tactics on the Palestinian strategy from the period of 1967 through 1987. It proposes that the implementation of Israel's counterinsurgency policy since 1967 was a crucial factor in creating the conditions for revolution and influencing the Palestinians’ adaptation of their tactics, culminating in the intifada.     

Psychological Dimensions of the Israeli Settlements Issue: Endowments and Identities

When you have a rational discussion of what to do with the Israeli settlements, how do you factor in the irrational, the deeply held beliefs of people with varying views? As we witnessed at the conference, when people speak about the Israeli settlements, they do so with emotion, using such phrases as “Messianic spirit,”“longing for homeland,”“compassionate revenge,” and “the destruction of dreams.” The land in question is precious to two different groups, who each imbue the land with their own narrative and fervor. In fact, at the very heart of what makes the settlements issue so complex and seemingly intractable is its psychological dimensions — the mental and emotional factors that permeate the discussion at every level.     

Death is in the eye of the beholder: a study of casualty count framing in the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict

The 2014 Israel–Gaza war was the third of a string of conflicts to erupt between the State of Israel and Hamas in neighbouring Gaza and quickly became the deadliest for both sides. Even with the extensive media attention this crisis received, calls for more objective reporting were widespread, as locating sources that were not clearly influenced or reflective of political biases seemed near impossible. This paper seeks to explore the role “cultural proximity” plays in informing casualty count reporting in times of conflict. Qualitative content analysis is conducted on news coverage of the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict in the American daily newspaper, The New York Times, and the Israeli daily newspaper, Haaretz, to assess whether significant differences exist in the way casualty figures are addressed across varying degrees of political and cultural involvement. This research reveals that variations in casualty count reporting do indeed exist across cultural and national contexts, and deems this subject worthy of further research.     

Political Dimensions of the Israeli Settlements Issue: Historic Opportunities and Challenges

There is a danger inherent in devoting a panel to a discussion of the political aspects of the Israeli settlements issue: in attempting to discuss everything, we could have ended up talking about nothing because many practitioners and scholars view the settlements as primarily a political project. The multidisciplinary nature of this conference reflected our belief that the settlement issue is deeper and wider than "simply politics." Yet, we were not free from the challenge of focusing a panel on the political aspects of the settlements in a way that makes a real contribution.     

The problems of Eastern Europe

The outlook for conflict settlement in the Middle East is gloomy, and the chances for a new round of peace talks being initiated by the parties in the region are next to zero. US President Barack Obama has announced that he wants to engage “aggressively” in favour of Middle East peace making and has taken first encouraging steps in that direction. It would be wrong, however, to assume that the US President can achieve conflict settlement largely on his own. Europeans should therefore rethink their policy approaches -- above all, how to deal with Hamas, the Gaza Strip and how to push the peace process forward -- and seek a more effective division of labour and coordination with the Obama administration.     

Ingredients of a Successful Track Two Negotiation

During three days in 2003, an Israeli–Palestinian group met in London to negotiate the draft of the “Geneva Initiative,” which offered a potential final status agreement between Israel and Palestine. In this article, I analyze the video recording of these unofficial negotiations and examine how the framing and conduct of the talks enabled significant progress toward reaching an agreement. I describe six main framing techniques used by the mediators: calling the meetings an “exercise,” which reduced restraints on the participants and enhanced their flexibility, avoiding deep historical issues to focus solely on future‐oriented pragmatic solutions, allowing the participants to discuss any topic they chose while deliberately avoiding crucial narrative issues, convincing the participants that this track two negotiation was crucial for the future of official Israeli–Palestinian relations, accentuating the parties' understandings and agreements with each other, and building a sense of superordinate group identity among the participants, to encourage cooperation. These components were the key “ingredients” for the first — and still the only — (unofficial) detailed proposal for an Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement. They provide lessons that could improve the success of other track two negotiations.     

The Social Construction of Identity: Israeli Foreign Policy and the 2006 War in Lebanon

This article uses a constructivist analysis to consider the social construction of identity and the Israeli military action in Lebanon in 2006. Strands of meaning, constructive of a collective sense of self, emerged out of historical continuities, interacted and were made meaningful in relation to each other around the issue of the Hezbollah threat in 2006. They framed, contextualised and constituted that policy issue to form a situated and contingent identity of the possible, within which the policy decisions that produced the second Lebanon War were taken. Whilst a body of work has resulted from engagement with this conflict, and a well established literature discusses Israeli identity, little has been done to bring the two together and consider in detail the role of identity in constructing the 2006 war as possible and desirable for Israel. This is the focus and contribution of this article. Domestically, the institutional context of the 2006 Knesset elections revealed a national identity in which the multi-faceted vulnerability identity and Fighting Jew identity were salient, interacting strands. The narratives of ordeal, existential threat, and self-reliance acted to increase the power of the Fighting Jew identity, predicated on a faith in military solutions to threats. These ideas came up against and were rearticulated in the context of the global “War on Terror” to make the war in 2006 both possible and desirable.     

Priming,Issue Ownership,and Party Support: The Electoral Gains of an Issue-Friendly Media Agenda

Issue ownership theory posits a positive relationship between electoral support and public attention to issues that a party “owns.” We investigate this key prediction of the issue ownership theory in a dynamic analysis of 20 years of party support and media coverage across multiple parties and issues. The results provide support for the basic electoral implication of issue ownership theory, showing that increased media attention to owned issues increases support for the issue owners. Furthermore, the article demonstrates that the effect of the ownership mechanism materializes differently for opposition and government parties. Opposition parties benefit from media attention to owned issues without losing ground when news concentrates on issues owned by government parties, while government parties, always struggling with the electoral cost of ruling, lose votes when news about opposition-owned issues increases without gaining support when the media agenda is “issue-friendly.”     

Vigilant Jewish fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or ‘Shalom Jews,Shalom Dogs')

The essay aims to explain the emergence of Kahanism in Israel and why Israeli democracy saw it necessary to defend itself against Kahane's quasi‐fascist ideas and to curtail his legitimacy. The author reflects on the Kahanist phenomenon, its ideology and political programme which brought Rabbi Kahane to the Knesset. The reading of Kach's racist proposals explains why extraordinary measures were taken against Kahane by the political system as well as by the media and the educational system.     

Curious Victory: Explaining Israel's Suppression of the Second Intifada

The article examines Israel's successes and failures during the Second Intifada. It argues that Israel's advances came from an effective counterterrorism campaign involving a mix of military operations, defensive measures, and in particular improved intelligence gathering. Domestic resilience also proved strong in the face of a brutal terrorism campaign. Yet long-term victory remains elusive for Israel. Deterrence, always difficult against terrorist groups, is growing harder for Israel. Hamas's control of Gaza, and the mistrust and hatred sown during the Second Intifada, have hindered a political deal between Israel and moderate Palestinians. Much of what went into successful counterterrorism, notably the security barrier and the aggressive campaign of raids and arrests, does not jibe with most visions of what peace would look like and makes a deal harder to achieve. To make a peace deal work, Israeli counterterrorism must change, with measures including relocating parts of the security barrier, bolstering moderate Palestinian politicians, and working with, as opposed to undermining, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank.     

Abba Eban and the Development of American–Israeli Relations, 1950–1959

Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador in Washington and representative at the United Nations from 1950 to 1959, had a central role in the transformation of American–Israeli relations during a period of frequent discord over key strategic issues. This analysis examines the influence of one prominent actor upon bilateral ties that would eventually become the American–Israeli “special relationship.” Eban’s oratory talent, linguistic skills, and effective style of diplomacy augmented both Israel’s image in the view of the American public and relations with official Washington. The article explores several critical elements of these relations during the 1950s, re-examining both Eban’s involvement in events such as Israel’s approach toward the problem of borders, its policy of military retaliation, and the response to severe American pressure following the 1956 Sinai campaign. Whilst not attributing the development of close relations between the two Powers solely to the works of a single individual, evidence suggests that Eban was the right man in the right place and time to provide the necessary foundations for the elevation of American–Israeli relations to “special” in the following decade.     

The face of development aid: volunteers and their hosts in southern Israel

The current scholarship on development aid has asserted that a “transformation” of development, one that “puts people first”, is presently taking place in the particular form of volunteer aid. In southern Israel, this claim is evident in recent attempts to “strengthen” depressed “development town” communities through a movement that combines Zionist settlement with the volunteer aid of university students. Based on ethnographic work in the development town of Yeruham, this article problematises this claim by investigating the daily encounter of volunteers with members of their multiply marginalised host community. It challenges such claims of “transformation” and exposes the complex social reality of what it means to “develop” and “empower” a population routinely framed as disadvantaged and targeted for aid.     

The Arabs in Israel: Identity,criminality and the peace process

The basic datum that criminality among the Palestinian Arabs of Israel is nearly double the average among the population in general begs some hard questions and answers. It is suggested here that, besides the regular crimes endemic in Israeli society of which Arabs and Jews alike partake, there is a category of criminal activity that is peculiar to the Arabs, under the heading of ‘ideological’, namely nationalistically and/or religiously induced. It is suggested here that the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians does not necessarily reduce the rate of criminality among Israeli Arabs. Quite the contrary, in some cases it might increase criminal partnerships between Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line divide even when the peace process is alive and kicking; and when it is not, things might even get worse with the Israeli Arabs increasingly identifying with their brethren across the border in their struggle against the right‐wing government of Israel from which they are totally alienated.     

Ballots,Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities

Benjamin Netanyahu's come-from-behind victory over Shimon Peres in the Israeli national elections of May 1996, following an apparent intensification of Palestinian terrorism over the course of that spring, reminded observers of the political ramifications of terrorism. Since May 1996 was also the month in which Israel reentered Final Status negotiations with a Palestinian delegation in Taba, Egypt, the timing of this surge in violence encourages us to ask if terrorists regularly conceive of elections and rounds of negotiations as “spoiler opportunities,” or opportune times to undermine peaceful political processes. We address this question in the context of Israel's long‐running experience with elections, negotiations, and terrorism. We hypothesize that attacks resulting in fatalities are likely to increase in periods immediately surrounding Israeli general elections and key rounds of negotiations affecting the fate of the Palestinian population. Negative binomial event count analyses of the period 1970–2007 suggest that violent opponents indeed viewed the periods preceding negotiations and the ends of electoral cycles as “spoiler opportunities.”     

Mediating the War of Olives and Pines: Consensus-Based Land-Use Planning in a Multicultural Setting

The proposed Nahal Tzalmon national park lies in the Galilee region of northern Israel. It encompasses land of unique natural beauty, some of which is occupied by Arab-Israeli families. Statutory plans defining the park's boundaries were enacted more than twenty years ago. Despite ongoing preparation, however, the park has not yet opened to the public, in part because of continuous conflict between the Israeli government authorities and the resident families over property rights affecting construction, land use, and nature preservation.
In 2000, after a long period of stagnation and discord, the Joint Environmental Mediation Service ( JEMS), guided by its founding organizations — the Consensus Building Institute and the Israel–Palestine Center for Research and Information — led a mediation process in the region. This was the first such process in the history of Israeli land-use planning. The mediation resulted in a settlement that was agreed to and signed by nearly all parties on July 8, 2004. The agreement allows residents to remain on their land and it includes incentives, such as park employment, to ensure that they help preserve the natural environment. Plans based on this agreement are currently undergoing state ratification, although several implementation challenges are yet to be resolved.
This case points to the importance of having a mediation team knowledgeable about and sensitive to local cultural norms and the difficulties of ensuring appropriate representation in the absence of a strong civic culture and organized advocacy groups. It also highlights the requisite for ensuring that all parties thoroughly understand the consensus building process and how it fits in with established bureaucratic procedures, as well as the critical need to secure strong support from implementing agencies at the outset.