封建狱吏腐败述论

历代封建统治阶级的监狱,是封建统治者对广大劳动者实行专政的机器,是奴役残害人民的场所。作为封建统治集团的马前卒狱吏,在执法中纳贿曲法、断狱不公、惨酷用刑,甚至残杀生命。狱吏腐败成为一种普遍现象。狱吏腐败,是封建监狱统治的必然结果。封建狱吏位卑责重,薪俸低薄,造成心理失衡,以及法律制裁、监督纠劾乏力,皆是造成狱吏腐败的重要原因。     

史比官贵：古代官场怪象

高官坐牢方知狱吏之贵 高官勋臣一旦仕途蹉跎，身陷囹圄，不免受狱吏凌辱，所谓“人在屋檐下，哪得不低头”。     

美国耳号拨款项目透视

一般来说，美国从总体上说是比较清廉的。之所以这么说，有两个原因；一是美国监督体系发达，现在没有大面积的腐败；二是美国的腐败已经不是低层次的腐败，有的腐败需要一定的专业知识才能看得到。为委托人争取“耳印记拨款”过程中的腐败就是后面一种。     

有一种腐败叫“全懂全能型腐败”

随着反腐败斗争的不断深入，腐败的成本将越来越高，腐败的空间会越来越小，而腐败的手段方法也将越来越隐蔽多样。在这样严峻复杂的反腐败形势下，有一种“全懂全能型腐败”悄然而生。搞这种腐败的官员有文化，懂理论；有知识，懂法律；有权力，懂运作；有谋划，懂造势；有人缘，懂作秀……他们参加政治学习、     

权力腐败是黑社会生成的社会结构性土壤

何清涟“中国问题”研究法，是以解剖当代中国现代化进程中真实存在的经济社会矛盾为切入点的研究法。她认为中国当前腐败与黑社会勃兴的现实，是未来中国社会发展进程中最大的隐患与陷阱之一。她对腐败与黑社会生成关系的研究并不直接，但她研究所得出的深刻结论，却异常深刻的揭示出腐败与黑社会间一种深层的机制联系。她研究认为，当前中国的腐败是“源于制度的社会结构性”腐败；进而认为，当代中国的腐败，核心是“三大权力腐败”；又进而逻辑地揭示出，“三大权力腐败”，是黑社会生成的“源于制度的社会结构性”土壤。     

[域外经验]反“中介腐败”在美国

环球同此凉热。在中国，一场自上而下、声势浩大的反中介腐败运动正澎湃兴起；大洋彼岸，面对中介腐败侵蚀，进军号角早已吹响。运用立法规范、司法打击等手段，美式反“中介腐败”驶入深水区。     

幽默大王

挖洞 一个罪犯的妻子要求狱吏能给她丈夫一份稍微轻松些的工作。 "他抱怨说他近来一直觉得很劳累。"她解释道。 "但是,他白天什么活也没干啊。"狱吏回答道。 "这我不知道,但他对我说他连续几个晚上都在掘一个墙洞呢。     

国外预防职务犯罪对策述评

一、预防为主是治理腐败的治本之策　　进入法制建设高度发展的二十世纪以来，全球范围的腐败活动更为变本加厉。各国高层高员的腐败大案层出不穷，震惊世人。九十年代法国有十二位市长涉嫌腐败；法国前总理贝雷格瓦涉嫌100万元“借款”而自杀；意大利三位前总理分别被控与黑手党有染和受贿而被提起公诉；前北约秘书长涉嫌受贿被法办；韩国在八十年代出现了三位前首相、四名内阁成员和数百名官员的恶性腐败事件。亚洲、非洲和南美的第三世界国家中的腐败问题也都成为严重的社会问题，直接威胁到政权的稳定和经济的发展。目前出现的经济全球…     

从“李离自罚”说开去

近读《史记·循吏列传》,其中“李离自罚”的史实颇令人深思。春秋时,晋国狱吏李离审理一案子不慎误判,杀无辜一人。按晋法中“不当死者被杀,狱吏要抵以性命”之规定,李犯的是死罪,他懊悔不迭,为谢罪天下,他一面令手下人将自己关进狱中,一面请求主公对他秉公执法。可晋文公接报     

中国古代监狱狱吏责任浅议

监狱狱吏责任古已有之，责任追究更是彰于法典，从“酝酿”到“完善”，其不断强化，体现出历朝历代的治监思想理念。中国古代监狱狱吏的责任追究虽然有着浓重的重处罚、重惩罚、重人治、轻教化、轻管理、轻自律的特点，甚至还有“残暴”与“黑暗”的色彩，但是毕竟对国家统治地位的维护以及对罪囚人身权利的保护，推进监狱的文明进步，发挥了历史的作用。     

明代官吏职务犯罪问题研究

明代作为封建制后期一个卓有建树的王朝,其法律对于官吏的贪赃枉法、失职渎职、擅权越权等各种职务犯罪行为作出了具体、严密的规定,在预防和惩治官吏职务犯罪方面也建立了较以往历代更为完备的制度体系。这一系列法律制度的贯彻实施,在明前期确实取得了一定的成效,吏治呈现一时之清明。然而,至明代中后期,官吏职务犯罪情况日益严重,吏治腐败局面终难扭转。     

腐败预防立法体系的理性建构

腐败的本质是权力的滥用,腐败预防立法体系能够有效控制权力.理性的腐败预防立法体系建构应当考虑腐败的衍生规律与治理效能,厘清腐败预防立法体系中存在的一些现实障碍,明确公共权力在管理国家与社会事务中的角色定位,一体推进"不敢腐""不能腐""不想腐",以确保公权力行使的廉洁性,有效预防腐败.     

我国古代封建政权治吏略论

人类历史上文官制度的创始者归为中国,而尤为封建官吏制度备受世人推崇。中国古代的封建官吏制度是中国 古代封建政治制度的一个重要组成部分,它对封建制国家的产生、发达产生过重要影响。试图从中国古代封建官 吏的选任、考核、奖惩、监察等方面揭示一些带有共性的,已被历史证明是成功的,可供我们现在参考、倦鉴的一些 法律和制度。     

简论反腐技术侦查程序制衡机制构建

当前,中国腐败现象较为严重,职务犯罪处于高发态势,犯罪手段不断升级,证据获取困难重重,这与检察机关缺乏有效地技术侦查措施有内在联系。可借鉴其他国家的做法,赋予检察机关职务犯罪技术侦查权,并严格规定其适用范围、审批程序、执行程序和救济程序。相关程序的合理建构,有利于有效收集诉讼证据,落实刑事程序法治,顺应科技强检趋势,对接国际公约。     

Corruption and NIC development: A case study of South Korea

The debate on corruption and economic performance has swung from one position to the other over the decades. During the 1960s the school of thought associated with modernisation theory argued corruption was often positively correlated with economic growth. (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964) Subsequently corruption came to be viewed as inimical to growth by undermining the basis of stable, rational public policies and allocation through markets (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Theobald, 1990), the situation in which it is still largely viewed today, particularly following the “corruption eruption” of the 1990s (Alam, 1989; Leiken, 1997; Naim, 1995). East Asian countries stand as important case studies of the role of corruption in industrialisation: this article focuses on South Korea. Firstly corruption coexisted with development. Secondly corruption in South Korea was at different times functional, detrimental, irrelevant and relevant, but always present during rapid industrialisation. This is not of course to argue corruption fuelled growth nor to recommend it as a plausible policy option for developing or transitional economies, since it is evident that in many cases corruption is harmful to growth. This article seeks to understand the role corruption played in Korean economic development to better understand the phenomenon of corruption itself. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

From corruption to extortion: Conceptualization of post-communist corruption

Moral outrage and lack of comparison distorts the understanding of the natureand politically determined functions of governmental corruption in post-communist transition. As post-communist societies move towards open market systems and corruption is no longer limited to the public sector, politics is transformed into a potent tool for illegal transactions. The political structureitself creates corrupt practices that become a structural feature of transition societies. This article offers first a critical discussion of both moral theories of corruption and the thesis that posits a link between corruption and democracy deficit in post-communist countries. Subsequently, it sketches a neo-functionalist approach that puts corruption in a specific social context.With respect to East/Central Europe, corruption is presented as a betrayal ofpublic trust that serves specific requirements of an emerging ``extortioniststate.' These requirements relate to the expansion of extortion opportunitiesand their institutionalization into a semblance of a Tule of law system.     

Does Authoritarianism Breed Corruption? Reconsidering the Relationship Between Authoritarian Governance and Corrupt Exchanges in Bureaucracies

This article advocates for ethnographic and historical study of the political roots of corruption. Focusing on informal economies of Belarusian universities, it reexamines two theoretical propositions about corruption in autocracies. The first proposition is that authoritarianism breeds bureaucratic corruption; the second is that autocrats grant disloyal subjects corruption opportunities in exchange for political compliance. Using qualitative data, the author finds that autocracies can generate favorable as well as unfavorable preconditions for bureaucratic corruption. The author argues that lenient autocratic governance, characterized by organizational decoupling, creates favorable conditions for bureaucratic corruption. In contrast, consolidated autocracy, defined by rigid organizational controls, is unfavorable to such corruption. The author also concludes that in autocracies, disloyal populations may be cut off from rather than granted opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. These findings suggest that the relationship between autocratic governance and corruption is more complex than current studies are able to reveal due to their methodological limitations.     

清除腐败赖品德———兼论法律作用的有限性

腐败有掌权者腐败和机构腐败之分。掌权者腐败具有“行为的个别性”和“明显的不合理性”的特点。机构腐败也有两个显著特点：（1）它是机关行为或一定权力系统的行为,没有具体的责任人;（2）它的不合理性不十分明显,人们对它常常不能形成稳定一致的是非评价。由于腐败与执法的同源性、权力的不受惩罚性、反腐败的法令只能由不腐败的权力创制等原因,对腐败无法像对其他犯罪那样通过严格执法来实现治理目标。在民主政治下,根治腐败的根本出路是贯彻品德原则,建立对官员的品德评价系统。品德评价系统是依据品德标准对公职人员实施辞退、罢免、撤换的政治评价系统。这个系统由执法权自洁系统、监督系统和以公众为力量源泉的基础系统等构成。     

监督文化、机制与官员腐败犯罪

触目惊心的官员腐败犯罪说明我国的监督机制亟待完善。我国监督文化存在的缺陷,使得监督官员腐败犯罪的氛围难以形成,并导致监督机制缺乏力度,反腐法网不严密,贪污贿赂犯罪机会多、成本低,法律对官员腐败犯罪缺乏应有的威慑作用。因此,必须采取中央主导型反腐败模式,建立高效、独立、权威的反腐专门机构;以法律形式确立公务员制度、财产申报制度、储蓄实名制度;制定专门的《反贪污贿赂法》,严密法网,堵塞漏洞,减少腐败犯罪的机会,提高犯罪成本。     

How Chinese e-public feel and think about corruption: A case study of Audit Storm (Shenji fengbao – – Part I)

Corruption is pervasive, rampant, enduring, and above all else a tolerated and taken for granted social problem in China. Still, corruption is a major concern for the political leaders, general public and foreign observers. Foreigners complained about the corruption cost of doing business in China. Students took to the street and peasants staged violent protest against government corruption. The consensus is that corruption challenges CPC's legitimacy and threatens China's stability.A systematic review of literature uncovers no investigation on the Chinese people's reception and reaction to the corruption, in the net. This is a first attempt to do so.This is a research into the “feelings” and “thinking” of Chinese internet users (e-public) on (anti)corruption in China. Specially, it tries to document and analyze the comments – reaction of the e-public to news articles on various aspects of “Audit Storm” in June–July of 2004.