There are nothing but hard cases

Conclusion I have tried to suggest that two types of hard cases can be distinguished: real hard cases which appear when the game of justice is played and a situation appears which the play does not recognize, and false hard cases which are a part of an argument for a certain paradigm (often in key-concept reasoning). To recognize the latter kind of hard cases, one has to know the rules for the paradigm in which such hard cases function as examples.The solution of real hard cases can only be found through a study of how the game of justice is played. And to do this, it is also necessary to recognize the false problems which are caused by mixing in arguments from other language games. The investigation of hard cases must concentrate on what is most familiar to the players and try to separate the grammar of the game of justice from the experience that one can get from playing the game itself.     

Rights,goals, and hard cases

Rights have two properties which prima facie appear to be inconsistent. The first is that they are conditional in the sense that one some occasions it is always justifiable for someone to act in a way which appears to be inconsistent with someone else's rights, such as when the defence of necessity applies. The second is that rights are indefeasible in the sense that they are not subject to being defeated our outweighed by utilitarian or policy considerations. If we view rules and the rights which they establish as being subject to a ceteris paribus clause, the form of which generates out the exceptions, the conditionality of rights becomes reconcilable with their nondefeasibility. Such a view of rules and rights would entail that the goals of the law and their orderings be considered as a part of the law. When so viewed, propositions about goals and their orderings become legitimate premises for legal reasoning, furnishing solutions to hard cases in the law of torts, without resort to balancing of interests or judicial discretion.     

The ethics of promulgating principles of research ethics: the problem of diversion effects

There is an important distinction between ethical standards for the conduct of research with human subjects and the ethics of promulgating principles of research ethics. Those who promulgate ethical standards for the conduct of research have an ethical responsibility to consider the consequences to which those promulgations give rise. In particular, they must consider whether their promulgations will give researchers incentives not to conduct research or not to conduct research in locales in which participants would benefit from participation. I first show how such ‘diversion effects’ are possible and then examine four principles of research ethics in that light. I then consider several objections to the argument that those who promulgate principles of research ethics should consider diversion effects.     

Facing the Consequences

Many philosophers endorse deterrence justifications of legal punishment. According to these justifications, punishment is justified at least in part because it deters offenses. These justifications rely on empirical assumptions, e.g., that non-punitive enforcement can’t deter or that it can’t deter enough. I’ll challenge these assumptions and argue that extant deterrence justifications of legal punishment fail. I begin by isolating, in a simplified form, important claims common to deterrence justifications. I then endorse an uncontroversial claim about punishment and explore its implications for enforcement. These implications undermine the simple versions of the deterrence claims. I then evaluate several modifications of the claims to see whether they can be improved upon. I argue that they can’t easily be improved upon. In the process, I examine contemporary deterrence research and argue that it provides no support for deterrence justifications. I conclude by considering objections.     

Occupational health ethics: OSHA and the courts

Recent court decisions have stressed the necessity for cost-benefit analysis in evaluating Occupational and Safety Health Administration (OSHA) standards, thus raising difficult ethical questions which this paper analyzes using classical approaches of deontology and teleology. Since both modes of analysis have deficiencies, the need for a synthesis using economic and noneconomic measures is suggested.     

Navigating the minefield: legal ethics and healthcare law

Practicing law in the healthcare field is a daunting task due to the highly-regulated nature of the field and the increasing scrutiny of the conduct of industry providers, payors, and vendors. Attorneys must provide difficult opinions regarding matters with civil, criminal, and reimbursement implications and often are asked to represent multiple parties in healthcare-related settings. This article discusses some legal ethics issues for the healthcare practitioner and touches on some of the recent changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were adopted by the American Bar Association's House of Delegates at its mid-February 2002 meeting. The authors conduct their analysis by applying the model rules to a number of hypothetical fact situations typical of those encountered in the day-to-day practice of healthcare law.