'Liberation' or capture: Youth in between 'hakuma', and 'home' during civil war and its aftermath in Southern Sudan

Generational tension and youth crisis have been prominent themesin recent analyses of civil conflict in Africa. Field researchin Southern Sudan in 2004–2006 suggests that the analysisdoes not fit the Sudanese war. This article examines a structuralopposition between the sphere of military/government (the ‘hakuma’)and the sphere of ‘home’. It argues that to be a‘youth’ in Southern Sudan means to inhabit the tensionsof the space between these spheres. While attempting to resistcapture by either sphere, youth have used their recruitmentby the military to invest in their home or family sphere. Theiraspiration to ‘responsibility’ illustrates not generationalrebellion, but the moral continuity in local society, also evidentin discussions of marriage.     

The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts

Somalia's catastrophic humanitarian crisis of 2007, in whichup to 300,000 Mogadishu residents were displaced in fightingpitting Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government (TFG)forces against a complex insurgency of clan and Islamist opposition,was the culmination of a series of political miscalculationsand misjudgements on the part of Somali and external actorssince 2004. They resulted in a cascading sequence of politicalcrises which plunged Somalia into increasingly intractable conflicts.This ‘tragedy in five acts’ includes the flawedcreation of the TFG in late 2004, which emerged as a narrowcoalition rather than a government of national unity; the failureof a promising civic movement in Mogadishu in summer of 2005to challenge the power base of warlords and Islamists in thecapital; the disastrous decision by the US government to encouragean alliance between its local counter-terrorism partners inMogadishu, producing a war which led to the victory of the Councilof Islamic Courts (CIC) in June 2006; the radicalization ofthe CIC over the course of 2006, which guaranteed a war withEthiopia; and the Ethiopian offensive against the CIC in late2006, leading to its occupation of the capital, a complex insurgencyagainst Ethiopian forces and armed violence which produced whatthe UN described as a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’.In virtually every instance, key actors took decisions thatproduced unintended outcomes which harmed rather than advancedtheir interests, and at a cost in human lives and destructionof property that continues to mount.     

On the limits of liberal peace: Chiefs and democratic decentralization in post-war Sierra Leone

Liberal peace, the explicit merging of international securityand development policy, has arrived fairly late on the scenein Sierra Leone. One of its primary foci is regimes of customarygovernance and sociality associated with chiefdom administration.Many international agencies consider these regimes irredeemablyoppressive towards the rural poor and a root cause of the recentcivil war. While the present government of Sierra Leone remainssupportive of chieftaincy, international donors are supportinga fast-track decentralization programme that, it is hoped, willsupply a new system of democratic governance to a rural populacealready straining against the leash of ‘custom’.This article, drawing upon the author’s recent fieldworkin Sierra Leone, undertakes a critical examination of this policy.It is argued that, popular grievances notwithstanding, chieftaincyis the historic focus of struggles for political control overthe Sierra Leonean countryside. Both the national elite andthe rural poor remain deeply engaged in these struggles, andmany among the latter continue to value customary authorityas a defence against the abuse of bureaucratic power. Fast-trackingdecentralization in the war-ravaged countryside may thereforeonly succeed in shifting the balance of political power awayfrom the poor.     

BETWIXT AND BETWEEN: 'TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY' AND DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION IN POST-WAR MOZAMBIQUE

The end of civil war in Mozambique has been accompanied by democratizationof political processes, as exemplified by the 1994 multi-partypresidential and parliamentary elections. Under the rubric ofdemocratization, the issue of state decentralization has alsobeen raised. Current political debates focus on what role ‘traditionalauthority’ might play in local governance. Advocates arguethat ‘traditional authority’ constitutes a genuinelyAfrican form of local governance, while detractors suggest thatthese institutions were irrevocably corrupted by their involvementwith the colonial administration. This article challenges notonly the black-and-white framework in which the present-day‘legitimacy’ of ‘traditional authority’has been debated, but also questions the value of the term ‘traditionalauthority’ itself. The article explores the diverse historiesof kin-based political institutions in Mozambique, arguing thatthe meaning and function of ‘traditional authority’has been transformed many times over with changes in the largerpolitical contexts in which local institutions have existed.As a result of historical events, the issue of ‘traditionalauthority’ is, today, intimately bound up with the dividebetween the ruling FRELIMO party and the opposition, RENAMO.Only by approaching the issue of ‘traditional authority’through an understanding of its variegated and contentious historywill policy-makers and Mozambican residents alike be able totranscend existing political divides on issues of local governance.     

Fluid Loyalties in a Regional Crisis: Chadian 'Ex-Liberators' in the Central African Republic

This article examines a neglected pattern of the regional crisisin Darfur, Chad, and the Central African Republic: the cross-borderactivities of combatants with fluid loyalties. The trajectoriesof Chadian ‘ex-liberators’ in CAR, which have beenlittle documented, are used to illustrate the regional movementsof armed men. The article explains how unemployed Chadian soldierswere recruited to fight with François Bozizé inCAR and why many of them joined other armed groups after Bozizé'stakeover. The reconversions of armed combatants, who may easilyshift allegiance and cross borders to carry on with their ‘politico-militarycareers’, is thus a structural characteristic of the currentconflict, which has major implications both at the local andtransnational levels. The article concludes that freelance militaryentrepreneurs’ trajectories are crucial in understandingthe unfolding of this regional crisis.     

INTRODUCING RACE AS A VARIABLE INTO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KENYA DEBATE: AN INCENDIARY IDEA

The debate on the nature and development potential of ‘indigenous’capitalism in Kenya seemed to have petered off indecisivelyin the 1980s. At that time some form of socialism was stillan option for some of the debaters. Following the seemingly-globalacceptance of free-enterprise as the developmental model ofchoice, however, the Kenya debate has been resurrected but ina different intellectual guise. In line with the revival (especiallyin the United States) of culture and ethnicity as determinantsof economic prosperity, some non-Kenyan authors have faultedthe 1980s literature for leaving out Kenyan-Asian capitalists,the principal protagonists of local entrepreneurship, who, itis argued accounted for Kenya's outstanding development performancein the high-growth years before independence in 1963, and theonset of economic regress under the Moi government in the early1980s, by dint of their industry and cultural heritage. Withoutgiving in to the undeserved Asian-bashing which this thesishas provoked in some Kenya-African political circles, this articleprovides evidence that credit for Kenya's economic achievementsis more widespread and more race neutral. So is credit for thecorruption and crass mismanagement that has characterized theMoi years. Considering the low intellectual pay-off and thehigh political dangers inherent in careless introduction ofrace and culture as operating variables to explain growth, thearticle advocates greater attention to analytical concepts thatshow more promise in accounting for inter-ethnic differencesin material prosperity. These include law-based governance,a stable macroeconomic environment, and the strengthening of‘social capital’ at community level.     

日本增加农民收入的途径及启示

农业在国民经济中处于基础地位,增加农民收入是刺激农村消费需求、提高农村购买力、扩大内需的重要途径。日本在增加农民收入方面的成功经验主要包括政府的大力扶持、农业经营模式的完善、全方位的科技研发推广及积极推动城乡互动发展等。从日本经验的总结中我们可以得出一些有益的启示：建立完备的法律法规;完善农民合作经济组织体系;加大政府对农业的补贴及政策倾斜;灵活运用WTO的相关规定和原则;加强农业科技开发的推广和劳动者素质的提高;实现城乡互动发展。     

THE GHANAIAN ELECTIONS OF 1996: TOWARDS THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY?

Foreign donors expended over $23 million on micro-managing theDecember 1996 Ghanaian elections in an attempt to ensure thatthe process was technically ‘free and fair’. Owingpartly to this expenditure and partly to the efficiency andimpartiality of the Electoral Commission, the conduct of theelections was in fact remarkably technically correct. The losingopposition parties still complained, however, that PresidentRawlings and his party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC),exploited the advantages of incumbency to a degree that renderedthe result ‘free but not really fair’. The articleargues that such very limited acceptance of election results,however justified or unjustified, is almost bound to obtainin economically underdeveloped African societies where, partlyfor structural and partly for cultural reason, politics continuesto be very much a zero-sum game characterized by high levelsof distrust. This in turn suggests limits to the likely consolidationof multi-party democracy. The article also analyses the reasonsfor the electoral victory of Rawlings and the NDC, arguing thatit hinged on the rural population's trust in Rawlings' abilityto provide rural development and political stability.     

The geography of regime survival: Abacha's Nigeria

This article examines the state-creation process in Nigeriain the context of military regime survival in the 1990s. Nigeriaentered a period of protracted political crisis following theannulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election and theentrenchment of the Abacha military government. The southwest,or Yorubaland,was the hotbed of opposition to continued militaryrule. This research shows how the Abacha government utilizedthe neo-colonial strategy of ‘divide and survive’to fragment opposition in Yorubaland, and how the governmentdivided regional opposition both socially and spatially. A localcoalition of Ekiti elites chose statehood over solidarity withtheir fellow Yorubas opposing Abacha, particularly those alignedwith Afenifere and the Oduduwa People’s Congress. Newstate movements — like that for Ekiti State — promotedmore local identities at the expense of pan-Yoruba solidarityand unified opposition to the regime. The article is based onsix months of fieldwork in Nigeria in 2002, including a casestudy of the movement for the creation of Ekiti State. Overall,it seeks to contribute to our understanding of the geographyof regime survival.     

Sharia and control over territory: conflicts between 'settlers' and 'indigenes' in Nigeria

Introducing Islamic laws is a means of setting up claims overterritory in which the will of Muslims reigns supreme. Thishas led to violent conflicts, especially in parts of the MiddleBelt of Nigeria, where Muslim ‘settlers’ from thenorth, most of them Hausa and Fulani, have clashed with indigenousethnic groups which are largely Christian and ‘traditionalist’.The call for Sharia is popular among the migrants, as it providesthem with a divine mission: they have to assume supremacy overthe local non-Muslim population in order to shape public institutionsaccording to what they see as the will of God. The ‘indigenes’,however, have little interest in a religious confrontation.As ‘sons of the soil’, they want to defend theirancestral land against ‘foreign tribes’; they thereforeemphasize ethnic, not religious, antagonisms.     

Social capital, social liabilities, and political capital: Social networks and informal manufacturing in Nigeria

This article addresses the question of why social networks havefailed to promote economic development in Africa when they havebeen associated with economic growth in other parts of the world.Detailed field research traces the role of social networks inthe economic organization of two dynamic informal enterpriseclusters in the town of Aba in south-eastern Nigeria, an arearenowned for the density of its popular economic networks andfor the rapid development of small-scale manufacturing underNigeria’s structural adjustment programme. Focusing onthe role of embedded social institutions and their restructuringamid the competitive pressures of rapid liberalization, I considerthe extent to which social networks in Aba constitute ‘socialcapital’ capable of promoting economic development inthe context of ongoing liberalization, ‘social liabilities’that undermine accumulation through a social logic of redistributionand parochialism, or ‘political capital’ throughwhich popular forces are incorporated into the ‘shadowstructures’ of predatory states. This article challengesthe essentialism of much of the contemporary literature on Africansocial networks, arguing for a sharper focus on the specificinstitutional capacities of indigenous economic institutions.It calls for greater attention to the role of rapid liberalizationand state neglect in explaining the developmental failures ofAfrican informal enterprise networks.     

AIDS, security and the military in Africa: A sober appraisal

This article examines four accepted wisdoms about HIV/AIDS andAfrican armies and in each case concludes that substantial revisionis necessary in the light of emerging evidence. First, it appearsthat military populations do not necessarily have a higher prevalenceof HIV than civilian populations. HIV levels in armies dependon many factors including the demographics of the army, itspattern of deployment, the nature and stage of the epidemicin the country concerned, and the measures taken to controlthe disease by the military authorities. Second, although theepidemic has the potential to undermine the functioning of nationalmilitaries, and may have done so in isolated instances, armiesin general are well placed to withstand the threat. Third, evidencethat war contributes to the spread of the virus is meagre andsuggests that we should be concerned primarily with specificrisks that conflict may entail including population mobilityand changing sexual networks. Lastly, the hypothesis that AIDShas the potential to disrupt national, regional, and internationalsecurity remains speculative. ^1. Roger Yeager, Craig Hendrix, and Stuart Kingma, ‘Internationalmilitary Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiencysyndrome policies and programs: strengths and limitations incurrent practice’, Military Medicine 165, 2 (2000), pp.87–92. ^2. S. Kingma, ‘AIDS prevention in military populations: learningthe lessons of history’, International AIDS Society Newsletter,4, March 1996, pp. 9–11. ^3. UNAIDS, ‘AIDS and the military: UNAIDS point of view’,UNAIDS Best Practice Collection, May 1998 (http://www.unaids.org/html/pub/publications/irc-pub05/militarypv_en_pdf.pdf,9 January, 2005). ^4. A.E. Pettifor, H.V. Rees, A. Steffenson, L. Hlongwa-Madikizela,C. MacPhail, K. Vermaak, and I. Kleinschmidt, HIV and SexualBehaviour Among Young South Africans: A national survey of 15–24year olds (Reproductive Health Research Unit, University ofWitwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2004). ^5. According to a South African AIDS Law Project press releaseof 23 October 2003, ‘the SANDF has however excluded andcontinues to exclude job applicants with HIV from employmentin the SANDF’ (http://www.alp.org.za/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=229,16 April, 2005). ^6. Yigeremu Abebe, Ab Schaap, Girmatchew Mamo, Asheber Negussie,Birke Darimo, Dawit Wolday, and Eduard J. Sanders, ‘HIVprevalence in 72,000 urban and rural army recruits, Ethiopia’,AIDS 17, 12 (2003), pp. 1835–40. ^7. Taddesse Berhe, Hagos Gemechu, and Alex de Waal, ‘Warand HIV prevalence: evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia’, AfricanSecurity Review 14, 3 (2005), pp. 107–14. ^8. Olive Shisana, Leickness Simbayi, and E. Dorkenoo, ‘SouthAfrica’s first national population-based HIV/AIDS behaviouralrisks, sero-status and media impact survey (SABSSM) researchproject’ (Third Quarterly Progress Report, Household Survey2002, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 2002). ^9. UNAIDS, ‘AIDS and the military’, UNAIDS TechnicalUpdate, 1998 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/aidsleadership/dls_AIDS_military_may14.pdf,July 21, 2004); ‘Military populations’ AIDS Briefs(http://www.heard.org.za/publications/AidsBriefs/sec/military.pdf,December 22, 2005). ^10. Tsadkan Gebre Tensae, ‘HIV/AIDS in the Ethiopian military:perceptions, strategies and impacts’ (unpublished paper,2002). ^11. A. Adefalolu, ‘HIV/AIDS as an occupational hazard to soldiers– ECOMOG experience’ (Paper presented at the 3rdAll Africa Congress of Armed Forces and Police Medical Services,Pretoria, 1999), pp. 4–11. ^12. M. Fleshman, ‘AIDS prevention in the ranks – UNtarget peacekeepers, combatants in war against the disease’,African Recovery 15, 1–2 (2004), pp. 9–10. ^13. The same was true in Thailand, where the army responded in advanceof the government. ^14. ‘HIV/AIDS and Uniformed Services: Analysing the Evidence’.Expert Meeting, Cape Town, December 6–7, 2004 called byUNAIDS and attended by Alan Whiteside. ^15. Edward Hooper, Slim (Bodley Head, London, 1990); Edward Hooper,The River: A journey to the source of HIV and AIDS (Penguin,London, 2000), pp. 42–9. ^16. Robert Shell, ‘The silent revolution: HIV/AIDS and militarybases in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Consolidating Democracy,Seminar Report Series (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, East London,2000), pp. 29–41. ^17. Reinhard Kaiser, Paul Spiegel, Peter Salama, William Brady,Elizabeth Bell, Kyle Bond, and Marie Downer, ‘HIV/AIDSseroprevalence and behavioral risk factor survey in Sierra Leone,April 2002’ (Center for Disease Control and Prevention,Atlanta, GA, 2002). ^18. C. Mulanga, S. Bazepeo, J. Mwamba, C. Butel, J.-W. Tshimpaka,M. Kashi, F. Lepira, M. Carael, M. Peeters, and E. Delaporte,‘Political and socio-economic instability: how does itaffect HIV? A case study in the Democratic Republic of Congo’,AIDS 18, 5 (2004), pp. 832–4. ^19. Taddesse Berhe, Hagos Gemechu, and Alex de Waal, ‘Warand HIV prevalence: evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia’, AfricanSecurity Review 14, 3 (2005), pp. 107–14. ^20. Tim Allen, ‘AIDS, security and democratic governance’,The Hague, 2–4 May 2005. Presentation at expert seminar. ^21. Paul Spiegel, ‘HIV/AIDS among conflict-affected and displacedpopulations: dispelling myths and taking action’, Disasters28, 4 (2004), pp. 322–39. ^22. African Rights, Rwanda: Broken bodies, torn spirits; livingwith genocide, rape and HIV/AIDS (African Rights, Kigali, 2004);V. Randell, ‘Sexual violence and genocide against Tutsiwomen. Propaganda and sexual violence in the Rwandan genocide:an argument for intersectionality in international law’,Columbia Human Rights Law Review 33, 3 (2002), pp. 733–55. ^23. Kaiser et al., ‘HIV/AIDS seroprevalence’. ^24. P. Fourie and M. Schönteich, ‘Africa’s newsecurity threat: HIV/AIDS and human security in southern Africa’,African Security Review 10, 4 (2001), pp. 29–44; M. Schönteich,‘AIDS and age: SA’s crime time bomb’, AIDSAnalysis Africa 10, 2 (1999), pp. 1–4. ^25. Rachel Bray, ‘Predicting the social consequences of orphanhoodin South Africa’ (Working Paper No. 29, Centre for SocialScience Research, University of Cape Town, 2003).     

Rural industrialization in China: From backyard furnaces to township and village enterprises

This article examines the development of rural industrialization in China from the late 1950s to the mid-1990s. The initial attempt to industrialize China during the Great Leap Forward resulted in a short-lived rural industrialization program, epitomized by the frenzied establishment of hundreds of thousands of backyard furnaces. The second wave of rural industrialization came in the late 1960s and gave rise to the development of local “five small industries” aimed at providing goods and services for agricultural development. Since the introduction of economic reforms in the late 1970s, rural enterprises, known as township and village enterprises, have experienced explosive growth. They are no longer limited to the five small industries, but are engaged in producing consumer goods for both domestic and international markets. This article looks into the driving forces behind the growth of TVEs during the 1980s and examines the evolving roles and challenges they face in the 1990s. Li tu bu li xiang jin chang bu jin cheng. (Leave the land but not the village; enter the factory but not the city.) —A popular Chinese saying about rural industrialization in the 1980s This is based on a background review chapter of his doctoral dissertation, entitled “Industrialization and Energy Use: An Emprical Study of China's Township and Willage Enterprises,” University of Pennsylvania, 1997.     

SOUTH AFRICAN LAND REFORM: CASE-STUDIES IN 'DEMAND' AND 'PARTICIPATION' IN THE FREE STATE

This article offers an ethnographic cross-section in one provinceof South Africa's new land reform programme. ‘Demand’and ‘participation’ are the rhetorical keywordsof the programme. Demand for land redistribution, however, cannotbe understood in abstraction from the political and economicconditions of its supply. Similarly, ‘participation’is a managed process involving many institutional intermediaries.A series of illustrative case-studies is presented, relatingto the allocation of state-owned land; state-facilitated ‘market’access to privately-owned land; the reconstruction and partialprivatization of a para-statal development agency, which havebrought into question the viability of a ‘community conservation’project and also exposed the agency to political cross-fire;and, finally, some intricacies of the possibility of land restitutionto people dispossessed under apartheid, which raises the questionof whether the concept of indirect racial discrimination maybe applied in the South African context. Several contradictionsof the process of land redistribution are analysed: for example,the massive financial costs, direct and indirect, of bringingprojects to fruition in the short term, without resolution ofthe need for long-term support; the divergence between nominaland actual beneficiaries; political and institutional conflicts,both inside and outside the state; and routine incompatibilitybetween the diverse aspirations of beneficiaries and the ‘businessplans’ required by bureaucrats and suppliers of credit.     

The Elephant, Umbrella, and Quarrelling Cocks: Disaggregating Partisanship in Ghana's Fourth Republic

Within the literature on Ghanaian partisanship, a healthy debatehas arisen between those viewing Ghana’s two dominantparties as cleaved along socioeconomic lines and those suggestingthat this cleavage runs along ethnic lines. Using election results,constituency maps, census data, and a survey of voters’‘cognitive shortcuts’, this article weighs in withthe debate. The findings suggest that ethnicity matters in Ghanaianelections far more than socioeconomic variables. The findingsdo not, however, lead easily towards the gloomy predictionsthat often accompany ethnic politics. The relationship betweenethnicity and partisanship in Ghana is far more complex. Datapresented here suggest that Asante and Ewe voters are likelyto vote for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and National DemocraticCongress (NDC), respectively, regardless of the candidates theyselect. Voters of other ethnic backgrounds, who make up thevast majority of Ghanaian voters, view the dominant partiesas representative of Asante and Ewe interests but do not themselvesvote as a block and base their evaluations of the ‘Asante’and ‘Ewe’ parties ultimately on things other thanethnicity. It is this latter group of voters that makes Ghanaianelections unpredictable and discourages politicians from turningnational votes into a zero-sum ethnic censes.     

The Politics of Land Acquisition in Haryana: Managing Dominant Caste Interests in the Name of Development

ABSTRACT

Anti-Special Economic Zone (SEZ) mobilisation in Haryana failed to generate a mass movement. This is despite the political strength of farmers and their deep resentment of the government’s policy to build up land reserves for industrial purposes. This article argues that there are two main reasons for this outcome. First, the state government put in place a series of significant policies to compensate landowners and give them a stake in the industrial project, primarily through payment of an “annuity.” Second, the main anti-SEZ movements were led by dominant landowning castes who did not incorporate the concerns of landless labourers and tenant farmers who faced equally or even more dire consequences from the government’s land acquisition policy. Moreover, mobilisation relied on traditional caste institutions such as khap panchayats and farmer unions strongly associated with Jats, rather than adopting a more broad-based approach. Entrenched caste animosity and pre-existing conflicts of interest between landed Jats and Dalits, who have traditionally worked as agricultural labourers, further explain the limited scope of the mobilisation among rural groups. The analysis underscores how hierarchical relations shape social movements, define the claims they make and ultimately impact their effectiveness.     

ERRATA

The Editors regret that the following mistakes occurred in thetext of the article ‘The Great West African Drought, 1972–74’,by Jonathan Derrick, which appeared in the October 1977 numberof the journal. The main reason for these mistakes was a breakdownin communications between the editors and the author, whilethe article was being processed for publication. P. 540—line 36: The word ‘population’ shouldbe inserted after ‘West-Indian style’. P. 543—line 33: ‘1969–70’ should read‘1970–71’. P. 544—line 34: ‘Ivory Coast’ should read‘Upper Volta’. P. 546, Table: The Maiduguri figures are incorrect and shouldbe ignored (The author apologizes to the source of the statisticsfor this misquotation). P. 548—line 12: ‘eruption’ should read ‘irruption’. P. 564—note 69 refers to the sentence ‘In fact ...for tax’, not to the preceding sentence. P. 569—note 87: ‘Protection’ should be ‘Production’. P. 571—note 94 should be deleted. P. 582—line 34: ‘affected’ should be ‘effective’.      

Inadequately self-critical: Rwanda's self-assessment for the African peer review mechanism

During the first stage of the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD) peer review process, the country under reviewcompiles a report on the state of economic, political, social,and corporate governance in the country. This article examinesRwanda’s evaluation of its political governance duringthis first stage, as reflected in the January 2005 version ofthis country’s self-assessment report. After sketchingthe compromised political environment in which the report waswritten, it is indicated how this rosy report inadequately addressesa number of serious political problems in Rwanda, such as Rwanda’sinvolvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the inadequateseparation of powers in the Rwandan political system, tensionsin Rwandan society, and the flawed presidential and parliamentaryelections of 2003. While it remains to be seen to what extentRwanda either acknowledges its political problems in the finalversion of its self-assessment report, or is censured in thesubsequent stages of the peer review process, it is concludedthat the greater the failure to do either, the greater the doubtthat will linger over the value of the African peer-review exercise. ^1. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Memorandum of understanding on theAfrican Peer Review Mechanism’ (http://www.nepad.org,17 July, 2005). ^2. P. Chabal, ‘The quest for good government and developmentin Africa: is NEPAD the answer?’ International Affairs78, 3 (2002), pp. 447–62; I. Taylor, NEPAD: Towards Africa’sdevelopment or another false start? (Lynne Rienner, Boulder,CO, 2005). ^3. See Taylor, NEPAD, pp. 15–44. ^4. On this problem, see ibid, pp. 61–74. ^5. M. Katzenellenbogen and W. Hartley, ‘No political peerreview, says Mbeki’, Business Day, 31 October, 2002. ^6. T. Mbeki, ‘Critics ill-informed about NEPAD peer review’,ANC Official Home Page (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at45.htm,27 July, 2005). ^7. Ibid. ^8. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, Rwanda Country Self-Assessment Reportfor the African Peer Review Mechanism (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat,Kigali, 2005). The 230-page report consists of an introduction,followed by four chapters, each addressing one of the thematicareas set out in the questionnaire. ^9. On Kigali’s ‘official line’, see J. Pottier,Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, survival and disinformation inthe late twentieth century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2002). ^10. During the second stage of the peer review process, the countryvisit by the Country Review Team, this team’s ‘priorityorder of business will be to carry out the widest possible rangeof consultations with the Government, officials, political parties,parliamentarians and representatives of civil society organizationsincluding the media, academia, trade unions, business and professionalbodies’: NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines for countriesto prepare for and to participate in the African Peer ReviewMechanism (APRM)’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm/aprmguidelinesforcountryreview200104final.pdf,27 July, 2005). Never mind that ‘representatives of civilsociety organizations’ in Rwanda tend to be not all thatindependent from the government, the NEPAD documents make nomention of possible consultations with embassy staff, the UNand its agencies, international financial instutions, internationalchurch groups and international NGOs — groups that wouldbe able to broaden the perspectives of the Country Review Team. ^11. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration on democracy, political,economic, and corporate governance’, NEPAD Official HomePage (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/2.pdf, 15 July,2005). ^12. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism(APRM) base document’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf,22 July, 2005). ^13. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines’. ^14. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment for the AfricanPeer Review Mechanism’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/156.pdf,24 January, 2005). ^15. Ibid. ^16. Ibid. ^17. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM base document’. ^18. According to Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM NationalCommission’, Rwanda NEPAD Magazine 1 (2004), pp. 14–16. ^19. Ibid, p. 14. ^20. NEPAD Secretariat, Final Report: African Peer Review Mechanismcountry support mission to Rwanda, 21–June 24, 2004 (NEPADSecratariat, Midrand, 2004), p. 4. ^21. Ibid. ^22. On the extent of presidential and senatorial appointments, seeGovernment of Rwanda, The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda(Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Kigali, 2003),Articles 88 and 113. ^23. In May 2003, Pro-Femmes sided with the government and attackedHuman Rights Watch for being ‘divisive’: UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2003’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27744.htm,27 January, 2005). ^24. They were Aimable Kabanda (African Peer Review Focal Point,Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat), Alex Semarintoya (Ministry of LocalGovernment), Solange Tuyisenge (Member of the National Assembly)and James Ngango (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). ^25. US Department of State, ‘Country Report 2003’; UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2004’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41621.htm,23 July, 2005). ^26. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: human rights organizationforced to close down’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470012005,22 January, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: preparingfor elections: tightening control in the name of unity’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503.bck.htm,9 February, 2005). ^27. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration’, op. cit. ^28. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué: The African PeerReview (APRM) support mission to Rwanda’, Southern AfricanRegional Poverty Network Official Home Page (http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000845/P958-Rwanda_APRM.pdf,31 July, 2005). ^29. Nepad Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^30. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 26. ^31. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: observing the rules ofwar?’ Human Rights Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/rwanda2,15 February, 2005). ^32. See Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:killing human decency’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620072000,9 February, 2005); Amnesty International, ‘DemocraticRepublic of Congo: Rwandese-controlled east: devastating humantoll’, Amnesty International Official Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620112001,19 July, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Observing the rulesof war?’ ^33. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo:"Our brothers who help kill us" — economic exploitationand human rights abuses in the east’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620102003,19 July, 2005). ^34. T. Longman, ‘The complex reasons for Rwanda’s engagementin Congo’, in J.F. Clark (ed.), The African Stakes ofthe Congo War (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002), p. 136. ^35. Government of Rwanda, ‘Reply to the final report (documentS/2002/1146) of the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitationof natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo’ (http://www.afrol.com/Countries/Rwanda/documents/reply_un_resources_2002.htm,15 June, 2005). ^36. Amnesty International, ‘Our brothers who help kill us’. ^37. United Nations, ‘Final report of the panel of expertson the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other formsof wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UnitedNations in Denmark Official Home Page (http://www.un.dk/doc/S20021146.pdf,10 February, 2005). See also Amnesty International, ‘Ourbrother who help kill us’. ^38. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^39. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:Arming the east’, Amnesty International Official HomePage (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620062005,14 July, 2005). ^40. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 25. ^41. Amnesty International, ‘Arming the East’. ^42. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^43. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 36. ^44. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^45. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’; USDepartment of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^46. F. Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide todictatorship’, African Affairs 103, 411 (2004), p. 187. ^47. Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, p. 9. ^48. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^49. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^50. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^51. National Electoral Commission, ‘Executive summaries ofNational Electoral Commission reports on the constitutionalreferendum, presidential and parliamentary elections’,National Electoral Commission of Rwanda Offical Home Page (http://www.comelena.gov.rw/english/resumeelection2003.html,18 July, 2005). ^52. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^53. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^54. European Union Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report2003’, EU Official Home Page (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/rwanda/moe_ue_final_2003.pdf,25 July, 2005). ^55. During the presidential elections (August 2003), the incumbent,Paul Kagame, won 95 percent of the vote, while his party, theRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), won 74 percent of the vote inthe parliamentary elections (September 2003). ^57. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: government slams dooron political life and civil society’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470122004,22 January, 2005); US Department of State, ‘Country report2003’. ^56. The US Department of State referred to the 2003 presidentialelections as ‘seriously marred’: US Department ofState, ‘Country report 2003’. ^58. Amnesty International, ‘Government slams door’;Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: run-up to presidentialelections marred by threats and harassment’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470102003,22 January, 2005); I. Samset and O. Dalby, ‘Rwanda: presidentialand parliamentary elections 2003’, Norwegian Centre forHuman Rights Official Home Page (http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2003/12.pdf,28 February, 2005). ^59. Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: resolve disappearances, assassination’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/05/04/rwanda133.htm,9 February, 2005). ^60. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: deeper into the abyss— waging war on civil society’ Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470132004,22 January 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^61. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^62. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^63. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^64. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^65. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report 2003’. ^66. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^67. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^68. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report’. ^69. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^70. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^71. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^72. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’, emphasisadded. ^73. Amnesty International, ‘Devastating human toll’(http://web.amnesty.org, 19 July, 2005). ^74. As had happened during the previous year, as during 2004 Rwanda’sjudiciary ‘was subject to presidential influence’:US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^75. N. van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of PermanentCrisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge University Press, 2001),p. 51. ^76. On this tension, see Chabal, ‘Good government and developmentin Africa’; Taylor, NEPAD. ^77. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué issued at the endof the third summit of the Committee of Participating Headsof State and Government in the African Peer Review Mechanism(APR Forum), 19 June, 2005, Abuja, Nigeria’, Institutefor Security Studies Official Home Page (http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/nepad/aprm/comsum3jun05.pdf,28 July, 2005).