The Boundaries of Property: Complexity,Relationality, and Spatiality

What does the property boundary mean to laypersons? How do everyday geographies of property work? Merrill and Smith offer an influential set of hypotheses concerning the boundary's role in communicating simple messages of exclusion in the everyday world. The first goal of this article is to assess these claims. Drawing from qualitative data on gardening from Vancouver, I suggest that the messages of the boundary may also be complex, intersubjective, and ambiguous. The supposedly robust moral intuitions that inform people's interactions with boundaries are not always exclusionary. Drawing from the sharp distinction between the heterogeneity of the empirical record and the studied simplicity of Merrill and Smith's account, my second goal is to make some broader claims regarding property and the boundary. Rather than seeking universality, simplicity, and singularity, I suggest the necessity and value of working with complexity. A relational view of property and space (or “spatiality”), I suggest, offers us a better perspective in which to begin to think about the complex work of the everyday property boundary.     

隐私的价值独特性:个人信息为何应受保护?

要想准确理解已经开始施行的《个人信息保护法》,就必须恰当回答“个人信息为何值得保护”的问题,而这个问题的答案经常与“隐私”的价值关联在一起。但是,对隐私的理解,主要被一种“隐私并不具备独特价值”的化约论所统治;因此,只有击败化约论,才能最终证明隐私的价值独特性,也才能最终说明隐私为何值得保护。击败隐私化约论最主要的理由是,如果认为隐私不具备价值独特性,那么对任何特定个体而言,就只能提供“我是我”的对待,而这种对待将会带来贬损、甚至否认“我是人”的结果,这将会严重损害人的尊严。     

Citizen acceptance of police interventions: an example of CCTV surveillance in Las Vegas,Nevada

Efforts to install crime cameras in public are sometimes met with resistance from segments of the community who raise concerns over personal privacy. Drawing on an example from Las Vegas, NV, this paper explores community acceptance of CCTV cameras placed in a high-crime public location. In doing so, the paper applies a theoretical model that describes the mechanism by which private citizens accept interventions developed by police or other security officials. The paper analyzes specific privacy concerns raised by camera opponents and classifies the methods that police used to address those concerns and gain community support.     

Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human Body?

This article compares three frameworks for legal regulation of the human body. Property law systematically favors those who use the body to create commercial products. Yet contract and privacy rights cannot compete with the property paradigm, which alone affords a complete bundle of rights enforceable against the whole world. In the face of researchers' property rights, the theoretical freedom to contract and the meager interest in privacy leave those who supply body parts vulnerable to exploitation.     

Disentangling privacy from property: toward a deeper understanding of genetic privacy

With the mapping of the human genome, genetic privacy has become a concern to many. People care about genetic privacy because genes play an important role in shaping us--our genetic information is about us, and it is deeply connected to our sense of ourselves. In addition, unwanted disclosure of our genetic information, like a great deal of other personal information, makes us vulnerable to unwanted exposure, stigmatization, and discrimination. One recent approach to protecting genetic privacy is to create property rights in genetic information. This Article argues against that approach. Privacy and property are fundamentally different concepts. At heart, the term "property" connotes control within the marketplace and over something that is disaggregated or alienable from the self. "Privacy," in contrast, connotes control over access to the self as well as things close to, intimately connected to, and about the self. Given these different meanings, a regime of property rights in genetic information would impoverish our understanding of that information, ourselves, and the relationships we hope will be built around and through its disclosure. This Article explores our interests in genetic information in order to deepen our understanding of the ongoing discourse about the distinction between property and privacy. It develops a conception of genetic privacy with a strong relational component. We ordinarily share genetic information in the context of relationships in which disclosure is important to the relationship--family, intimate, doctor-patient, researcher-participant, employer-employee, and insurer-insured relationships. Such disclosure makes us vulnerable to and dependent on the person to whom we disclose it. As a result, trust is essential to the integrity of these relationships and our sharing of genetic information. Genetic privacy can protect our vulnerability in these relationships and enhance the trust we hope to have in them. Property, in contrast, by connoting commodification, disaggregation, and arms-length dealings, can negatively affect the self and harm these relationships. This Article concludes that a deeper understanding of genetic privacy calls for remedies for privacy violations that address dignitary harm and breach of trust, as opposed to market harms, as the property model suggests.     

Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era

This article examines the impact of the Human Rights Act (HRA) on the current lack of a remedy for non-consensual publication of personal information by the media. It argues that the action for breach of confidence is now ripe for development into a privacy law in all but name and that the normative impetus for this enterprise can be found in the HRA which will require domestic courts to consider Convention jurisprudence. It will suggest that when Strasbourg decisions are examined in the context of more general Convention doctrines, they may be seen to suggest the need for an effective privacy remedy. Drawing upon approaches from other jurisdictions it seeks to demonstrate that principled solutions may be found to the thicket of legal problems associated with such development. It contends that the main objection to this enterprise, the perceived threat to media freedom, is largely misplaced, as analysis at the theoretical and doctrinal levels reveals that speech and privacy interests are in many respects mutually supportive and the areas of conflict small and readily susceptible to resolution.     

Laws of Inclusion and Exclusion: Nomos,Nationalism and the Other

This article explores how and why contemporary nationalist ‘defence leagues’ in Australia and the UK invoke fantasies of law. I argue these fantasies articulate with Carl Schmitt’s theory of ‘nomos’, which holds that law functions as a spatial order of reason that both produces and is produced by land qua the territory of the nation. To elucidate the ideological function of law for defence leagues, I outline a theory of law as it relates to (political) subjectivity. Drawing on the work of Foucault, Agamben and Brown, I demonstrate how subjects form and are formed by historically contingent relationships to law in the contemporary neo-liberal moment. Turning to Lacan, I show how nationalistic invocations of law provide nationalists with a fantasy that the nation’s law represents them and holds them together (as the nation itself). Similarly, I argue that nationalists imagine that the other has their own law as well, which not only corresponds to the other, but functions as a legible index of the other’s otherness—a metonym for the threatening uncertainty and radical difference that the other represents. Drawing on Lacan’s concept of the big Other, I ultimately argue that nationalists aggressively (re)assert law not only to defend the nation, but to ensure their own symbolic and ontological security therein.

     

The Liberal Value of Privacy

This paper presents an argument for the value of privacy that is based on a purely negative concept of freedom only. I show that privacy invasions may decrease a person’s negative freedom as well as a person’s knowledge about the negative freedom she possesses. I argue that not only invasions that lead to actual interference, but also invasions that lead to potential interference (many cases of identity theft) constitute actual harm to the invadee’s liberty interests, and I critically examine the courts’ reliance on a principle of ‘no harm, no foul’ in recent data breach cases. Using a number of insights from the psychology of human belief, I also show that the liberal claim for protection of privacy is strengthened by the observation that often the privacy invader cannot be held responsible for the influence on the invadee’s negative freedom.     

Public charge,legal estrangement,and renegotiating situational trust in the US healthcare safety net

US immigration law increasingly excludes many immigrants materially and symbolically from vital safety-net resources. Existing scholarship has emphasized the public charge rule as a key mechanism for enacting these exclusionary trends, but less is known about how recent public charge uncertainty has shaped how noncitizens and healthcare workers negotiate safety-net resources. Drawing on ethnographic observations and interviews with 80 safety-net workers and patients in three US states from 2015 to 2020, I argue that intensifying anti-immigrant rhetoric surrounding public charge has extended a sense of surveillance into clinical spaces in previously unexamined ways. Drawing on theories of medical legal violence, system avoidance, and legal estrangement, I demonstrate how these dynamics undermined immigrants' health chances and compromised clinic workers' efforts to facilitate care. I also reveal how participants responded to this insinuation of legal violence in healthcare spaces by promoting situational trust in specific procedures and institutions.     

论隐私权的宪法保护——以自媒体时代为分析背景

自媒体在彰显言论自由之对,也打开了一扇偷窥公民隐私之窗.在宪法视野下,隐私权已经超越部门法的疆域上升为一项基本人权.在自媒体时代,侵犯公民隐私权的特征表现为隐蔽性、侵财性、便捷性和严重性,隐私权的传统法律保护模式遭遇了新的挑战.宪法对公民隐私权加以保护有其合理性与必要性.隐私权的宪法保护路径在于明确隐私权是一项列举的人权,强化违宪审查制度的贯彻执行,并通过部门法落实和实施该项权利,建立一个由宪法统领的、由部门法具体实施的、多层级和全方位的立体保护架构.     

What the publisher can teach the patient: intellectual property and privacy in an era of trusted privication

This article begins with a premise that intellectual property and privacy have something significant and yet understated in common: both are about balancing a creator's desire to control a particular set of data with consumers' desires to access and redistribute that data. Both law and technology influence such balancing, making it more or less palatable to use data for particular purposes--whether one is an individual making a copy of a popular song for a friend, or a hospital selling a list of maternity ward patients to a day care service. In the shadow of the Internet's rapid development and concomitant easing of barriers to data sharing, holders of intellectual property are pairing increased legal protection with the technologies of "trusted systems." I describe how these technologies might allow more thorough mass distribution of data, while allowing publishers to retain unprecedented control over their wares. For instance, an e-Book seller might charge one price for a read-only copy that could not be printed or forwarded and charge an additional fee for each copy or printout made. Taking up the case of medical privacy, I then suggest that those who worry about the confidentiality of medical records, particularly as they are digitized by recent congressional mandate, might seek to augment comparatively paltry legal protections with trusted systems technologies. For instance, a trusted system could allow a patient to specify how and by whom her records could be used; within limits, she could allow full access to her primary care physician, while allowing only time-limited access to emergency care providers, non-personally identifiable access to medical researchers, and no access at all for marketing purposes. These technologies could allow for new kinds of privacy protection, without sacrificing the legitimate interests of the consumers of medical records.     

隐私权的经济分析

隐私本质上是私人信息,隐私权是个人控制其私人信息的权利。无论隐私是否涉及到个人名誉,从对隐私的成本——收益分析来看,在权利的初始配置的意义上,都应当将控制私人信息的权利配置给信息生产者而形成隐私权。隐私权不能仅仅囿于人格权的范畴,而应该向其财产权性质方面着力发挥。将私人信息的权利配置给个人,个人就能够控制其私人信息从而形成对其私人信息的财产权,进而实现对隐私权更为切实的保护之目的。     

Chilling effects and transatlantic privacy

Can the European and American privacy divide be bridged? Bilyana Petkova, in this issue, offers compelling reasons to be sceptical. One recent solution, advanced by Pierluigi Perri and David Thaw, is that common concerns about chilling effects can bridge that divide. However, their discussion of chilling effects was narrow and their analysis limited to procedural transatlantic convergence. This essay explores this idea with a more systematic and sustained discussion of chilling effects theory and research, while arguing that chilling effects does, in fact, provide possibilities for substantive transatlantic privacy. I argue that “chilling effects” is often treated as an ahistorical singular idea but there are, in fact, three separate paradigms of chilling effects theory, research and understanding: (1) speech; (2) privacy and autonomy; and (3) collectivist. I set out each and argue that the conceptualisation of chilling effects exemplified by the second paradigm—focused on privacy‐related chilling effects—offers a shared normative and theoretical foundation to bridge the transatlantic privacy divide. I also explore how new chilling effects theory and research can impact substantive and procedural transatlantic privacy efforts, including re‐thinking consent; empowering stronger judicial enforcement of privacy claims; and balancing competing claims in substantive proposals like the Right to be Forgotten (RTBF).     

Privacy principles,risks and harms

The protection of privacy is predicated on the individual's right to privacy and stipulates a number of principles that are primarily focused on information privacy or data protection and, as such, are insufficient to apply to other types of privacy and to the protection of other entities beyond the individual. This article identifies additional privacy principles that would apply to other types of privacy and would enhance the consideration of risks or harms to the individual, to groups and to society as a whole if they are violated. They also relate to the way privacy impact assessment (PIA) may be conducted. There are important reasons for generating consideration of and debate about these principles. First, they help to recalibrate a focus in Europe on data protection to the relative neglect of other types of privacy. Second, it is of critical importance at a time when PIA (renamed ‘data protection impact assessment’, or DPIA) may become mandatory under the European Commission's proposed Data Protection Regulation. Such assessment is an important instrument for identifying and mitigating privacy risks, but should address all types of privacy. Third, one can construct an indicative table identifying harms or risks to these additional privacy principles, which can serve as an important tool or instrument for a broader PIA to address other types of privacy.     

Opening Up Ownership: Community Belonging, Belongings, and the Productive Life of Property

Drawing on empirical data and property theory, this article explores the property structure of a "free school" and the work property performs there. At Summerhill, we can see a tension between two property registers. On the one hand, the founder and present members stress the importance of individual ownership; at the same time the school's property regime involves property-limitation rules, a dispersal of rights, collective forms of property, and cross-cutting, pluralized sites of institutional recognition. In exploring how this tension is manifested through property's work, the article focuses on property's contribution to a variegated social life at the school, analyzed in terms of personal, civic, and boundary relations. With belonging treated as the central component of property rather than exclusion or control, ways of understanding what constitutes property and how it works shift.     

Knowledge,Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary Congress

Scholars, practitioners, and observers typically portray committee influence as rooted in traditional congressional processes and practices, which are thought to provide committees with powerful opportunities to block and shape legislative proposals. The erosion of regular order processes suggests these traditional processes cannot underlie committee power in the contemporary Congress. Drawing on a mixed‐methods approach of interviews with congressional staff and an original data set of every amendment offered on the floor of the House of Representatives from 2005 to 2008, I find that absent these traditional process norms, committees in the contemporary Congress can rely on their specialized knowledge and expertise to influence the behavior of their colleagues and shape the legislation that passes.     

Who’s Afraid of Property Rights? Rights as Core Concepts,Coherent, Prima Facie,Situated and Specified

Natural property rights are widely viewed as anathema to welfarist taxation, and are pictured as non-contextual, non-relational and resistant to regulation. Here, I argue that many of the major arguments for such views are flawed. Such arguments trade on an ambiguity in the term ‘right’ that makes it possible to conflate the core concept of a right with a situated or specified right from which one can read off people’s actual legal entitlements and duties. I marshal several arguments demonstrating this conflation. In particular, I examine the right to free speech, where contextualization and responsiveness to the requirements of other rights are assumed as a matter of course. I conclude that the existence of one natural right does not foreclose the existence of other natural rights. Arguments for or against welfare rights must be assessed, at least to some extent, independently of the assertion of a natural property right.     

美国公开权理论发展史考察——以经典案例为线索

美国公开权理论的诞生、发展乃至成熟,经由一系列经典判决的推动而获得实现。这一系列判决的发展,正是将姓名、肖像、声音等人格标志上的商业价值逐步从隐私权的保护领域中独立出来的过程。公开权最终发展成为旨在保护人格标志上的经济利益的无体财产权。时至今日,美国法中作为财产权的公开权和旨在保护人格标志上的精神利益的隐私权,构成一种二元权利模式。     

Reconstructing consumer privacy protection on‐line: a modest proposal

Problems with consumer trust and confidence in the Internet as a safe environment in which to shop, browse and associate are well documented, as are the correlations between this lack of consumer trust and fears about privacy and security online. This paper attempts first to show why existing legal and extra‐legal modes for the protection of privacy online are failing to protect consumers and promote consumer trust. In particular it critiques the European regime of mandatory data protection laws as outdated and inappropriate to a world of multinational corporatism and ubiquitous transnational data flows via cyberspace. In the second part lessons are drawn from the crisis currently faced by intellectual property in cyberspace, particularly in reference to MP3 music files and peer‐to‐peer downloading and useful parallels are drawn from the solution devised by William Fisher of the Berkman Centre, Harvard, in the form of an alternative payment scheme for copyright holders. Finally, the insights drawn from Fisher's work are combined with original proposals drawn from a comparison of the consumer–data collector relationship in cyberspace with the roles played by truster, trustee and beneficiary in the institution of common law trust. The resulting ‘modest proposal’ suggests that a ‘privacy tax’ be levied on the profits made by data collectors and data processors. This could fund no‐fault compensation for identified ‘privacy harms’, improve public privacy enforcement resources, provide privacy‐enhancing technologies to individuals, satisfy the desire of commerce for less data protection‐related internal bureaucracy and possibly create the conditions for better promotion of consumer trust and confidence. The uptake of electronic commerce would thus be significantly enhanced.     

Mourners in the Court: Victims in Death Penalty Trials,through the Lens of Performance

This article presents findings from ethnographic research in death penalty trials around the United States, focusing on the role of victims and their supporters. Victim impact testimony (VIT) in death penalty sentencing has received intense legal scrutiny during the past thirty years. The ruling jurisprudence allows VIT with the explanation that it deserves parity with testimony about the defendant's background. Drawing on observations and interviews with participants in 15 death penalty trials, I demonstrate that this framing confuses the central role of victim supporters in the courtroom. Victim supporters function as mourners, which grants them a socially elevated position in the courtroom. I argue that the consequences of the institutionalization of VIT can only be understood through this lens.