Much Ado about Nothing? The Size and Credit Quality Implications of Municipal Other Postemployment Benefit Liabilities

This paper presents estimates of the size and scope of other postemployment benefit (OPEB) liabilities among municipal governments. The findings indicate these liabilities vary substantially, ranging from less than a dollar per capita to more than $2,000 per capita. Those liabilities were then incorporated into separate models of credit ratings and borrowing costs. Results suggest OPEB liabilities do not directly affect credit quality, but the interaction between an issuer's fiscal capacity to address its liability does have a notable effect.     

Do speed cameras produce net benefits? Evidence from British Columbia,Canada

Traffic collisions kill about 43,000 Americans a year. Worldwide, road traffic injuries are the leading cause of death by injury and the ninth leading cause of all deaths. Photo Radar speed enforcement has been implemented in the United States and many other industrialized countries, yet its cost‐effectiveness from a societal viewpoint, taking all significant impacts into account, has not been reported. This paper fills this gap, reporting on a Photo Radar traffic safety program introduced in 1996 in British Columbia, Canada, and incorporating the results of rigorous statistical analyses on speed and crash impacts into a comprehensive cost‐benefit analysis from both societal and sponsoring‐agency perspectives. The study reveals that the Rhoto Radar Program cost C$27 million per year in 2001 Canadian dollars (?US$21 million) and generated benefits valued at $142 million per year (?US$109 million), for net societal benefits of C$115 million per year (?US$88 million). It was estimated that the sponsoring agency saved C$38 million (?US$29 million) annually in claim costs. These results are robust to plausible alternate assumptions. Societal net benefits become negative only if the reduction in injuries and fatalities is one standard error below the expected value, or if private travel time is valued at or above C$15 per hour. Agency claim cost savings are greater than program costs under all scenarios tested. These results are likely applicable to jurisdictions in developed countries with similar traffic infrastructure: Greater use of highway photo radar speed enforcement would be good public policy. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

The impact of changing financial work incentives on the earnings of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries

SSDI beneficiaries lose their entire cash benefit if they perform work that is substantial gainful activity (SGA) after using Social Security work incentive programs. The complete loss of benefits might be a work disincentive for beneficiaries. We report results from a pilot project that replaces the complete loss of benefits with a gradual reduction in benefits of $1 for every $2 earned above an earnings disregard level. Beneficiaries who volunteered to participate in the project were randomly assigned to a group receiving the new program or to a control group. The policy led to a 25 percent increase in the percentage of beneficiaries with earnings above the annualized SGA amount, or $11,760 in 2009 dollars. It did not result in a reduction in benefit payments. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Public service reductions associated with placement of homeless persons with severe mental illness in supportive housing

Abstract

This article assesses the impact of public investment in supportive housing for homeless persons with severe mental disabilities. Data on 4,679 people placed in such housing in New York City between 1989 and 1997 were merged with data on the utilization of public shelters, public and private hospitals, and correctional facilities. A series of matched controls who were homeless but not placed in housing were similarly tracked.

Regression results reveal that persons placed in supportive housing experience marked reductions in shelter use, hospitalizations, length of stay per hospitalization, and time incarcerated. Before placement, homeless people with severe mental illness used about $40,451 per person per year in services (1999 dollars). Placement was associated with a reduction in services use of $16,281 per housing unit per year. Annual unit costs are estimated at $17,277, for a net cost of $995 per unit per year over the first two years.     

Representational Altruism: The Wary Cooperator as Authoritative Decision Maker

What drives policymakers to put the interests of others above their own? If human nature is inherently selfish, it makes sense to institutionalize incentives that counter decision makers' temptations to use their positions to benefit themselves over others. A growing literature rooted in evolutionary theories of human behavior, however, suggests that humans, under certain circumstances, have inherent predispositions towards “representational altruism,” i.e., to make an authoritative decision to benefit another at one's own expense. Drawing on Hibbing and Alford's conception of the wary cooperator, a theoretical case is made for such behavioral expectations, which are confirmed in a series of original laboratory experiments.     

Workers' compensation: coverage, benefits, and costs, 1985

The 84.3 million workers protected by workers' compensation laws in 1985 represented 87 percent of all wage and salary workers in that year. Both the amount of benefits paid to workers and the cost of the program to employers rose substantially from 1984 to 1985. Benefit payments totaled $22.5 billion-14.1 percent higher than in 1984 and the largest annual increase since 1978-79. About two-thirds of the payments in 1985 were money payments ($15.1 billion) and the remainder ($7.4 billion) went for medical care for disabled workers. Private insurance companies made nearly three-fifths of these payments and State funds and self-insured employers each paid about one-fifth of the total benefit amount in 1985. For the first time since 1978, the annual growth in employer costs exceeded the growth in workers' benefits, resulting in a slight decrease in the loss ratio for 1984-85. Employer costs were up nearly 17 percent from the previous year, reaching an estimated $29.3 billion. Covered payrolls increased by 7 percent in that same period. Total benefit payments as a percent of payroll also increased noticeably in 1985.     

Reducing women's poverty by shifting social security benefits from retired couples to widows

This article examines proposals to transfer Social Security benefits from married couples to surviving widows in terms of effects on poverty rates, trust fund expenditures, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) expenditures. Because widows are much more likely to be living in poverty than older married women, it makes sense to consider Social Security benefits in a lifetime framework and transfer some benefits from the time both the husband and wife are alive to the time when there is only one survivor, usually the wife. Because of expected life span and age differences of marital partners, a $1 reduction of the couple's benefit can finance a $1.45 increase in the widow's benefit. The 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to the Social Security Administration's benefit records are the basis for the estimates.     

Modeling SSI financial eligibility and simulating the effect of policy options

This article simulates eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) among the elderly, analyzes factors affecting participation, and looks at the potential effects of various options to modify financial eligibility standards for the federal SSI program. We find that in the estimated noninstitutional elderly population of 30.2 million in the United States in 1991, approximately 2 million individuals aged 65 or older were eligible for SSI (a 6.6 percent rate of eligibility). Our overall estimate of the rate of participation among eligible elderly is approximately 63 percent, suggesting that more than a third of those who are eligible do not participate in the program. The results of our analysis of factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly show that expected SSI benefits and a number of demographic and socioeconomic variables are associated with the probability of participation. We also simulate the effects of various policy options on the poverty rate, poverty gap, annual program cost, the number of participants, and the average estimated benefits among participants. The simulations consider the potential effects of five policy alternatives: Increase the general income exclusion (GIE) from $20 to $80. Increase the earned income exclusion (EIE) from $65 to $260. Increase the federal benefit rate (FBR) by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples and eliminate the GIE. Increase the asset threshold to $3,000 for individuals and $4,500 for couples. Increase the asset threshold to $6,000 for individuals and $9,000 for couples. Using 1991 microdata from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to Social Security Administration administrative records and making adjustments reflecting aggregate program statistics, we present the results of our simulations for December 1999. The results show substantial variation in the simulated effects of the five policy alternatives along the various outcome dimensions considered. The simulated effects on the poverty gap of the elderly population range from a 7.9 percent reduction ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a 0.1 percent reduction ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). All simulated interventions are expected to increase the rate of SSI participation among the elderly from a high of 20.3 percent ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a low of 0.5 percent ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). We also find that the interventions that have greater estimated effects in terms of increased participation and reduced poverty tend to cost more. At the high end, we estimate that increasing the GIE from $20 to $80 could raise annual federal SSI cash benefit outlays by about 46 percent, compared with only 0.9 percent for increasing the EIE from $65 to $260. Similar to the EIE intervention, raising the resource thresholds by 50 percent would reduce the overall poverty gap of the elderly by only 0.2 percent, would increase SSI participation only modestly (by 1.3 percent), but would entail slightly higher program costs (by 1.4 percent). Increasing the asset threshold by 200 percent would have higher estimated effects on all three outcomes, but it would still be associated with relatively low increases in both costs and benefits. Finally, the simulated effects on the three key outcomes of increasing the FBR by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples, combined with eliminating the GIE, are relatively large but are clearly less substantial than increasing the GIE from $20 to $80. This work relies on data from the SIPP matched to administrative data on federal SSI benefits that provide a more accurate picture of SSI participation than has been feasible for previous studies. We simulate eligibility for federal SSI benefits by applying the program rules to detailed information on the characteristics of individuals and couples based on the rich array of demographic and socioeconomic data in the SIPP, particularly the comprehensive information SIPP provides on assets and monthly income. A probit model is estimated to analyze factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly. Finally, we conduct the policy simulations using altered program rules represented by the policy alternatives and predicted participation probabilities to estimate outcomes under simulated program rules. We compare those simulated outcomes to observed outcomes under current program rules. The results of our simulations are conditional on the characteristics of participants and eligibles in 1991, but they also reflect aggregate adjustments capturing substantial changes in overall participation and program benefit levels between 1991 and 1999.     

The cost-effectiveness of methanol for reducing motor vehicle emissions and urban ozone

This article analyzes the costs and emissions characteristics of methanol vehicles. The cost-effectiveness of methanol—the cost per ton of reactive hydrocarbon emissions reduced—is calculated and compared to the cost-effectiveness of other hydrocarbon reduction strategies. Methanol is found to cost from $33,000 to nearly $60,000 per ton, while several other options are available for under $10,000 per ton. The cost per part-per-million reduction in peak ambient ozone levels is also computed for two cities, Houston and Philadelphia. Despite the greater improvement in ozone in Philadelphia than Houston, methanol is found to be more cost-effective in Houston. This result occurs because Houston's distribution and marketing costs are lower than Philadelphia's. The costs in both cities, however, are far higher than estimates of the benefits from acute health improvements. Finally, the reduction in ozone exposure in Los Angeles is estimated and the costs of the reduction compared with an estimate of acute health benefits. Again, the benefits fall far short of the costs.     

Tax impact from elimination of the retirement test

The OASI eligibility provisions include a retirement test (or earnings test), and in 1979 aged beneficiaries who are under age 72 give up $1 in current benefits for each $2 of annual earnings above $4,500. If the retirement test were eliminated, total OASI payouts would increase because aged workers would no longer forfeit benefits. Aged workers also might increase earnings or delay retirement if this penalty on work effort were removed. Increased earnings would generate additional OASDHI taxes and individual income taxes. This article examines the fiscal effects on OASI benefit payouts and increased tax receipts if the retirement test were eliminated.     

How costly is “clean”? An analysis of the benefits and costs of Superfund site remediations

The cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund program is governed by a number of legislative and regulatory constraints. Congress passed legislation in 1986 directing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to pursue permanent remedies that embodied stringent cleanup standards. The agency has chosen to use conservative assumptions in risk assessments at hazardous waste sites, including a presumption that on‐site risks for hypothetical future residents should be calculated in the site remediation process. This article offers the first comprehensive assessment of the cost‐effectiveness of these Superfund cleanups. Our results reveal that many EPA Superfund remediations fail a partial benefit‐cost test. For a sample of the 150 Superfund sites, we find that at the majority of sites the expected number of cancers averted by remediation is less than 0.1 cases per site and that the cost per cancer case averted is over $100 million. The analysis demonstrates the importance of explicitly calculating the trade‐offs embodied in environmental cleanup decisions. © 1998 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Social Security's special minimum benefit

Social Security's special minimum primary insurance amount (PIA) provision was enacted in 1972 to increase the adequacy of benefits for regular long-term, low-earning covered workers and their dependents or survivors. At the time, Social Security also had a regular minimum benefit provision for persons with low lifetime average earnings and their families. Concerns were rising that the low lifetime average earnings of many regular minimum beneficiaries resulted from sporadic attachment to the covered workforce rather than from low wages. The special minimum benefit was seen as a way to reward regular, low-earning workers without providing the windfalls that would have resulted from raising the regular minimum benefit to a much higher level. The regular minimum benefit was subsequently eliminated for workers reaching age 62, becoming disabled, or dying after 1981. Under current law, the special minimum benefit will phase out over time, although it is not clear from the legislative history that this was Congress's explicit intent. The phaseout results from two factors: (1) special minimum benefits are paid only if they are higher than benefits payable under the regular PIA formula, and (2) the value of the regular PIA formula, which is indexed to wages before benefit eligibility, has increased faster than that of the special minimum PIA, which is indexed to inflation. Under the Social Security Trustees' 2000 intermediate assumptions, the special minimum benefit will cease to be payable to retired workers attaining eligibility in 2013 and later. Their benefits will always be larger under the regular benefit formula. As policymakers consider Social Security solvency initiatives--particularly proposals that would reduce benefits or introduce investment risk--interest may increase in restoring some type of special minimum benefit as a targeted protection for long-term low earners. Two of the three reform proposals offered by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security would modify and strengthen the current-law special minimum benefit. Interest in the special minimum benefit may also increase because of labor force participation and marital trends that suggest that enhancing workers' benefits may be a more effective means of reducing older women's poverty rates than enhancing spousal or widow's benefits. By understanding the Social Security program's experience with the special minimum benefit, policymakers will be able to better anticipate the effectiveness of other initiatives to enhance benefits for long-term low earners. This article presents the most recent and comprehensive information available about the special minimum benefit in order to help policymakers make informed decisions about the provision's future. Highlights of the current special minimum benefit include the following: Very few persons receive the special minimum benefit. As of December 2001, about 134,000 workers and their dependents and survivors were entitled to a benefit based on the special minimum. Of those, only about 79,000 received a higher total benefit because of the special minimum; the other 55,000 were dually entitled. (In effect, when persons are eligible for more than one type of benefit--that is, they are dually eligible--the highest benefit payable determines total benefits. If the special minimum benefit is not the highest benefit payable, it does not increase total benefits paid.) As of February 2000, retired workers who were special minimum beneficiaries with unreduced benefits and were not dually entitled were receiving, on average, a monthly benefit of $510 per month. That amount is approximately $2,000 less than the annual poverty threshold for an aged individual. Special minimum benefits provide small increases in total benefits. For special minimum beneficiaries who were not dually entitled as of December 2001, the average special minimum monthly PIA was just $39 higher than the regular PIA. Most special minimum beneficiaries are female retired workers. About 90 percent of special minimum beneficiaries are retired workers, and 77 percent of those retired workers are women. The special minimum benefit has never provided poverty-level benefits. Maximum payable special minimum benefits (unreduced for early retirement) equal 85 percent of the poverty level for aged persons, down from 96 percent at the provision's inception. Major public policy considerations raised by this analysis include the following: Social Security benefits alone do not protect all long-term low earners from poverty. Low earners with 30 years of earnings equal to the annual full-time minimum wage who retired in selected years from 1982 to 2000 received benefits that were 3.9 percent to 20.1 percent below the poverty threshold, depending on the year they retired. For 40-year earners, the range was 3.9 percent to 15.3 percent below poverty. Furthermore, in 1993, 29.2 percent of retired-worker beneficiaries who were poor had 30 or more years of coverage. The size of the universe of persistently low earners with significant attachment to the covered workforce is unknown. Available research that examines two 28-month periods suggests that only 4 percent to 6 percent of full-time, full-period earners had below-minimum wages for more than 12 consecutive months. Targeting enhanced benefits only toward long-term, regular workers who are low earners is difficult under the current Social Security program. All else being equal, if total wage-indexed lifetime covered earnings are the same for both a full-career low earner and for a high earner who has worked only occasionally, then their Social Security benefits will be identical. Social Security has no information on number of hours worked, hourly wages, or other information that could distinguish between two such persons.     

The Role of Philanthropy in Local Government Finance

Nonprofit organizations thrive on the altruism of citizens, and actively court donors for major gifts. Yet individual gifts to government agencies are often unexpected, sporadic, and initiated by the donor. This article introduces the phenomenon of private giving to local governments and tests hypotheses regarding the expected forms of giving to public agencies. Results indicate that philanthropy is and will likely remain a minor and highly variable source of revenue, making it an ill‐suited replacement for broad‐based tax revenue. However, deliberate government efforts to provide a suitable environment for private donations appear to succeed in attracting more gifts per capita.     

Suicide-bombing as inter-generational investment

A simple model of terrorism is presented where the current generation is linked to the next one by some altruism, as in standard dynastic family models. Bombing today some target increases the probability of the benefit of some public good accruing to the next generation. The model is used to discuss the fact that suicide bombers, of the Hezbollah in particular, have been found by Krueger and Maleckova (2002) to come disproportionately from wealthy families, and have an above average education level. While the latter could be expected to increase the opportunity cost of investing in such a suicide, it is suggested that it probably increases also the sensitivity to the future generation’s welfare. The latter effect might offset the deterrent effect of the former.     

Three Strategies to Prevent Unintended Pregnancy

This paper presents results from fiscal impact simulations of three national‐level policies designed to prevent unintended pregnancy: A media campaign encouraging condom use, a pregnancy prevention program for at‐risk youth, and an expansion in Medicaid family planning services. These simulations were performed using FamilyScape, a recently developed agent‐based simulation model of family formation. In some simulation specifications, policies’ benefits are monetized by accounting for projected reductions in government expenditures on medical care for pregnant women and infants. In a majority of these specifications, policies’ fiscal benefit‐cost ratios are less than 1. However, in specifications that account additionally for projected savings to programs that provide a broader range of benefits and services to young children, all three policies have benefit‐cost ratios that are comfortably greater than 1. The results from my preferred specifications suggest that the simulated policies would produce returns to taxpayers on each dollar spent of between $2 to $6. On the whole, the results of these simulations imply that all three policies are sound public investments.     

The social cost of trading: Measuring the increased damages from sulfur dioxide trading in the United States

The sulfur dioxide (SO₂) cap and trade program established in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments is celebrated for reducing abatement costs ($0.7 to $2.1 billion per year) by allowing emissions allowances to be traded. Unfortunately, places with high marginal costs also tend to have high marginal damages. Ton‐for‐ton trading reduces emissions in low damage areas (rural) while increasing emissions in high damage areas (cities). From 2000 to 2007, conservative estimates of the value of mortality risk suggest that trades increased damages from $0.8 to $1.1 billion annually relative to the initial allowance allocation and from $1.5 to $1.9 billion annually relative to a uniform performance standard. With U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) values, trades increased damages from $2.4 to $3.2 billion annually compared to the initial allowance allocation and from $4.4 to $5.4 billion compared to a uniform performance standard. It is not clear that the ton‐for‐ton SO₂ cap and trade program is actually more efficient than comparable command and control programs. The trading program needs to be modified so that tons are weighted by their marginal damage. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Revisiting the Income Tax Effects of Legalizing Same‐Sex Marriages

In this paper we estimate the impacts on income tax collections of legalizing same‐sex marriage. We utilize new individual‐level data sources to estimate the federal income tax consequences of legalizing same‐sex marriages. These data sources also allow us to estimate the impact of legalization on state income tax collections. We find that 23 states would realize a net fiscal benefit from legalization, while 21 states would experience a decline in revenue. The potential (annual) changes in state tax revenue range from negative $29 million in California to positive $16 million in New York. At the federal level, our estimates suggest an overall reduction in revenues, ranging from a potential loss of $187 million to $580 million. Overall, we find that the federal and state impacts are quite modest. We also find that our estimates are only marginally affected by alternative assumptions about how many same‐sex couples will choose to marry and which partner will claim any children for tax deduction purposes.     

Monarchy, Monopoly and Mercantilism: Brazil Versus the United States in the 1800s

GDP was $738 per capita in Brazil and $807 in the United States in 1800, but was $4,854 in the latter in 1900 and actually fell from $738 inBrazil by 1913. Relative factor endowments and institutions, broadlyconsidered, are twin traditional explanations for the extremely diversegrowth rates. In this paper we offer a complementary analysis of specificpolitical and economic structures to help explain the success andpersistence of monopoly restrictions in Brazil and the failure of internalmercantilism in the U.S. We conclude that Brazilian institutions provideda ripe and efficient environment for rent seeking. Such conditions did notexist in the U.S., a fact that helped produce the vast difference ingrowth in the 1800s.     

Private provision of public goods can be efficient

Economists have long believed that private provision of public goods will be inefficient, though recently some have argued that altruism may mitigate the inefficiencies. Without altruism, agents contribute to the point where marginal cost equals their private marginal benefits. With altruism, they contribute more and hence are closer to the point where marginal cost and total marginal benefits are equated. In an earlier paper (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989), we showed that private provision need not be inefficient. In a very natural model of private provision without altruism, we showed that the set of (undominated perfect) equilibrium outcomes is identical to the core. Here we consider the effect of altruism on private provision. Altruism essentially creates more public goods because the well-being of others becomes a public good. We show that our model of private provision still has efficient equilibria under a wide variety of circumstances. Interestingly, the equilibria may be inefficient when agents are concerned about the effect of private provision on the distribution of wealth. Intuitively, the game we consider is a very powerful instrument for efficient private provision, but must be supported by other instruments if the set of public goods is expanded too far.We wish to thank Jim Andreoni, Ted Bergstrom, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and to acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation through NSF Grant SES-8520296. Of course, any remaining errors are our responsibility.     

Social Security Amendments of 1977: legislative history and summary of provisions

This article describes the legislative history of the Social Security Amendments of 1977 and contains a summary of the amendments. The major provisions revise the benefit structure so that future replacement rates--initial benefits as a percent of previous earnings--will be relatively stable and revise the tax structure to restore the financial soundness of the program in the short range and into the 21st century. Other significant provisions include: An increased special minimum benefit for long-term workers with future automatic adjustment to prices; a minimum benefit frozen at the December 1978 level (roughly $121) with automatic adjustment only for those on the rolls; a higher retirement test exempt amount of beneficiaries aged 65 and over; an annual measure of "quarter of coverage" and other changes in annual wage reporting provisions; and authorization for agreements with foreign countries for limited coordination between social security systems.