Rent dissipation and efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations

This paper introduces contest efficiency as an alternative to rent dissipation when measuring efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations. Contest efficiency is defined as the expected proportion of the maximum obtainable benefit captured by the contest, and differs from rent dissipation because it values the expected winner of the contest. Therefore, rent dissipation and contest efficiency may suggest contradictory conclusions when agents have asymmetric valuations. This result is illustrated when comparing alternative equilibria in contests with asymmetric reimbursement and when analyzing the comparative static effect of a change in the relative benefit of two agents in a Cournot-Nash contest.     

Political decision of risk reduction: the role of trust

Surveys concerning environmental and health risks point out the lack of trust of citizens in risk evaluations provided by governments. The aim of this paper is to take into account the impact of this potential distrust on political decisions concerning risk reduction. We prove that lack of trust reduces the attractiveness of risk reduction measures. When heterogeneity in risk exposure and the possibility of complete risk elimination are introduced, political decisions of risk reduction may differ from the preferred decision of any risk and trust group. Namely, total risk elimination can be adopted, even if all individuals prefer null or partial risk reduction measures.     

Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player

We consider an extension of Tullock's (1980) N-player contest under which prize valuations may vary across players. We show that the pure-strategy equilibrium of this contest is unique. We also establish the following results: rent dissipation increases, individual winning probabilities decrease, and individual spending either increases or decreases with the addition of a player.     

浅议中小企业与民间融资

从我国中小企业的发展状况及融资现状入手,对我国近年来民间融资的快速发展进行分析,对我国民间融资和中小企业协调发展提出对策和建议如下:改革中小金融机构;民间借贷阳光化进一步推进,但必须进一步规范化;大力支持和指导中小企业民营经济的发展;作为民间借贷主体,中小企业必须增强对经济、产业发展的预见性;中小企业自身也应该寻求解决困难的途径和办法。     

Public versus private production and economies of scale

The cost of producing the same good often differs substantially for public and private producers. We investigate the effect of organization in a case where the production technology is simple: The cleaning of Danish schools. Three forms of organization are used: Decentral municipal, central municipal or private. For small schools the organizational form has little impact on cost. For larger schools decentral municipal production is the most expensive. On average centralization reduces costs by 5%, while privatization reduces costs by 30%. Similar cost differences are reported in the literature for other cases, but it is a new result that the cost differences are due to economies of scale. Public choice theories predict that cost differences are due to ownership or competition. We find evidence that both theories help explain the cost differences.     

Rent-seeking contests with private values and resale

This paper studies rent-seeking contests with private values and resale possibilities. With a stochastic success function, the resulting possible inefficiency creates a motive for aftermarket trade. Players’ valuations are determined endogenously when there is an opportunity of resale. We characterize symmetric equilibria. We assume that the winner has full bargaining power, but the results extend to other resale mechanisms. We show that resale enhances allocative efficiency ex post at the expense of more social resource waste since players compete more aggressively with resale possibilities.     

Government growth and private contributions to charity

We exploit the time-series properties of charitable giving to provide additional insights into the relationship between charitable contributions and government spending. Cointegration tests reveal a significant long-run relationship between several categories of charitable giving and government spending. Granger causality tests provide evidence on the short-run giving and spending relationship. Evidence suggests that charitable contributions to education respond quite differently to state and local government education expenditures versus federal government expenditures. We argue that the government spending and charitable giving relationship depends on the source of government revenue, how this revenue is used, and the rational ignorance of private donors.