The dilemma of government responsiveness

The expectation that the government will respond to future circumstances, say bailing out a dictator to avoid a bloodbath, or raising taxes on immovable capital investments, often hinders the establishment of appropriate incentives for efficient behavior. The government's dilemma, simply, is that it may be unable to commit future governments not to be responsive. Contracts and constitutional provisions are mechanisms to limit responsiveness. So too are arrangements that increase the cost of being responsive, or build reputations for adhering to certain patterns of behavior. A promising strategy for being responsive is to base government actions on variables not under the control of individuals, such as unalterable characteristics or aggregate outcomes. These are at best palliative measures: Informed policy making must recognize the tension between providing appropriate incentives and permitting government to be responsive.     

Disaggregating public-private governance interactions: European Union interventions in transnational private sustainability governance

Transnational private sustainability governance, such as eco-certification, does not operate in a regulatory or jurisdictional vacuum. A public authority may intervene in private governance for various reasons, including to improve private governance's efficient functioning or to assert public regulatory primacy. This article argues that to properly understand the nature of public-private governance interactions—whether more competitive or complementary—we need to disaggregate a public authority's intervention. The article distinguishes between four features of private governance in which a public authority can intervene: standard setting, procedural aspects, supply chain signaling, and compliance incentives. Using the cases of the European Union's policies on organic agriculture and biofuels production, the article shows that public-private governance interaction dynamics vary across these private governance features as well as over time. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the importance of active lobbying by private governance actors in influencing these dynamics and the resulting policy outputs.     

Goats or wolves? Private sector managers in the public sector

Public administration reforms have propagated the use of private sector management skills in the public sector, and an increased openness to managers with a private sector background. This has created a debate between those who think private sector experience improves public institutions by bringing core managerial values such as results orientation, efficiency, or openness to innovation, and those who argue that private sector experience can damage core public sector values, such as impartiality and equity. Despite the abundant anecdotal evidence, broad empirical evidence on the effects of private sector experience on public managers' values remains limited. Using data from a survey among central government top managers in 18 European countries, we show that public managers with private sector experience have, as expected, more core managerial values. Yet, unlike the conventional view, core public values do not suffer.     

Top‐Down Self‐Organization: State Logics,Substitutional Delegation,and Private Governance in Russia

This study investigates the counterintuitive emergence of self‐regulation in the Russian construction sector. Despite its proclivity for centralizing political authority, the government acted as the catalyst for the delegation of regulatory powers to private industry groups. The article argues that a factor little considered in extant literature—namely, a weak and corrupt bureaucracy—is key to explaining why the normally control‐oriented executive branch began to promote private governance despite industry's preference for continued state regulation. The article's signal contribution is to theoretically explain and empirically demonstrate how a government's prior inability to establish intrastate control over an ineffective and bribable public bureaucracy creates incentives for political authorities to search for alternative means for policy implementation outside of existing state agencies. These findings are important for understanding the impetus and logic behind particular regulatory shifts in countries where the state apparatus is both deficient and corrupt.     

Coexistence of public and private job agencies: Screening with heterogeneous institutions

In response to the analysis of bureaucracies and the finding of inherent inefficiencies, public choice theory argues for an increase in competition by contracting out government services and deregulation. The paper explores the effect of coexisting public and private employment services in a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice. The employer's use of an efficient unemployment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best contracts. This is due to the assumption that good types of workers lose more human capital than bad types in periods of unemployment or mismatch. In contrast to standard screening contracts, a bad type of worker earns an information rent if the employment exchange is inefficient, but the employer chooses not to use the private agency for good types.     

Governance and regulation of urban bus transportation: Using partial privatization to achieve the better of two worlds

Mixed delivery of public services is gaining increasing attention as a way for public managers to avoid deciding between a purely public and purely private delivery system. The unusual coexistence of public and private operators in the urban bus market in Barcelona provides an interesting context in which to analyze the challenges and opportunities posed by this system. Competition for concessions among private operators and the regulation of concessionaires generate incentives to improve efficiency and quality. Furthermore, partial privatization increases the efficiency and feasibility of public operators. In fact, competitive bidding is effective in disciplining private operators and increasing the regulators' bargaining power over both public and private firms. The reform implemented in Barcelona offers an interesting insight into all metropolitan areas that are in a position to create a number of separate concessions large enough to benefit from economies of density.     

Implementing management tools in Turkish public hospitals: the impact of culture,politics and role status

The government of Turkey has attempted to substantially improve the management of its public hospitals. However, an analysis of the performance of the quality certified hospitals finds only minor improvements. This study seeks to explain these disappointing results by interviewing 46 hospital managers and employees about the successes and failures of the management reform effort. The interviews suggest that traditional Turkish organisational culture often hinders attempts to decrease hierarchy, but, more positively, it also encourages the use of frontline teams and group rewards. Moreover, Turkey's hybrid system of allowing public doctors to maintain private practices has provided doctors with both the resources and the incentives to fight management reform efforts. Finally, organisational decentralisation in Turkey has evoked fierce political opposition, ironically even from many pro‐modernising forces that fear it could increase the power of Islamic fundamentalists. Turkey's experience suggests a number of broader points about management reform in non‐western societies. It suggests that decentralisation can often impede, rather than strengthen the other aspects of management reform; that a hybrid market organisation is often harder to move toward market efficiencies than a purely governmental one; and that national cultures should help guide the order in which reform tools are implemented. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lobbying and asymmetric information

Informational lobbying — the use by interest groups of their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies — is often regarded as an important means of influence. This paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting. On the one hand, the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker, whilst, on the other hand, the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to (mis)report or conceal its private information. It is shown that in a setting of partially conflicting interests a rationale for informational lobbying can only exist if messages bear a cost to the interest group and if the group's preferences carry information in the ‘right direction’. Furthermore, it is shown that it is not the content of the message as such, but rather the characteristics of the interest group that induces potential changes in the policymaker's behavior. In addition, the model reveals some interesting results on the relation between, on the one hand, the occurrence and impact of lobbying and, on the other hand, the cost of lobbying, the stake which an interest group has in persuading the policymaker, the similarity between the policymaker's and the group's preferences, and the initial beliefs of the policymaker. Moreover, we relate the results to some empirical findings on lobbying. qu]Much of the pressure placed upon government and its agencies takes the form of freely provided “objective” studies showing the important outcomes to be expected from the enactment of particular policies (Bartlett, 1973: 133, his quotation marks). qu]The analysis here is vague. What is needed is an equilibrium model in which lobbying activities have influence. Incomplete information ought to be the key to building such a model that would explain why lobbying occurs (information, collusion with decision makers, and so on) and whether lobbying expenses are socially wasteful. (Tirole, 1989: Ch. 1.3, p. 77, Rentseeking behavior).     

Rent seekers who demand government production: Bureaucratic output and the price of complements

Many goods and services produced by government bureaus are sold at prices which do not maximize net revenues (maximize profits or minimize losses). Indeed, bureaucratic institutions typically create incentives to expand production beyond that which would maximize net revenues. Furthermore, many of the products sold by government bureaus are highly complementary to privately produced goods and services. If a bureau's output is not priced to maximize net revenues, then private sellers of various complements may be in a position to extract rents by adjusting their prices. This paper explores the implications of bureaucratically generated rents for privately produced complements. First, rent seeking can materialize when private sector interests apply pressure for expanded bureau production and lower bureau prices. Second, if the bureau does expand its production capacity beyond the net revenue maximizing level, and if a private producer obtains exclusive rights to supply complements, then the extraction of rents will result in an inefficient mix of resources in bureaucratic production. The basis of the inefficiency is not the reason often given, however. Rather, inefficiencies arise because the actual level of use is less than that which the ‘bureaucratic plant’ was constructed to produce due to the relatively high price of the complementary services.     

A theory of global public goods and their provisions

This paper develops a general theory of a global public good and its optimal provision. In a national public good problem that researchers have long been acquainted with, government taxation and public expenditure are an inevitable tool for an optimal provision. This paper shows that an efficient provision of a truly global public good through public taxation and expenditure becomes unattainable because of nationally disparate incentives, especially given large uncertainties about the future. This paper describes two alternative approaches. One is a technological solution, which is a high promise but has unresolved issues of uncertainties with regard to developments of necessary technologies. The other is an adaptation framework. This paper shows that the provision of a truly global public good becomes manageable through a framework of adaptation strategies as it overcomes both divergent national interests and uncertainties with regard to needed technologies. Adaptation strategies would unfold triggered by changes in private incentives over a long‐term time horizon in a private–public partnership. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Australian way of government and public sector commercial reform: from a lucky to a clever country?

In recent years, Australia has struggled to remain in the top twenty developed countries, globally. The reality is that Australia's natural resource and agricultural bases no longer serve to provide sustainable national competitive advantage. In the past decade, therefore, government initiatives have aimed to produce a range of industry policies, apparently designed to strengthen the economic base, enhance government and industry responsiveness and productivity, and to attract increased overseas investment. The modernization of Australian public sectors and the adoption of private sector business principles, especially commercialization and privatization, have been critical aspects of competitive reform. This article examines several of the key strategies adopted by Australian governments, especially those designed to enhance national competitive advantage, to determine which strategies may be working, or not working, and why. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of governments as corporate business managers and their ability to respond to commercial realities on a business management, as distinct from an ideological, basis. (© 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)     

Government-to-Government Contracting: Stewardship,Agency, and Substitution

ABSTRACT

This paper provides empirical evidence detailing the distinctive nature of service delivery provided through contracts with other governments. The results of a survey of Ohio city and county managers both confirm and stand in contrast to implications derived from stewardship theory. Consistent with stewardship, our data demonstrate that contracts with public sector service partners generate less intensive monitoring by contracting governments than do services contracted with private entities. In contrast to stewardship theory, we find that contracting governments do not use other governments for services requiring intensive monitoring. In an era of accountability and results-oriented management, reliance on trust may not satisfy constituents who seek evidence of effective service delivery. The inability of the contracting government to affect another government's service delivery reduces the attractiveness of that government as a contracting partner. If the tools of stewardship prove to be inadequate, the imposition of carrots and sticks appropriate for a principal-agent relationship could undermine the trust central to stewardship. Given these tensions, it is not surprising that governments are contracting less with other governments.     

Assessing comparative efficiency of the state-owned mixed and private sectors in Indian industry

This paper evaluates performance differences between government owned, mixed sector and private sector enterprises in India for the period 1973–1974 to 1988–1989. The results establish that enterprises owned by the central government and state governments are less efficient than mixed or private sector enterprises, while mixed sector enterprises are less efficient than those in the private sector. The results contradict extant evidence finding no performance differences between government-owned and private firms in India. There have, however, been inter-temporal efficiency gains for the sector as a whole, perhaps resulting from reforms undertaken towards improving government-owned enterprises' performance.     

Recentralization and vertical alignment in the French health‐care system

In foreign exemplars, key new public management (NPM) features such as decentralization and devolution of health‐care responsibilities had outcomes below expectations. Other NPM traits such as the patient as overseer of reforms or the empowerment of patient remained elusive. In France, the integration of public values such as greater participation of patients and local actors (NGOs and elected officials) and NPM‐driven private values such as performance evaluation has yet to be seen. Taking advantage of NPM's failings and austerity agenda, a French welfare elite regained control over health‐care policy decisions at the expense of regions and other local actors. NPM outcomes were below expectations. Austerity cures led to weakening of the regional decision spaces, which can be explained under the principal–agent relationship. Accountability shifted to managerial (the professionalization of hospital managers) and legal (governance via regulations) forms in a bid to restore central government control. A democratic recess results from the lack of public engagement in recent health reforms.     

Getting the fundamentals wrong: woes of public–private partnerships in solid waste collection in three Ghanaian cities

Until over a decade ago, concerted efforts at involving private agents to deliver solid waste collection services did not feature in local government's (LG's) policies and practices in Ghana. The LGs had over the years directly delivered the services with their labour, materials and equipment. The purpose of entering into partnerships with private contractors was to improve service delivery. This comes at a time when the private sector is generally viewed as more efficient and effective than the public sector. There is abundant literature on potential benefits of private sector participation in public service delivery; yet, figures of efficiency gains are often accepted without challenge. More advantages but fewer disadvantages are cited and anecdotal evidence is used only to illustrate successful applications of the concept of public–private partnerships (PPPs). Using research data from three cities (Accra, Kumasi and Tema) in Ghana, this article exposes the contrast between policy expectations and outcomes of PPPs. The article argues that simply turning over public service delivery to private agents without ensuring that the fundamentals that make them successful are put in place leads to a worse situation than portrayed in literature about the benefit of PPPs. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Computer-Based Performance Information for Executives in Local Government

Performance information is crucial to effective management. Computer-based information systems (CBIS) now play a significant role in the effective delivery of information to senior managers. Executive information systems (EIS) are emerging as popular tools to assist organisations in their strategic decision-making processes. This trend has spread from the private to the public sector, and is now evident in Australian government organizations
This article draws on the findings of a survey into the uses and benefits of CBIS and EIS, from a sample of Australian local government organisations. The study shows that lessons from the private sector are being heeded by system developers in public organisations, leading to successful EIS projects, or at least improved CBIS. The study indicates that EIS, which were originally developed for profit-oriented private companies, are now seen as appropriate for many public sector organisations, providing effective delivery of information to senior managers. Survey results indicate that improved information systems give executives a more accurate picture of their organisation's performance and so provide support for improved strategic decision-making. In addition, EIS are seen by respondents as offering significant benefits not only to managers but also to the rest of the organization.     

The political economy of dissonance

Cognitive dissonance is defined as the psychological discomfort or annoyance that may exist when an individual's choice is not consistent with his values and beliefs. Dissonance may cause an individual to reconsider his values and beliefs, enter new choices with different parameters, respond to the constraints imposed, or change his individual preference function. This paper extends Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance to the work of public choice theorists and seeks to explain the incentives of the iron triangle to foment and quell dissonance. Examples are provided for specific environmental and health and safety risks. Akerlof and Dickens (1983) used cognitive dissonance to justify public sector intervention as necessary to correct what they perceived as a market failure in the choice of safety equipment by workers in hazardeus industries. Unlike Akerlof and Dickens (1983), we argue that the concept of cognitive dissonance is applicable to the analysis of public sector decisions giving rise to government failure as well as private decisions involving possible market failure. This paper views the public sector as a market-like arrangement in which dissonance may be produced and exchanged like any other commodity. Cognitive dissonance provides a useful framework for examining individual choice and also expands our understanding of the unseen elements of rent-seeking.     

Charitable giving in the German welfare state: fiscal incentives and crowding out

There are two ways that government activities influence private charitable giving: (1) government spending on the provision of public goods may cause crowding out of private charitable contributions; and (2) tax incentives may boost private charitable giving. From a sample of German income tax returns, we estimate the elasticity of charitable giving relative to tax incentives, income, and government spending. Using censored quantile regression analysis, we derive results for different points of the underlying distribution of charitable giving. Evaluating overall treasury efficiency, the tax deductibility of charitable donations fosters enough private giving to offset foregone tax revenues.     

The Financial Crisis and Varieties of Pension Privatization Reversals in Eastern Europe

Since the global financial crisis, those East European countries that had partly privatized their pension systems in the 1990s or early 2000s increasingly scaled back their mandatory private retirement accounts and restored the role of public provision. What explains this wave of reversals in pension privatization and variation in its outcomes? Proponents of pension privatization had argued that it would boost domestic capital markets and economic growth. By revealing how pension privatization helped increase sovereign debt and how large a part of pension funds' assets was invested in government bonds, the crisis strengthened the position of domestic opponents of mandatory private accounts. But these actors' capacity and determination to reverse pension privatization depended on the level of their country's public debt and on pension funds' portfolio structure. Empirically, the argument is supported with case studies of Hungarian, Polish, and Slovak pension reform.     

The influence of management on the cost of fire protection

An important and unresolved issue central to the study of government performance is how the actions of managers and the nature of organizations affect the cost of public services. This paper presents an empirical analysis of fire departments that estimates the influence of managerial choices on per capita spending within a simultaneous public production system. It does so by refining a theoretical cost model from the field of public management to include fundamental dimensions of government organizations and administration. Two‐stage least squares regression analysis is then employed to examine the fire protection case. The results of the analysis substantiate the intuition that managerial practices and decisions influence the cost of a public service. They show that the cost of fire protection depends significantly on the outcomes of a department's fire prevention and suppression activities, some key aspects of a department's management practices, the configuration of its workforce and equipment, its legal structure, and factors in its external environment. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.