The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks—election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. We also find evidence that richer countries from the developing world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability. By contrast, development aid does not predict election.     

Reform of the United Nations Security Council: equity and efficiency

Rents and political motives are present in many aspects of public policy. This article considers the role of rents, rent seeking, and the political choice of environmental policy. Rents are introduced into the political choice of price and quantity regulation under conditions of uncertainty. The model shows how political-economy aspects affect the choice between price and quantity regulation. The contesting of rents associated with different policies affects the regulatory structure and influences the political choice of an environmental policy target. The primary conclusion is that the political choice of environmental policy depends on the interaction between the efficiency of rent transfer and the size of rent-seeking groups within the economy.     

The United States,Japan, and the European Union: comparing political economy approaches to China

Abstract

This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US–Japan and US–EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US–Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe.     

Shocks and oscillations: The political economy of Hungary

While economic voting studies exist for the new democracies in post-communist Europe, time-series vote functions are scarce. Here, we fill this void by testing how public support for the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) responds to political shocks and economic oscillations, using monthly data from 2002 to 2009 (N = 83). As the economy fluctuates, on both objective and subjective measures, Hungarians reward or punish the Prime Minister’s party in the traditional manner. Political shocks, including the change to an MSZP minority government, the 2006 riots, and the IMF bailout, induced increased support for the party while troops in Iraq and the election campaign led Hungarians to be less supportive of the party. Clearly, government support in Hungary can be explained in political economic terms, despite the newness of democracy and the severe economic uncertainties of the times.     

The political economy of centralization and the European Community

Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis, it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in GDP. The actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed. The dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds. “Popitz' law” of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the EC Commission: high-ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states. The voters' attitudes toward European unification are analyzed in a pooled regression. Ten years hence, 80% of our economic legislation, and perhaps even our fiscal and social legislation as well, will be of Community origin (Jacques Delors, Debates of the European Parliament, 6 July, 1988, No. 2-367/140).     

The political economy of taking and just compensation

By creating an implicit right to judicial review and lowering the transaction costs a property owner must incur to challenge a taking, the just compensation restriction on eminent domain limits the tendency of political decision-makers to avoid the subjective costs their actions inflict on property owners and moves the level of taking closer to the social optimum. Its impact, however, is partially to completely erased by the risk aversion of the property owner and the fiscal illusion of the political decision-maker, unless there are additional constraints in the fiscal constitution.     

The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe

This paper analyzes the public policies that lead to ‘`Katrina,’' paying particular attention to political decisions that created unusual risks in the New Orleans area. Most of the deaths from hurricane Katrina were concentrated in one place, New Orleans, and those losses arose in large part from its location in combination with its three century long effort to ‘`manage’' the risks associated with that location. Crisis management is inherently more error prone than ordinary policy making, because surprise implies the existence of significant information problems and urgency implies that time does not exist to completely address those problems (Congleton, 2005). In New Orleans the unavoidable mistakes of crisis management were compounded by policy choices made well before Katrina made landfall, as well as federalism, partisan politics, corruption, and incompetence.     

The provision of lighthouses services: a political economy perspective

Ronald Coase’s 1974 article on lighthouses and the Trinity House case, in particular, has triggered extensive debate on the notion of a public good, but also on the possibility of private production of public goods. The resultant literature has discussed the concept of private property and the characteristics of a public good, and offered an economic analysis of the status of lighthouses. This contribution sets out to situate the debate in the context of an economic policy for which the lighthouse is an asset subject to political rent seeking. Thus, it highlights the fact that the characteristics of rivalry and exclusion, which define the public good, are in fact influenced by governments, which decide the nature of the services produced by lighthouses. The weight of the institutional setting, together with political competition for the control of lighthouses, calls for interpretation relating to rent seeking. In this respect, the lighthouse, prior to being a capital asset, has already emerged as a political object that is a source of revenue for certain individuals.