On the efficiency of law: A public choice perspective

The authors thank Robert Higgs, Charles Rowley, and Gordon Tullock for helpful comments on an earlier draft. They also thank participants at the Law and Economics Session of the Public Choice Society's 1989 annual meetings for constructive suggestions.     

Constitutional verbosity and social trust

A common argument in the trust literature is that high-trust cultures allow efficient commercial contracts to be shorter, covering fewer contingencies. We take this idea to the topic of social contracts. Specifically, we ask whether social trust affects the length and detail of constitutions. Cross-country estimates suggest that national trust levels are indeed robustly and negatively associated with the length of countries’ constitutions.     

Determining the classics in social choice

Determination of classic papers and books in any field is of interest and importance to scholars and others interested in the subject areas. Since social/public choice is such a rapidly growing field of increasing importance it seems particularly relevant that we pay tribute to the founders. One means of doing this is to analyze citations to their most important works. This process allows us to simultaneously observe the depth and breadth to which the seminal ideas in the sub-discipline have penetrated the world of social science scholarship. My methodology produces somewhat different results than those reported in the 1981 Public Choice paper by Downing and Stafford. This is not to say that their method is inferior, but that different methods produce differing results which provide readers with a wider range of information about important works in social choice.This paper was considerably improved by comments from Jay Shogren.     

Empirical social choice: an introduction

The year 2012 was the 30th anniversary of William H. Riker’s modern classic Liberalism against populism (1982) and is marked by the present special issue. In this introduction, we seek to identify some core elements and evaluate the current status of the Rikerian research program and its empirical applications. Special attention is given to three phenomena and their possible empirical manifestations: The instability of social choice in the form of (1) the possibility of majority cycles, (2) the non-robustness of social choices given alternative voting methods, and (3) the possibility of various forms of manipulation of the decisions (heresthetics). These topics are then connected to the contributions to the current special issue.     

Tax enforcement: A public choice perspective

Federal income tax inforcement varies greatly across individual states. While it is not known if this interstate variation enhances efficiency, anecdotal evidence suggests it does not. In this paper we apply the Weingast/Moran model to the treasury and explore the relationship between the legislature and the IRS. Specifically, we model IRS audit rates by state as a function of both political and efficiency considerations. We find that the interstate differences in enforcement is influenced by efficiency considerations but also the IRS shifts enforcement away from states represented by legislators who sit on committees with oversight responsibility for the IRS.     

A law and economics perspective on terrorism

This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. It considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in which individuals will be provided with incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement authorities.     

Chicago political economy: A public choice perspective

George J. Stigler (Ed.), Chicago studies in political economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pages xviii + 641.     

An economic approach to social choice — II

There is a formal equivalence between games, societies, and economies. Lindahl equilibrium for a game or society corresponds to competitive equilibrium for the equivalent economy. Results on existence and optimality of competitive equilibrium thus apply to the theory of games and societies. The “core” for a game or society as derived by extension from the core of an economy is “too large” to be interesting. An example illustrates that the α-core may be disjoint from the set of Lindahl equilibria. However, if the power of coalitions to inflict negative externalities is suitably restricted, Lindahl equilibria must be in the α-core.     

Energy and social change: An historian's perspective

The dominant model for analyzing the relationship between energy and social change, the “technology assessment” model, is criticized for being technologically deterministic, over-ambitious and insensitive to the political and social context of technology development. Three “lessons from history” are offered:

1. A multiplicity of disciplines, world views and explanatory factors are required to fully understand the relationship between technology and social change.
2. The lack of historical understanding and explicative theory in this field call for modesty in attempts to quantify and predict social impacts.
3. More emphasis should be placed on developing an understanding of the process by which technology is developed and diffused through society.

     

Chav-spotting in Britain: the representation of social class as private choice

The word chav is a relatively new one in British English, used to describe a supposed social group defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “a young person of a type characterised by brash and loutish behaviour and the wearing of designer-style clothes … usually with connotations of a low social status”. Discourse on chavs in contemporary Britain has been widely implicated in the reinforcement of social inequalities. This article argues that a central element of such discourse is the representation of “everyday” British public experience as a practice of chav-spotting, of reading materials as signs of the private characteristics of those with which they are associated. This means reading class as a privately motivated phenomenon, as the product of the “choice incompetence” of chavs. This chav-spotting practice is viewed from two perspectives: (1) as a recontextualisation of class as the result of private choice; and (2) as a practice of sign-making by which meanings are articulated for publicly observable materials in accordance with (1).     

The Condorcet-Jefferson connection and the origins of social choice theory

This paper explores the relationship between Condorcet and Jefferson to gain insight into the early development of social choice theory. Jefferson does not seem to have read or understood Condorcet's theoretical work, but studying the relationship leads to the identification of intellectual intermediaries and a different perspective on the creation of social choice theory in the French Academy of Sciences.