Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool

This article discusses the common‐pool problems that arise when multiple territorially overlapping governments share the authority to provide services and levy taxes in a common geographic area. Contrary to the traditional Tiebout model in which increasing the number of competing governments improves efficiency, I argue that increasing the number of overlapping governments results in “overfishing” from the shared tax base. I test the model empirically using data from U.S. counties and find a strong positive relationship between the number of overlapping jurisdictions and the size of the local public sector. Substantively, the “overlap effect” amounts to roughly 10% of local revenue.     

The incentive effects of property taxes on local governments

This paper applies the ideas of Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) to local property taxes. When local governments maximize their revenues, property taxes provide incentives for adequate amenity provision. Local amenity provision determines property values which then determine local tax revenues. As long as the demand for housing is inelastic, property-taxes will provide stronger incentives for local governments than lump-sum taxes. As current property values reflect expectations about future amenity levels, property taxes create incentives for even the most myopic government to invest for the future. Local property taxes can also act to limit the incentives of localities to tax; there are cases where higher levels of local property taxes lead to lower overall tax burdens. These ideas are applied to the tax reform in the late 1970s; one reason that tax reform may have been so successful is that in a period where land prices are driven by many forces other than government amenities, property taxes lose their value as incentive devices.     

Unintended Consequences of Local Sales Tax: Capitalization of Sales Taxes into Housing Prices

Local governments are under pressure to look for alternatives to property taxes as their main revenue source. One response has been to adopt local sales taxes. Prior studies offer little guidance on whether and how much local governments enhance their revenue capacity with local sales taxes. This article unveils the underlying mechanisms by exploring the capitalization of sales taxes into housing prices as a property tax base measure. The empirical analysis reveals a capitalization of local sales taxes into housing prices, indicating the reduction of property tax bases in higher sales tax areas from the long-term perspective. The findings suggest that a sales tax rate increase might not raise local revenue capacity as much as policymakers intend.     

How Pollution Taxes may Increase Pollution and Reduce Net Revenues

This paper develops a positive theory of pollution taxation by a federal authority when pollution abatement subsidies are used by local governments. Environmental and industry lobby groups influence governments with campaign contributions. First, pollution may increase in the pollution tax because the abatement subsidy increases (decreases) with the tax, and pollution increases (decreases) in the abatement subsidy. This occurs because the lobbying incentives change at a pollution tax reform. Second, pollution taxes may reduce net revenues because subsidy expenditures rise. Third, pollution may increase simultaneously as net revenues fall. Finally, the welfare effect of a pollution tax may be negative.     

Administrative problems of the provincial sales tax on beer in Papua New Guinea

With the establishment of provincial government in Papua New Guinea, the Organic Law has conferred on the provincial governments the authority to raise revenue using local revenue bases including retail sales taxes. These taxes have significant advantages and a sales tax on beer has particular benefits in P.N.G. in terms of potential yield and ease of administrative management. The tax is levied on the two breweries and the breweries collect the tax at their breweries and wholesale warehouses on behalf of the provincial governments. For the brewery with the dominant share of the market the arrangement under which it collects the tax for a commission and pays over quarterly to the provincial governments brings financial advantage. The brewery with a smaller share of the market and localized sales is less likely to be benefitting by the arrangement. For the future given expected beer consumption a change from a quantity based tax to ad valorem rates would be financially advantageous to the provincial governments, and would reduce the need for some provinces to seek tax sources elsewhere, but experience shows the general benefit of raising the tax, not at the point of final sale, but on the wholesaler or manufacturer.     

Property tax in Indonesia: measuring and explaining administrative (under‐) performance

One of the arguments made by some Indonesian government officials in defence of continued central control over the property tax is that it has performed well under their authority and that its decentralisation would inevitably result in weaker operations and outcomes. The property tax has indeed grown remarkably well over the past 15 years. This growth, however, has been from a very low base, has been dominated by increased revenues from the mining sector and has been driven by a small number of sub‐national governments. Recently, only around 40% of local sector property tax potential has been realised under central control, given the existing tax rate and base. Property valuations are the most problematic aspect of administration but tax coverage and collections are also sub‐standard. While there may, in fact, be insufficient local government capacity to manage the property tax, even to current levels of performance, this problem could be solved by transferring the relevant central staff to local governments, as has been carried out in other newly decentralised sectors. But even before tax administration is devolved, local governments could at least be given some authority over the property tax rate, presently one of the lowest in the world. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Tax decentralization and local government size

This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments. While many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it, they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy. The paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments (tax-separation), rather than on tax-base sharing, would restrain local public expenditures. Using an unbalanced panel of OECD countries, the key finding is that only property taxes—mostly based on a “tax-separation” scheme—seem to favor smaller local governments. Thus, while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments, it does not appear sufficient, as tax-separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required.     

Partisan Influence on the Local Tax Burden in the Netherlands

This paper analyses the role of partisan politics in determiningthe local tax burden. Property taxes are the most important revenuesource which municipalities in the Netherlands can decide uponthemselves. Using a new data set on Dutch local property taxes in1996, it is concluded that municipalities with a council dominatedby left wing parties have a higher tax burden. We also find thatlarger coalitions have lower levels of taxation. Finally, taxexporting increases tax rates.     

Conservative Mobilization and Fiscal Policies

The two conservative parties in Norway, the old Conservative Party and the younger Progressive Party increased their electoral support from 23 percent in 1975 to 34 percent in the election of 1987. The electoral mobilization by these conservative parties was mainly based on an ideologically inspired rhetoric of reduced government spending and corresponding tax reductions. With the benefit of hindsight, it may be argued that these were policies to which the two parties did not live up. Whatever their political strength in the local arena, they were unable to reduce local government income taxes. But when analysing other fiscal strategies available to local governments we do find differences related to political strength, even if the findings are not always as expected. Municipalities dominated by the conservatives are run on the principle of families paying the actual costs of having children in public day-care institutions. But so are socialist-dominated municipalities. Conservative and socialist municipalities tend to subsidize fees for home-help services for the elderly. The main fiscal source of the conservatives is fees and charges on technical services used by every household and paid according to costs. The watershed between socialist and conservative parties appears as we analyse the use of property tax - a tax used much more frequently by socialist than by conservative and centrist parties.     

Subnational Taxes in Developing Countries: The Way Forward

Both theory and experience in a variety of circumstances around the world suggest strongly that if fiscal decentralization is to produce sustainable net benefits in developing countries, subnational governments require much more real taxing power than they now have. Students of public finance have studied the subject, and practitioners in developing countries have installed many different versions of subnational government tax. In most developing countries there are potentially sound and productive taxes that subnational governments could use: personal income tax surcharges, property taxes, taxes on the use of motor vehicles, payroll taxes, and even subnational value‐added taxes and local “business value” taxes may all be viable options in particular countries. Still, there is no general consensus about what works and what does not. In this review paper, we try and pull together enough evidence to suggest the way forward. We also develop the argument that given political realities one cannot usually decentralize significant revenues to subnational governments without having in place an intergovernmental transfer system to offset at least some of the disequalizing effects that would otherwise occur. Nor does it make sense to think of decentralizing exactly the same package of tax choices to all subnational governments regardless of their scale and scope of operations.     

Local Option Sales Taxes and Fiscal Disparity: The Case of Georgia Counties

While local option sales taxes (LOST) have become an important revenue source for local governments, there has been concern about the distribution of LOST revenues: the uneven distribution of sales tax bases may have introduced a new source of fiscal inequality and exacerbated existing fiscal disparity. Using Georgia county data (N=159, 1970–2000), this study examines whether and how LOST have affected local fiscal disparity. Our findings suggest that the effects of LOST on fiscal disparity vary with the approach to measure revenue‐raising capacity; thus the issue of LOST distribution is sensitive to the underlying conceptualization of “fiscal equity.”     

Local Officials’ Support for PILOTs/SILOTs: Nonprofit Engagement,Economic Stress,and Politics

Nonprofit property tax exemption has become a major policy issue as the collapse of the housing market, the Great Recession, and property tax caps have threatened local tax collections. Consequently, many local governments have sought to obtain payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) from charities that are formally exempt from property taxes. Using a 2010 survey of local government officials in Indiana, this article examines whether support for PILOT policies is related to officials’ personal involvement with nonprofits, their views on government–nonprofit relationships, the type of position they hold, the level of economic distress in the county, local political conditions, and local nonprofit wealth. The findings support most of these hypotheses but also show that attitudes toward PILOTs appear to be shaped by somewhat different concerns than attitudes toward services in lieu of taxes (SILOTs).     

The Adoption of Local Option Fuel Taxes: Evidence From Florida Counties

This study examines the time to adoption of local option fuel taxes (LOFTs) among Florida counties from 1972 to 2015. Florida county governments are authorized to levy up to 12 cents of LOFTs in the form of three separate instruments. Using a Cox proportional hazards model, this study finds that additional LOFT instruments in place affect time to adoption and that the factors associated with the adoption of LOFTs differ from those of local option sales taxes. Additionally, there is evidence that suggests the legal structure of LOFTs affects both the time to adoption and the relationship with other LOFTs.     

How Governments Respond to Business Demands for Tax Cuts: A Study of Corporate and Inheritance Tax Reforms in Austria and Sweden

How responsive are democratic governments to business demands for tax cuts? We research this question in comparative case studies of cuts in corporate taxes and inheritance taxes in Austria and Sweden. We find that governments, regardless of partisan composition, are responsive to business demands, but that fiscal and electoral goals attenuate responsiveness. In both countries, the limited revenues generated by inheritance taxation and greater alignment of business demands with middle‐class voter interests resulted in governments heading business demands for an abolition of this tax. Goal conflict were larger for corporate tax cuts. In both countries, governments tried to minimize these goal conflict by adopting compensatory policy measures, specifically measures to broaden the tax base and simultaneous tax cuts for low‐income groups. The findings suggest that the policy output of business‐friendly tax cuts reflect a balancing of conflicting goals, rather than outright business dominance.     

Competition and Monopoly Power in Local Government: An Extension of Caplan (2001)

Caplan (2001) shows that because land is asource of immobile wealth, localgovernments can use the property tax toavoid competitive pressures of the Tieboutmodel, allowing them to deviate fromcitizens' preferences. In this comment Ishow that the property tax is not the onlytax local governments can use to avoidcompetitive pressure. Most taxes placed onproperty owners allow local governments toextract some rents despite perfect citizenmobility.     

Property Tax Responses to State Aid Cuts in the Recent Fiscal Crisis

Many states experienced fiscal crises at the beginning of this decade. Some responded by cutting state aid to local governments. This paper explores the extent to which local governments responded to these aid cuts by raising property taxes. The authors hypothesize that changes in aid help explain the observed differences in per capita property tax revenue changes across states. They find that on average school districts increased property taxes by 23 cents for each dollar cut in state aid. These results highlight the important role that the property tax plays in maintaining the stability of the state and local sector.     

Constitutional Dimensions of State and Local Tax Deductibility

President Reagan's proposal to eliminate the deduction of stateand local taxes for the purpose of assessing federal incometaxes will vastly enlarge the scope of the federal government,unduly burden state and local governments, and greatly harmthe federal system. The essence of the federal idea is thatthere are arenas of government that must not be invaded by othergovernments. Yet the Treasury Department would have us believethat the most fundamental activities of state and local governmentsare in some significant sense paid for by the federal governmentthrough "subsidies" provided by the federal tax code.     

Federal tax reform and the financing of state and local governments

Although the Reagan Administration tax reform proposals would reduce federal income tax liabilities for most taxpayers, federal tax reform would also create strong pressures on state and local governments to cut taxes and public services. These pressures would arise primarily because itemizers would no longer be able to deduct state and local taxes in determining their federal income tax liabilities. In New York City and Boston, it is likely that the Administration's tax reform would induce cuts in spending that range from 2.5 to 7.5 percent. While the elimination of state and local tax deductibility may promote allocative efficiency in the provision of local public goods, the cost would be a decline in the degree of redistribution through the state and local public sector, and a reduction in local public services for the poor.     

Are Overlapping Local Governments Competing With Each Other When Issuing Debt?

Local public services are produced through various overlapping jurisdictions. This study examines how the issuance of municipal general obligation bonds is affected by the tax policies of overlapping local governments. The findings challenge the hypothesis that the shared tax base would be overused in a common-pool resource scenario. Instead, the empirical results show that the issuance of general obligation bonds is more likely in jurisdictions where counties and school districts make more intensive use of the property tax. These findings highlight the importance of the signals local governments receive from their overlapping neighbors regarding voters’ demand for additional public spending.     

State income taxation with mobile labor

The ability of state and local governments to use tax and other fiscal policies to redistribute income may be limited when labor is mobile. An analysis of the allocative and distributional effects of a state income tax shows that, by driving out taxed households, the burden of the tax may be shifted to immobile households and other owners of immobile factors of production and may impose an excess burden on them. The NBER TAXSIM model is used to calculate state income tax burdens for representative high-income households in 1986–1988. Further calculations based on assumed demand elasticities for labor indicate that if high-income households are mobile, the marginal excess burden of income taxes imposed on them may be of substantial size in certain states, especially among the highest income groups.