Culture and Negotiation Pedagogy

Both in theory and practice, our understanding of what culture is remains limited; the subject, in fact, is either misrepresented or all but ignored in most of the popular and scholarly literatures. The author offers six mutually related ideas that help to explain what culture is not. He then describes an approach to understanding cultures that he finds more useful. The implications of that approach have led him to several different techniques for teaching the subject in negotiation classes.     

Culture and Joint Gains in Negotiation

What effect does culture have on the achievement of joint gains in negotiation? Prior research has identified a number of strategies, for example sharing information about preferences and priorities, eschewing power, that lead to the development of joint gains when both negotiators are from the U.S. Are these same strategies used in other cultures? Are other strategies used? How effective are negotiators from different cultures in realizing joint gains? These are among the questions considered by the authors, whose research is based on data collected from negotiators from six different cultural backgrounds: France, Russia, Japan, Hong Kong, Brazil, and the U.S.

     

中美双边投资保护协定谈判的演进与发展

双边投资保护协定是国家与国家之间为鼓励、促进和保护本国公民在对方境内的投资而签署的双边条约。在第四次战略经济对话中,中美正式宣布开启双边投资保护协定谈判。谈判中,双方关注的核心问题是主权财富基金和国民待遇问题。尽管谈判取得了积极进展,但这样的谈判却不是一蹴而就的。鉴于中美两国经济在世界经济中的重要地位,中美双边投资保护协定谈判不仅对中美两国的投资环境和贸易关系,而且将对世界经贸关系产生重大影响。     

Culture and Negotiation: The Pedagogical Dispute Regarding Cross-Cultural Simulations

This article examines one especially challenging aspect of active-learning international studies courses—the use of cross-cultural simulations. What is the significance of culture for negotiation? What difficulties might cross-cultural negotiations pose, and how might negotiators work with cultural differences to achieve successful outcomes? Is it possible to model the effects of cultures on negotiators in a classroom role-play? What are the advantages to using cross-cultural simulations, and what difficulties do they entail? How might an instructor make best use of materials that focus on cultural issues and their effect on negotiation? When teaching students of different cultures by active-learning methods, what ought an instructor to bear in mind? What cross-cultural simulations are available, and what readings might be assigned to accompany them?     

国际气候谈判中的国家利益与中国的方略

20世纪80年代以来,随着全球气候的变化,人与自然的矛盾日益加剧。为了维护人类的共同利益,发达国家与发展中国家走到了一起,围绕如何保护气候、限制温室气体排放,展开了谈判、交涉等一系列的活动。这其中有合作也有冲突,全球气候协作的国际进程有曲折也有进展。它一方面形成了各国利益的互补与联系,促成了国际合作,另一方面也引发了国际间的对抗与冲突。这其间,困扰人们的是国家利益和人类共同利益之间的“囚徒困境”,体现的是国家利益至上原则。     

Your Pace or Mine? Culture,Time, and Negotiation

This article explores the impact that different perceptions of time may have on cross-cultural negotiations. Beyond obvious issues of punctuality and timekeeping, differences may occur in the value placed on the uses of time and the priorities given to past, present, or future orientations. The role of time in negotiations involves two key dimensions: differing perceptions and values of time, and the management of time. Both dimensions, the author suggests, need to be on the negotiation table.     

哥本哈根世界气候大会:巴西的谈判地位、利益诉求及谈判策略

巴西在联合国气候变化谈判中采取了积极的应对政策,发布了"应对气候变化的国家计划".提出了减排目标.巴西拥有世界最大的天然碳汇--亚马孙森林面积的2/3,可再生能源占能源消费的比重大大高于世界平均水平,使巴西在世界气候变化谈判中占有举足轻重的地位.在全球气候变化谈判中,巴西不仅与发展中国家结盟,而且与法国等发达国家采取共同立场,力图使自己掌握全球气候变化谈判的话语权,争取获得国际援助.由于各国在减排责任及援助等问题上的立场差距较大,哥本哈根世界气候大会难以达成有约束性的减排协定.     

Trading Refugees for Land and Symbols: The Palestinian Negotiation Strategy in the Oslo Process

This article analyses the negotiation strategy of the PalestineLiberation Organization regarding the refugee issue in the failedIsraeli–Palestinian peace process from 1993 to 2001. Itis argued that the PLO was on the brink of conceding the ‘rightof return’ for the sake of territorial concessions fromIsrael. The author discusses the implications of this strategyfor the domestic legitimacy of the Palestinian leadership, asgiving up the right of return would violate a core tenet inPalestinian national mythology. The PLO negotiators tried tosolve that dilemma by, first, separating the principle of returnfrom its implementation—making it possible for the PLOto remain committed to the principle, while offering compromiseson physical return—and, second, by demanding symbolicgestures from Israel, including acknowledgment of Israel's historicresponsibility for the refugee problem. It is argued that Israel'srefusal to offer a minimum of face-saving gestures preventedthe PLO from formalizing its compromise proposal.