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Robert Carle 《Society》2013,50(4):395-401
On July 22, 2011, Anders Breivik detonated a bomb in Oslo and massacred dozens of teenagers at a Labour Party Youth camp on the island of Utøya. Nearly all the media coverage of Breivik focused on the conservative political views outlined in his Manifesto. The week of the massacre, The New York Times ran a series of editorials which identified Breivik as a part of the counterjihad movement represented by Pete King, Bruce Bawer, Geert Wilders, Newt Gingrich, and Robert Spencer. In Norway, the Norwegian media was quick to blame Siv Jensen of the conservative Progress Party for creating the “climate of hate” which produced Breivik. In the wake of the murders, prominent Norwegian intellectuals began calling for a rejection of American “free speech absolutism” in favor of vigorously enforcing an “anti-racism” clause in Norway’s penal code which criminalizes threatening or insulting speech, or speech that incites contempt for anyone because of his or her skin color, religion, or sexual orientation. However, this would contribute little to public safety in Norway; instead it would stifle the kind of vigorous debate about social issues that one would expect to find in an open society. It would also demoralize moderate Muslims who are working to promote free speech and democratic pluralism in Muslim-majority countries.  相似文献   

3.
ABSTRACT

The ideological influence that several right-wing radical thinkers exercised on the Norwegian ‘lone wolf’ terrorist Anders Behring Breivik raises the question of how far a writer can be held responsible for acts of terrorism s/he may have influenced. Italian history provides a vital lesson in this respect: namely, the role played by the Italian traditionalist Julius Evola in the crucial passage from Fascism to neo-fascism. After reviewing Evola's ideological development, Wolff then analyses Evola's influence on a young generation of neo-fascists in Italy. Another relevant topic is the ideological continuity between Fascism and neo-fascism identified here, as centred on Evola's view of ‘general fascism’ as the Traditional right.  相似文献   

4.
This article is about two ideologies. Welfare-consequentialism holds that government should adopt the policies that can rationally be expected to maximise aggregate welfare. Populism holds that society is divided into a pure people and a corrupt elite, and asserts that public policy should express the general will of the people. The responses of world governments to the coronavirus pandemic have clearly illustrated the contrast between these ideologies, and the danger that populist government poses to human wellbeing. The article argues that welfare-consequentialism offers a vaccine for populism. First, it rebuts populism’s claims about who government is for and what it should do. Second, the pessimism and distrust that make people crave populism can be satiated by successful welfare-consequentialist government. Finally, welfare-consequentialism’s sunny narrative of progress can be just as compelling to people as populism’s dark story has proven to be.  相似文献   

5.
ABSTRACT

Most scholarship on far-right parties focuses on populism while largely ignoring the role of intellectualism. Disregarding the increasing support by well-educated voters, much of this literature appears to presume that populism and intellectualism in the far-right are separate rather than complementary phenomena. Against this view, this article uses Skinner’s concept of ‘innovating ideologists’ to explore the role of Heideggerian philosophy in the interplay between German New Right (GNR) intellectualism and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) populism. To do so, Heidegger’s conception of ‘people’ is outlined before turning to the GNR’s use of these concepts in articles, books and speeches, by both GNR intellectuals and leading AfD members. The analysis shows that GNR and AfD actors refer to Heideggerian philosophy both in the context of intellectual circles and to wider audiences to legitimize an exclusive idea of nationhood based not on the illicit idea of race but on a more acceptable idea of history. The findings suggest that intellectualism and populism in the German far-right are closely connected. The article concludes that neglecting GNR intellectualism means underestimating the GNR’s and AfD’s capacity to bring about social change.  相似文献   

6.
《New Political Science》2012,34(4):585-604
This article examines right-wing populism and populist rhetoric in Norway preceding the July 22, 2011 terror attacks at Utøya and in Oslo. It describes how the mainstream media, academics, and political parties have appealed to the public in an increasingly populist fashion and have spread fear about immigration, immigrants, and integration. It argues that while the populist right-wing Progress Party has adopted immigration and integration as its main cause and has gained support because of it, the Progress Party alone cannot be blamed for the widespread xenophobia in Norway. The media are also responsible for the way immigration, culture, and race have been reported, as are a wide range of politicians for formulating increasingly stricter immigration policies. In the aftermath of July 22 politicians became acutely concerned about their own anti-immigrant rhetoric and how it may have influenced the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik. A broad consensus to address and change the language used in the immigration debate was agreed upon; more openness and more democracy was promised. Much has changed, but even more has stayed the same in Norwegian politics and attitudes to immigration and Islam.  相似文献   

7.
Abstract.  The scientific debate about populism has been revitalised by the recent rise of extreme-right parties in Western Europe. Within the broad discussion about populism and its relationship with extreme-right, this article is confined to three topics: a conceptual, an epistemological and an empirical issue. First, taking a clear position in the ongoing definition struggle, populism is defined primarily as a specific political communication style. Populism is conceived of as a political style essentially displaying proximity of the people, while at the same time taking an anti-establishment stance and stressing the (ideal) homogeneity of the people by excluding specific population segments. Second, it is pointed out that defining populism as a style enables one to turn it into a useful concept that has too often remained vague and blurred. Third, drawing on an operational definition of populism, a comparative discourse analysis of the political party broadcasts of the Belgian parties is carried out. The quantitative analysis leads to a clear conclusion. In terms of the degree and the kinds of populism embraced by the six political parties under scrutiny, the extreme-right party Vlaams Blok behaves very differently from the other Belgian parties. Its messages are a copybook example of populism.  相似文献   

8.
Going beyond conventional conceptions of political representation, Ernesto Laclau takes representation to be a general category and not just limited to formal political institutions, and he takes representation to be performative in that it also brings about what is represented. This article examines the implications of this conceptualization of representation for Laclau’s theory of populism. Laclau takes populism to be exemplary of his conception of representation because populism is a discourse that brings into being what it claims to represent: the people. This is important for current debates about populism and the crisis of democratic institutions, whether domestic or international. I show how our conceptions of representation inform how we think about populism and liberal democracy, and specifically about populism as a threat to liberal democracy at the domestic or global level. I show this in the context of a reading of Jan-Werner Müller’s influential critique of populism.  相似文献   

9.
《New Political Science》2012,34(4):564-584
This article presents an analysis of McCarthyite and Tea Party political discourse and explores the possibilities of utilizing populism as an analytic construct for making comparisons between the political and economic projects envisaged by these two conservative movements. Relying on a definition of populism as a universal discursive formation, this article argues that there is a similar structure to the discourses of McCarthyism and the Tea Party, which relies on the construction of a “left-oriented enemy,” posed as a threat to the American values of freedom and independence historically tied to the nation's “founding moment.” With this comparative discursive structure established, the article then explores the ideological differences between the movements and attempts to interpret them within a historical framework. This article concludes by asserting that cases of populism in the immediate postwar period such as McCarthyism were short lived compared to new cases of populism such as the Tea Party, insofar as the universal discursive structure of populism, which once proved to be an exceptional phenomenon within modern forms of political rule, is now becoming part of the institutionalized structure of democratic politics, evidenced by a number of cases taken in comparative-historical perspective.  相似文献   

10.
This article explores the recent rise of populist politics from the perspective of Karl Polanyi's theory of the ‘double movement’. It firstly introduces Polanyi's understanding of interwar populism, and relates this to his broader critique of liberal economic thought. This framework is then used to analyse three prominent explanations for populism which emerged in the wake of the UK's 2016 EU referendum: globalisation; cultural reaction; and social media. I show how each of these explanations exogenises contemporary populist movements, narrating them as something external to the liberal economic restructuring pursued globally since the 1980s. Failing to diagnose adequately the causes of contemporary populist movements, which lie in this utopian attempt to treat labour as a commodity, they cannot support an intellectually coherent progressive response to Brexit. Finally, I outline a political agenda centred on labour de‐commodification, which could directly address populist grievances and reclaim the discourse of ‘taking back control’ for the left.  相似文献   

11.
Abstract

The main aim of this contribution is to assess the relevance of the notion of ‘exclusionary populism’ for the characterisation of the Front National (FN) in France. Since its emergence in the 1970s, several categories or notions have been applied to this political party. Once considered as the resurgence of a traditional extreme right, it has since been classified as a case of a new European right-wing extremism, or as one of the neo-populist parties that obtained electoral successes in the 1990s. The recent evolution of the party has also been described as a sort of ‘normalisation’. Is therefore ‘exclusionary populism’ still a category that can grasp the evolution of the party, as well as its present position in the French party system? To answer this question, this article examines political discourses and various electoral platforms of the Front National to gather some empirical evidence. The argument is twofold: The Front National, despite its ‘dédiabolisation’ strategy, is still a classic populist party characterised by exclusionary populism and a sort of ‘catch-all populism’; its evolution is, however, dependent on the recent evolution of the French party system.  相似文献   

12.
ABSTRACT

Right-wing Eurosceptic political groups gained ground in the elections for the European Parliament in May 2014. The electoral victory of right-wing Euroscepticism was accompanied by a concern that populism is (once again) spreading in Europe. Associating right-wing Eurosceptics with populism raises the question of whether critiques of populism can be directly extended to right-wing Euroscepticism. By reconstructing the right-wing Eurosceptic concept of ‘the people,’ this article demonstrates that the Eurosceptic concept of the people has a dual meaning that encompasses both a transnational and a national concept of the people. The article concludes that while Euroscepticism shares ideological features with populism, it is problematic, due to the internal structure of the promoted concept of the people and the European political environment, directly to extend recent critiques of populism to right-wing Euroscepticism.  相似文献   

13.
Although populism and technocracy increasingly appear as the two organising poles of politics in contemporary Western democracies, the exact nature of their relationship has not been the focus of systematic attention. This article argues that whilst these two terms – and the political realities they refer to – are usually assumed to be irreducibly opposed to one another, there is also an important element of complementarity between them. This complementarity consists in the fact that both populism and technocracy are predicated upon an implicit critique of a specific political form, referred to in this article as ‘party democracy’. This is defined as a political regime based on two key features: the mediation of political conflicts through the institution of political parties and a procedural conception of political legitimacy according to which political outcomes are legitimate to the extent that they are the product of a set of democratic procedures revolving around the principles of parliamentary deliberation and electoral competition. This argument is made through a close analysis of works by Ernesto Laclau and Pierre Rosanvallon, chosen as exemplary manifestations of the contemporary cases for populism and technocracy, respectively.  相似文献   

14.
Abstract

The article comparatively examines the levels of populism exhibited by parties in Western Europe. It relies on a quantitative content analysis of press releases collected in the context of 11 national elections between 2012 and 2015. In line with the first hypothesis, the results show that parties from both the radical right and the radical left make use of populist appeals more frequently than mainstream parties. With regard to populism on cultural issues, the article establishes that the radical right outclasses the remaining parties, thereby supporting the second hypothesis. On economic issues, both types of radical parties are shown to be particularly populist. This pattern counters the third hypothesis, which suggests that economic populism is most prevalent among the radical left. Finally, there is no evidence for the fourth hypothesis, given that parties from the south do not resort to more populism on economic issues than those from the north.  相似文献   

15.
Abstract

Drawing upon Karl Polanyi's journalistic writings and unpublished lectures from the 1920s and 1930s, this article reconstructs the lineaments of his research programme that was to assume its finished form in The Great Transformation. It identifies and corrects a common misinterpretation of the thesis of that book, and argues that Polanyi's basic theoretical framework is best conceived as Tönniesian: market society is Gesellschaft, while the ‘protective counter-movement’ of The Great Transformation is Gemeinschaft, understood dynamically. It examines the two central mechanisms by which, in Polanyi's understanding, Gesellschaft broke down in the mid-twentieth century: the ‘clash between democracy and capitalism’ and the ‘perverse effects’ whereby political intervention in markets impairs profitability and saps the vitality of the market system.  相似文献   

16.
《Patterns of Prejudice》2012,46(2):111-135
ABSTRACT

Contemporary radical right-wing populism is an ideational compound of anti-elite populism and nativism, the latter encapsulated in the notion that ‘the own people’ should come first. Like populism, nativism has proven to be a rather elusive concept, particularly when it comes to its relationship to related concepts, such as patriotism, nationalism and particularly racism. Originally developed to analyse anti-immigrant sentiments in the United States and Canada, the term ‘nativism’ has recently been increasingly used to understand the success of the radical populist right in Europe and elsewhere. In this article, Betz present three facets of nativism: economic nativism, centred on the notion that jobs should be reserved for native citizens; welfare chauvinism, based on the notion that native citizens should be accorded absolute priority when it comes to social benefits; and symbolic nativism, advancing the notion that government should do everything to defend the cultural identity of a given national society. Whereas, in the past, economic considerations, including concerns about the viability of the welfare state, were central to anti-immigrant sentiment, in recent years, symbolic nativism, grounded in a defence of national cultural identity, is central to the success of radical right-wing populist mobilization.  相似文献   

17.
Populism studies finds itself in a crisis of originality. While some scholars have signalled over-usage, others have argued that by contextualising populism, we are able to specify our own ‘populist moment’ and remedy the term’s slipperiness. This article opts for the latter tactic through a comparison of two aspects of contemporary populism with late nineteenth century precedents. In the late nineteenth century, the American People’s Party pioneered a mode of mass politics anchored in agrarian and industrial labour which launched the term ‘populism’ in Western discourse. Contemporary populists show rhetorical and political overlap with this template, but also come up against two new constraints: (1) a stagnant capitalism increasingly centred on ‘rentiership’; and (2) a disorganised civil society. These factors render today’s populism resistant to analogy but also conceptually more specific, sharpening the contours of our populist moment.  相似文献   

18.
This article surveys The Norman Geras Reader: ‘What’s There is There’, a recent collection of the work of Norman Geras, edited by Eve Garrard and Ben Cohen. The article explores the relevance of Geras’s attempted reconciliation between liberalism and Marxism to some of the key issues confronting the contemporary left: foreign policy and the failures of humanitarian intervention and non-intervention; internationalism and the necessity for solidarity across borders in an age of nationalist populism; left approaches to totalitarianism and antisemitism; the possibilities and limitations of alternatives to and critiques of liberal capitalism; and the reinvigoration of utopian imaginaries and the futures they promise. It suggests that important lessons for the left can be unpicked from the contested legacy of the ‘decent leftism’ Geras represents, where reapplied in the wake of new political and diplomatic challenges.  相似文献   

19.
《New Political Science》2012,34(4):455-468
This article contends that we have little understanding of why the idea of the “liberal media” became an article of faith among conservatives. This study looks to the past by examining the construction of the “liberal media” in conservative thought to understand the present state of right-wing populism. The objective is not to determine whether the news media has a liberal bias, rather it is to understand the origins and development of this political and rhetorical project. It is argued that the liberal media critique was developed in the “conservative counter-sphere,” a public sphere for right-wing activists and thinkers. Based on a content analysis of the conservative publication Human Events from 1957–1965, this study finds that the presidential campaign of 1964, and the political actors and issues surrounding it, played a critical role in solidifying the right-wing critique of the liberal media.  相似文献   

20.
《Democracy and Security》2013,9(3):270-286
Lone wolf terrorism has a long and bloody past, even if the motivations and context of this tactic over the last three decades by right-wing extremists and, more recently, jihadi Islamists, have witnessed a noticeable spike with the onset of the Internet Age. By approaching lone wolf terrorism as a generic phenomenon, this article will retrace both the historical trajectory and recent revival of this self-directed recourse to the “terrorist cycle.” This extends to an overview of earlier waves of lone wolf terrorism (notably deriving from anarchist and leftist doctrines), as well as a survey of the surprisingly sparse academic literature on the subject in English. By way of contribution, this review of some key instances and interpretations of lone wolf terrorism pursues two straightforward aims. The first is the identification of a nearly 150-year tradition of lone wolf terrorism now at its most ideologically disparate and potentially destructive, and the second is a heuristic definition and accompanying discussion of pan-ideological, solo-activated terrorism.  相似文献   

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