How Do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees?

Concerns that interest groups use their financial resources to distort the democratic process are long‐standing. Surprisingly, though, firms spend little money on political campaigns, and roughly 95% of publicly traded firms in the United States have never contributed to a political campaign. Do interest groups seek political access through their modest contributions, or are these contributions only a minor and forgettable part of the political process? In this article, we present comprehensive evidence that interest groups are extremely sophisticated in the way they make campaign contributions. We collect a new data set on U.S. state legislative committee assignments and legislator procedural powers from 1988 to 2014, merged with campaign finance data, in order to analyze over 440,000 candidate–committee observations across 99 legislatures. Using a series of difference‐in‐differences designs based on changes in individual legislators' positions in the legislature, we not only show that interest groups seek out committee members, but we also show that they value what we call indirect access. When a legislator gains procedural powers, interest groups reallocate considerable amounts of money to her. The results reveal how interest groups in a wide range of democratic settings seek to influence the policy process not only by seeking direct access to policy makers but by seeking indirect access to legislative procedure as well.     

POLITICAL CONDITIONS MOTIVATING LEGISLATORS' USE OF POLICY INFORMATION

While "research utilization" literature has focused on the limited use of policy research by policymakers, there has been l i t t l e attention directed at legislators1 use of policy research o r the importance of the decisionmaking context in explaining policy research use.
Relying on the research utilization literature and the legislative behavior literature, this paper examines the legislative setting as it relates to policy information use, and it outlines the conditions under which policy information might be used by legislators. Specifically, two types of legislator information searches are discussed–the constituent service search and policy formulating search. While there are many obstacles to policy information use–including cognitive and organizational ones–this paper focuses only on political conditions and political obstacles relating to legis- lators' use of policy information.     

On the stability of legislative outcomes

This paper argues that by arranging vote trades in the face of information costs, legislative committees contribute to the stability of legislative outcomes. A structure of permanent committees and subcommittees facilitates informational specialization and helps legislators acquire experience in their specializations. Committees arrange vote trades by adjusting amounts of recommended spending on separate items in bills that receive majority support. Each legislator is allotted a roughly equal amount of legislative spending that he can influence plus an additional amount that depends on his skill and experience as a committee member.     

Academic freedom 1979: The West German case

Abstract

Given the continued significance of ideology as a social and political phenomenon, political science must consider the important contributions made to ideology theory made over the last thirty years by Louis Althusser. In this essay, I offer a critical exegesis of Althusser's views, focusing on the concept of reading, on the various conceptions of ideology held by Althusser, on the distinction Althusser made between ideology and science, and on his theory of the subject. This study of his thought makes three claims: (1) that Althusser's views, billed as a radical break with bourgeois thought, can be assimilated easily into social scientific understandings about ideology; (2) that Althusser's theory has internal difficulties rooted in the tension between positive and negative conceptions of ideology; and, (3) that Althusser left unanswered the key question of the means to ideological liberation.     

Rousseau's Critique of Representative Sovereignty: Principled or Pragmatic?

In the Social Contract, Jean‐Jacques Rousseau advanced an impassioned critique of representative sovereignty, yet it is often thought that his objections were merely pragmatic and that he did not consider the question of representation to be a matter of basic political right. This article maintains, to the contrary, that Rousseau did have a principled argument against representative sovereignty and elucidates the nature and bearing of that argument by situating it in response to Hobbesian accounts of representation. Rousseau's argument is shown to have far‐reaching implications, as it entails that the existence of representative sovereignty contravenes two principles central to the legitimacy of modern democratic states: the sovereignty of the people and the moral equality of the citizens.     

Constraining Executive Action: The Role of Legislator Professionalization in Latin America

What explains the failure of legislatures with strong constitutionally endowed powers to exert themselves over the executive in practice? We examine the role of legislator professionalization in strengthening the legislature's ability to constrain executive action, conceptualizing legislator professionalization as prior legislative experience and prior professional work experience. We argue that more professionalized legislators, through the skill and knowledge they bring to the policymaking process from prior experience, will be better equipped to challenge executive authority. In a sample of four Latin American countries from 1990 through 2010, we find that legislatures are more likely to curb executive decree issuance when individual legislators are strongly professionalized, controlling for constitutional powers and several other partisan and political factors. Our findings suggest that legislatures composed of more professionalized legislators can constrain executive action, especially in the context of a unified political opposition in the legislature.     

Rousseau's Politic Argument in the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts

Rousseau's arguments often turn on a correct understanding of the relationship between cause and effect. We argue that the principal cause-effect argument of the Discourse is actually the opposite of the one Rousseau appears to posit in his work. Whereas he initially seems to argue that the sciences and arts corrupt morals, his ultimate argument is that the corruption of morals is the cause of the advancement of the sciences and arts and of their corrupting effects. Behind both moral corruption and the advancement of the sciences and arts lies a more remote cause: human pride and the unequal social and political conditions that result from pride and then foster it. Rousseau takes advantage of this complex causal relationship by simultaneously presenting an initial causal argument that gives his essay its paradoxical character and obscuring the ultimate causal argument of the work because of its implications as a critique of political authority and inequality.     

Congressional responsiveness to presidential popularity: The electoral context

A number of recent studies have reported that the influence of the president's public approval rating on congressional support is not substantial. We hypothesize that this unexpected finding might be the result of the inappropriate application of an approval-driven model of legislative voting to the entire Congress. Specifically, we argue that members from certain kinds of electoral contexts—constituencies where the president's, or their own, electoral standing is in doubt—should be especially likely to vary their support for the president with changes in his approval rating. Although the patterns of presidential support scores between 1977 and 1991 do not confirm our specific hypotheses, they do suggest that the electoral context from which a legislator emerges does shape his or her responsiveness to changes in national presidential approval.     

Measuring New Public Management and Governance in Political Debate

New Public Management (NPM) recently has been compared and contrasted with public governance (PG) to illustrate shifts in conceptions of public administrations and in reform agendas. The authors develop measures to capture the relevance of NPM and PG in textual discourse and investigate the extent to which they have entered the political debate. Content analysis of electoral programs for the 2005 Italian regional elections reveals that even in this legalistic country, considerable attention was paid to both NPM and PG issues. An important explanatory variable in preference for NPM or PG is party ideology, highlighting often‐ignored within‐country dynamics. Furthermore, the authors show how a methodological approach adapted from mainly political science and business research can be exploited in the field of public administration.     

The Immovable Foundations of the Infinite and Immortal: Tocqueville's Philosophical Anthropology

My purpose in this essay is to show that the enduring value of Alexis de Tocqueville's work is rooted in his philosophical anthropology, or view of human nature. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville reveals his view of human nature as he treats the relationship between religion and politics in the democratic social state. His political science remains valuable because he understands human beings as creatures distinguished by their desire for the infinite and immortal. In sum, for Tocqueville, religion is an essential support of liberty in the democratic social state because it answers the soul's desire for the infinite and immortal, and provides the foundations for personal and political justice.     

Rousseau's General Will: Freedom of a Particular Kind

Had Rousseau not been centrally concerned with freedom, some of the structural features of his political thought would be unaccountable. Above all, the notion of general will would not have become the core of his political philosophy. Rousseau's reasons for using 'general will' as his central political concept were essentially philosophical. The two terms of general will - 'will' and 'generality' - represent two main strands in his thought. 'Generality' stands for the rule of law, for civic education that draws us out of ourselves and towards the general (or common) good. 'Will' stands for Rousseau's conviction that civil association is 'the most voluntary act in the world', that 'to deprive your will of all freedom is to deprive your actions of all morality'. And if one could 'generalize' the will, so that it 'elects' only law, citizenship, and the common good, and avoids 'willful' self-love, then one would have a general will in Rousseau's particular sense. The distinctiveness of Rousseau's general will is further brought out through a comparison with Kant's 'good will' about which Rousseau would have felt severe doubts.     

Who is Punished? Conditions Affecting Voter Evaluations of Legislators Who Do Not Compromise

In American politics, legislative compromise is often seen as a necessary and desirable aspect of policymaking, yet people also value politicians who stick to their positions. In this article, we consider these conflicting expectations of legislators and ask two intertwined questions: what conditions lead people to punish legislators for not compromising (when legislative action is at stake) and, conversely, what conditions leave people more willing to overlook a legislator’s unwillingness to engage in compromise? Relying on previous research, we suggest that legislator gender, legislator partisanship, and issue area may all affect which legislators are punished for not compromising. Relying on two national experiments, we demonstrate that the extent to which lawmakers are punished for not compromising is conditional on the intersection of the three factors in this study. In general, our results suggest that people may be most willing to overlook unwillingness to engage in compromise when party, gender and issue ownership align than when party, gender, and issue ownership are at odds.     

Modernity Gone Awry: Lefort on Totalitarian and Democratic Self-representation

Abstract

This essay starts by reviewing Claude Lefort's writings on totalitarianism, a theme that runs like a red thread through his oeuvre and plays a key role in the different stages of his intellectual development. The analysis of the USSR is a central interest of Lefort and his colleagues at Socialisme ou Barbarie (and inspires them to adopt an explicitly "political" approach against the "economism" of their fellow Marxists); the problem of totalitarianism features prominently in Lefort's theory of democracy and human rights (where it functions as the "flipside" of democracy); and the theme holds Lefort's attention well after the events of 1989. The emphasis of this essay, however, is not on the chronology of Lefort's trajectory, but on the methodological role of totalitarianism in his theoretical framework. Lefort's account of totalitarianism serves him as a tool to dissect the symbolic fabric of modern society. In Arendt's view, totalitarian rule reveals something of the essence of modernity, as a movement towards ever increasing technical mastery. For Lefort, by contrast, totalitarian tendencies arise as an attempt to close off the experience of indeterminacy that has been opened up by political modernity. He shows that the totalitarian "imaginary" (which he dissects in psychoanalytic terms) presupposes yet deliberately inverts the very ideas that sparked the democratic revolution and that are central to the self-representation of democratic societies. In consequence, democracy is continuously at risk of degenerating into totalitarianism. Importantly, the totalitarian threat, which Lefort believes to be the main threat to modern society, only becomes visible by adopting a specifically "political" perspective. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we continue to under stand and to interpret our society in "political" terms, that is, in reference to the symbolic constellation of collective power.     

House or home? Constituent preferences over legislator effort allocation

In many political systems legislators face a fundamental trade‐off between allocating effort to constituency service and to national policy‐making activities, respectively. How do voters want their elected representatives to solve this trade‐off? This article provides new insights into this question by developing a conjoint analysis approach to estimating voters’ preferences over their legislator's effort allocation. This approach is applied in Britain, where it is found that effort allocation has a significant effect on voter evaluations of legislators, even in a political system where other legislator attributes – in particular, party affiliation – might be expected to predominate. This effect is nonlinear, with voters generally preferring a moderate balance of constituency and national policy work. Preferences over legislator effort allocation are not well‐explained by self‐interest or more broadly by instrumental considerations. They are, however, associated with voters’ local‐cosmopolitan orientation, suggesting that heuristic reasoning based on underlying social dispositions may be more important in determining preferences over representative activities.     

Notes on contributors

American political science has recently undergone a process of self-criticism principally illustrated by the so-called "Perestroika movement." This article suggests turning to Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of science to clarify some of the mechanisms that contribute to this perceived malaise, beyond the most visible and well-known debate over the supremacy of quantitative methods. In particular, in light of his analysis of the scientific field and his key concept of scientific capital, four major structuring dimensions of American political science are reviewed: academic status, research fields, sociological characteristics and political allegiances. The author then reflects upon the existence of an "establishment" in the discipline.     

The Unscientific Determinants of Voting on a Controversial Scientific Issue: An Evaluation of Biofuels Policy in the U.S. Congress

Whether allegiance to party or the preferences of constituents are most important in an elected representative's voting decision has been a long‐running question in political science. This study contributes to this debate through an evaluation of biofuels policy in the U.S. Congress. Results indicate that in this policy area the House and Senate balance these influences differently, with partisanship playing a significant role in the House but not in the Senate. Analysis of voting on this issue indicates that there are important distinctions between how a legislator views the overall partisan preferences of constituents in their district or state versus how they view the interests of particular groups of constituents; when the concentration of agricultural interests in a legislator's district or state is great enough, it can override the effects of party for this issue, which suggests that legislators are especially concerned with specific constituency groups in their district or state that would stand to gain or lose from a policy. The proposition that a legislator is most likely to do that which benefits him or her most regardless of the available science relevant to a policy is a useful starting point for understanding what has been found in this research project.     

Can my religion influence my conception of justice? Political liberalism and the role of comprehensive doctrines

In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice, rather than just one. This ‘Deep Version’ of political liberalism opens up new questions about the relationship between citizens’ political conceptions, from which they must draw and offer public reasons in their political advocacy, and their comprehensive doctrines. These questions centre on whether a reasonable citizen’s choice of political conception can be influenced by her comprehensive doctrine. In this paper I present two models of the relationship, which give contrasting answers to these questions, and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines. This has important implications for our understanding of Rawlsian political liberalism, and reduces the force of objections that have been offered by theorists sympathetic to religion.     

Constitutional political economy,democratic theory and institutional design

Democracy and constitutionalism are both central to the Western political tradition. And yet, constitutional restrictions are often perceived to be in tension with democratic commitments. I argue that the constitutional political economy approach developed by Nobel Laureate James Buchanan resolves the tension between constitutionalism and the values of democratic governance by shifting the analysis from a system-attributes perspective that focuses on the particular institutional properties of a political order to a system-legitimacy perspective that focuses on the manner in which political institutions gain democratic legitimacy. In so doing, the approach reveals that constitutionalism can be understood as a natural expression of democratic values.     

The problem of polarization

This paper offers a unified political economy explanation of political extremism and moderation regarding income redistribution. Unlike the standard spatial voting model, the explanation herein recognizes that extremists are distinguished not only by their political positions, but also by the intensity with which they hold them. The paper uses an extension of Aumann and Kurz’s (Econometrica 45(5):1137–1161, 1977) bargaining model to endogenize moderation and extremism in the context of democratic voting. The extension shows that low-income voters tend to be bolder in their redistributive demands and high-income voters tend to be more tenacious in defending them. These hypotheses are evaluated empirically using the Political Action Panel Study.     

Three roads to institutionalisation: Vote‐, office‐ and policy‐seeking explanations of party switching in Poland

Party institutionalisation is a central problem in political science. The literature tends to understand it as a syndrome and therefore has difficulty explaining variations. This article suggests a new approach based on the transaction between a legislative party and its deputies, the failure of which is observable in party switching. Three routes to institutionalisation are identified by appealing to the vote‐seeking, office‐seeking or policy‐seeking motivations of deputies. Poland has had a large volume of party switching, along with wide variation in the incentives facing differently‐motivated deputies. Survival analyses of switching in four Polish parliaments find that vote‐seeking is the most likely route to institutionalisation for Polish parties. Moreover, in this article a concrete hypothesis is established for comparative testing: legislative parties can survive as long as their popular support exceeds 40 per cent of their share in the previous election.