Toward “hardened” accountability? Analyzing the European Union's hybrid transnational governance in timber and biofuel supply chains

The voluntary/mandatory divide is a constant feature of scholarly debates on corporate accountability for sustainability in global supply chains. A widely held assumption is that the addition of state authority to private transnational governance in global supply chains will “harden” accountability and, thus, promote more sustainable production. The state's ability to set legally binding requirements is expected to coerce companies into complying. The hybridization of private and state authority is seen to strengthen good practice in private authority. This empirical study questions these assumptions based on an analysis of two hybrid governance arrangements for sustainability in global supply chains: the EU's Timber Regulation (EUTR) and Renewable Energy Directive (RED). The results demonstrate that both EUTR and EU-RED yield sector wide efforts of compliance and to this extent can be seen as enhancing accountability in the sense of answerability. At the same time, we find that the policies in both cases are not more demanding, nor enforced strictly, the latter putting into question their potential to coerce companies. Further, a “hardening” of accountability is at least obscured as both EUTR and EU-RED have stripped private authority they employ in their hybrid transnational governance from the need to establish legitimacy with a broader audience. This makes legal compliance and cost-effectiveness the core factor for companies’ efforts to demonstrate compliance. Our findings hence question whether the EUTR and EU-RED have led to “hardened” accountability compared to private transnational governance, and ask for an empirical, more nuanced understanding of what there is to gain or lose from hybridizing private and state authority in transnational governance.     

The politics of resonance: Transnational sustainability governance in Argentina

Why do private governance initiatives trigger greater participation in one country than another? This article examines the domestic dimension of transnational regulation through a case study of private sustainability governance in Argentina. Drawing from theories of contentious politics, the argument poses that the resonance of transnational private governance is shaped by the semantic compatibility of “incoming” sustainability programs against national political culture. Analyzing the limited participation of Argentine actors in contemporary sustainability initiatives, the article claims that the validity and relevance of sustainability programs is affected by three dimensions of national political culture accentuated over the last decade: a politicized model of state‐society relations, the low visibility of environmental matters, and a widespread anti‐corporate culture. By examining the ideational fundamentals of the “politics of resonance” in Argentina, the article makes a relevant and original contribution to transnational regulation literature, highlighting the need for theoretical accounts and empirical analyses that address domestic and cultural variables as fundamental pieces in transnational norm diffusion and effectiveness.     

Civil Society in World Politics: How Accountable are Transnational CSOs?

Transnational civil society organizations (CSOs) are often said to lack accountability. Taking issue with this claim, we report the results of a study on the accountability regimes of 60 transnational CSOs engaging in political advocacy. We scrutinize their transparency, opportunities for internal participation, evaluations and self-regulation, complaint procedures, and their independence from the state and intergovernmental organizations. We find that most transnational CSOs are reasonably transparent and offer participatory opportunities at least for members. They are organizationally independent from states and intergovernmental organizations, but dependencies on public funding are striking in some cases. Independent evaluations of their activities are scarce and codes of conduct, often suggested as an avenue towards better self-regulation of CSOs, do not seem to play a major role in practice. We conclude that the debate over transnational CSO accountability should focus on the most critical issues. In the case of general interest organizations, this seems to be the danger of co-optation through public financing. Special interest organizations, by contrast, are highly independent but have deficits in external transparency, especially regarding their budget.     

Big audit firms as regulatory intermediaries in transnational labor governance

Due diligence and corporate disclosure initiatives effectively expand the role of professional service firms as regulatory intermediaries in the governance of conditions of production in global supply chains. In this paper, we examine the rise of the “Big Four” audit firms in the market for services connected to transnational labor governance. Through a qualitative case study of audit firms in modern slavery governance, we argue that the Big Four's political repertoire for transnational labor governance expands beyond the roles that are typically linked to their services, and promotes an agenda that touches on key debates on what constitutes proper transnational labor governance. Big audit firms engage in a variety of informal and covert influencing practices and are shown to promote an agenda of incrementalist soft‐law labor governance, opposing concrete performance targets, binding public regulation and an independent watchdog role for civil society.     

Transparency without Democracy: The Unexpected Effects of China's Environmental Disclosure Policy

This article examines the impact of transparency regulations enacted under authoritarian conditions, through a study of China's environmental transparency measures. Given China's decentralized administrative structure, environmental disclosure ends up being weakest in the most polluted cities. However, the measures have allowed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to affect environmental governance through unusual pathways. Multinational companies (MNCs) have used NGO pollution databases to monitor Chinese suppliers, whereas local governments have responded to a transparency index with greater NGO engagement. That said, these civil society initiatives have had limited impact on key stakeholder behavior. For the environment ministry, enforcement costs remain high. Local government behavior depends on their economic priorities and the nature of their relations with enterprises. Chinese enterprise behavior depends on the character of their relations with government and MNCs. Given China's authoritarian structure, improved governance does not translate into stronger accountability, challenging common assumptions about the relationship between transparency and accountability.     

Cheap talk or incredible commitment? (Mis)calculating transparency and anti‐corruption

Why do “tainted” politicians in high‐corruption countries adopt transparency and anti‐corruption policies that risk exposing their wrongdoing? Using the cases of freedom of information and public asset disclosure in Romania, we assess three explanations: that these policies are meant to be mere window dressing, facilitate bottom‐up monitoring, or ensure access to information for the ruling party if it loses power. We find that decision makers adopt transparency and anti‐corruption policies because they want to signal their integrity and because they underestimate their consequences. Because they assume they will be able to control implementation, decision makers discount the potential costs of damaging information being released. Sustained political competition can keep corruption and lack of transparency on the public and political agenda, shifting attention from policy adoption to implementation and leading to increased compliance. Since politicians miscalculate the consequences of their actions, signals that are intended to be cheap can end up being quite costly.     

Transparency in multilateral climate politics: Furthering (or distracting from) accountability?

This article analyzes the interplay between transparency and accountability in multilateral climate politics. The 2015 Paris Agreement calls for a “pledge‐and‐review” approach to collective climate action with an “enhanced transparency framework” as a key pillar of the Agreement. By making visible who is doing what, transparency is widely assumed to be vital to holding countries to account and building trust. We explore whether transparency is generating such effects in this context, by developing and applying an analytical framework to examine the link between transparency and accountability. We find that the scope and practices of climate transparency reflect (rather than necessarily reduce) broader conflicts over who should be held to account to whom and about what, with regard to responsibility and burden sharing for ambitious climate action. We conclude that the relationship between transparency and accountability is less straightforward than assumed, and that the transformative promise of transparency needs to be reconsidered in this light.     

The Translation of Transnational Voluntary Standards into Practices: Civil Society and the Forest Stewardship Council in Russia

The article analyses closely the role of civil society in the local translation and adaptation of transnational standards of responsible use of natural resources in global certification regimes. The study builds on original evidence from Russia on civil society and forest certification, based on extensive fieldwork. It argues that the local translation of global sustainability standards into on-the-ground practices is not a straightforward execution of rules imposed by powerful transnational actors—e.g. international nongovernmental organizations, multinationals, governments, or consumers. Rather, local civil society actors elaborate the ways in which transnational standards are implemented locally and thereby construct new knowledge related to standard implementation and responsible natural resource management. The paper contributes to the literature on transnational governance by examining the involvement of civil society organizations in the translation, adaptation, and learning dynamics in global certification regimes.     

Promoting good governance in Africa: The role of the civil society as a watchdog

Corruption, maladministration, nepotism, and poor accountability have reached unprecedented levels within the African continent. Consequently, this has impeded the successful and adequate provision of public services and by extension, hampered socio‐economic development and good governance. Undeniably, the entrenchment of civil society is vital for democratic purposes and the consolidation of good governance. For the purpose of this study, Africa is regarded as a unitary entity composed of synchronized autonomous states and governments. As a result, a strict examination of available and relevant literature on the provision of civil society in Africa was applied (were a systematic review of literature irtes was undertaken). The study was able to comprehensively understand the dynamics, challenges, and benefits related to the increasing rate at which is participating in Africa's governance related issues and their overall impact. The study was also able to understand how civil society in Africa has contributed to promoting good governance. It is, however, apparent that the increasing involvement of civil society in governance issues relates to transparency, upholding the rule of law, human rights, and the fight against corruption inter alia. The study also uncovered that the increase in the participation of civil society organizations will have a positive impact on governance as they will have the capacity to act as watchdogs to ensure that governments are effective and serving the needs of the public. Going forward, it will be imperative for civil society to work hand in hand with democratically elected governments in not only fighting corruption and promoting good governance but to also ensure that there is a socio‐economic and by extension political development within the African continent.     

Accountability‐by‐Proxy in Transnational Non‐State Governance

Transnational non‐state governance arrangements (NGAs) are increasingly common in areas such as labor standards and environmental sustainability, often presenting themselves as innovative means through which the lives of marginalized communities in developing countries can be improved. Yet in some cases, the policy interventions adopted by the managers of these NGAs appear not to be welcomed by their supposed beneficiaries. This article accounts for this predicament by examining the effects of different configurations of accountability within NGAs promoting labor rights. Most labor‐rights NGAs incorporate “proxy accountability” arrangements, in which consumers and activists hold decision makers accountable “on behalf” of the putative beneficiaries of the NGAs: workers and affected communities in poorer countries. The article shows how and why different combinations of proxy versus beneficiary accountability influence the choice of policy instruments used by NGAs, and applies the argument to three prominent non‐state initiatives in the domain of labor standards.     

The effectiveness of regulatory disclosure policies

Regulatory transparency—mandatory disclosure of information by private or public institutions with a regulatory intent—has become an important frontier of government innovation. This paper assesses the effectiveness of such transparency systems by examining the design and impact of financial disclosure, nutritional labeling, workplace hazard communication, and five other diverse systems in the United States. We argue that transparency policies are effective only when the information they produce becomes “embedded” in the everyday decision‐making routines of information users and information disclosers. This double‐sided embeddedness is the most important condition for transparency systems' effectiveness. Based on detailed case analyses, we evaluate the user and discloser embeddedness of the eight major transparency policies. We then draw on a comprehensive inventory of prior studies of regulatory effectiveness to assess whether predictions about effectiveness based on characteristics of embeddedness are consistent with those evaluations. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Civil Society after Democracy: The Evolution of Civic Activism in South Africa and Korea

The phase of democratic consolidation can significantly impact the motives, dynamics and objectives of civil society. Its internal roles, dynamics and power balances are significantly altered by the advent of democracy, due to shifting resources, political opportunities and a general reframing of goals and objectives. By adopting a definition of civil society as an ‘arena’ (which highlights the continuously evolving composition and leadership of civil society) and borrowing a number of theoretical dimensions from social movement theory (which underline the importance of resource mobilization, political opportunities and conceptual framing processes), the article shows that the advent of democracy has posed a number of challenges to civil society organizations in Korea and South Africa. Moreover, the consolidation of democracy has inevitably changed the nature of government–civil society relations. While in South Africa institutional politics reasserted itself in the first years of democracy, thereby sidelining organizations and movements concerned with public accountability and good governance (which have only recently resurfaced through the action of new social movements), in Korea corruption and lack of transparency immediately marred the dawn of democracy, providing civic movements with a fertile terrain to galvanize civic mobilizations vis-à-vis the lack of responsiveness of the political class.     

Legitimacy through targeted transparency? Regulatory effectiveness and sustainability of lobbying regulation in the European Union

Regulating interest groups’ access to decision makers constitutes a key dimension of legitimate and accountable systems of government. The European Union explicitly links lobbying regulation with the democratic credentials of its supranational system of governance and proposes transparency as a solution to increase legitimacy and regulate private actors’ participation in policy making. This lobbying regulation regime consists of a Transparency Register that conditions access to decision makers upon joining it and complying with its information disclosure requirements. The extent to which transparency‐based regulatory regimes are successful in ensuring effective regulation of targeted actors and in being recognised as a legitimate instrument of governance constitutes a key empirical question. Therefore, the study asks: Do stakeholders perceive the transparency‐based EU lobbying regulation regime to be a legitimate form of regulatory governance? The study answers by building on a classic model of targeted transparency and proposes perceived regulatory effectiveness and sustainability as two key dimensions on which to evaluate the legitimacy of the Register. The arguments are tested on a new dataset reporting the evaluations of 1,374 stakeholders on the design and performance of the EU lobbying regulation regime. The findings describe a transparency regime that scores low in perceived effectiveness and moderate to low in sustainability. Citizens criticise the quality of information disclosed and the Register's performance as a transparency instrument. The Register did not effectively bridge the information gap between the public and interest groups about supranational lobbying. In terms of sustainability, interest organisations appreciate the systemic benefits of transparency, but identify few organisation‐level benefits. Organisations that are policy insiders incur more transparency costs so they instrumentally support transparency only insofar it suits their lobbying strategies and does not threaten their position. Insiders support including additional categories of organisations in the Register's regulatory remit but not more types of interactions with policy makers. They support an imperfect regulatory status quo to which they have adapted but lack incentives to support increased transparency and information disclosure. Targeted transparency proves an ineffective approach to regulating interest groups’ participation in EU policy making, constituting a suboptimal choice for ensuring transparent, accountable and legitimate supranational lobbying.     

Risk Analysis of Nanomaterials: Exposing Nanotechnology's Naked Emperor

Risk analysis (encompassing risk assessment, management, and communication) is touted internationally as the most appropriate approach for governing nanomaterials. In this article, we survey existing criticisms of risk assessment as a basis for regulatory decision making on emerging technologies, particularly highlighting its exclusion of key societal dimensions, its epistemological underdetermination, and its lack of democratic accountability. We then review the specific case of nanomaterials and identify six major barriers to the effective operation of both risk assessment and risk management. These include a lack of: nano‐specific regulatory requirements, shared definitions, validated and accessible methods for safety testing, available scientific knowledge, reliable information on commercial use, and capacity for exposure mitigation. Finding the knowledge, standards, methods, tools, definitions, capacity, and political commitment all insufficient, we argue that risk analysis is a “naked emperor” for nanomaterial governance. We therefore suggest that additional concepts and approaches are essential for nanomaterials policy and regulation.     

When state‐level institutions cannot tell the whole story: An inquiry into municipal variations in quality of government

The lion's share of comparative research on corruption, good governance, and quality of government (QoG) has been cross‐country. However, a growing body of literature has begun to explore within‐country variations observed at the subnational level regarding corruption and social trust. The existence of such variations implies that state‐level institutions are not capable of telling the entire story and that quality of subnational‐level institutions might be important determinants of within‐country variations regarding, for instance, trust. This article delves into the Swedish case, an egalitarian country that scores high in international indices on lack of corruption and social trust; hence, a “least likely case” of subnational variations in both QoG and trust. Using two unique data sets, we find variations in both municipal QoG and social trust. In line with theory, we find that “local QoG” is associated with individual levels of community trust. This finding—in a low‐corrupt, high‐trust egalitarian society—strengthens the universality of the QoG‐perspective.     

Is Governance Reform a Catalyst for Development?

International development agencies contend developing countries can boost rates of economic growth by introducing “good governance” measures. However, close analysis of specific governance reforms and economic turning points in the United States (when it was a developing country), Argentina, Mauritius, and Jamaica suggests that the agencies underestimate the time and political effort required to change governance, and overestimate the economic impact. Counter to optimistic claims about how much “institutions matter,” these carefully selected cases imply that greater transparency, accountability, and participation are often a result, rather than a direct cause of faster development. Furthermore, they show that closed institutions may be a satisfactory platform for rapid growth, provided those institutions open over time. Policymakers need to understand these processes better before counting on governance reforms to be the springboard out of poverty for most developing countries today.     

Deliberative Politik in transnationalen Räumen — Legitimation und Effektivität in der grenzüberschreitenden Umweltpolitik zwischen Kanada und USA

The article addresses new, horizontal and dialogue-oriented forms of political governance in transnational spaces. A normative-analytical model of deliberative governance will be developed to appraise the democratic potential of transnational structures and actions. The research is guided by the observation that the North American Great Lakes Regime reveals a high democratic-deliberative quality whereas international governance rather tends to de-democratization. This raises a challenging research question: To what extent does the deliberative governance of the Great Lakes Regime provide a model case, which allows drawing conclusions on institutional prerequisites and means how to “democratize” governance in similar issue areas.     

Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes

The legitimacy and accountability of polycentric regulatory regimes, particularly at the transnational level, has been severely criticized, and the search is on to find ways in which they can be enhanced. This paper argues that before developing even more proposals, we need to pay far greater attention to the dynamics of accountability and legitimacy relationships, and to how those in regulatory regimes respond to them. The article thus first seeks to develop a closer analysis of three key elements of legitimacy and accountability relationships which it suggests are central to these dynamics: The role of the institutional environment in the construction of legitimacy, the dialectical nature of accountability relationships, and the communicative structures through which accountability occurs and legitimacy is constructed. Second, the article explores how organizations in regulatory regimes respond, or are likely to respond, to multiple legitimacy and accountability claims, and how they themselves seek to build legitimacy in complex and dynamic situations. The arguments developed here are not normative: There is no “grand solution” proposed to the normative questions of when regulators should be considered legitimate or how to make them so. Rather, the article seeks to analyse the dynamics of legitimacy and accountability relationships as they occur in an attempt to build a more realistic foundation on which grander “how to” proposals can be built. For until we understand these dynamics, the grander, normative arguments risk being simply pipe dreams – diverting, but in the end making little difference.     

Fragmented control: Governing contentious labor organizations in China

How does an authoritarian state govern contentious civil society and what are the effects on grassroots mobilization? This article theorizes the relationship between repression and mobilization by examining the case of informal labor organizations in South China that threaten social stability. Findings based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork inside these organizations suggest that the central state's mandate to maintain social stability is refracted through the interests and capabilities of local agencies. This results in “fragmented control”: divergent, even conflicting, forms of state governance over civil society. Local authorities work at cross‐purposes by simultaneously repressing, co‐opting, and neglecting underground organizing. Fragmented control generates political uncertainty on the part of activists and induces them to engage in “censored entrepreneurialism”—a set of tactical adaptations characterized by a mixture of self‐censorship and entrepreneurial experimentation.     

Civil Society Mappings by Government: A Comparison of Ecuadorian and Colombian Cases

Scholars argue that we cannot see civil society organizations (CSOs) as legitimate players in policy if we have no clear ways to define them and if we lack information explaining their functions. Thus, scholars and practitioners alike have encouraged the ‘mapping’ of civil society. Mapping civil society consists of gathering and collating information on CSOs and often making it publicly available. There is little scholarship about such mapping efforts implemented by government. This article compares new mapping efforts in two countries—i.e., registries of CSOs created by governments in Ecuador and Colombia. The article examines the intentions of civil society mapping by government, identifying three key goals: to collect data, to regulate, and to foster collaboration. It discusses the differences across civil society mappings by government and in comparison with other mapping projects. The article argues that registries are increasingly positioned as a link between government and civil society not only to collect data for transparency but also to implement regulatory measures and to foster various degrees of collaboration. Thus, greater research attention to civil society mappings by government and their possible implications on civil society development and civil society/state relations is needed.