Predatory democracy: Family,bureaucrats and gangsters

Daniel Burton‐Rose, with Dan Pens and Paul Wright, eds., THE CELLING OF AMERICA: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE U.S. PRISON INDUSTRY (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1998).

Winston James, HOLDING ALOFT THE BANNER OF ETHIOPIA: CARIBBEAN RADICALISM IN EARLY TWENTIETH‐CENTURY AMERICA (London: Verso Press, 1998).

Rupert Charles Lewis, WALTER RODNEY'S INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (Barbados: University of West Indies Press, and Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1998).     

The economic approach to political behavior: Governors,bureaucrats, and cost commissions

Cost control commissions provide two primary types of recommendations: widespread benefits-widespread costs and widespread benefits-narrow costs. Both types of recommendations are not of the form predicted by the standard economic models of political behavior. The paper explores why governors sanction these commissions and the types of recommendations governors will accept. Legislators use the maxim of concentrate benefits-spread costs to maximize votes. Governors, however, face a lower return to concentrated benefit policies and a lower cost from concentrated cost policies. This leads a governor to favor at the margin, policies which have widespread benefit-widespread cost or widespread benefit-concentrated cost. Evidence from 5 state cost control commissions support the difference between the politicians. The cost control commissions sanctioned by governors have proposed recommendations of the widespread benefit-widespread cost and widespread benefit-concentrated cost form. Governors accepted approximately two-thirds of the widespread benefit-concentrated cost proposals, although they were more likely to accept recommendations of the widespread benefit-widespread cost nature. Recommendations which required legislative approval saw a lower likelihood of acceptance. This is consistent with the view that legislators prefer concentrated to widespread benefit recommendations. qu][The politician's] favorite strategy is to create a commission to study a problem and make recommendations that may then be used as political cover. Call it government by commission.     

Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats

Bureaucrats in the government sector have a double role since they are both suppliers and demanders of public employment; they are publicly employed (supply labor) and they have an important say in deciding the size of the municipal employment (demand labor). In this paper we present and estimate a theoretical model that focuses on this double role of bureaucrats. The predictions from the theoretical model are supported by our empirical results: The estimates, based on data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002, show that wages have smaller effects on the demand for bureaucrats than on the demand for other types of public employees. Actually, wages have no significant effect on the number of bureaucrats the municipality employs.     

Legislators,organizations and ties: Understanding interest group recognition in the European Parliament

What explains Members of European Parliament's (MEPs’) decisions to recognize some interest groups as relevant policy actors? Addressing this question is fundamental for understanding the role of political elites in shaping patterns of interest representation and interest groups’ role in legislative decision making. Building on theories of legislative behaviour and informational theories of legislative lobbying, we argue that MEPs give recognition to those organizations that are instrumental for achieving key political goals: re-election, career-progression and policy influence. The pursuit of these goals generates different patterns of MEP recognition of interest groups. We contribute to the literature in three ways. Conceptually, we propose interest group recognition as a key concept for understanding interactions and links between legislative and non-legislative actors. We illustrate the high conceptual relevance of recognition for interest groups research while noting its conspicuous neglect in the literature. We address this gap and place the concept central stage in understanding legislators’ attention to and behaviour towards interest organizations. Theoretically, we build on a classic framework explaining legislators’ behaviour and refine it through the lenses of informational theories of legislative lobbying. We argue and show that legislators recognize organizations that enhance electoral prospects in their home Member States, and that legislator–group ideological proximity and an interest group's prominence in a specific policy field affect MEPs’ decisions to recognize some organizations as relevant actors. Our argument acknowledges the importance of the broader context in which MEPs operate and pays attention to how they react to and interact with it. Empirically, we propose an original and innovative research design to identify and measure recognition with the help of social media data. Our measurement strategy constitutes a significant improvement insofar that it reduces the challenges of measurement bias usually associated with self-reported data generated through interviews, surveys, or the textual analysis of newspaper articles and official documents. Our research design allows using fine-grained measures of key dependent and explanatory variables and offers the very first analysis of MEP interest group recognition that holds across decision-making events and policy areas. We test our argument on a new dataset with 4 million observations recording the recognition of more than 7,000 organizations by 80 per cent of MEPs serving in EP8. We find that MEPs are more likely to recognize organizations from their Member State, particularly under flexible- and open-list electoral institutions. MEPs are also more likely to recognize organizations that share their ideological affinities and are prominent actors in policy areas legislators specialize in.     

Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators

This article examines the effect of gender on legislators' attitudes and bill initiation behavior in three Latin American countries—Argentina, Colombia, and Costa Rica. I argue that sex role changes in Latin America over the past 35 years have led to changes in how female legislators perceive their political roles, and consequently, changes in their attitudes and behavior. Specifically, female legislators will place higher priority than male legislators on women's issues and children/family concerns, but their attitudes in other areas, such as education, health, the economy, agriculture, and employment, will be similar. However, I expect that gender dynamics in the legislative arena lead to marginalization of women such that gender differences will emerge for bill initiation behavior where they did not appear for attitudes. I test this using a survey of legislators' issue preferences and archival data on the bills that legislators sponsor and find statistical support for the hypotheses.     

Comparing Legislators and Legislatures: The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock Reconsidered

Lawrence S. Rothenberg Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627 e-mail: lrot{at}mail.rochester.edu (corresponding author) Although political methodologists are well aware of measurementissues and the problems that can be created, such concerns arenot always front and center when we are doing substantive research.Here, we show how choices in measuring legislative preferenceshave influenced our understanding of what determines legislativeoutputs. Specifically, we replicate and extend Binder's highlyinfluential analysis (Binder, Sarah A. 1999. The dynamics oflegislative gridlock, 1947–96. American Political ScienceReview 93:519–33; see also Binder, Sarah A. 2003. Stalemate:Causes and consequences of legislative gridlock. Washington,DC: Brookings Institution) of legislative gridlock, which emphasizeshow partisan, electoral, and institutional characteristics generatemajor legislative initiatives. Binder purports to show thatexamining the proportion, rather than the absolute number, ofkey policy proposals passed leads to the inference that thesefeatures, rather than divided government, are crucial for explaininggridlock. However, we demonstrate that this finding is underminedby flaws in preference measurement. Binder's results are a functionof using W-NOMINATE scores never designed for comparing Senateto House members or for analyzing multiple Congresses jointly.When preferences are more appropriately measured with commonspace scores (Poole, Keith T. 1998. Recovering a basic spacefrom a set of issue scales. American Journal of Political Science42:964–93), there is no evidence that the factors thatshe highlights matter. Authors' note: Thanks to Sarah Binder and Keith Poole for furnishingdata used in our analysis and to Chris Achen and Kevin Clarkefor advice. All errors remain our own. Online appendix is availableon the Political Analysis Web site.     

Explaining Explanations: How Legislators Explain their Policy Positions and How Citizens React

Legislators claim that how they explain their votes matters as much as or more than the roll calls themselves. However, few studies have systematically examined legislators’ explanations and citizen attitudes in response to these explanations. We theorize that legislators strategically tailor explanations to constituents in order to compensate for policy choices that are incongruent with constituent preferences, and to reinforce policy choices that are congruent. We conduct a within‐subjects field experiment using U.S. senators as subjects to test this hypothesis. We then conduct a between‐subjects survey experiment of ordinary people to see how they react to the explanatory strategies used by senators in the field experiment. We find that most senators tailor their explanations to their audiences, and that these tailored explanations are effective at currying support—especially among people who disagree with the legislators’ roll‐call positions.     

Beyond freedom,beyond control,beyond the Cold War: approaches to American culture and the state-private network

Cold War historiography has been through several recognizable stages over the last five decades, and the increasing interest over the last few years in cultural themes has added an important extra dimension to this. Yet the focus on ‘culture’ has rarely gone beyond studies of government support for particular cultural events and programs. Rarely have historical studies attempted to address the issue that such political uses of culture were part of an overall ideological offensive in both the East and the West. Recognition that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was ideologically-driven is one thing, but historians have generally avoided a similar posture regarding the United States. Yet without sufficient attention as to how the US government attempted to mobilize and utilize all areas of social activity for the greater good of confronting the Soviet Union, there can be no satisfactory understanding of what the Cold War really involved In addition, this ‘ideological impulse’ has not disappeared with the end of the Cold War, as the reaction of the United States to the events of 11 September 2001 has demonstrated.     

Keeping them Honest: Public and Elite Perceptions of Ethical Conduct among Australian Legislators

Public confidence in politicians across all democratic countries has fallen to historic lows in recent years. In Australia, around one in three voters believe that legislators use their public office for financial gain, and only one in four believe that legislators have a high moral code. Governments in many countries have attempted to deal with this problem by establishing codes of ethical conduct for legislators. This paper examines what standards citizens expect from their politicians and, in turn, what standards politicians themselves regard as important. The data come from the 1996 Australian Election Study survey which asked voters and elected representatives what importance they attributed to the eight principles laid out in the federal parliament's own ethical guide. The results show that voters expect higher standards from legislators than do legislators themselves, particularly with regard to the proper use of public resources and rejecting favouritism. A range of hypotheses are tested to account for citizen and elite beliefs about legislators' ethical conduct. The results show that stronger democratic culture and political skills are important for the public, and lengthy exposure to political parties and democratic institutions for the elite.     

State Legislators and State Auditors: Is There an Inherent Role Conflict?

Traditionally, one of the functions of state legislatures has been that of oversight. However, because it is the least rewarding, legislatures have paid it the least attention. This has led to increased responsibilities for state auditors. In many cases, their role has expanded from an examination of financial transactions and internal control to include the oversight functions previously performed by the legislatures. The result has been considerable auditor-legislative tensions. This study surveyed state auditors to determine potential areas of conflict between auditors and legislatures. It found the major areas of conflict include inaction by legislators on the findings and recommendations of auditors and attempts at inappropriate control over the audit function by legislatures.     

Scripted Messengers: How Party Discipline and Branding Turn Election Candidates and Legislators into Brand Ambassadors

Political parties with strict party discipline are well-placed to demand that their election candidates and legislators promote the party brand. The franchise-franchisee relationship causes representatives to relinquish individual expression in exchange for centralized party messaging. This article looks at how a strategic desire for party unity combines with internal brand management to turn lower-ranking politicians in a parliamentary system into party brand ambassadors. Our Canadian case study draws on in-depth interviews with party leaders, Members of Parliament, political staff, candidates for office and prospective candidates. The implications for representative democracy in a Westminster system are considered, including the representational constraints for racial and sexual minorities.     

Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation

Proportional representation systems affect the extent to which elected legislators exhibit various attributes that allow them to earn a personal vote. The sources of variation in personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) lie in informational shortcuts voters use under different electoral rules. List type (closed or open) and district magnitude (the number of legislators elected from a district) affect the types of shortcuts voters employ. When lists are closed, legislators' PVEA are of decreasing usefulness to voters as magnitude (and hence the number of candidates on a list) increases. When lists are open, legislators' PVEA are increasingly useful to voters as magnitude increases, because the number of candidates from which voters must choose whom to give a preference vote increases. As predicted by the theory, the probability that a legislator will exhibit PVEA—operationalized as local birthplace or lower-level electoral experience—declines with magnitude when lists are closed, but rises with magnitude when lists are open .     

Constructing a global commons in,against and beyond the state

The “commons” is emerging as one of the progressive political key words of our time. Against a backdrop of continuing neoliberal governance of the global economy, there is interest in a “translocal” global commons as an alternative that transcends both state and capitalist forms of appropriation. In this paper, I offer a constructive critique of the global commons. While sympathetic to arguments about the deficiencies of state-centric forms of socialist projects for emancipation, I nevertheless argue that realizing the commons vision of a more democratic politics means continuing engagement with the state, particularly for connecting up and scaling up local autonomous projects to achieve more transformative social change.