Why so much stability?: Another opinion

Public Choice - In this paper I have suggested three important factors that render majority rule stable in real world settings; small numbers of alternatives, constraints on agenda setters, and a...     

Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking

Recent formal models of legislatures have proved that equilibrium outcomes are extremely unlikely without either (1) extreme restrictions upon preferences or (2) constraints upon the agenda. The implication is that constant instability or dictatorial manipulation is the norm in politics. This paper argues to the contrary, that legislatures (and other political processes) are characterized by some regularities, and that equilibrium models are the appropriate technique to use in describing these regularities. Examples from economic theory are used to illustrate this principle. The assumption of equilibrium is methodological, committing the researcher to develop models that have specific empirical implications. Using analogies from the economic theories of general equilibrium, oligopoly, and demand revealing processes, some potentially fruitful means of developing equilibrium political models are described. Assuming that legislators may freely make binding contracts has both empirical and normative advantages. Finally, institutional restrictions on legislative agendas may assure equilibrium. These include ‘constitutional’ rules, agreements to share ‘pork barrel’ projects evenly, limitation of committees to specific policy arenas, and the election of leaders who then determine the voting agenda.     

Why Muslims like democracy yet have so little of it

This paper explains the observed combination of relatively low levels of democracy and positive attitudes towards it in the Muslim world. It argues that this democracy paradox is understandable from the perspective of the principle of diminishing marginal utility: people value highly that of which they have little. This reasoning implies, however, that surveys like the World Values Surveys (WVS) elicit circumstance-driven marginal preferences rather than culturally determined attitudinal traits. Empirical evidence showing that individuals living in undemocratic societies have much more favorable inclinations towards democracy supports our argument.     

Why so few, and why so late? Green parties and the question of governmental participation

Abstract.  Green parties have been represented in the parliaments of European Union countries since 1981, but it was not until recently that a few have entered national governments. Using a data set comprised of 51 government formation opportunities (where the Greens were represented in parliament), the authors of this article show that the parties involved in these bargaining situations are more office-oriented than earlier studies had found. As Green parties are seen to be less office-seeking than other parties, this general tendency for office-seeking behaviour in government formation may partly account for the scarcity of Greens in government. Furthermore, a number of hypotheses derived from theories that account for the specific nature of Green parties in terms of their office-, policy- and vote-seeking orientations are tested. It is found that Greens participate in government when they have lost votes in at least one election, when the main party of the left identifies them as a clear electoral threat and when the policy distance between the Greens and either the formateur party or the main left party is small (the latter condition must be accompanied by a substantial proportion of seats for the Green party in parliament). As most of these simultaneous conditions only materialized recently, and in a few countries, it is argued that this analysis, which is the first comparative and multivariate test focused on this question, explains the scarcity and the delay of Green governmental participation.     

Roadgrading Community Culture: Why the Internet is so Dangerous to Real Democracy

This article forwards an anarchist analysis of the internet as inherently degrading of local community and the possibility of real democracy emerging. The authors suggest that rampant virtuality, based on the eradication of time and space as functional communicative restraints, acts to separate individuals from their face-to-face relationships and localities. They forward that local community is the only forum in which genuine democracy and an ecological society can hope to thrive. The article argues that in asking the question Where do you want to go today?, the internet attempts to create a virtual everywhere, a universalising logic that is to communication what the WTO and globalisation are to economics. Further, the piece forwards a view of technology and society in dialectic relationship with one another, suggesting that democratic tools and a democratic society rely on one another for their emergence.     

我国NGO参与社会福利为何困难重重——体制层面的分析

对于当今中国公众而言,NGO一词并不陌生。改革开放以来的三十余年中,我国各类NGO活跃在社会福利、公共服务、慈善事业等领域,成为社会福利社会化过程中的重要参与主体,也成了社会公众和媒体关注的焦点。然而,同国外相比,我国的NGO发展尚不成熟,其赖以生存制度环境依旧不稳定。我国NGO管理体制上的瓶颈在很大程度上限制了我国NGO的进一步发展。主要从体制层面分析我国NGO参与社会福利过程中的阻力,并寻求解决途径。     

Why do so many people vote 'unnaturally'? A cultural explanation for voting behaviour

Abstract. The traditional class approach to politics maintains that the working class 'naturally' votes for left-wing parties because they represent its economic interests. Such traditional voting patterns have, however, become less typical, giving rise to the 'Death of Class Debate' in political sociology. Against this background, using data collected in the Netherlands in 1997, this article examines why so many people, working and middle class alike, vote for parties that do not represent their 'real class interests'. Critically elaborating Lipset's work on working-class authoritarianism and Inglehart's on postmaterialism, the article confirms that 'natural' voting complies with the logic of class analysis. 'Unnatural' voting, however, is not driven by economic cues and class. Right-wing working-class voting behaviour is caused by cultural conservatism that stems from limited cultural capital. The pattern of voting for the two small leftist parties in Dutch politics underscores the significance of this cultural explanation: those with limited cultural capital and culturally conservative values vote for the Socialist Party ('Old Left') rather than the Greens ('New Left'). Breaking the traditional monopoly of the one-sided class approach and using a more eclectic and open theoretical approach enables political sociologists once again to appreciate the explanatory power of the class perspective.     

Why the EHRC Report into Anti‐Semitism in the Labour Party is About so much More than Anti‐Semitism in the Labour Party—A Personal View

The Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHCR) investigation into anti‐semitism in the Labour Party, the virtual disavowal of the report by Jeremy Corbyn, his subsequent suspension from and then reinstatement to the party and then his exclusion from the Parliamentary Labour Party, raise issues far wider than just the EHRC’s legalistic and limited investigation.     

Life-style constraints on formal political participation—Why so few women local councillors in Britain?

Much of the literature on both formal political participation and political recruitment is static in concept. It fails to take into account that opportunities for participation may alter during one individual's lifetime. In particular, the lives of women change, often abruptly, on marriage and at childbirth. Time constraints increase and decrease as family demands heighten or lessen. The small survey of women political activists reported here suggests that flexibility of time constraints, taken together with family attitudes, are important factors in women's recruitment. Some women's expectations of local government and perceptions of its power also militate against their recruitment. Although the survey is small and limited to Labour Party activists, its findings are likely to be applicable to women in other industrialized countries.     

Modeling the interaction of parties, activists and voters: Why is the political center so empty?

Abstract.  The formal stochastic model of voting should be the theoretical benchmark against which empirical models can be gauged. A standard result in the formal model is the 'mean voter theorem' stating that parties converge to the electoral center. Empirical analysis based on the vote-maximizing premise, however, invalidates this convergence result. We consider both empirical and formal models that incorporate exogeneous valence terms for the parties. Valence can be regarded as an electorally perceived attribute of each party leader that is independent of the policy position of the party. We show that the mean voter theorem is valid for empirical multinomial logit and probit models of a number of elections in the Netherlands and Britain. To account for the non-centrist policy positions of parties, we consider a more general formal model where valence is also affected by the behavior of party activists. The results suggest that non-convergent policy choice by party leaders can be understood as rational, vote-maximizing calculation by leaders in response to electoral and activist motivations.     

Why does the Senate “win” in conference committee?: A stability explanation

This paper develops a bicameral stability model wherein the conference committee serves as a vehicle for mutually advantageous bicameral exchange. The goal is to maintain a single party's bicameral majority. Majority party leaders use the conference committee to attenuate the outlying positions of House standing committees that threaten the bicameral majority. Conference outcomes favor the Senate because it is more vulnerable to party turnover. Statistical results on data from the U.S. Congress, 1949 through 1991, demonstrate that when one party holds a bicameral majority, a relative increase in conference bills preserves at the margin, Senate majority-party seats at the expense of House majority-party seats.