NATO's Response Force: finally getting it right?

Abstract

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) declared the NATO Response Force (NRF) a fully operational capability. Yet only 8 months later – and behind closed doors – the Alliance's military authorities rescinded the declaration as it became increasingly clear that member states were unwilling to make the necessary commitments to the force. To this day, the force has been a qualified failure: while many allies have benefited from participating in the NRF, lack of concrete troop commitments and disagreement as to the force's operational role have largely eroded its credibility. This could change with the allies' recent adoption of a revised NRF-construct. However, as NATO is still in a state of strategic confusion, the NRF is likely to continue to be different things to different nations.     

Why do they want American Nukes? Central and Eastern European positions regarding US nonstrategic nuclear weapons

This article analyses the potential motivations behind the opposition of a number of Central and Eastern European States (CESs) to the withdrawal of US deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) from Europe. It shows why CES governments obtain no military benefits from the deployed NSNW; it argues CES are unlikely to truly see them as a promising bargaining chip; it suggests CES can derive only limited prestige from US-deployed weapons and the contrasting norm of ‘nuclear disarmament’ likely offers a more attractive option; and it assesses potential bureaucratic interests as improbable to play a decisive role. In contrast, the article proposes a more nuanced elaboration of the transatlantic ‘linkage’ argument. It maintains CES have significant motives to keep the United States involved in Europe, shows how they are likely to mistrust US commitment pledges, and argues they are prone to use the NSNW debate as a convenient instrument (within a limited toolbox) towards locking in the US foothold on the continent.     

The US–Russian security ‘reset’: implications for Central-Eastern Europe and Germany

Abstract

The article examines the reactions of selected European states to the US-performed ‘reset’ in relations with Russia and explores the ways in which they have been adapting to the new set-up. The article is divided into three parts: after the discussion of the substantive continuity and limited change in US foreign and security policy (USFSP), the multilateral and bilateral dimensions of USFSP procedure are examined through John Ruggie's theoretical observations. The second part of the article deals with implications of the USFSP for Central-Eastern European countries. This part begins with a discussion of Russian attempts to wheedle Europe into embracing its plans for new European security architecture. The next section sheds light on the unexpected process of strategic realignment of the region (USA/NATO/EU/CSDP) and simultaneous transformation of the special relationship with the USA into ‘normal life’. The third part of the article tackles the implications of heightened US–Russian bilateralism for Germany. Authors' findings, many of them based on conducted elite interviews, suggest the contrary process, namely Germany's strengthened multilateral commitment to the EU and specifically to European Security and Defence Policy, limiting the bilateral option to energy trade with Russia. What follows are concluding remarks.     

波兰加入北约对波俄关系的影响

波兰加入北约使波兰从原来苏联对抗西方的防御区，变成了西方遏制俄罗斯的前沿，使波俄双边依存关系消失、地区安全战略相左、敌对情绪增加，对波俄双边关系的发展造成了一定的负面影响。但是作为地缘近邻国家，尽管波兰把自身安全托付给北约，但也须改善同俄罗斯的关系；虽然俄罗斯对波兰加入北约深感恼怒，但也只好接受现实，希望通过发展与波兰等北约新成员的关系加强俄罗斯在这一地区的影响，改善西部安全环境。同时，波兰加入北约，无疑使波俄关系受到美国以及北约同俄罗斯关系的影响，增加了双边关系的不确定因素。     

Europe and Iran’s Nuclear Issue: The Labours and Sorrows of a Supporting Actor

At the time of writing, representatives from Iran and the E3/EU+3 are trying to work out an agreement that will guarantee that Iran’s controversial nuclear programme, widely suspected of having a military purpose, serves only peaceful ends. As the negotiations enter their most crucial phase, the time is ripe to attempt an assessment of the role played by the only actor, besides Iran, that has been on stage since it all began over ten years ago: Europe. Throughout this long drama, Europe’s performance has had some brilliant moments. Yet the quality of its acting has decreased as a new protagonist, the US, has come on stage. Overall, the Europeans’ record is positive, albeit not entirely spotless.     

北约网络安全战略及其启示

冷战结束后,北约在不断扩大的同时,多次提出“战略新概念”,追求地域扩张和功能深化,寻求在两个维度上实现发展与转型。自2002年布拉格峰会上首次将合作保障网络空间安全列入北约政治议程以来,网络空间安全已经成为北约功能拓展的一个主要方向。网络安全战略基于北约对网络攻击破坏力和网络空间公共性的考虑,已经形成较为完整的政策网络,然而由于各国对未来形势判断不一,这一战略尚未完全定型。理解和分析北约网络安全战略需要理清虚与实、公与私、攻与防、近与远四组关系——它们分别涉及北约确立网络安全战略的原因、战略发展过程中面临的主要挑战、战略未来的发展方向和战略的总体特点,贯穿了北约网络战略发展的始终。作为北约核心成员,美国在北约打造网络战略的整个过程中将扮演关键角色。正因如此,网络安全作为美国与欧洲共同关注的前沿问题,也将为掌握美欧关系动态打开一扇窗口。及时了解北约这一战略及发展方向,对于中国认识北约、理解跨大西洋（美欧）关系、制定本国网络战略和维护网络安全都应有所启示。     

“9．11”事件之后俄罗斯的活力与乏力

"9.11"事件后,美国认识到国际恐怖主义才是现实的主要威胁,从而淡化了俄美矛盾,两国关系发生了深刻的变化.俄罗斯意识到机遇的到来,积极支持反恐,然而,在联合反恐取得重大胜利的背后,俄罗斯面临着失去重要地缘战略位置的尴尬和对北约东扩的无力抵抗.     

European security as practice: EU–NATO communities of practice in the making?

ABSTRACT

European security is at a critical juncture and many have called for a more coherent and efficient response, involving both the EU and NATO. However, the primary tool for EU–NATO cooperation, “Berlin Plus”, has been stuck in a political quagmire since the mid-2000s, making a lot of scholars to conclude that this cooperation is obsolete and outdated. This article is challenging this view by analysing a range of informal but regular interaction patterns that have emerged. Using practice theory, it sheds new light on and explores how EU and NATO staff at all levels engage in informal practices on various sites in headquarters in Brussels and in field operations. A study of EU–NATO cooperation as practice focuses on the everyday, patterned production of security as well as what makes action possible, such as (tacit) practical knowledge and shared “background” knowledge (education, training, and experience). The article also discusses the extent to which shared repertoires of practice may evolve into loose communities of practice that cut across organisational and professional boundaries.     

Governing after crisis – the politics of investigation,accountability and learning Emergency politics – paradox,law, democracy

Sarkozy's decision to bring France back into NATO's integrated military structure in 2009 represents in some ways a break with French exceptionalism. But how deep is this change? This article examines whether the decision has led to a real integration of France along various dimensions of integration; whether the decision represents a continuation or a break with the traditional French approach and the effects of this reintegration on NATO/EU cooperation. The empirical analysis of French political and military practices in NATO combines a focus on macro-level foreign policy formulations with a micro-level study of how French officials and representatives communicate and interact on a day-to-day basis. The analysis shows that France has become increasingly integrated into NATO since 2009 on most dimensions except with regard to cultural integration. Thus, France may be reintegrated in practice, but not yet in principle.     

NATO and the Arctic: is the Atlantic alliance a cold war relic in a peaceful region now faced with non-military challenges?

Abstract

This article analyzes which role the Atlantic Alliance plays in the Arctic and whether it can contribute to the security and territorial integrity of its members in the region. In a dramatic change from the cold war era, the Arctic is no longer at the center of a conflict between two hostile superpowers. But what can a basically military organization such as NATO – though with proven political functions – contribute to stabilizing the Arctic region if its major challenges are non-military? With regional challenges resulting mostly from globalization and climate change, it is open to question whether a military alliance such as NATO has the will and the capability to cope with them. We might thus need to look also at individual members’ interests and abilities besides searching for joint alliance action. If we find NATO not up to the challenges, which alternative institutions offer themselves for coping with the political conflicts and controversies in the Polar region?     

NATO and the war on terror: The organizational challenges of the post 9/11 world

This paper deals with NATO’s ability to contribute to the war on terrorism. The paper highlights the difficulties that the organization has encountered in dealing with a threat that is entirely different from the one that the organization was created to deal with. The paper discusses NATO’s new policies, al Qaeda’s transformation since 9/11, and the nature of terrorism. The paper suggests that although NATO has drafted a number of new antiterrorist policies they are all premised on the idea of fighting a war against terrorism as if terrorism were a well defined military enemy. We conclude by arguing that the organizational behavior demonstrated by NATO is consistent with what Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow predict in their organizational process model and that many of the difficulties encountered by NATO in the war against terrorism are due to the nature of the organization. An erratum to this article is available at .     

论奥巴马政府对俄政策调整的原因及俄美关系前景

前些年,布什政府对俄罗斯奉行的"挤压、遏制及削弱"的"单边主义"政策,致使美俄关系陷入日益"冰化"的状态。奥巴马上台后,呈现出谋求修复和改善与俄罗斯关系的政策调整趋势,而美国"单边主义"政策的挫败、俄罗斯方面的积极"抗争"以及美俄势力此消彼长的发展趋势等则是美国对俄政策调整的主要原因;以美国对俄政策调整为契机,美俄关系有望进入一个"合作加强、对抗减少"的"建设性"新阶段,然而,由于一系列制约性因素的存在,俄美关系的实质性改善仍任重而道远。