EU power and armed humanitarianism in Africa: evaluating ESDP in Chad

This article analyses the European Union's (EU's) largest European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) military mission outside Europe to date; Eufor Tchad/RCA was a 3700-strong force involving personnel from 23 states, deployed to Chad and the Central African Republic for 12 months from March 2008. Far from this mission achieving EU ‘supremacy’ or projecting an ‘imperial’ reach, an evaluation of its objectives and achievements reveals acute limitations in the EU's ability to project power. The article analyses the context in which Eufor was conceived and deployed. It notes that the mission's weaknesses, like those of the United Nations mission to whom the EU transferred its security role in 2009, reflected its convoluted origins and objectives. Finally, the article examines whether the EU as a unitary actor has the desire or the ability to ‘replace’ individual European nations—in this case France—in their post-colonial military and ‘humanitarian’ roles in sub-Saharan Africa.     

Superficial,not Substantial: The Ambiguity of Public Support for Europe's Security and Defence Policy

Abstract

Surveys such as the European Commission's Eurobarometer regularly reveal high levels of public support for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This paper argues, however, that public support for ESDP is only superficial, not substantial. First, there is no homogeneous ‘European’ public support for ESDP. Second, security and defence, as covered by ESDP with its focus on global crisis-management, rank very low among Europeans’ priorities. Third, Europeans are very sceptical about the appropriateness of military means, and hence a core element of ESDP, as a legitimate instrument in international affairs. These reservations are likely to have constraining effects on ESDP's future development. At the same time, there are compelling reasons for the further development of ESDP. Therefore, Europe's political elites should initiate a public diplomacy campaign inside the EU in which the case for Europe's further evolution as a strategic security and defence actor is made. ESDP operations are the most promising starting points as they illustrate both the normative and the ‘realist’ necessities of European engagement in global security affairs.     

Maritime security in the Black Sea: can regional solutions work?1

The development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been seen by some as key to giving the EU greater international influence, by others as a threat to the EU's strengths as a civilian power. This article finds that, as of 2002, the EU's new military dimension could not be conceived as a fundamental threat to its civilian power acquis. Concerns have justifiably been raised over the possible diversion of resources into the military sphere, the emergence of a less transparent policy‐making culture and ESDP's effect on the way the EU is perceived from outside. However, force levels have remained limited and most policymakers see the new EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) as an instrument for complementing civilian elements of crisis management. This article measures ESDP more specifically against the substantive approaches towards security challenges that the EU has elaborated. It argues that European strategies suffer most notably from political‐level conceptual weaknesses that cut across both civilian and military domains and that the incipient ESDP has yet to address.     

Norway and the ESDP: Explaining Norwegian Participation in the EU's Security Policy

Abstract

This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of why various Norwegian governments of recent years have been willing to contribute to European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations and integrate into the ESDP structures despite their country's increasingly limited access to the decision-making and/or decision-shaping process in this policy area. Norway participates in most of the ESDP structures in one way or the other—it contributes with troops and personnel to ESDP operations, participates in a battle group and has an association agreement with the European Defence Agency. The result of Norway's will to integrate is that, as a non-member, it has become more integrated into the ESDP structures than members such as Denmark, who have chosen to opt out from this policy area. How can this be explained? Does the Norwegian government decide to participate because that is seen as the best way of pursuing Norwegian national interests, or are there other institutional or normative explanations for this policy choice?     

Fit for what? Towards explaining Battlegroup inaction

Abstract

The thrust of this paper concerns the case of the European Battlegroup (BG) non-deployment in late 2008, when the United Nations requested European military support for the United Nations Organisation Mission peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The argument is built on the fact that when, in official documents, the EU approaches the European security and ESDP/CSDP's military crisis management policy and interventions, it makes strong references to the United Nations and the UN Charter Chapter VII's mandate of restoring international peace and security. Such references make it seem that supporting the UN when it deals with threats and crises is a primary concern of the EU and the member states. These allusions lead to the main contention of this paper, that there is much ambivalence in these indications. The paper develops its argument from one key hypothesis; namely, that the non-deployment of a European BG in the DRC, at the end of 2008, constitutes a useful case study for detecting a number of ambiguities of the EU in respect of its declarations in the official documents establishing the European military crisis management intervention structure.     

What do ESDP actors want? An exploratory analysis

Abstract

This paper analyzes the preferences of European defense actors vis-à-vis the European security and defense policy (ESDP) with a view to identifying the main ideational points of convergence and fault lines that structure this policy domain. In an exploratory analysis that relies on an original data-set compiled from systematic interviews conducted with 73 ESDP actors in France, the UK, Germany, and Brussels, we address two research questions. First, what do ESDP actors think about ESDP? Second, can we classify their preferences according to sociological factors that underpin the ESDP domain? To conceptualize the belief system of ESDP actors, we propose a typology that distinguishes (1) the social context in which ESDP actors are embedded and (2) the specific ESDP aspects about which preferences are shaped. Our results suggest that both national and occupational variables play an important role in explaining the preferences of ESDP actors.     

The first casualty in the war against terror: the fall of NATO and Europe's reluctant coming of age

In 2003, hardly a keynote speech goes by without Western leaders stressing that the transatlantic bond is as important as ever. This is perhaps true – a timelier question is whether the same can be said for the perception of common values and common threats that used to define this partnership and its sole institutional link: NATO. This essay explores five security policy conundrums that point towards a revised burden-sharing and power-sharing in the transatlantic strategic partnership: the UK's ambiguous role in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); the blocking of the formal bond between NATO and the EU; the implications of a change in US policy towards Europe; NATO's improbable move into soft security and, finally, NATO's invocation of Article 5 in the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.     

‘Old’ un peacekeeping principles and ‘new’ conflicts: Some ideas to reduce the troubles of post‐cold war peace missions

The European Union (EU) has declared its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operational. It has put the institutional structures in place to manage the political aspects of security and defence policy and the member-states have pledged a range of military capabilities, which the EU may call upon. However there are significant issues that need to be resolved for the ESDP to be a truly effective and credible policy. On the whole, these issues revolve around military capabilities, defence spending and a strategic concept. Without investing in critical military capabilities and without a clear direction, ESDP will become a policy without substance.     

The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than Expected

Abstract

This article takes issue with the prevailing view that the ESDP capacity building process is easier and has been more successful in the civilian than in the military field. It argues that civilian capacity building is harder than military capacity building, demonstrates that the European Union's (EU's) civilian rapid reaction capacity is considerably smaller and less integrated than is generally assumed and that the capacity goals set for 2008 are unattainable. Yet another major EU expectations–capability gap has been created and there is now a real danger that this gap will seriously damage the EU's reputation as the global leader in civilian rapid reaction crisis management.     

Pushing the Boundaries of the Possible at the Margins of Peacekeeping: The Promises of ESDP–Russia Co-operation for Humanitarian Intervention1

While relatively little attention has been paid to the significance of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a newly emerged mechanism in the domain of international peacekeeping, even less research has been undertaken on the potential benefits of its external relations and co-operation with third countries. This article sheds light on such a potential by investigating the relations of the ESDP with the Russian Federation. The current debate on humanitarian intervention tends to reduce the analysis to a single plane of reality, namely the normative one, thus ignoring the material aspects of military intervention. The enlargement of the ontological horizon of research from normative to material factors uncovers the greatest advantage of ESDP–Russia co-operation for humanitarian intervention, namely their mutually complementary peacekeeping capacities. Whilst the European Union boasts a long-standing human rights culture, Russia could offer vast material resources both in terms of manpower and logistics. Ignoring this possible synergy between the ESDP and Russian capacities would be a considerable loss for the cause of humanitarian intervention. Joint operations conducted by the European Union, Russia, and NATO against genocidal governments, the “common enemies”, would not only enhance the cause of humanitarian intervention but also enable common actions and thus mitigate current tensions between the East and West. In many respects ESDP–Russia co-operation actually lags behind NATO–Russia relations.     

Europe's intergovernmental NGO: The OSCE in Europe's emerging security structure

The OSCE is little understood outside diplomatic circles, but has a unique and increasing role in encouraging European peace and stability. The article highlights the OSCE's historical development and its more recent role in the European security structure. The OSCE mission in Latvia, tracking the country's language and citizenship issue, is illustrative of the organization's unusual charter. A second section attempts to fix the OSCE within the context of contemporary international theory and the developing literature on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). With a broad but thin mandate, the organization manages regime activity left over from NATO and EU disinterest or immobility and, with its extensive grassroot efforts at problem‐solving, functions much like an NGO. OSCE success may lie in the combination of regime and NGO attributes, allowing it to move easily both within and outside of formal governmental structures.     

Growing without a Strategy? The Case of European Security and Defence Policy

Contrary to the expectations of many experts and politicians, one of the most politically sensitive sectors of the European integration process, the common foreign and security policy, has seen remarkable growth in recent years. The pressure of crises and conflicts beyond the EU's borders and the need to deal with them in a unitary way has driven the governments of member states and the community institutions to take development of CFSP/ESDP more seriously. The process has been pragmatic, establishing the mechanisms and policies required to respond to the challenges. It is this bottom-up, disorderly growth that the Constitutional Treaty had attempted to rationalise in a coherent framework, completing the work of the preceding treaties. With the stalled ratification of the CT, this growth has continued. But it cannot go on indefinitely. In order to bring order and coherence into CFSP/ESDP bodies and procedures, the substance of the Constitutional Treaty must be saved and approved rapidly.     

EU Security Strategy

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) comprises an important part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The aim of ESDP is to strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management. In December 2003, the EU adopted its first European Security Strategy (ESS). Ever since then, the implementation of the ESS has been regarded as one of the biggest challenges for the EU in CFSP/ESDP matters. Although much progress has been made in its independent security and defence-building process, EU still faces serious problems and difficulties in this policy area. This paper tries to examine these recent developments, assess their impacts in regional-global security, and analyze existing problems and future trends. Finally, the author also examines EU-China engagements in recent years and explores possibilities for their future cooperation in the area of international security.     

Parliamentary control of CSDP: the case of the EU's fight against piracy off the Somali coast

Parliamentary involvement remains a key tool for the democratic control of executive policies. This article explores the web of parliamentary involvement in decision-making on European Union (EU) military operations, using insights gained in an in-depth case study on the EU's anti-piracy mission Atalanta. We find that parliaments at all levels became involved only after key political decisions had already been made. At the member state level, we find highly uneven involvement with only some parliaments being very well informed and closely monitoring, if not influencing government policy. The European Parliament became active only after the launch of the mission but then scrutinised it intensely, profiting (in contrast to national parliaments) from its access to top military officials and key decision-makers. Finally, transnational parliamentary assemblies as well as more informal networks provided opportunities to transmit information across the boundaries of individual parliaments and party-groups thus potentially enhancing the ability of parliamentarians to scrutinise government policies.     

THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT: ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES

A good part of Western Europe has been united in a military alliance for more than 50 years, and grown into an economic union with a single market and a new, common currency. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is adding another facet of coordination and cooperation among countries which are already highly integrated. Defense and security have lagged behind other areas of integration, with arms procurement and production particularly fragmented. One of the new instruments for increased integration related to ESDP development, is the Framework Agreement, which regulates important aspects of joint arms production among major Western European producers.     

Practical lessons from gender audit of an education sector plan in Lao PDR

In 2013, the Laos Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) commissioned a mid-term review of the Education Sector Development Plan 2011–2015 (ESDP, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Ministry of Education and Sports 2010). Plan International, a United Nations Girls Education Initiative partner, worked with MoES to lead a gender audit for the mid-term review. The gender audit strengthened the mid-term review and contributed to the design of the new ESDP. A MoES gender and inclusion working group was established, providing an institutional structure to support focused policy dialogue and address recommendations. This note recommends the inclusion of gender audits within mid-term reviews and final evaluations of sectoral plans to ensure that investments adequately address gender equality.     

The EU's security and defense policy (ESDP) and the challenges of civil–military coordination (CMCO): the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Abstract

The article assesses the role of the EU in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the ability of the EU to coordinate its different means and instruments with regard to the relationship between the European Commission and the Council. The article focuses on what is referred to as civil–military coordination (CMCO) in internal EU documents. The aim is to compare the four ESDP missions in DRC since 2003 with special regard to CMCO since the aim of the EU as a comprehensive security actor is to avoid artificial distinctions between military and civilian missions. Hence, the distinctiveness of ESDP derives precisely from its civil–military synergies, and a comparative perspective on CMCO could tell us more about how the EU has developed so as to become a comprehensive security actor in a country which is of importance for EU interests. The final part of the article assesses the impact on CMCO of the newly implemented Lisbon Treaty. A suitable institutional framework as devised for in the Treaty is essential so as to shape a framework that creates a timely as well as a comprehensive response to crises.     

The Institutionalization of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI)

A number of observers have expressed serious concerns that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), as it expands in the Sahel, may become strong enough to be a threat to Europe and carry on the global mission of Al-Qaeda as conceived by bin Laden. This fear seems unwarranted. Using institutional analysis to study the AQMI behavioral fluctuations over the last decade, this article argues that AQMI's need to find a compromise between external and internal legitimacy has constrained its behavior. The affiliation of the Algerian terrorists with Al-Qaeda was in many ways a marriage of convenience that created a number of internal contradictions. At the cognitive level, implicit Algerian nationalism to rid the country of its corrupt regime remains at odds with pan-Islamic views shared by Al-Qaeda's leadership. At the normative level, indiscriminate suicide bombing supported by Al-Qaeda is abhorrent to many Algerian terrorists, who construe their mandate in the spirit of the Algerian war of independence where it is their duty to protect civilians. These and other contradictions prevent AQMI from developing a coherent political agenda and thus it is less likely to engage in a long-term conflict against European societies.     

The advantages of complementarity: US and European policies towards the middle east peace process

Russia-related problems remain prominent in the European security debate. While a minimalist goal would be to reduce mutual antagonism in the Russia--European security area, a more ambitious mission would be to make Europe part of the eventual solution of Russia's problems, and vice versa. Moscow's draft of a European security treaty was not met with overwhelming enthusiasm. But engaging in a serious re-thinking and re-building of the Euro--Atlantic security architecture seems to be increasingly perceived as a worthy endeavour. What is needed is an entire network of instruments for governance and joint actions, both in “traditional” security areas and in new ones. Some of these tools could appear within the framework of existing multilateral institutions or in conjunction with them, others could emerge from their reform (or, conversely, stimulate it), while certain structures would require a new basis. Within such an agenda, Russia's involvement in the Euro--Atlantic area as a respectable and responsible actor would be an essential factor in promoting security in it.     

Austria and European integration, 1947–60: Western orientation,neutrality and free trade

The purpose of this paper is to analyze Austria's role in the early days of European integration. This includes the attempt to find a European solution to the South Tyrol problem and the first steps towards the economy's Western orientation, that is, Austria's participation in the Marshall Plan, its OEEC and EPU memberships as well as its relationship with the Council of Europe and the ECSC. International relations determined Austria's room for manoeuvre in its efforts to obtain independence. This excluded EEC membership. The Ballhausplatz was thus striving for a European Free Trade Area. The role of the political parties are also covered in this paper. A further objective is to examine Austria's integration policy and the contrasts between the situation in Austria and West Germany. The paper points out how this small European state tried to avoid its exclusion from the European integration process and how it applied various methods to approach and cooperate with European institutions.