The effects of tort reform on medical malpractice insurance markets: an empirical analysis.

I use statewide loss ratio data to assess empirically the manner in which tort reforms have affected relative prices and profitability, and underwriting risk in the medical malpractice insurance industry. The empirical evidence suggests that the imposition of statutory ceilings on recoveries both decreased risk and improved relative profitability. Reforms that codified the required standard of care appeared to have a beneficial effect on relative profitability in certain cases.     

Blending reform of tort liability and health insurance: a necessary mix

The thesis of this Article is that making more health insurance benefits available to more people, far from lessening injury victims' proclivity to sue in tort (as conventional wisdom argues), will increase such suits. Thus, it is necessary to accompany any increases in health care coverage with the type of tort reform proposed herein. This reform would allow parties to opt out of the cumbersome and expensive tort claim process with its compensation of noneconomic losses by substituting quicker and surer compensation of any unmet economic losses.     

Australian tort law reform: statutory principles of causation and the common law

By mid-2004, Parliaments in each Australian jurisdiction will either complete or will be in the process of partial codification of the law of torts. The reforms, including those to the law of negligence, are extensive. This article focuses on codification of the law of causation as an element of the cause of action in negligence. It examines the background to "tort reform", as the process has been labelled, and discusses the common law paradigm of negligence and various approaches to causation. It then analyses and compares the causation provisions in each jurisdiction.     

Controlling large malpractice claims: the unexpected impact of damage caps.

Indiana's comprehensive malpractice reforms, inaugurated in 1975, include a cap on damages, a mandated medical review before trial, and a state insurance fund to pay claims equal to or greater than $100,000. We have found that the amount of compensation going to claimants with such large malpractice claims in Indiana is, on average, substantially higher than in Michigan and Ohio. Indiana's mean claim severity between 1977 and 1988 was $404,832, while the means for Michigan and Ohio were $290,022 and $303,220, respectively, with the difference between these three means being highly significant. Although data on claim and claimant characteristics reveal considerable interstate variation, the results of regression analyses show that Indiana claim payment amounts are higher than Michigan or Ohio payments, independent of the effect of factors such as sex, age, severity of injury, allegations of negligence, and year of settlement.     

Regulating through information: disclosure laws and American health care

Efforts to reform the American health care system through direct government action have failed repeatedly. Nonetheless, an alternative strategy has emerged from these experiences: requiring insurance organizations and health care providers to disclose information to the public. In this Article, Professor Sage assesses the justifications for this type of regulation and its prospects. In particular, he identifies and analyzes four distinct rationales for disclosure. He finds that the most commonly articulated goal of mandatory disclosure laws--improving the efficiency of private purchasing decisions by giving purchasers complete information about price and quality--is the most complicated operationally. The other justifications--which he respectively terms the agency, performance, and democratic rationales--hold greater promise, but make different, sometimes conflicting assumptions about the sources and uses of information. These insights have implications not only for health care, but also for other regulated practices and industries.     

Real reform begins within: an organizational approach to health care reform

Health care systems are under pressure to control their increasing costs, to better adapt to evolving demands, to improve the quality and safety of care, and ultimately to ameliorate the health of their populations. This article looks at a battery of organizational options aimed at transforming health care systems and argues that more attention must be paid to reforming the delivery mechanisms that are so crucial for health care systems' overall performance. To support improvement, policies can rely on organizational assets in two ways. First, reforms can promote the creation of new organizational forms; second, they can employ organizational levers (e.g., capacity development, team-based organizations, evidence-informed practices) to achieve specific policy goals. In both cases organizational assets are mobilized with a view to creating complete health care organizations -- that is to say, organizations that have the capacity to function as high-performing systems. The challenges confronting the development of more complete health care organizations are significant. Real health care system reforms may likewise require implementing ecologies of complex innovation at the clinical, organizational, and policy levels. Policies play a determining role in shaping these new spaces for action so that day-to-day practices may change.     

An attempt to incorporate fairness into an economic model of tort law

This paper incorporates fairness into a simple economic model of tort law and discusses the difficulties of doing so. People are assumed to adhere to either the negligence or the strict norm and to incur a cost if liability is not imposed in accordance with their norm. The optimal standard of negligence is determined in a trade-off between fairness and efficiency. Conditions are derived under which preferences for fairness do not affect the optimal negligence standard. The modeling difficulties concern the ad hoc nature of the fairness norms. They are argued to be inherent to the subject.