The skeptic's guide to a movement for universal health insurance

The social movement has become institutionalized as a form of political action. The aim of this article is to evaluate the possibilities presented by this form as a strategy to bring about universal health insurance in the United States. I draw on the work of social movement theorists, on the substantial body of empirical research on health-related social movements, and on relevant comparative work from Canada to develop a template for this evaluation. Using that template I compare the failed campaign for President Bill Clinton's health insurance plan with a recent, more successful campaign in the state of New York. I conclude that the keys to success are, first, a broad-based coalition that combines an ideologically and/or grievance-motivated grass roots with financially and politically well-endowed mainstream organizations; second, a "master frame" that resonates with the American people; and, third, a political window of opportunity. The prospects for such a conjunction are not hopeless, but they are not high.     

Why requiring employers to provide health insurance is a bad idea

There is mounting pressure at the federal (and state) level to require employers to provide health insurance to their employees. However, two quite different groups of workers could be affected by such a mandate. In addition, there are at least five major problems with requiring employers to provide health insurance. Chief among these is the further fracturing of the insurance market, so that the spreading of risk will be reduced, and only the young and healthy will be offered insurance at relatively low premiums. We should be designing a health insurance system that has both universal coverage and a cost-containment structure. Toward this end, we need to tackle issues that transcend alternative methods of financing health care in the U.S.     

Risk-Taking,Recklessness and HIV Transmission: Accommodating the Reality of Sexual Transmission of HIV Within a Justifiable Approach to Criminal Liability

This paper examines the issue of justifiability of risk-taking with regard to the transmission of HIV. It considers a number of factors, such as seriousness of risk, likelihood of risk occurring, social utility of conduct involved, ability to use precautions and victim awareness of the risk and willingness to accept it, which combined help to determine whether the taking of a risk is reasonable or not. It argues that by considering the issue of justifiability in this way, it is possible to accommodate the wider social, psychological and public health realities of HIV. It further argues that a criminal law which fails to take account of such considerations is not only overly broad in its application but ultimately risks punishing those who are not in fact deserving of punishment. I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft.     

The medically examined applicant for private insurance and his/her right to informed consent: a comparative analysis

Within the context of health and insurance law, an important question that arises is "to what extent is an applicant for private insurance truly capable of giving his/her 'free' and informed consent for a medical examination?". It should be borne in mind that it is the private insurer who requires a medical examination in order to gather medical information, and, moreover, that the insurer will not be inclined to conclude or carry out an insurance contract without this medical information. A distinction has to be made between not being free by legal coercion and not being (completely) free by factual circumstances. Exercising the right to informed consent involves exactly weighing up the consequences of the decision. Hence the applicant must be put in a position of being able to weigh up the consequences and take them into consideration.     

从平衡保险双方利益的角度看中国海上保险人的法定解除权

从法定解除权的产生条件、行使后果以及消灭三个层面分析中国有关海上保险人法定解除权的现行规定在平衡保险双方利益方面的合理性与不足,并尝试提出完善现行立法的建议。     

You cannot hide your telephone lies: Providing a model statement as an aid to detect deception in insurance telephone calls

Deception research regarding insurance claims is rare but relevant given the financial loss in terms of fraud. In Study 1, a field study in a large multinational insurance fraud detection company, truth telling mock claimants (N = 19) and lying mock claimants (N = 21) were interviewed by insurance company telephone operators. These operators classified correctly only 50% of these truthful and lying claimants, but their task was particularly challenging: Claimants said little, and truthful and deceptive statements did not differ in quality (measured with Criteria‐Based Content Analysis [CBCA]) or plausibility. In Study 2, a laboratory experiment, participants in the experimental condition (N = 43) were exposed to an audiotaped truthful and detailed account of an event that was unrelated to insurance claims (a day at the motor races). The number of words, quality of the statement (measured with CBCA), and plausibility of the participants' accounts were compared with participants who were not given a model statement (N = 40). The participants who had listened to the model statement provided longer statements than control participants, truth tellers obtained higher CBCA scores than liars, and only in the model statement condition did truth tellers sound more plausible than liars. Providing participants with a model statement is thus an innovative and successful tool to elicit cues to deception. Providing such a model has the potential to enhance performance in insurance call interviews, and, as we argue, in many other interview settings.