Nuclear deterrence: Bankrupt ideology

This article argues that nuclear deterrence is a contemporary ideology (an elaborately-developed set of convictions, socio-politically central, stable over time, idealistic in intent, widely and emotionally embraced). And vulnerable. Vulnerable to the critique of the social scientist who can raise questions about the reliability of nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone. Vulnerable to the critique of the moral philosopher who can raise important questions about the propriety of nuclear deterrence and the programmatic activities it underlies.     

Politics-as-usual on trial: regional anti-corruption campaigns in Indonesia

Abstract

This article explores to what extent to local pro-reform actors matter in Indonesia through the prism of anti-corruption campaigns in the country's regions. I argue that the rash of anti-corruption campaigns and related trials involving legislative members, especially from mid-2004 onward, can be attributed neither to the resources lavished on anti-corruption organizations based in Jakarta, nor to the popularity of President Yudhoyono's anti-corruption rhetoric. Instead, it can be traced to a particular anti-corruption campaign that began in earnest in 2002 in Padang, West Sumatra. Using a multi-dimensional approach, a small group of activists relentlessly pursued their newly elected provincial legislators to be accountable to their democratic mandates and as important, to respect the rule of law pursuant to new national anti-corruption legislation. The guilty verdicts of May 2004 galvanized similar groups across the country to investigate their respective legislative bodies. This exemplary case of societal accountability also demonstrated the leverage activists can gain over local politicians when they forge coalitions with other elite actors, especially those in Jakarta. I further explore two anti-corruption cases in the province of West Kalimantan to place post-Padang developments in their proper perspective. If hopes were raised that regional anti-corruption movements–based on the Padang model–might accomplish more than sensational trials but help consolidate democracy at the regional level by holding elected officials accountable, these two examples show how fleeting these expectations might be. The trials that took place but which produced no convictions resulted from the fallout of local political tussles, and not from local civil society organizations galvanized by the ideals of transparency and good governance.     

Institutional Anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence

This article investigates the effectiveness of anticorruption practices against bribery incidence, highlighting top‐down and bottom‐up approaches. A random survey of local residents is used in conjunction with institutional anticorruption indicators. Findings suggest that the top‐down approach works, but with substantial variation across practices. More intense top‐down anticorruption deters bribery incidence within citizens' dense networks, and more judicial convictions directly suppress citizens' bribery experience and willingness. The bottom‐up and combined approaches yield both deterrence and signaling effects, contingent on institutional parameters. More public whistle‐blowing deters citizens' bribery experience and willingness, yet, when coupled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, it signals severe government corruption and predicts more bribery incidence. On the contrary, more grievance filings predict more bribery incidence via signaling effects, but, when bundled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, they deter citizens' subsequent bribery experience and willingness. The article concludes with a discussion of the research findings and theoretical and practical implications.     

The war on cartels and the social meaning of deterrence

The global war on cartels has had much success in introducing tough sanctions for cartel conduct, such as price fixing and market sharing. The policy rhetoric justifying criminalization assumes that compliance can be induced through deterrence. This, in turn, assumes that business people know about the law, believe that they are likely to be caught and face enforcement action and jail if they break the law, and calculate that they should comply. This paper problematizes these policy assumptions using evidence from a survey of a random sample of Australian business people and in‐depth interviews with 25 cartelists. This paper argues that business people's knowledge about the law is less important than their relationship with (or distance from) the law. Corporate elites see themselves as intimate with the law and, therefore, able to strategically “play” the law; while small business people and managers lower down the corporate hierarchy see themselves as “innocent” of any knowledge of the law. The impact of a policy of increased sanctions for misconduct cannot be understood solely in terms of marginal difference in aggregate levels of deterrence. It must also be understood in terms of how it interacts with people's experience of the law to create and maintain or contest and destabilize social segmentation and inequality.     

Regulation by generalization

Both criminal and regulatory laws have traditionally been skeptical of what Jeremy Bentham referred to as evidentiary offenses – the prohibition (or regulation) of some activity not because it is wrong, but because it probabilistically (but not universally) indicates that a real wrong has occurred. From Bentham to the present, courts and theorists have worried about this form of regulation, believing that certainly in the criminal law context, but even with respect to regulation, it is wrong to impose sanctions on a “Where there’s smoke there’s fire” theory of governmental intervention. Yet, although this kind punishment by proxy continues to be held in disrepute both in courts and in the published work, we argue that this distaste is unwarranted. Regulating – even through the criminal law – by regulating intrinsically innocent activities that probabilistically, but not inexorably, indicate not‐so‐innocent activities is no different from the vast number of other probabilistic elements that pervade the regulatory process. Once we recognize the frequency with which we accept probabilistic but not certain burdens of proof, probabilistic but not certain substantive rules, and probabilistic but not certain pieces of evidence, we can see that defining offenses and regulatory targets in terms of non‐wrongful behavior that is evidence of wrongful behavior is neither surprising nor inadvisable.     

Pennies from heaven: Entry fees to a socialist “paradise”

Based on a political-economic perspective, this paper assesses the former GDR-regime's policy of obligatory exchange (Pflichtumtauschsatz). ThePflichtumtausch, one of a wide array of instruments used to collect convertible currency and restrict access to the GDR, is briefly described. Following that, a demand function, relating visits to East Germany on the one hand to thePflichtumtauschsatz on the other, is estimated. The empirical evidence adduced suggests that visits to the East were considered a normal good. The next question considered is whether the GDR-regime, acting in its role as a monopolist, followed an optimal pricing policy. On both theoretical and empirical grounds this can be rejected. Visits to the East were underpriced. This resulted in a higher number of visits and lower revenue when seen from a profit-maximizing perspective. On the other hand the actual pricing was advantageous with respect to two goals: the deterrence of visits and the collection of convertible currency. Nonetheless, it is clear that the GDR-regime voluntarily restricted its revenue collection from thePflichtumtausch. This restraint, however, can be seen as its input into a political bargain. As a rule, such “good manners” in the matter of thePflichtumtausch were more than compensated by interest payments saved in the use of the Swing. The GDR-regime's generosity thus turned out to be a rather expensive good for the West Germans.     

The politics of ‘wrongful life’ itself: discursive (mal)practices and Tay-Sachs disease

Abstract

This article examines eight wrongful life/wrongful birth suits filed by parents of children born with Tay-Sachs disease. Their legal claims are analysed in terms of the biopolitics of genetic risk that has emerged in recent decades with a view to arguing that, as health and disease are increasingly understood within a genetics framework, the individual is becoming responsibilized to be proactive and undergo genetic testing. At the same time, this responsibilization is being defined as a kind of entitlement rooted in historically specific ideas about personhood and quality of life. The only option for reconciling this contradiction has been simply to define responsibilization as the individual's right, thereby calling into question the notion of agency in genetic decision-making and revealing that choice in this context is in fact becoming the unfreedom to choose.     

All Mistakes Are Not Equal: Intelligence Errors and National Security

Strategic situations create motivational biases that help to predict the type of errors intelligence communities are more likely to commit (Type I errors predict behavior never observed, while Type II errors fail to predict behavior later observed). When the dangers of inaction are low and the cost of action high, the intelligence community is more likely to fail to predict threats (Type II error). If the dangers of inaction are high and the costs of military action low, it is more likely to predict mistakenly threats never observed (Type I error). Studies of US and Israeli decision-making and analyses of two new experimental studies support this theory. The key is to recognize the incentives for error and to develop systems that, at worst, lead to intelligence errors (mistakes consistent with a state's national security needs) and not intelligence failures (errors contrary to national security requirements).     

Estimating Regression Models in Which the Dependent Variable Is Based on Estimates

e-mail: jblewis{at}ucla.edu (corresponding author) e-mail: dlinzer{at}ucla.edu Researchers often use as dependent variables quantities estimatedfrom auxiliary data sets. Estimated dependent variable (EDV)models arise, for example, in studies where counties or statesare the units of analysis and the dependent variable is an estimatedmean, proportion, or regression coefficient. Scholars fittingEDV models have generally recognized that variation in the samplingvariance of the observations on the dependent variable willinduce heteroscedasticity. We show that the most common approachto this problem, weighted least squares, will usually lead toinefficient estimates and underestimated standard errors. Inmany cases, OLS with White's or Efron heteroscedastic consistentstandard errors yields better results. We also suggest two simplealternative FGLS approaches that are more efficient and yieldconsistent standard error estimates. Finally, we apply the variousalternative estimators to a replication of Cohen's (2004) cross-nationalstudy of presidential approval.     

Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas

How do a regulator's decisions depend on the characteristics and strategies of its external clients? We develop a theory of approval regulation in which an uninformed regulator may veto the submission of a better‐informed firm. The firm can perform publicly observable experiments to generate product information prior to submission. We find that when experimentation is short, Type I errors (approving bad products) are more likely for products submitted by firms with lower experimentation costs (larger firms), while Type II errors (rejecting good products) should be concentrated among smaller firms. These comparative statics are reversed when experimentation is long. We perform a statistical analysis on FDA approvals of new pharmaceutical products using two different measures of Type I error. We find consistent support for the counterintuitive hypothesis that, under particular conditions, errors are decreasing in the size of the firm submitting the product.     

Measuring Exposure to Political Advertising in Surveys

Research on the influence of negative political advertising in America is characterized by fundamentally conflicting findings. In recent years, however, survey research using estimates of exposure based on a combination of self-reported television viewing habits and Campaign Media Analysis Group data (a database of all advertisements broadcast on national and cable television in the top 75 media markets) has argued that exposure to negative political advertising boosts interest in the campaign and turnout. This paper examines the measurement properties of self-reports of television viewing. I argue that the errors from common survey formats may both be nonrandom and larger than previously acknowledged. The nonrandom error is due to the tendency of politically knowledgeable individuals to be more sensitive to question format. Thus the inferences drawn about the relationship between political knowledge, exposure to negative ads, and political behavior are also sensitive to the measures used to estimate exposure. I demonstrate, however, that one commonly used measure of exposure—the log of estimated exposure—is not only more theoretically defensible but also alleviates some of the more serious problems due to measurement error.

The Impact of Ballot Type on Voter Errors

Studies of ballots have traditionally focused on roll‐off, candidate order, and partisan advantage. This study is among the first to assess the impact of ballots on individual‐level voter errors. We develop new hypotheses by bringing together theoretical insights from usability research and political science about the effects of ballots with and without a straight‐party voting option. By comparing voters’ intentions to the votes they cast, we are able to create two measures of voter errors: votes unintentionally cast for the wrong candidate and unintentional undervotes. Voters generally make fewer errors of both types when using a standard office‐bloc ballot than when using an office‐bloc ballot with a straight‐party option, with the number of wrong‐candidate errors substantially exceeding the number of unintentional undervotes. Voters’ background characteristics have a significant impact on their ability to vote without error. Our results offer a new perspective for evaluating the use of the straight‐party option.     

DNA fingerprints and rape: A feminist assessment

Can the use of DNA fingerprinting reduce the frequency of rape? Feminist technology assessment is used here to evaluate this new forensic technique, which distinguishes between persons by differences in DNA sequences in variable regions of their chromosomes. Although everyone's DNA pattern is unique, the statistical degrees of difference among sub-populations within ethnic and racial groups are not fully known. The technique is beset by laboratory errors, difficulties in interpretation, and lack of quality control. Policy analysts may also be troubled by the politics behind the harassment of expert witnesses, the rejection by journals of critical articles, the influence of the FBI on federal assessment reports, and the inequitable distribution of costs and benefits. The cases of British rapist-murderer Colin Pitchfork, San Diego rape victim Alicia Wade, and eight exonerated convicts demonstrate how the technique can clear probably innocent rape suspects, but they illustrate little rape-prevention capacity. If DNA testing accurately exonerates a suspect, then the police may continue searching; yet, a test with greater power to exonerate may let criminals escape and may lower the credibility of rape victims' eyewitness testimony. Furthermore, any accurate DNA typing might foster behavior to avoid apprehension or the reduction of sentences through plea-bargaining, thus having a negative effect on deterrence. Despite clear benefit to individual women in specific circumstances, this technique is likely, overall, to be disadvantageous to women. The rape victim identifies her assailant in a police line-up again before the jury in court. He is convicted and put behind bars. Some years later he hears about DNA testing and convinces his lawyer to get tests on the semen that was fund on the victim's clothes. when results show that he could not have been the rapist, he is released from prison. Yet the victim remains convinced that he was the man who attacked her and lives in fear that will find her and rape her again.¹     

On the permissibility of shaping children’s values

Abstract

According to Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, parents have a limited and conditional moral right to deliberately shape their children’s values and interests in light of their own particular comprehensive convictions. Their view contrasts with Matthew Clayton’s account of legitimate childrearing, according to which it is always impermissible for parents to seek to pass on their particular convictions to their children or, more generally, to ‘enroll’ them into their conception of the good, since this violates a requirement of respect for children’s independence. This paper offers a novel defense of Brighouse and Swift’s position that at least some forms of comprehensive enrollment are permissible. First, I argue that the claim that there is a duty to respect the independence of very young children is problematic. Then, drawing on Brighouse and Swift’s account of familial relationship goods, I argue that seeking to pass on comprehensive values or beliefs to one’s children is actually compatible with proper respect for their independence, as Clayton understands it.     

The Advent of Space Weapons

Constellations of observation satellites resemble the “Panopticon” system imagined by British philosopher Jeremy Bentham in his 18th century project for an ideal jailhouse — a system that Michel Foucault analyzed in Discipline and Punish (1975). Just as the warden in the central tower watches the prisoners without their being able to see him, satellites watch the Earth while observed countries cannot escape or monitor the extent of the observation.

Will observed countries factor in the control exerted by observing countries, just as prisoners will eventually interiorize the warden's discipline? This may indeed have been the goal of the U.S. satellite observation policy during the Cold War (1950's–1980's). The U.S. at the time sought to exert a new form of power on the international scene, resorting to persuasion and deterrence rather than all-out aggression.

U.S. satellite surveillance was at work vis-a-vis the USSR through different policies linked to nuclear deterrence; and vis-a-vis U.S. Allies (NATO, Great-Britain, France and Israel), then subject to a U.S. information monopoly. The intended panoptical power was not totally efficient, however. Regarding the USSR, its exercise depended ultimately on the political climate between the two Superpowers. Allied countries succeeded repeatedly in warding off U.S. attempts at control through information.     

Ethics by Design: The Impact of Form of Government on Municipal Corruption

While trust in government at all levels is at an all‐time low, actual corruption at the municipal level has been declining. One factor often credited with this decline is the introduction of the council‐manager form of government. One of the key reasons the council‐manager form was created in the early 1900s was to act as an antidote to the corruption prevalent in the big‐city machine politics of the era. Despite this, no one has tested whether the council‐manager form has in fact influenced the decline in corruption rates. This article uses a rare events logit model to analyze corruption convictions in municipalities between 1990 and 2010 to determine which factors, including form of government, affect the probability that a corrupt act will occur. The findings indicate that municipalities with the council‐manager form are 57 percent less likely to have corruption convictions than municipalities with the mayor‐council form.     

Leadership,regime security,and China's policy toward Taiwan: prospect theory and Taiwan crises

Abstract

Traditional analyses of Taiwan crises have relied mainly on deterrence theory for their explanatory power. This approach fails to account for China's risk-taking behavior, which can be explained by prospect theory. We suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use more risky military coercion against Taiwan's pro-independence movements within a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime faces serious domestic and international challenges to its security. Conversely, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ less risky political pressure to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when the security of China's regime is not challenged. We conclude that maintaining a good US–China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to help prevent military crises in the Taiwan Strait.     

Corruption and Political Culture in America: An Empirical Perspective

Political culture helps define the boundaries of permissiblepolitical action. Thus, it should affect the amounts and typesof political corruption occurring in political systems, as wellas responses to corruption when it is discovered. This articlecompares the distribution of corruption convictions among federaljudicial districts over a three-year period to social and politicalcharacteristics of the districts, and to scaled measures ofElazar's moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic politicalsubcultures. Nationally, strong moralistic subcultures and highvoter turnouts are associated with numerous convictions, bothbefore and after district population is controlled. Analysisof regional patterns reveals a different model in the South,however, one suggesting ideas about the dynamics of traditionalisticpolitics. Corruption, and the impact of federal laws againstit, are best understood within their political and culturalsettings. ^* I am indebted to George Calafut and Philip Sidel of the SocialScience Computer Research Institute, University of Pittsburgh,who gave me many hours of assistance in assembling data. LeonardKuntz and William Nelson of the Universitys Office of Research,Father Bernard Quinn of the Glenmary Research Center, and WilliamNewman of the University of Connecticut helped me locate religiouscensus results. The County and City Data Book is published ontape by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and SocialResearch. Daniel J. Elazar, Michael Margolis, Bert A. Rockman,and two anonymous referees gave me extremely helpful commentson this study.     

Civic Engagements: Resolute Partisanship or Reflective Deliberation

Why do people practice citizenship in a partisan rather than in a deliberative fashion? We argue that they are not intractably disposed to one type of citizenship, but instead adopt one of two different modes depending on the strategic character of current circumstances. While some situations prompt partisan solidarity, other situations encourage people to engage in open‐minded deliberation. We argue that the type of citizenship practiced depends on the engagement of the emotions of anxiety and aversion. Recurring conflict with familiar foes over familiar issues evokes aversion. These angry reactions prepare people for the defense of convictions, solidarity with allies, and opposition to accommodation. Unfamiliar circumstances generate anxiety. Rather than defend priors, this anxiety promotes the consideration of opposing viewpoints and a willingness to compromise. In this way, emotions help people negotiate politics and regulate the kinds of citizenship they practice.     

The (Un)predictability of Primaries with Many Candidates: Simulation Evidence

It is common to describe the dynamic processes that generateoutcomes in U.S. primaries as ``unstable'' or ``unpredictable''. In fact, the way we choose candidates may amount to alottery. This paper uses a simulation approach, assuming10,000 voters who vote according to a naive, deterministicproximity rule, but who choose party affiliationprobabilistically. The voters of each party then must choose between twosets of ten randomly chosen candidates, in ``closed'' primaries.Finally, the winners of the two nominations compete in thegeneral election, in which independent voters also participate.The key result of the simulations reported here isthe complete unpredictability of the outcomes of a sequence ofprimaries: the winner of the primary, or the party's nominee,varied as much as two standard deviations from the medianpartisan voter. The reason is that the median, or any othermeasure of the center of the distribution of voters, isof little value in predicting the outcome of multicandidateelections. These results suggest that who runs may havemore to do with who wins than any other consideration. If more than two parties or candidates are expected, then thevote-maximizing position is not close to your opponents, butwell away from them. (Tullock, 1967: 55).