Preventing Dysfunction and Improving Policy Advice: The Role of Intra‐Departmental Boundary Spanners

It is well established in the public management literature that boundary spanners – people or groups that work across departments or sectors – are critical to the success of whole of government and joined‐up working. In studying recent unprecedented change to central government agencies in the Australian context, our research identified that intra‐departmental boundary spanners also play a critical role in the functioning of government departments, particularly during restructuring. Although most contemporary literature in public management concentrates on boundaries across formal organisational entities (departments, agencies, sectors), boundaries also exist within departments. Our research has found that without dedicated intra‐departmental boundary spanners, significant role confusion and dysfunctional practices arise. In turn, this has serious implications for the quality of policy advice given to Cabinet. Further research needs to be undertaken into both the role of intra‐departmental boundary spanners and how to nurture and manage the practice of intra‐departmental boundary spanners. This is especially the case if changes in Australia represent a fundamental shift more broadly in the way central government agencies operate.     

部门行政利益冲突的阶段性特征

部门行政在本质上是一种利益冲突,即部门利益与公共利益相冲突的过程。部门利益是部门行政的内在根源。从对公共利益的占有程度和表现形式来看,部门行政可以分成三个阶段:利益驱动阶段、利益攫取阶段和利益定型阶段,这三个阶段分别对应于权力部门化、部门利益化和利益法制化三个环节。从利益冲突角度来分析部门行政的阶段性特征有利于深入理解部门内集体腐败的发生规律。     

Glass Walls in State Bureaucracies: Examining the Difference Departmental Function Can Make

Occupational segregation in government employment is an important issue in public administration. Occupation determines pay and benefits, and when women have greater access to quality jobs—especially in the public sector—this promotes their economic, social, and political advancement. This research addresses two questions: (1) What changes have occurred to alter “glass walls” across departmental functions? (2) What impact does departmental function have on the salary of women? The findings reveal that although occupational segregation has decreased over the past two decades in Michigan’s bureaucracy, it is still prevalent. Gender‐based occupational segregation is linked to departmental function. Redistributive departments have much lower levels of occupational segregation than other functional categories. Mean salary is also linked to departmental mission, with distributive departments having both the highest mean salary and the highest level of occupational segregation. Salary differentials across departmental functions are becoming smaller over time. Overall, women appear to be most successful, both financially and career‐wise, in historically male‐dominated fields.     

MINISTERIAL STAFF IN AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT

Abstract: This study examines the ministerial staff in Australian commonwealth government to discover what they do and how they assist ministers in achieving political control of departments. The data consist of interviews with ministers, departmental secretaries and ministerial staff. The study finds that ministerial staff offer policy advice in much the same way as found by James Walter in his study almost a decade before this one. But there does appear to be more emphasis on monitoring departmental implementation of policy and brokering positions within government than was the case in the earlier study. The study concludes that the relationship between ministers and their offices and the departmental secretaries is characterised by a conditionally cooperative approach, which is similar to that recommended by several public administration scholars.     

DEADLY FORCE AS A POLICY PROBLEM IN LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: DO ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

This article examines the impact of six administrative practices on the use of deadly force by police officers in American cities with a population greater than 50,000. Generally, departmental policies demonstrate little association with the frequency of shooting incidents per police officer, or in the number of incidents resulting in fatalities or injuries. It does appear that police departments which issue more traditional sidearms tend to experience fewer incidents than departments which issue heavier firearms. This same lack of association between administrative practices and the use of deadly force is discovered when controlling for city population size arid state legal codes. Notwithstanding that some of the relationships are in the expected direction, their lack of statistical significance suggests that the use of deadly force has its antecedents in sources other than the administrative policies of local police departments.     

Not Just Parliamentary 'Cowboys and Indians': Ministerial Responsibility and Bureaucratic Drift

A strict interpretation of the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility requires that the minister alone bear public responsibility for her department's actions. Critics charge that it is not sensible to hold a mminister solel responsible for departmental errors when government departments are so large and complex, and senior bureaucrats so powerful in their own right; senior bureaucrats should be made directly accountable to Parliament. The paper uses a game theoretic model to show that this criticism is misguided. To the extent that politicians more effectively police the bureaucracy when they are governed by a doctrine of ministerial responsibility than when they are not, the doctrine strengthens accountability. Much of the doctrine's force comes from the threat of ministerial resignation, but the opportunities that the doctrine creates for opposition parties to embarrass the government also contribute to its efficacy.     

Aggregating Spending Preferences: An Empirical Analysis of Party Preferences in Norwegian Local Governments

To understand the role of political parties in public budgetmaking, we need separate data about spending preferences andbudgetary outcomes. In this paper we employ such data todiscriminate between different models of how competing partypreferences are transformed into policy outcomes. In the firststep of the analysis data on politicians' spending preferencesare used to estimate the desired allocation of each party. Inthe second step the desired allocations are used as inputs ina separate analysis of the decision-making process inNorwegian local councils.     

Microcomputers in Financial Management: Case Studies of Eight American Cities

The uses and effects of microcomputers were examined in case studies in eight American cities. Most departments in these cities used the microcomputers for financial management activities of one type or another. Other important findings were that microcomputer uses were related to departmental functions, and that the effects of microcomputers on work, people and the organization were largely positive.     

Police Budgeting: Winning Strategies

Based on a national survey of police chiefs with a follow-up focus group, this article discusses budgetary strategies that police departments used to be successful in budgeting. The strategies include: using crime and workload data judiciously; capitalizing on sensational crime incidents; effectively getting the message out; carefully mobilizing interest groups; strategic planning; playing the federal grants game; working closely with the chief executive and elected officials; and involving all departmental staff levels in budgeting.     

Priority-based budgeting: An honest broker among municipal functions?

Implemented in over 200 local governments, priority-based budgeting (PBB) reflects a contemporary attempt to systematically determine and implement desired budgetary reallocation. PBB proponents claim it is highly effective in prioritizing governmental programs and aligning budgetary allocation to priorities. However, core municipal functions such as public safety and public works are often impervious to budgetary shocks. Can PBB overcome this to better align budgetary allocations with organizational priorities? This study examines 32 municipal PBB implementers with difference-in-differences analysis; finding a varied effect upon municipal functions that casts doubt on its ability to fully reallocate budgetary resources from low- to high-priority programs.     

中国退役军人管理保障体制变革的理路与前瞻

退役军人事务部的组建实现了我国退役军人管理保障体制的历史性变革。本文在回顾新中国成立以来退役军人管理保障体制变革历程和分析其变革理路的基础上,瞻望未来。建议通过厘定协调领导体制、理顺部门关系、优化内部结构,在法治框架下健全完善由退役军人事务部主导、多部门协同的治理体制,积极推进退役军人管理保障体系和能力现代化。     

Unity and Distinctiveness in UK Coalition Government: Lessons for Junior Partners

Parties in coalition governments must address the ‘unity/distinctiveness’ dilemma: how to maintain governing cohesion, while sustaining individual identities. Within the Cameron–Clegg government this is a challenge for both parties, but it is more so for the Liberal Democrats as the junior partner. This paper considers how the Liberal Democrats negotiated this dilemma in relation to ministerial portfolio allocations. While the Liberal Democrat strategy of placing ministers in almost all departments has served the Coalition well in terms of governing unity, it has limited the extent to which they have been able to assert their distinctive contribution to Coalition policy‐making. This is demonstrated through an examination of the Liberal Democrats' influence on Coalition welfare policy. A lack of clear policy contributions is potentially highly damaging to the Liberal Democrats electorally, as it suggests that they have made little substantive contribution to the Coalition beyond propping up their Conservative partners. Accordingly, the paper reflects on lessons for junior partners in future UK coalition governments, suggesting that concentrating ministers within one or two departments may provide a more viable means of carving out a distinctive governing legacy.     

DELEGATION: A CASE STUDY

• 1 Whether to delegate or not to delegate has been an active issue in the New South Wales Public Service since 1960.
• 2 There has been considerable delegation of personnel authority to department heads during the period 1960–68, and the benefits of this programme have been significant.
• 3 The following rules seem to govern the selection of areas ripe for further delegation:

The “monopoly” rule: Where a department has a virtual monopoly over a particular occupational group in the Service, it should have authority to employ members of that group. The “rubber-stamp” rule: Where the rate of approval to departmental submissions approaches 100 per cent in any area, delegation of authority should be considered. The “guide-line” rule: Where the Board finds it possible to formulate guide-lines for the making of decisions within its own office, these guide-lines should be communicated to the departments, together with authority to make the appropriate decisions. The “no-harm” rule: Whenever authority can be exercised in a department without breaching any general or departmental limitation, delegation should be considered.

• 4 The following limitations to delegation of further personnel authority are seen to exist:

The “size” limitation: The small size of many departments limits the scope for further delegations of authority. The “geographical” limitation: The geographical dispersion of departmental staff is a factor that limits the scope for further delegations of authority. Regional decentralization, paradoxically, often leads to centralization of personnel authority. The “uniformity” limitation: The need to achieve uniformity in the Service, from one department to another, limits the scope for further delegations of authority. The ideal of uniformity, however, has probably been over-emphasized in the past because of the early history of the Public Service Board, and the centralized system of arbitration within which it operates. Other limitations: Factors unique to individual departments, such as historical influences and lack of competence in personnel administration, impose specific barriers to further delegations of authority.     

Gradgrinding the Social Sciences: The Politics of Metrics of Political Science

This article employs an interpretive approach, and in the light of contributions to this symposium by Butler and McAllister, and McLean et al ., holds that metrics of research 'quality' are socially constructed and hence are as 'subjective' as peer review. Thus it rejects the use of stand-alone metrics as an 'objective' basis to inform funding allocations. Rather, the optimum method of 'quality' assessment is a panel-based exercise with expert judgement informed by a range of discipline-sensitive metrics and peer review of publications. The article maintains that the politics of metrics of political science conceals interests about the foundations of social scientific knowledge, and so the dispute over metrics and peer review is a metaphor for the conflicting epistemological preferences of UK political scientists. It is also argued that metrics-led assessment subjects political science to 'Gradgrinding' on two fronts: that political science departments amount to less than the sum of their parts, and the audit culture strips the discipline of its humanism.     

政府绩效视角下的行政管理体制改革战略反思——基于地方政府公务员的感知调查

改革开放以来,我国行政管理体制改革一直坚持以组织结构调整为主的模式.对于这一模式的影响,尤其对地方政府的影响,一直缺少科学层面的检验和理论层面的反思.本文选取政府绩效作为标杆,利用地方政府公务员的问卷调查数据,探索政府部门间关系和部门管理制度建设影响部门绩效的路径和程度,使用结构方程模型实证检验了行政管理体制改革战略在地方层面的有效性.结果表明,部门间关系作为政府结构的核心特征对于政府绩效并没有直接的影响作用,其影响作用是通过部门制度建设和部门文化间接发挥的;部门制度建设对政府绩效的整体影响要大于部门间关系.因此,在今后的改革中应该给予管理制度层面的改革更多的重视,通过局部的、具体制度的改革为整体的、基本制度的变革创造条件.同时,还应在改革过程中维护政府组织文化的凝聚力和激励性.     

Block grants and state discretion: A study of the implementation of the partnership for health act in three states

This article examines the use of federal funds provided to state health departments under a grant consolidation of eight previously categorical health programs in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Alabama in a comparative context. The primary question addressed is why the three states chose to describe their allocations of funds within the total health department budget differently, and what political, administrative, and bureaucratic factors explained the differences. Although certain factors were found to be at work in all states (e.g. each had an incentive to concentrate the reported use of federal funds to simplify federal audits) these factors combined with circumstances unique to each state to produce different expenditure patterns. After examining the experience of three states, general hypotheses are developed. For example, it is hypothesized that more volatile changes in allocations will result from grant consolidations in policy areas which do not address basic service needs. Finally the decision-making process with respect to block grant funds is characterized as one in which a small group of professionals determined allocations autonomously with relatively little input from interest groups or other actors within state government; nevertheless, the external political and administrative environment severely limited the possibilities of realistic choice in each of the three states studied.I wish to thank the National Center for Health Services Research which supported this study under grant HS 01495. I am indebted to the state health department officials in Alabama, Michigan, and Pennsylvania who made this research possible. I would also like to thank Leonard Robins, Janet Shikles, William Schmalzreid, Bruce Vladeck, John Kingdon and Robert Baitty for comments on an earlier draft. Of course the views expressed are my own and in no way reflect the positions of the Department of Health and Human Services.     

Ministerial expertise and the Dutch case

Abstract. The prevalent Dutch prototype of 'specialist ministers' is critically examined. To this purpose a typology of ministerial expertise is proposed along with guidelines for measurement. Diachronic data concerning all Dutch ministers and all ministerial appointments covering the 1848–1986 period show that the specialist thesis should be amended. In general, political know-how within Dutch cabinets has been underestimated, partly because of methodological inadequacies. One of four conceivable types of ministerial expertise proves to be predominant: the expert minister experienced in both departmental and political affairs.     

LABOR'S UNKNOWN EXPERIMENT: THE MORETON REGIONAL COORDINATION EXERCISE*

Abstract: The Department of Urban and Regional Development's (DURD's) Moreton Regional Coordination Exercise was a bold experiment. It aimed to coordinate, at a regional level, the activities of all levels of government, an objective close to DURD's heart. The proposal emerged from DURD's struggles with other commonwealth departments, conflicts with the Queensland government over administrative arrangements for the Area Improvement Program and the Australian Assistance Plan, and representations from the Lord Mayor of Brisbane concerning regional arrangements. In the course of setting the exercise up, DURD faced many difficulties, including departmental opposition on the interdepartmental committees and the scepticism of officials at the regional level. In implementing the idea of a regional budget there were serious shortcomings in available information and major difficulties in overcoming the inertia of existing departmental budgetary routines and priorities. The Regional Team of officials produced a report that was redolent of general support for "better coordination", but the specific proposals and their effectiveness were very limited. DURD's coordinating ambitions were thwarted, despite apparent Cabinet support and oversight by a special Cabinet committee. In fact, Cabinet as an institution was too weak and its membership too fragmented to provide the necessary power to overcome bureaucratic conservatism.     

OUTCOMES OF VARIOUS MODES OF ADMINISTERING AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL COLLEGES

The outcomes of various modes of administration may be summarized as follows:

• 1 Under both ministerial and departmental control, the prior experience and predispositions of the Minister were critical factors affecting the colleges. Under departmental control, the background and attitudes of senior officers within the department were also important. Various instances of this were cited.
• 2 There tended to be proportionately fewer dismissals of principals or resignations in protest by them under departmental control than when colleges were controlled by Ministers of the Crown or governing councils. Several reasons for this trend were suggested.
• 3 Under all systems of control the colleges were subject from time to time to direct or indirect political pressure. For example, there were instances in which parents invoked or attempted to invoke political pressure to save their sons from expulsion from a college. Such pressures played a part in the dismissal or resignation of several principals.
• 4 Another factor which led to the resignation of two principals who were directly responsible to a Minister was the belief that their jurisdiction had been transgressed by another senior public servant.
• 5 Under departmental control a principal was likely to be caught up in intradepartmental politics. The fortunes of the college depended somewhat upon his success in this arena.
• 6 In determining the policies and practices to be adopted on the college farm, a principal generally had greater freedom under Education Department control than under Agriculture Department control. On the other hand, teaching practices were generally subject to closer departmental supervision in the former case than in the latter.
• 7 One problem with any system of control is that of maintaining a balance between continuity in policy on the one hand and sensitivity to demands for change on the other. In general, control over the colleges by government departments or governing councils tended to be conservative in emphasis, to stress continuity. By contrast, where control was directly exercised by Ministers of the Crown and where there were relatively frequent changes in incumbency of the relevant portfolio, continuity in policy was less assured.
• 8 The life of advisory committees was typically marked by early enthusiasms and influence in dealing with urgent matters of policy. After these matters had been dealt with there was generally a decline in activity and influence, growing disillusion among members, and eventually reconstitution or replacement of the committee.

     

ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING VALUATIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT: A POTENTIALLY PERNICIOUS UNION

Abstract: With the movement towards decentralisation of control over governmental trading activities much attention has been placed by politicians and economists on a loosely attached rate of return control philosophy. Independent boards are appointed to government business entities, generally comprising business managers and private sector directors who are experienced in profit generation and micro- economic planning. This thrust has now been facilitated by accounting standards with a private sector orientation. These favour accrual valuations with their associated resource allocations and guidelines for funds distribution. However, the extent of the subjectivity introduced by such measures has now placed many parliamentary conventions at risk. Such subjectivity also contributes to the lack of goal congruence and financial control in government which in turn can counteract macroeconomic planning and control as this is at present practised and understood. This paper examines normatively some of the theoretical defects and conventional heresies associated with these new allocative and distributional arrangements.