Channeling frustrations: Institutions,economic fluctuations,and political behavior

Abstract While the literature suggests that clear lines of responsibility lead to greater incumbent dependence on economic conditions for support, little has been said about how electorates channel frustrations in systems characterized by 'fuzzy' lines of responsibility, i.e., the shape and status of parliamentary government in relation to possible choice of electors open to them. The argument presented here is that fuzzy lines of responsibility result in lower incentives to participate in political processes and greater system dissatisfaction given economic circumstances. This decline is greater in systems in which incumbent responsibility is less easily identified by the individual citizen. To test this, data are collected from eight European nations over the period 1975–1992. Split sample and slope intervention models with robust estimation are employed at the individual level. System level aggregates are analyzed using pooled time–series analysis to confirm individual level findings. Finally, election turnout data are also analyzed to obtain election level verification of survey findings. Evidence suggests that participation is more heavily influenced by economic conditions in fuzzy settings. Coupled with existing literature, this suggests that while clear settings encourage punishment of the incumbent unclear settings tend to cause individuals to become more withdrawn and alienated. However, economic conditions are also important to overall system effects. The findings herein suggest that unclear or fuzzy settings increase the role of economic conditions in determination of system affect.     

Economic voting in multi-level contexts: Evidence from Kerala and West Bengal in India

What determines electoral support for national incumbent parties and state-level challengers in sub-national pro-poor contexts? Based on survey data from the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal, collected prior to the 2019 national election, we find that voters were more (less) inclined to vote for the sub-national incumbent relative to the national incumbent if their household economic conditions were perceived to have improved (deteriorated) relative to national economic conditions. Our findings indicate that voters in these settings correctly assume that the sub-national incumbent cannot be held responsible for changes in national economic conditions, but, at the same time, the existence of a strong welfare state at the sub-national level creates expectations that the sub-national government is responsible for personal welfare. Hence, the national election is used to assess the economic performance of both the sub-national and the national incumbent.     

Good times,bad times: Taxation and electoral accountability

In this article we address two important and related questions. First, do economic hard times make defeat inevitable for any incumbent? And, second, do voters sanction incumbents for a poor economy whatever the economic policy pursued? To answer these questions, we propose a new theory about the ways in which taxation policies, clarity of responsibility, government ideology, and economic conditions come together to shape election outcomes. We address these questions with a new set of data collected on elections, government policies, and economic measures before and during the current economic crisis. Our findings indicate that taxation policies have effects on incumbent electoral patterns net of economic performance measures, but that these effects differ in theoretically-expected fashions depending on clarity of responsibility, government ideology, and whether or not there has been a recession in the year before an election is held.     

Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level Analysis

An important component of incumbent support is the reward/punishment calculus of economic voting. Previous work has shown that "clarity of responsibility" within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice: where clarity is high (low), economic effects are greater (less). This article advances the "clarity of responsibility" argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting. In institutional contexts of multilevel governance, the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult. This article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government. Individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 are used to test this proposition. Results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance.     

The election timing advantage: Empirical fact or fiction?

Do non-fixed election dates in Westminster parliamentary democracies create an unfair incumbent advantage? The consensus in the literature is that the incumbent party can gain an advantage at the ballot box by controlling election timing (Bakvis, 2001; Docherty, 2010; Smith, 2004; White, 2005; Wolinetz, 2005). Surprisingly, however, there is a lack of empirical evidence to support this claim. We address this lacuna by providing an empirical test of whether the election-timing power matters for incumbent vote support. We do so by employing an innovative web-based voting experiment. Our findings show that the government does gain an advantage by timing an election when it is to their advantage, but the context is limited to conditions where the election follows immediately after a heightened level of positive government coverage.     

Cognitive Heterogeneity and Economic Voting: A Comparative Analysis of Four Democratic Electorates

This article examines the cognitive foundations of economic voting in four diverse democratic electorates: Canada, Hungary, Mexico, and Taiwan. We present a theory of heterogeneous attribution, where an individual's level of political sophistication conditions his or her ability to attribute responsibility for economic conditions to governmental actors. In contrast to previous literature, we argue that higher, not lower, levels of political sophistication prompt citizens to "vote their pocketbook." Using data from surveys done in conjunction with recent elections in all of these countries, we find that more politically sophisticated respondents are more likely to make use of pocketbook evaluations in their decisions to support or oppose the incumbent government. These findings both present a significant challenge to the conventional wisdom on political sophistication and economic voting and shed light on the necessary cognitive preconditions for democratic accountability.     

The accountability effect of endorsements: A survey experiment

Do endorsements from incumbent politicians to co-partisans lead to more electoral accountability for the performance of the government? I use a randomized experiment embedded in a national survey conducted before the 2012 Mexican general election to examine the effect of endorsements by the outgoing president Felipe Calderón to the Senate candidates of his Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). Results show that among PAN identifiers, the incumbent vote is more tightly linked to the performance of the president when voters are exposed to the endorsement. I improve on the current standing of the accountability literature by showing that the relationship between an outgoing politician and the candidates of her party matters for electoral sanctioning. My findings imply that politicians’ strategic decisions have an effect on how voters assign responsibility: By nominating candidates without close ties to the endorser in cases of weak government performance, parties can use nominations strategically to diffuse responsibility.     

Economic vulnerability and economic voting in 14 OECD countries

The economic voting literature shows that good economic performance bolsters the electoral prospects of incumbents. However, disagreement persists as to whether voters in vulnerable economic conditions are more likely to engage in economic voting. It is argued in this article that a crucial factor in explaining individual‐level variation in economic voting is the degree of exposure to economic risks, because risk exposure affects the saliency of the economy in voting decisions. In particular, the focus is on job insecurity and employability as key determinants of economic voting patterns. The article hypothesises that the extent of economic voting is greater in voters who are more vulnerable to unemployment and less employable in case of job loss. Support for these hypotheses is found in a test with a dataset that combines survey data on incumbent support with occupational unemployment rates and other measures of exposure to economic risks.     

Campaign spending and Senate elections, 1978–84

This paper uses a sample of recent Senate election results and estimates vote equations that show challenger spending hurts, and incumbent spending helps, incumbent re-election. While both types of spending have diminishing returns, the effects are asymmetrical. Challenger spending is more productive at lower levels of spending, but incumbents can spend greater amounts more profitably than can challengers. These results can explain why Senate incumbents spend money, why they typically outspend their challenger, and why incumbents who can outspend their challenger would tend to be against spending limits or public financing.However, the results do not explain why incumbent spending does not work in House election equations. Jacobson and others have run countless linear and quadratic specifications that persistently show perverse effects for incumbent spending. These results are not affected by the procedural problem of logging observations that have a value of zero, and pose a genuine puzzle. There are other empirical results suggesting the idea that there are basic differences in the nature of elections between the House and Senate. For example, Grier and Carlson (1988) find that state-level economic conditions have a strong effect on individual Senate elections, while Owens and Olson (1980) find that district-level economic conditions have no effect on House elections. Since I show that there are a significant number of elections where incumbent spending does matter, and that simultaneity bias may not be a tenable explanation for results where incumbent expenditures do not matter, it may be time to take a new look at the House data or to develop a testable theory that can explain persistant empirical differences in the determinants of elections in the House and Senate.     

Through thick and thin? The dynamics of government support across income groups during economic crises

Students of economic voting have recently made substantial progress in their understanding of when the economy is and is not likely to impact election outcomes. Our knowledge of the lower level dynamics that drive these aggregate results remains fairly murky. In this paper we test competing theoretical claims about how individual level orientations toward political economy lead to observed aggregate trends in support for incumbent politicians. We do this with models of support for the Labour Party in the United Kingdom before and during the recent global economic turndown.     

Economic performance and presidential trait evaluations: A longitudinal analysis

Presidential traits (i.e. morality, intelligence, leadership) have generally been assumed to be idiosyncratic personal characteristics of the individual and are treated as exogenous from other political and economic factors. Prior literature has shown that presidential characteristics and economic performance are important elements of vote choice and approval. Using ANES data from 1984 to 2008, we demonstrate an important link between these factors, showing that objective and subjective indicators of economic performance are significant predictors of trait evaluations. Specifically, evaluations of the incumbent president at election time are directly related to changes in economic performance earlier in the year. The effects of economic performance are not isolated to retrospective policy evaluations, but also influence the overall evaluation of the president as a person.     

Economic voting: The effect of political context, volatility and turnout on voters' assignment of responsibility

Abstract.  This study analyses macroeconomic conditions and the electoral fortune of incumbents in 21 parliamentary Western countries between 1950 and 1997 in 266 national elections. Voters' assignment of responsibility for the state of the national economy is assumed to vary according to the context of the election. Building on previous research, the importance of the political context – clarity of responsibility and availability of alternatives – is analysed. The study also breaks new ground by introducing two new contexts of importance: volatility, seen from a systemic perspective, and the trend in turnout. The contextual hypothesis is confirmed. The universal economic effect as such is very weak indeed. However, given a favourable political and institutional environment (clear responsibility structure and availability of alternatives), an economic effect appears. Tests including the new contexts created on the basis of behavioural patterns in the electorate (system volatility and turnout trend) identify elections where the economic effects are even stronger.     

Money,candidates, and mayoral elections

In this paper, we extend a well-trod line of research from congressional and state-level elections—the electoral impact of campaign expenditures and candidate characteristics—to a relatively understudied context, urban mayoral elections. Using a sample of large U.S. cities, we provide evidence that mayoral elections are very similar to elections at other levels of office: there is a tremendous incumbency advantage, one that is overcome only with great effort; campaign spending is closely tied to incumbent vote share but it is challenger rather than incumbent spending that seems to drive outcomes; and challengers are hopelessly outspent. In addition, we find that the effect of local economic conditions on incumbent success is mediated by challenger spending and that incumbent candidates fare better in racially diverse settings.     

Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption

This article demonstrates that political institutions influence the level of corruption via clarity of responsibility. The key hypothesis is that when political institutions provide high clarity of responsibility, politicians face incentives to pursue good policies and reduce corruption. These incentives are induced by the electorates' rejection of incumbents who do not provide satisfactory outcomes. However, if lines of responsibility are not clear, the ability of voters to evaluate and punish politicians—as well as to create incentives for performance—declines. The findings confirm that countries with institutions that allow for greater clarity of responsibility have lower levels of corruption.     

Credit Where it’s Due? Valence Politics,Attributions of Responsibility,and Multi-Level Elections

When considering elections in multi-level contexts, scholars have typically assumed—in line with second-order election theory—that the way voters approach an election depends on their attributions of responsibility, that is, on what they see as being at stake in that election. This assumption is questionable. The formal position is not always clear, and is further blurred by parties and the media. Moreover, many voters pay little attention to politics and have little incentive to trace constitutional responsibilities. In this paper I use data from election studies in two multi-level contexts, Ontario and Scotland, to explore the nature and impact of voters’ attributions of responsibility. The evidence suggests that, when called upon in surveys to do so, many voters can confidently and fairly accurately assign issues to different levels of government. Yet they do not seem to consider these attributions much at elections. There is very little indication that issues weighed heavier in the decision-making of those who regarded them as the responsibility of that electoral arena. A plausible explanation is that most voters sidestep the cognitive demands imposed by multi-level elections.     

The fate of governing parties in times of economic crisis

The severity of the recent economic crisis in Europe provides an opportunity to test some of the conventional hypotheses about the effects of economic adversity on election outcomes in a broadly comparative context. In 16 of 27 elections held in EU member countries between 2008 and the end of 2011, incumbent governments went down to defeat. In many of the cases in which a governing party was defeated, a government of the center-left was replaced by one of the center-right. The average level of decline in the share of the vote for governing parties (−8.1%) however was surprisingly modest in comparison with previous election cycles. Nevertheless, the results were devastating for governing parties in a number of instances, such as Ireland or Hungary. We also consider the relative merits of retrospective and prospective interpretations of these outcomes in the light of contextual effects arising from factors such as globalization and institutional clarity as these affect perceptions of the responsibility of governing parties or coalitions in coping with the crisis in the domestic political environment.     

Voter Partisanship and the Effect of Distributive Spending on Political Participation

Do distributive benefits increase voter participation? This article argues that the government delivery of distributive aid increases the incumbent party's turnout but decreases opposition‐party turnout. The theoretical intuition here is that an incumbent who delivers distributive benefits to the opposing party's voters partially mitigates these voters’ ideological opposition to the incumbent, hence weakening their motivation to turn out and oust the incumbent. Analysis of individual‐level data on FEMA hurricane disaster aid awards in Florida, linked with voter‐turnout records from the 2002 (pre‐hurricane) and 2004 (post‐hurricane) elections, corroborates these predictions. Furthermore, the timing of the FEMA aid delivery determines its effect: aid delivered during the week just before the November 2004 election had especially large effects on voters, increasing the probability of Republican (incumbent party) turnout by 5.1% and decreasing Democratic (opposition party) turnout by 3.1%. But aid delivered immediately after the election had no effect on Election Day turnout.     

Re‐electing the Culprits of the Crisis? Elections in the Aftermath of a Recession

Theories of economic voting and electoral accountability suggest that voters punish incumbent governments for poor economic conditions. Incumbents are thus expected to suffer substantially during significant economic crisis but their successor in office will face the difficult task of reviving the economy. The economic crisis may, therefore, negatively affect government parties in subsequent elections even though the economic conditions may, to a large degree, have been inherited from the previous government. It is argued in this article that economic conditions play an important role in such circumstances as they place specific issues on the agenda, which structure the strategies available to the parties. Therefore, the article studies the 2013 Icelandic parliamentary election in which the incumbent government parties suffered a big loss despite having steered the country through an economic recovery. While perceptions of competence and past performance influenced party support, three specific issues thrust on the agenda by the economic crisis – mortgage relief, Icesave and European Union accession/negotiations – help explain why the centre‐right parties were successful in returning to the cabinet.     

How election dynamics shape perceptions of electoral integrity

In recent years a growing literature focuses on how and why some election processes are viewed as having integrity while others lack it. Some scholars examine how a state's characteristics (e.g. its economic development, the education levels of its citizens, and their experience with elections) shape the voting process while others study how individual voters view the process and their role in it. The relative importance of election dynamics themselves and the process of their evaluation, however, remain unclear. What stages of the election process are most important when people evaluate elections? We argue that a better understanding of how election dynamics shape perceptions of election integrity is crucial because theoretically this process is at the heart of democratic representation and because from a policymaking standpoint these dynamics vary more over time than individual and state-level factors. This paper explains why certain parts of the election cycle are critical to determining how an election is judged—especially the fairness of election laws and media access, the conduct of election authorities, and the use of political violence. Empirical results using new data on 121 elections held in 109 countries during 2013, 2014, and the first half of 2015 are supportive of our argument.     

No sorting,no advantage: Regression discontinuity estimates of incumbency advantage in Japan

While the existing literature has identified a sizable incumbency advantage in single-member district (SMD) races in developed democracies, we argue that some political and institutional contexts of Japan's Lower House elections would undermine the incumbency advantage. Our regression discontinuity (RD) analysis indeed shows little advantage, and further examination suggests this as largely due to the “best-loser” provision in Japan's mixed-member system, which gives a loser of SMD competition a chance to be a “resurrected” incumbent. We also show no evidence of sorting – i.e., systematic difference between bare winners and bare losers – in close SMD races and thus add further evidence to support the methodological argument that the election RD analysis is a viable and promising research design.