The convergence of transatlantic sanction policy against Iran

Between 1996 and 2012, cooperation between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) on Iran sanctions underwent a dramatic shift from open disagreement to almost unanimous consensus. Whereas the US preferred negative sanctions throughout this period, the EU opted at first for using economic incentives and dialogue. The EU’s diverging approach exemplified the overall preference for multilateralism and engagement strategies over unilateral coercive measures. Beginning in 2005, however, European sanction policy towards Iran converged with that of the US. In this article, I argue that the convergence of transatlantic sanction policy against Iran cannot be understood without the pressure employed by Washington. The US pressure campaign consisted of secondary sanctions against European companies. As necessary condition, US pressure has been a key external factor that complemented the EU’s internal developments fostering a more coercive approach towards Tehran after the revelation of the Iranian nuclear programme in 2002 and the breakdown of the E3 (Great Britain, France and Germany) negotiations in 2005.     

Learning From a Troubled Experience – Transatlantic Lessons from the Nuclear Standoff with Iran

With the US eventually embracing the European-devised ‘dual track’ approach comprising both sanctions and incentives, the transatlantic partners have currently reached a remarkable level of convergence on how to deal with the Iranian nuclear conundrum. Although EU--US unity might not be enough to solve the dispute, the experience of transatlantic cooperation on Iran offers some important lessons. It shows that strategic convergence between the transatlantic partners, or lack thereof, has a considerable impact on the way a crisis unfolds in an area in which both parties have a stake. It highlights the added value represented by European/EU political and economic assets in a situation in which US military options are both unlikely to have the desired effect and at grave risk of backlash. Finally, it sets an important precedent for a specific option for intra-EU and EU--US cooperation – the contact or lead group – that seems to suit the emerging multipolar world better than other, more institutionalised methods.     

欧美对华政策协调及其局限

随着中国的持续崛起以及欧美对华政策的转型,中国因素在跨大西洋关系中的重要性更加凸显。为了应对中国崛起、巩固跨大西洋关系以及维护在国际秩序中的主导地位,欧美加快了对华政策协调的步伐,试图围绕意识形态、经贸投资、科技创新以及全球治理等议题协调共识并采取更加一致的行动。当前欧美对华政策协调也有别于过去“美主欧从”的模式,呈现出更具机制化和更全面的新特点。在协调的过程中,欧美对华政策出现了一定的趋同,但分歧也显露无遗。欧美对华认知与政策分歧、欧盟“战略自主”倾向以及“特朗普主义”遗产的影响都将对欧美协调的深度和效果构成制约。当今国际体系的特点和中国和平发展道路也决定了欧美协调难以复制冷战时期的遏制战略,“和平共处”是欧美协调和中美欧三边关系应该遵守的基本原则。     

Humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Iran and Syria

International sanctions against Iran and Syria have been tightened to unprecedented levels since 2012, particularly in the case of the European Union's (EU's) restrictions on the countries' energy and finance sectors. Marking a departure from the EU's carefully targeted sanctions policies of recent decades, they represent de facto comprehensive measures widely associated with negative humanitarian impacts. This paper analyses semi-structured interviews, official discourse and case studies to explore early reports of negative impacts on the health of ordinary citizens in Iran and Syria and examines associated policy responses, particularly in the EU context. The author outlines why a shift towards broader-based sanctions could be problematic for the EU and outlines constraints currently preventing more efficient risk mitigation. This paper suggests ways that sanctions, representing an increasingly vital, albeit contested, tool of EU foreign and security policy, could be used in a more prudent manner if a worsening humanitarian situation is to be avoided.     

Just How Special is “Special”: Britain,Cuba, and US Relations 1958–2008 an Overview

In June 2008, despite intense lobbying from the Bush administration, the Council of Ministers of the European Union lifted the diplomatic sanctions on Havana that it had imposed in 2003 and agreed to resume a “comprehensive political dialogue” with the revolutionary regime. Instrumental in this decision was a change in policy by the UK that had hitherto stood against such a normalisation of relations. The move came as a surprise to many who had anticipated that the British would oppose the lifting of sanctions in deference to their “special relationship” with their transatlantic ally. However, as this overview suggests, the UK decision was not unusual. Even from the earliest days of the revolution, the UK has differed with the US over Cuba. By surveying the five decades of the UK–Cuba relationship since 1959 the article explains how the UK has maintained an ambivalent attitude towards Washington's embargo. While recognising US primacy of interest in Cuba, London has consistently attempted to follow an independent policy that at times has come between the close allies. It concludes that although the UK (along with other European partners and Canada) shares the US goal of seeing the end of Communism on the island, it has ironically helped to thwart this ambition. The history of the relationship provides an example of the limitations of unilateral economic sanctions as policy instruments. The failure of the US embargo to affect the behaviour of the Castro regime should be no surprise when Washington's closest ally has never fully agreed to it.     

欧美科技制裁协作的动力与分歧：基于欧盟的视角

科技制裁在持续的军事冲突中发挥着关键作用,在和平时期的地缘政治中也从未消失。欧盟与美国是最大的制裁实施者,双方的制裁协作在多个地区和领域产生了重要影响。虽然欧美科技制裁协作较为频繁,但欧盟和美国在制裁政策上仍存在诸多分歧。文章从欧美价值观、安全威胁和二级制裁这三个维度出发,剖析欧盟与美国进行科技制裁协作的动因与诱发分歧的因素,并选择俄罗斯、伊朗和中国这三个具有代表性和差异性的案例进行比较。欧盟与美国对俄罗斯的制裁协作水平最高;在伊朗案例中,二级制裁因素带来的欧美分歧较为突出;在中国案例中,欧美尚未达成明显的制裁共识。共同价值观、安全威胁的紧迫性、二级制裁压力等要素是促使欧盟参与美国科技制裁的重要动因。然而,不同的外交政策理念、安全认知的错位和二级制裁的反作用力也使欧美分歧难以弥合,大大削减了制裁效率。     

Cosmetic agreements and the cracks beneath: ideological convergences and divergences in US and EU democracy promotion in civil society

This piece examines the substance of EU democracy promotion from a comparative point of view and from a perspective placing under inquiry the meaning of the idea of liberal democracy itself. Instead of assuming that the democratic ideal that the EU promotes (‘liberal democracy’) has a clear, fixed meaning, the article examines in detail what actually constitutes the ‘ideal of democracy’ at the heart of EU democracy promotion, and compares this vision to that which informs the democracy promotion of the US. It argues that interesting differences, and shifts and oscillations, in the models of liberal democracy that the EU and the US promote exist and that these are important to note in order for us to fully appreciate how the substance of EU and US democracy support can be shaped by conceptual and ideological debate on the meaning of democracy. This dynamic is particularly relevant today, in the context of the recent attempts to develop transatlantic dialogue on democracy support. This dialogue, it is suggested, plasters over some subtle but important ideological cracks over what is meant by democracy in EU and US democracy support.     

An effective sanctioning actor? Merging effectiveness and EU actorness criteria to explain evolutions in (in)effective coercion towards Iran

EU sanctions invoked in response to the Iranian nuclear crisis (2006–2016) were long considered to be of limited effectiveness in halting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Recently, however, sanctions seem to have contributed to a breakthrough in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme. This article aims at explaining this evolution. It, therefore, designs a framework that explains why sanctions (fail to) change targets’ behaviour. Since the sanctions effectiveness literature lacks an integrated framework to explain evolutions in effective coercion, this article merges sanctions effectiveness variables and Bretherton and Vogler’s actorness criteria. Applying the resulting framework to two broad episodes of the Iranian case (2006–2013 and 2013–2016), this article provides a first test of the framework’s added value. It concludes that a full understanding of sanctions effectiveness requires consideration of external, internal, and in-between factors.     

Rising to the Challenge: Europe’s Security Policy in East Asia amid US-China Rivalry

ABSTRACT

China’s growing power and assertiveness towards its smaller and weaker neighbours has been a wakeup call for the European Union and its member states which, as a result, have stepped up their involvement in East Asia. EU security policy in the region shows many elements of alignment with the United States, but also differences. In North East Asia, the EU has adopted harsh sanctions against North Korea but, contrary to the Trump administration which continues to seek regime change, has left the door open for dialogue. Moreover, the EU supports the process of trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea, while Washington has traditionally been lukewarm towards a process that excludes the US and risks being dominated by Beijing. The transatlantic allies also show differing approaches with regard to maritime disputes in the South China Sea. While EU security policy in East Asia is largely complementary to that of Washington, in some cases Europe tends – albeit inadvertently – to favour Beijing.     

Counter‐terrorism and commercial interests: Do they conflict?

This paper concentrates on whether there is an inherent conflict between commercial interests and the fight against state‐sponsored terrorism.¹ It examines the differences between US and EU policy, particularly in relation to Iran; the roles of Russia and China and the wider impact of international responses. The author concludes that symbolic sanctions and sporadic dialogue are completely inadequate instruments, but that genuine international sanctions and critical dialogue should not be viewed as mutually exclusive policy instruments.     

Europe and Iran’s Nuclear Issue: The Labours and Sorrows of a Supporting Actor

At the time of writing, representatives from Iran and the E3/EU+3 are trying to work out an agreement that will guarantee that Iran’s controversial nuclear programme, widely suspected of having a military purpose, serves only peaceful ends. As the negotiations enter their most crucial phase, the time is ripe to attempt an assessment of the role played by the only actor, besides Iran, that has been on stage since it all began over ten years ago: Europe. Throughout this long drama, Europe’s performance has had some brilliant moments. Yet the quality of its acting has decreased as a new protagonist, the US, has come on stage. Overall, the Europeans’ record is positive, albeit not entirely spotless.     

Inventing terrorists: the nexus of intelligence and Islamophobia

The transatlantic Islamophobia industry, emboldened by US intelligence efforts to entrap Muslims, appears to have helped to increase permissible levels of Islamophobia across the US, as illustrated by the fiery anti-Muslim rhetoric during the 2016 presidential campaign. In this article, I first look at five key leaders of the Islamophobia industry who also claim to be “terrorism experts” and have links to US and Israeli intelligence. I then describe US law enforcement’s mass surveillance of Muslims and its invention of terrorists, including a map of the “successful terrorist prosecutions” claimed by the US Department of Justice, most of which were tried only as criminal cases. Finally, I explore in-depth the case against the Holy Land Foundation, a Muslim charity based in Texas that was run by Palestinian-Americans and targeted by both the state and the Islamophobia industry for its dubious links to “terrorism”, helping to legitimate the Bush W. Administration’s “War on Terror”. I argue that this nexus of intelligence and Islamophobia has empowered anti-Muslim voices that were formerly marginal.     

英国脱欧对欧美关系的影响

英国脱欧不仅是英国国内的重大政治事件和欧洲一体化发展的重要节点,也对欧美关系产生了重要影响。英国脱欧前在欧美关系中占据特殊地位,既是欧美沟通的重要桥梁,又能塑造欧盟发展方向以契合美国利益。英国脱欧深刻改变了欧盟,推动其内部力量变化和政策调整,也将改变欧美之间的互动方式,对欧美关系发展构成新的挑战。百年变局下欧美关系正经历深刻调整,而英国脱欧也成为这一过程中的重要内部变量。     

Mending the “Unhinged Alliance” in the 1970S: Transatlantic Relations,Public Diplomacy,and the Origins of the European Union Visitors Program

This article examines in depth the foundation of the EU’s one explicit example of public diplomacy, the European Union Visitors Programme. The narrative covers the historical background to the EUVP, the main individuals involved, and its significance for the development of the EU as an international actor. Public diplomacy relies on personal contacts, and the intention here is to demonstrate the importance of this petit histoire. The contribution of the EUVP towards establishing a transatlantic “community of values,” as demonstrated by the support it received from the U.S. diplomatic representation in Brussels, is an important extra dimension. The article concludes that the EUVP, while offering a potential model for the EU to project its “soft power” and world-view internationally, remains limited in scope and unable to fulfill its potential.     

How the West Was One: France,America, and the “Huntingtonian Reversal”

Samuel Huntington was such a prolific scholar that it is sometimes difficult for researchers to keep up with his many policy analyses and recommendations. This article deals with one important Huntingtonian thesis, of the late 1990s. The thesis appertains to Huntington's worry about the US becoming a “lonely superpower” due to a French-led campaign to drive a wedge between America and its transatlantic allies. The authors detail the current irony inherent in what they call a “Huntingtonian reversal.” Today, unlike in 1999 when Huntington propounded his “lonely superpower” thesis, it can appear as if it is America that seeks to drive a wedge between itself and the European allies. Moreover, should the West become “one” again, it will in part be due to French efforts to revive transatlantic solidarity.     

American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda

This article explores US perspectives on the new transatlantic security agenda in the context of the evolution of strategic culture. The war on terrorism and the Iraq War of 2003 serve as focal points to examine sources of divergence and convergence between US and European security policies. The article explores key questions including: Have we seen the collapse of a shared, transatlantic security culture since September 11? How have US leaders manipulated strategic cultures to achieve security objectives in the new era? Why has the Bush administration willingly engaged (and even encouraged) the intra-European divide? How significant to the United States is the shift in “old” and “new” European perspectives on the war on terrorism? The article concludes with an assessment of the implications of recent events for the future of transatlantic security ties.     

The transatlantic partnership: Holding China accountable for the Uyghur genocide

This article focuses on Metropolitan State University Denver Debate’s participation in the 2020 Schuman Challenge, a competition hosted by the Delegation of the European Union to the United States. Undergraduate participants were asked to answer the question: “How should the EU and the U.S. respond to China’s alternative models of governance?” In response, the debate team focused on the People’s Republic of China’s human rights violations against the Uyghurs. Three recommendations to address this injustice were presented: (1) expand the use of the Magnitsky Act; (2) amplify current EU/U.S. sanctions; and (3) apply pressure on China’s efforts to secure natural resources. Overall, the debate team’s research suggested that these approaches would both strengthen the EU/U.S. partnership and promote a coordinated response to China aimed at pursuing justice for the Uyghur people. This article also highlights the authors’ journey to engage in advanced undergraduate research focused on foreign policy.     

Promoting democracy or the external context? Comparing the substance of EU and US democracy assistance in Ethiopia

This article analyses the substance of the European Union's and United States' democracy assistance in Ethiopia in 2005–2010. Does this case reveal a transatlantic split, whereby the EU focuses on the external context and the US on the partial regimes of embedded, liberal democracy? Emphasizing the importance of institutions in analysing how interests and ideas affect democracy assistance, the article investigates how the substance may differ between the European Development Fund (EDF), European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The analysis finds a transatlantic split whereby the EU focused more on the external context and the US more on the partial regimes. This transatlantic split can be explained by the combination of ideas and institutions. More specifically, it reflects a difference between the EDF and USAID in their focus on ownership, alignment and harmonization in democracy assistance. The combination of interests and institutions played a less significant role in explaining the substance of democracy assistance, as USAID emphasized the partial regimes, despite political control from the State Department.     

The rocky road of interregionalism: EU sanctions against human rights-violating Myanmar and repercussions on ASEAN–EU relations*

From 1991 until 2012, the European Union (EU) applied sanctions on Myanmar with the purpose of promoting democracy and human rights. In addition, the EU called on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to exert pressure on Myanmar. This paper analyses, in the context of Myanmar’s 1997 accession to ASEAN, how the EU’s sanctions approach towards Myanmar was perceived within ASEAN and related repercussions of this approach on ASEAN–EU interregional relations. With the accession of Myanmar as the base story, it is argued that a regional organizations membership concept implies specific dealings with normative ideas such as democracy and human rights as well as strategies of punishment such as sanctions. The differing membership concepts of ASEAN and the EU explain ASEAN’s critical perception of the EU’s sanctions on Myanmar. Further, the conceptual difference in membership also explains that the EU’s pressure on ASEAN has severely impaired the interregional relations.     

Orchestrating peace in South Sudan: exploring the effectiveness of the European Union’s mediation support

ABSTRACT

Previous research has primarily focused on the EU’s high-profile involvement as direct mediator in peace negotiations. Conversely, less attention has been devoted to the EU’s support to third parties’ mediation efforts, which is a significant component of its mediation activities. Addressing this research gap, this article develops a conceptual framework for the systematic analysis of EU mediation support, identifying key mediation support techniques and the conditions for their success. In terms of mediation support techniques, the EU may rely on “endorsement”, “coordination”, “assistance”, and “lending leverage” to empower and steer third party mediators in line with its mediation objectives and values. We illustrate the utility of the conceptual framework for the EU’s support to IGAD in mediating in South Sudan’s civil war. We find that the EU has contributed significantly to IGAD’s empowerment in terms of endorsement, coordination, assistance, and lending leverage. Simultaneously, our analysis also points to important challenges in the EU-IGAD relationship, which relate to challenges concerning strategic engagement with IGAD’s internal politics that are marked by diverging interests and ties of its member states to the conflict parties.