Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?

There is not yet a Chinese international relations theory (IRT)mainly due to three factors: the unconsciousness of ‘international-ness’in the traditional Chinese worldview, the dominance of the WesternIR discourse in the Chinese academic community, and the absenceof a consistent theoretical core in the Chinese IR research.A Chinese IRT is likely and even inevitable to emerge alongwith the great economic and social transformation that Chinahas been experiencing and by exploring the essence of the Chineseintellectual tradition. The Tianxia worldview and the TributarySystem in the two millennia of China's history, the radicalthinking and revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth century,and reform and opening-up since 1978 are the three milestonesof China's ideational and practical development and thereforecould provide rich nutrition for a Chinese IRT. In addition,a Chinese IRT is likely to develop around the core problematicof China's identity vis-à-vis international society,a century-long puzzle for the Chinese and the world alike. Received for publication May 16, 2006. Accepted for publication June 27, 2007.     

印度尼西亚的多元民主改革及前景

印尼多元民主改革始于宪政改革,并效仿美国一些政治制度,在具体实践中遇到了严峻的挑战。经过10年的改革,印尼基本建立起多元民主体制。印尼的民主改革的前景并非一片坦途,最终还需与民主治理、政府效能结合起来,印尼民主改革才能具有生命力。     

Marketization,Class Structure,and Democracy in China: Contrasting Regional Experiences

After two and half decades of market reforms in China, the question of whether reforms have created favourable social conditions for democracy and whether the country's emerging entrepreneurial class will serve as the democratic social base have become hotly debated issues in both academic and policy circles. Based upon an analysis of two regions – Sunan and Wenzhou, the two prototypical local development patterns in China – the article argues that different patterns of economic development have produced distinct local level social and political configurations, only one of which is likely to foster the growth of democratic practices. It suggests that China's political future is largely dependent upon the emerging class structure and class relations that reform and development have produced. If the market reforms and economic development only enrich a few (like the Sunan case), then the possibility of democratic transition will likely be very bleak. Nonetheless, the possibility of a brighter alternative exists, as demonstrated by the Wenzhou case. These arguments thus link China's political transition to critical social conditions, echoing Barrington Moore's influential work on the social origins of democracy and dictatorship.     

Long-term outlook for China’s political reform

China’s post-1978 economic reform is generally acclaimed as success, for the Chinese economy has expanded nine-fold in a matter of 25 years and the country rose from the world’s 34th largest trading nation in 1978 to the third largest in 2004 ahead of Japan. Interestingly, the Chinese experiment is often described in the West as “economic reform without political reform”. This begets the question: how could a politically un-reformed system be able to deliver such an economic miracle? In reality, China has conducted, by its own standards, major political reforms since 1978. Though far short of the Western expectations, the Chinese experience since 1978 should better be described as “great economic reforms with lesser political reforms”, without which China’s economic success would be inconceivable. China’s “lesser political reforms” have reduced country’s opportunities for greater political change, thus alienating many reform-minded intellectuals. Nevertheless, it may also have helped China avert the possible economic and social upheavals which could have resulted from rushing too fast into a radically different economic and political system. There is a strongly held belief, especially among the more ‘ideological’ observers of Chinese affairs that unless there were a radical political reform, perhaps tantamount to a revolution, to rid China of its “oppressive” Communist Party, the Chinese system would inevitably collapse just like what had happened in the USSR and Eastern Europe. As the party has been in power, China had been predicted to face collapse in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, the Soviet Union’s disintegration of 1990, the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1996, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 2003 outbreak of SARS. Yet all these forecasts turned out to be wrong and the track record of the China doomsayers over the past 20 years is indeed poor. Will China become a democracy through its political reform in 20 years? Indeed, a full democracy could be the best scenario for China, the region and beyond, but it is difficult to give a definitive answer, which will, to a great extent, depend on how to achieve democracy in China, i.e. the costs/risks involved, as well as what kind of ultimate shape such a democracy will take. If full-fledged democratisation will take more time, the pressure for a more accountable government and more democratic society is growing, and this trend will continue with the rise of China’s middle class and civil society. Therefore, the most likely scenario for China in the coming two decades is that China will continue its own approach to political reform, and the relative successful experience of China’s economic reform may well set a pattern for China’s political reform in the years to come. As part of Europe’s general approach towards China’s political change, it is in Europe’s interest to assist, in line with the view of most Chinese, gradual reform rather than revolution or ‘regime change’, which could produce hugely negative consequences for China itself, Sino–European relations and European interests in China and even East Asia.     

Civil society activism and political parties in Malaysia: differences over local representation

Despite their importance to democratic consolidation, relationships between civil society activists and political parties have often been problematic following the downfall of authoritarian regimes. In challenging authoritarian rule in Malaysia, though, these forces have increased cooperation and jointly committed at the 2008 elections to local government reform. This was especially important for middle-class non-governmental organization (NGO) activists seeking a transformation in the political culture of parties. Moreover, state government victories by reformist Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalitions included Selangor and Penang where these NGOs are concentrated. Yet while local government reform followed, NGOs and parties placed differing emphases on elections, transcending ethnic-based representation, and checks and balances on local government power. Lacking substantial social and organizational bases, NGOs were outflanked by more powerful interests inside and outside PR parties, including those aligned with ethnic-based ideologies of representation and economic development models opposed by NGOs. NGO activists also advanced various democratic and technocratic rationales for local representation, indicating a complex ideological mix underlying their reform push. The study highlights interrelated structural and ideational factors likely to more generally constrain the capacity of middle-class NGOs to play a vanguard role in democratically transforming Malaysian political culture.     

Malaysia's 2005-2006 refugee stand-off with Thailand: a security culture analysis

In September of 2005, Malaysia–Thailand relations werestressed by an incident in which 131 Thai Muslims fled acrossthe Southern Thai border to seek refuge in Malaysia. The Malaysiangovernment initially refused to return these ‘asylum seekers,’and eventually chose to internationalize the situation by callingon the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR). Malaysia'sdecision to internationalize the issue points to potential instabilityin Malaysia-Thailand bilateral relations and reflects severalinternal political problems faced by United Malays NationalOrganization (UMNO) central decisions makers. This paper seeksto explain the Malaysian central government's security perspectiveon the northern border region. To do this, I employ MuthiahAlagappa's framework for security culture analysis in an attemptto understand Malaysian security culture from the perspectiveof that culture's central decision makers themselves. (Alagappa,M ed., (1998) Asian Security Practice: Material and IdeationalInfluences. Stanford: Stanford University Press.) Received for publication September 15, 2006. Accepted for publication October 10, 2007.     

Economic Reforms and Ethnic Nationalism in the Context of Transition to Democracy: The Case of Four Eastern European Nations

The end of communism stimulated an increase of nationalism in east central European countries. It is argued that this resurgence of ethnic sentiments is a consequence of prior severe suppression during the communist rule. An important research question that arises is whether nationalism is compatible with the goals of democratization and economic reform that east central European countries set out to accomplish. This article explores the relationship between the choice of economic reforms and the use of nationalistic rhetoric as a mobilization tool. It proposes that the commitment made by any one government to liberal economic reforms is likely to be negatively correlated with the nationalism expressed in social policies. It analyzes the issue by constructing specific indicators reflecting levels for both economic reforms and nationalism embedded in social policies. The research includes four countries: Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine, over a period of six years. Results lend support to the hypothesis that the commitment of a government to liberal economic reforms is associated with low levels of official nationalism.     

Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: The compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy

Why do states join US-led military coalitions? The war/dispute-diffusionliterature suggests that opportunity and willingness are crucialdeterminants of coalition participation (Siverson and Starr, 1990,1991). A state joins a coalition if it has a strong interestin war and enough capability to send armed forces abroad. Alliancestudies connect coalition participation problems with the reliabilityof allied countries (Leeds, 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004).These studies seem to provide a fairly good picture on the question;however, they are not free of problems. In particular, theystudy only coalitions for interstate war and militarized disputesbut ignore coalitions for other purposes. Coalitions can beformed for military operations other than war (Kober, 2002).There are coalitions for humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping,and even for the evacuation of noncombatants. This article showshow difference in operation-types and collective legitimacyaffect the decision of a state to participate in US-led coalitions.A coalition with United Nations' authorization may appear tobe a legitimate international ‘police’ act and attractmore partner states. A coalition for intervention into domesticaffairs may be less attractive to possible participants becauseof the violation of the noninterference norm of internationallaw. Statistical analysis on United States coalition partnersfrom 1950 to 1999 suggests that how and for what purposes coalitionsare formed cannot be overlooked. Coalition participation isnot fully explained by the existing perspectives found in war/dispute-diffusionliterature and alliance studies, and there is a need to invoke‘the compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy’. Received for publication November 16, 2005. Accepted for publication April 20, 2006.     

Democracy in Mexico's Capital: Structural Reforms and Democratic Governance

Historically, the national ruling party has governed the Federal District of Mexico through a presidentially-appointed administrator. Since the late 1980s, however, the national government has initiated several reforms there to satisfy public demands for self-governance. The main purpose of this article is to examine the influence of these initiatives on democratic governance in the Federal District. The study incorporates interviews with city council members, a survey of residents, and reports in scholarly books, articles, and Mexico City newspapers. In 1988 the government created a new city council, La Asamblea de Representantes del Distrito Federal (ARDF), and provided it with advisory powers. Council members, the public, and interest groups demanded more powers for the ARDF and the popular election of a regente (mayor). In response, the government incrementally parcelled out powers to the ARDF, and recently instituted the popular election of a regente and district administrators. The ARDF and regente have gained significant powers and have worked in the public interest. However, they remain dependent on the national government for budgetary revenues and lack policy-making authority in key areas. Also, despite the advances in structural reforms, democratic policy-making has been undermined by corruption in the police department, public transportation sector, and other key areas of governance. The findings support the view of Wayne Cornelius that 'pockets of authoritarianism' at the local level retard the transition to democracy in Mexico.     

The Tasks of Democratic Transition and Transferability

There is no single road to democracy. However, there are some factors that seem to have consistently positive effects on democratic development. These include the existence of a large and diverse civil society; a sharp political break with the authoritarian past, followed by regular turnovers in political leadership and governing parties; stable state borders; and political institutions which empower parliaments and, in culturally diverse societies, give minorities political voice without locking them into permanent coalitions that block collaboration across group divides in pursuit of common goals. Less important are economic considerations—though economic reforms are far more likely in democratic settings than in authoritarian regimes and far more supportive over the medium- and long-term of robust economic performance.     

Perils of parliamentarism? Political systems and the stability of democracy revisited

Parliamentary systems are generally regarded as superior to presidential ones in democratic sustenance. This article contributes to the debate on the relationship between systems of government and the survival of democracy by bringing in a new perspective and analysing the experiences of 131 democracies during 1960–2006. We argue that systems of government do matter, but their effects are indirect; they exert their influence through societies' prior democratic records. Confirming the conventional argument, our data analysis shows that uninterrupted parliamentary democracies face significantly lower risks of a first breakdown than their presidential counterparts. Contrary to the common understanding, however, we find that the risk of a democratic breakdown can be higher for parliamentary regimes than for presidential regimes among the countries whose democracy has collapsed in the past. Furthermore, the risk of a previously failed democracy falling again grows as (the risk of) government crises increase(s). Hence our study questions the common belief that parliamentary systems are categorically more conducive to democratic stability than presidential ones.     

Indonesia's democratic stagnation: anti-reformist elites and resilient civil society

As Egypt and Tunisia begin difficult democratic transitions, comparative political scientists have pointed to the world's largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, as a role model. Seen as a stand-out exception from the global recession of democracy in the pre-2011 period, Indonesia has been praised as an example of a stable post-authoritarian polity. But a closer look at Indonesia's record in recent years reveals that its democratization is stagnating. As this article demonstrates, there have been several attempts to roll back reforms introduced in the late 1990s and early 2000s. While not all of these attempts have been successful, Indonesia's democratic consolidation is now frozen at 2005–2006 levels. However, the reason for this democratic stasis, the article argues, is not related to Diamond's notion of societal dissatisfaction with bad post-authoritarian governance. Opinion polls clearly show continued support for democracy despite citizen disgruntlement over the effectiveness of governance. Instead, I contend that anti-reformist elites are the main forces behind the attempted roll back, with civil society emerging as democracy's most important defender. This insight, in turn, questions the wisdom of the decision by foreign development agencies – in Indonesia, but other countries as well – to reduce their support for non-governmental organizations and instead intensify their cooperation with government.     

Conclusion: On the possibility of a non-Western IR theory in Asia

In the conclusion, we seek to ascertain the possibility of anon-Western International Relations theory (IRT) in Asia. Wefind while there is a good deal of writing that can be regardedas ‘pre-theoretical’, these have not been fullyexploited or exported to other parts of Asia and beyond. Thereis certainly little that can be called an Asian IRT. This isnot because scholars in the region accept that Western IRT isunchallengeable nor that it has found all the answers to themajor problems of international relations. Nor is it becausenon-Western theories are ‘hidden from the public eye’.It is rather due to a lack of institutional resources, the head-startof Western IRT, and especially the hegemonic standing of WesternIRT. At the same time, the case studies point to the existenceof abundant intellectual and historical resources that couldserve as the basis of developing a non-Western IRT that takesinto account the positions, needs and cultures of countriesin the region. There is room in Asia for the development ofnon-Western IRT, but not an ‘Asian School of internationalrelations’ (although national perspectives such as a ‘ChineseSchool’ are possible) which would assume a degree of convergenceof perspectives and interactions among Asian scholars, whichclearly does not exist. This development should and could gobeyond simply ‘joining in to the existing game seekingto add local colour and cases to existing theory’, ordeveloping a localist exceptionalism (‘Asian values’)or organizing local thinking into rebellions against prevailingorthodoxies (especially realism and liberalism) in the mannerof the dependencia theory. Western IRT does not need to be replaced,but can and should be enriched with the addition of more voicesand a wider rooting not just in world history but also in informedrepresentations of both core and periphery perspectives withinthe ever-evolving global political, economic and social order. In the conclusion, we first offer some generalizations fromthe four case studies with a view to addressing the main questionposed in the introduction: the apparent absence of IRT in Asiaand possible explanations behind it. We then reflect on whetherthe question of a non-Western IRT in Asia is a meaningful one,and whether the way it is approached in this special issue couldresult in a productive debate that would advance the disciplineof IR. Although our empirical focus is on Asia, we suggest someinsights that have more general relevance for non-Western IRT. Received for publication May 16, 2006. Accepted for publication June 27, 2007.     

拉美国家国有企业改革及对中国的启示

20世纪 70年代中期以来 ,智利、墨西哥、阿根廷等国家对国有企业进行了改革 ,其特点是围绕私有化展开 ,各具特色 ,又不拘一格且不乏共性和同步性。这些国家的国有企业实施私有化改革后 ,曾取得了提高经济效益、减轻财政负担的积极效果 ,但也造成了大量失业、两极分化和金融动荡等负面影响 ,为经济的长期发展埋下隐患。其改革的经验和教训对中国当前的国有企业改革有一定的借鉴意义。     

Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council

The Arab Spring has fundamentally shifted the strategic balance in the Middle East. As all sides rush to ensure that their interests will be secured, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has emerged as a key battleground between those who would like to see a more democratic region, and those who would like to maintain economic stability. On one side of this debate is the Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Saudi Arabia, that views democratic reform as a threat to economic stability. On the other side are the forces of the Arab Spring, which have called for political reform in states such as Egypt, Syria, and Libya, even if these reforms come at the expense of stability. This article examines the various forces, both domestic and international, that are attempting to influence Jordan, and through it, the balance of power in the Arab World.     

Who Can Reform the Labor Market? IMF Conditionality,Partisanship, and Labor Unions

Labor market reforms are critical for economic growth. Yet, they are politically contentious, and governments, more often than not, are faced with strong opposition from interest groups. Scholarly work shows that governments often rely on external intervention to implement politically difficult reforms. This is the case with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that typically conditions its financing on the implementation of required reforms. Do borrowing governments benefit from IMF programs to overcome domestic opposition to reform by organized interests? Utilizing a unique new data set on IMF conditionality, I show that partisan and electoral concerns and domestic alliances strongly affect the implementation of labor market reforms, even when the IMF imposes them. When faced with increasing number of strikes, left-wing governments are more likely to implement labor market reforms than center/right-wing governments. However, the left is less likely than the center/right to fulfill its international commitments during election years when labor groups are militant. These findings highlight the left’s unique ability to form pro-reform coalitions and the IMF’s conditional role in removing domestic political opposition to reform. Counter-intuitively, right-wing governments still struggle to reform the labor market, even during economic crises and under IMF programs.     

Systemic Explanations, Divergent Outcomes: The Politics of FinancialLiberalization in France and Spain

This article challenges the adequacy of prevalent market-driven models of regulatory change, and more specifically, the stipulation that international market integration will lead governments undertaking financial liberalization in formerly interventionist states to carry out adequate market reforms. It does so through an analysis of financial regulation in two European countries: France and Spain. The article offers an integrated historical perspective on regulatory change which suggests that the market-driven convergence thesis does not adequately capture the political dynamic behind financial interventionism and liberalization in the two countries. The introduction of dirigisme and its later-day abandonment were driven less by the "state vs. market” dynamics emphasized in much of the literature than by macroeconomic policy choices on the part of postwar elites. Focusing on similarities and differences in the timing and pattern of reform, the article argues that dirigisme was abandoned in France and Spain not because of changing sectoral pressures or the lack of viability of external controls, but because it raised the political costs of monetary austerity for elected authorities. This link between regulatory choices and the politics of macroeconomic adjustment has implications that are likely to be critical in any country undergoing financial liberalization.     

缅甸“新政”及前景

缅甸在军政府于2011年脱胎为民选政府之后,持续对内外大政方针进行大刀阔斧的改革。全面启动民族和解进程,力争实现国内永久和平;开启经济政策大调整、大改革。＂新政＂能够实施,是缅甸过去23年艰难民主转型探索、在夹缝中实行经济改革开放的现实需要;从外部环境看,也是美国施压、拉拢与利诱的结果。＂新政＂为缅甸外交全面拓展创造了前所未有的机遇,同时也面临创建国内和平稳定政治局面的挑战。就目前而言,缅甸未来经济会不断向好的方向发展,现代化之路将重新开启。     

A Nested Game Approach to Political and Economic Liberalization in Democratizing States: The Case of South Korea

South Korea enjoyed high rates of economic growth until the mid–1990s. However in mid–1997 the country went into a severe economic crisis which ultimately resulted in a request for an IMF bailout. Leading up to the crisis, the government had embarked upon democratic liberalization but not much economic liberalization. This research explores why the government would lay the foundation for political reform without creating institutions capable of imposing economic reform on the politically powerful business sector. The absence of such institutions put the government in a position where it could not respond to the emerging economic crisis. The government's inability to act eroded its own position of power and governance. From this perspective, the government's inattention to economic reform appears irrational as it led to a weakening of its own position. We build a model of political and economic liberalization showing that the government was engaged in nested games (i.e., games in multiple arenas) with the political opposition, the labor unions, and the powerful business sector. We develop an argument that strong, antiliberal economic actors create incentive for the government in a democratizing state to refrain from economic liberalization, even while moving forward with democratic liberalization.