Human Rights and Assigned Duties: Implications for Corporations

Human rights imply duties. The question is, duties for whom? Without a well-defined scheme for assigning duties correlative to human rights, these rights remain illusory. This paper develops core elements of a general scheme of duty assignment and studies the implications for corporations. A key distinction in such an assignment is between unconditional and conditional duties. Unconditional duties apply to every agent regardless of the conduct of others. Conditional duties reflect a division of moral labour where different tasks are assigned to specific agents, whose default activates back-up duties of other agents. Corporations face unconditional duties to not directly violate the rights of others, and not undermine the division of moral labour through practices such as tax evasion or corruption. Being unconditional, these duties cannot be deviated from by reference to the misconduct of competitors. In addition, corporate conditional duties to protect, promote or fulfil rights can be activated if the state and other designated duty-bearers fail to discharge their duties.     

International Soft Law, Human Rights and Non-state Actors: Towards the Accountability of Transnational Corporations?

During this age of globalisation, the law is characterised by an ever diminishing hierarchical framework, with an increasing role played by non-state actors. Such features are also pertinent for the international enforceability of human rights. With respect to human rights, TNCs seem to be given broadening obligations, which approach the borderline between ethics and law. The impact of soft law in this context is also relevant. This paper aims to assess whether, and to what extent, this trend could be a proper path to enforce the legal accountability of transnational corporations for human rights. It will be argued that the interplay between law and ethics should be assessed differently depending on which kind of correlative duty is at stake. With regard to negative duties, soft law tools concerning TNCs’ conduct may weaken the impact of hard law. By contrast, when positive duties are concerned, insofar as the horizontal effect of rights cannot be assumed, soft law turns out to be much more useful.

Foucault,Critique and Rights

Abstract

This paper outlines Foucault's genealogical conception of critique and argues that it is not inconsistent with his appeals to concepts of right so long as these are under stood in terms of his historical and naturalistic approach to rights. This approach is explained by reference to Nietzsche's account of the origins of rights and duties and the example of Aboriginal rights is used to exemplify the historical character of rights understood as internal to power relations. Drawing upon the contemporary ‘externalist’ approach to rights, it is argued that the normative force of rights can only come from within historically available moral and political discourses. Reading Foucault's 1978-1979 lectures on liberal governmentality in this manner suggests that his call for new forms of right in order to criticise disciplinary power should be answered by reference to concepts drawn from the liberal tradition of governmental reason.     

A Critique of the Universalisability of Critical Human Rights Theory: The Displacement of Immanuel Kant

While the critically oriented writings of Immanuel Kant remain the key theoretical grounds from which universalists challenge reduction of international rights law and protection to the practical particularities of sovereign states, Kant’s theory can be read as also a crucial argument for a human rights regime ordered around sovereign states and citizens. Consequently, universalists may be tempted to push Kant’s thinking to greater critical examination of ‘the human’ and its properties. However, such a move to more theoretical rigour in critique only solidifies the subversive statism of Kant’s apparent universalism, as long as it remains embedded in his prior theory of critical philosophy that privileges a singular form of reason. Universalist theories of human rights can break with this contradiction only insofar as they also displace the right to philosophy from the subject and site of ‘civil’ man to a politics of theory where no such subject or site is guaranteed.     

A Positive,Communitarian Right to Security in the Age of Super-Terrorism

Post-9/11, and especially with the dramatic rise of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the author advocates a collective right to security. Plotting a course through state absolutism and liberalism, one finds communitarianism as a philosophy to support this right to security. The communitarian right to security is based on an interpretation of European human rights law, particularly positive duties of the state, to protect the rights to life of individuals from violations by non-state actors such as suspected terrorists. But for reasons of practical enforcement, limitations to the exercise of the right are also articulated.     

Human rights and future people — Possibilities of argumentation

Questions of sustainability will be of crucial importance for the twenty-first century. But do we have to think about questions of responsibilities regarding future people in terms of human rights? And if duties regarding sustainability fall outside the scope of human rights, what would this imply for the moral and political importance of human rights in general? This article investigates conceptually how we should see the relationship between human rights and long-term global ecological challenges. We will discuss how a human rights approach to questions of sustainability would be different from other approaches and what would be required to see those ecological challenges as human rights questions. We will discuss the possibilities for conceptualizing the relationship between human rights and sustainability. And we will briefly draw some conclusions in terms of topics for further debate.     

The Honor of Human Rights: Environmental Rights and the Duty of Intergenerational Promise

The idea of human rights either as a moral system or as a set of legal practices does not sit well with the concept of honor. This is true for both ontological reasons and because of some reprehensible misuses of the term in constructs such as “honor killings.” Yet the absence of honor as an argument for human rights comes with a high cost in the defense of human rights generally. As Hobbes made clear in his early theory, rights—and dignity—are grounded in the human capacity to make promises and in the necessity of honoring them. In his view then, honor is an essential feature of human rights and one closely linked to the human capacity for dignity. In this article, I explore how environmental human rights place a renewed emphasis on honor as a requirement for the protection of the rights of future generations. In the process, I explore the general relationship between honor, dignity, and human rights.     

Human Rights and Modern Liberalism: a Critique

The idea of human rights has become one of the central moral notions of both the theory and practice of international politics. While its foundation and future in the practice of politics looks bright, it is an idea that still causes great trouble at the theoretical level. What are human rights? Why do we have them? To what should we attribute the authority of their moral claims? The theorist Michael Freeman has suggested one theory that by addressing such questions may serve as a foundation for human rights. His theory, however, ends by begging the questions it set out to answer.     

Philosophical Argument and Political Practice: On the Methodology of Normative Theory*

The article discusses methodological issues in normative political theory. The basic assumption is that normative theory has a dual purpose in both establishing valid principles of differentiating right from wrong and influencing actions and institutions in the right direction. The article starts by distinguishing between two approaches to normative political theory: one stresses the interpretation of existing ideas and conventions; the other takes on the constructivist task of finding out what is really right. Then the relationship between theory and practice is explored. The question is how philosophical arguments can instigate practical reform. It is argued that practical considerations should be incorporated as an explicit element of normative political theory. The recommendation is. in particular, that philosophical theories enter into dialogue with the moral conventions of everyday life. whose normative force people already acknowledge.     

Human Rights,Personal Responsibility,and Human Dignity: What Are Our Moral Duties to Promote the Universal Realization of Human Rights?

According to the orthodox or humanist conception of human rights, individuals have a moral duty to promote the universal realization of human rights. However, advocates of this account express the implications of this duty in extremely vague terms. What does it mean when we say that we must promote human rights satisfaction? Does it mean that we must devote a considerable amount of our time and resources to this task? Does it mean, instead, that we must make occasional donations to charities working to advance human rights realization? In this essay, I argue that this duty can only be constructed as imperfect. This means that it confers agent-relative discretion on us to decide when, how, and to what extent to advance the human rights of others. It also means that it is neither correlative with rights nor enforceable. As I will explain, the main reason for this is that any attempt to construct it as a perfect duty would infringe the dignity of the potential duty bearers and thereby undermine the very values that human rights practice aspires to serve. Finally, I will conclude by providing some guidelines for those who wish to comply with their imperfect duties to improve the situation of those whose human rights are in peril.     

The right to exclude

Many contemporary theories of immigration begin with the idea that we obtain the right to exclude, because there are some goods that can be produced only within bounded societies. I believe these views to be mistaken, both ethically and empirically. More plausible accounts of the right to exclude begin with the idea that individuals have rights, in virtue of their moral rights of association or of property, to avoid admitting foreigners into their societies. I believe these accounts have to be amended to make reference to the juridical nature of the modern state. My own view is that the right to exclude is grounded in the right to avoid becoming the agent charged with the defense of another’s human rights – unless there is some independent moral reason one ought to become so charged. This account is able to ground the right to exclude, but does not justify the ways in which modern states employ that putative right.     

The Idea of Citizenship in the Early Civil Rights Movement

Luther P. Jackson was a key supporter of the Association for the study of Negro Life and History and a leading historian of the African American experience. As a leader in the voting rights movement in Virginia as well a prominent activist within region-wide civil rights organizations, Jackson crafted a message of black citizenship that balanced rights and civic duties. His emphasis on political engagement and civic consciousness transcended the specific issues that occupied civil rights activists of the 1940s. This philosophy of political commitment tied the black freedom struggle to the fulfillment of the democratic promise enshrined in the founding documents of the American republic. It also connected the movement for racial justice to the working-class movement for union organization and economic democracy. His effort to place citizenship front-and-center in the civil rights movement echoed the universal ideals of the American crusade to free the world of fascism. It also resonated with the egalitarian aspirations of the Reconstruction era. By linking black equality to political engagement, Jackson set out the only terms under which full equality could be achieved. As much as his message of justice through citizenship challenged the racial orthodoxies of his day, it challenges our contemporary society, transfixed as it is by the illusions of consumerism and marketplace privatization. As Carter G. Woodson and Luther Jackson both understood, racial justice required more than historical consciousness; it required political awareness grounded in a sense of civic responsibility.     

The Moral Efficacy of Aesthetic Experience: Figures of Meaning in the Moral Field

Abstract

This paper proposes to analyse the process that makes paths of action meaningful. It argues that this process is one of "figuration". The term "figuration" intends to outline how the experience of moral meaning is one that already positively marks out a field and to identify and analyse the mechanisms used for such marking and selection. It is my contention that these mechanisms predate the persuasion to a moral path; they are the process through which this path is constructed as meaningful. This thesis is elucidated through an analysis of the tactics of meaning in Kant's moral theory. Kant turns to aesthetics as a means of corroboration for his moral theory, but he also attempts to limit the scope of the interactions between his aesthetic and moral theory. For instance, when he writes on the topic of form in aesthetic taste or outlines the technical specifications of aesthetic judgment, it is arguably the arcane peculiarities of his system that are met. For this reason, Kant insists on the merely analogical relations between beauty and morality. However, it is also possible to see how certain aspects of Kant's aesthetic theory execute wider, and potentially more important, functions for his practical philosophy, such as providing meaningful orientation for the ascetic moral attitude of his duty-ethics. In this respect, certain figures of Kant's aesthetic theory may well be viewed as complementing the dependence in his moral philosophy, in the important sections on moral pedagogy and methodology, on appeals to heroic models and stories as ways of shaping and inculcating the moral disposition. This paper considers these aspects of interaction between Kant's aesthetic and moral philosophies as both (1) a problem for the consistency of his philosophy given his avowed exclusion of aesthetic and religious elements of meaning in his duty-ethics; and (2) as a case study for the new, schematic analysis of "moral figuration" outlined in the paper.     

Philosophers,Activists, and Radicals: A Story of Human Rights and Other Scandals

Paradoxically, the political success of human rights is often taken to be its philosophical failing. From US interventions to International NGOs to indigenous movements, human rights have found a place in diverse political spaces, while being applied to disparate goals and expressed in a range of practices. This heteronomy is vital to the global appeal of human rights, but for traditional moral and political philosophy it is something of a scandal. This paper is an attempt to understand and theorize human rights on the terrain of the social actors who put them to use, particularly radical activists that have a more critical relationship to human rights. Attempting to avoid the philosophical pathology of demanding that the world reflect our conception of it, we base our reflection on the ambiguous, and potentially un-patterned, texture of human rights practice—taking seriously the idea that human rights express a relationship of power, importantly concerned with its legitimate arrangement and limitation. In both the philosophical literature and human rights activism, there seems to be a consensus on basic rights as undeniable moral principles of political legitimacy. This use of human rights is contrasted with radical social movements that reject this conception of rights as ideological and illegitimate, making specific reference to the Zapatista movement (Chiapas, Mexico) and the Landless Peasant Movement of Brazil (MST, from the Portuguese Movimento dos trabalhadores rurais Sem Terra), which are critical of the human rights discourse, but also make strategic use of the idea and offer alternative articulations of political legitimacy.     

儒家道德权利与政治权利要义

作为社会身份和政治资格的人权在儒家“孔仁孟义”的思想体系中被表达为“内圣外王”之道,其在“修齐治平”的实现程序之中又以“公私之辨”和“义利之辨”标志出政治伦理原则和“以德限权”的社会治理特色。儒家以“公权利”揭示人的自然权利,以其公平性和自然性引申为人的道德权利;再以道德权利为基础推演出人的政治权利,而“私权力”则仅为政治权利的异化形式,其极端化的结果就是“以权谋私”,后者因其“侵害公权利”的实质,儒家的人提倡以“道德权利”加以限制,故称为“德治”。儒家的道德权利与政治权利不仅影响了中国社会的思想和制度传统,而且其思想特色通过“为人民服务”、“改革开放”、“三个代表”和“三为”等原则亦被创造性地运用于当代中国共产党人的治国理政事业之中。     

Citizenship and capability? Amartya Sen's capabilities approach from a citizenship perspective

This article deals with the potential contribution of Amartya Sen's capabilities approach (CA) for studying citizenship. Although the CA cannot be described as a genuine citizenship theory it has informed recent attempts to reformulate social citizenship. Moreover, it shares important aims and assumptions with radical citizenship approaches, which emphasise democracy, voice, and difference. Especially, Sen's ideas can help formulate positive notions of equality. However, a fruitful dialogue between those perspectives has to lead over some controversial issues. In this context, this article suggests more substantive notions of agency and interaction as well as integrating rights and rights language.     

Global poverty and responsibility: Identifying the duty-bearers of human rights

Many rights theorists argue that global poverty violates certain human rights, so that responsibility to address poverty involves carrying out the duties that correspond with relevant rights-claims. Liberatirians argue that the rights and duties associated with global poverty, especially what are sometimes thought of as “positive” rights, or rights of assistance, are inappropriately agent-neutral, giving them less justificatory force than agent-relative rights and duties. To counter libertarian concerns, Thomas Pogge tries to reframe the responsibilities corresponding to human rights as institutional rather than as belonging to agents. While admirable, his approach inadequately expalains the relationships between institutional responsibility and individual and collective action. A better way to respond to libertarian concerns—that is also compatible with Pogge’s emphasis on institutional responsibility—is to show that the duties regarding global poverty are indeed agent-relative, but by virtue of individual and collective action within institutions.     

Constraining war: Human security and the Human right to peace

Conclusion The explicit articulation of a cosmopolitan conception of human security and a corresponding right to peace is a positive development in global politics, inasmuch as it decenters the state in our understanding of the human community and delegitimizes organized violence as the generally accepted means for the “continuation” of realist politics. I have argued that just war theory, when defined in suitably narrow fashion, helps to contribute to our thinking on issues of human security in several ways. First, it provides a stringent normative framework for a reasonable humanitarian justification of the resort to force. Second, it enables us to conceptualize significant moral and legal constraints on war and thus on the powers of states to wage war, thereby displacing the use of force from the statist paradigm of security. Third, it contributes to the delegitimation of unjust wars, that is, military actions undertaken for any purposes other than human security. Fourth, insofar as it provides a justificatory basis for the increasing demilitarization of society, it may influence the progressive and just pacification of global politics. As long as the types of human wrongs that present the gravest threats to human security continue to haunt the global community, there remains a need to be able to respond effectively so as to protect the rights and well-being of individuals. This need poses a genuine dilemma for humanitarian morality and politics, insofar as many of the military capabilities required to defend and to aid vulnerable persons can also be the source of threats to human life and welfare. Yet the existence of this dilemma need not lead us either to apathy or to cynicism. The nexus of human security, the right to peace, and just war theory offers a resolution to the traditional security dilemma by challenging the realist rationale for aggressive militarism, and by supporting the emergence of global security structures and processes guided by the humanitarian norms of just peace. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A28BB021 00002     

Is there an obligation to reduce one's individual carbon footprint?

Moral duties concerning climate change mitigation are – for good reasons – conventionally construed as duties of institutional agents, usually states. Yet, in both scholarly debate and political discourse, it has occasionally been argued that the moral duties lie not only with states and institutional agents, but also with individual citizens. This argument has been made with regard to mitigation efforts, especially those reducing greenhouse gases. This paper focuses on the question of whether individuals in industrialized countries have duties to reduce their individual carbon footprint. To this end it will examine three kinds of arguments that have been brought forward against individuals having such duties: the view that individual emissions cause no harm; the view that individual mitigation efforts would have no morally significant effect; and the view that lifestyle changes would be overly-demanding. The paper shows how all three arguments fail to convince. While collective endeavours may be most efficient and effective in bringing about significant changes, there are still good reasons to contribute individually to reducing emission. After all, for most people the choice is between reducing one's individual emissions and not doing anything. The author hopes this paper shows that one should not opt for the latter.     

OAKESHOTT AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL POLITICS

Abstract. Oakeshott offers a radical version of the thesis that philosophy cannot evaluate or recommend political ideas. We criticize each stage of his argument that practical life excludes philosophy's desire for ultimate truth and demands a distinctive form of reasoning. Believing that practice is not susceptible to philosophical guidance because it is composed of actions, subject to change and necessarily inconsistent and uncritical of assumptions, he exaggerates its contrast with theory. Moreover, he wrongly supposes that philosophy has no practical aspect, arguing that while all practical thought must be in terms of certain concepts, philosophy transcends those which it analyses. We contend that the distinctiveness of philosophy and practice does not imply they are separate; rather philosophy is a necessary part of any reasoned evaluation of political concepts.