Seal the Deal: Bargaining Positions,Institutional Design,and the Duration of Preferential Trade Negotiations

Multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization have stalled. This has contributed to a steep rise in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). At the same time, negotiations for PTAs have not always proven quick and painless: While some treaties are sealed within a few months or days only, other agreements are preceded by protracted bargaining processes in trade and trade-related issue areas. In this article, we provide a theoretical explanation for this empirical variation. More specifically, we argue that PTA negotiations take longer the greater the distance between the prospective partners’ initial bargaining positions. Moreover, we contend that negotiation processes become more protracted the higher the relative ambition of the prospective PTA. Due to the limited links to the domestic political arena in autocracies, we expect this latter effect to play out for groups of democratic bargaining partners only. We test these two hypotheses for 198 preferential trade negotiations using novel measures for bargaining templates and the ambition of PTA clauses. In our two-stage survival models, we find support for our argument. In line with qualitative evidence from recent preferential trade initiatives, our models indicate that services, investment and intellectual property rights are particularly sticky agenda items for democratic leaders at the international bargaining table.     

Collective Bargaining in the Twenty-First Century: A Negotiations Institution at Risk

Collective bargaining, a core social institution, faces a fundamental transformational challenge. National survey data provide unique insights into the current status of the bargaining process — revealing challenges and opportunities. Awareness and use of interest-based bargaining principles is widespread but complicated by underlying tensions between labor and management. The findings illustrate the value of conducting an institutional-level analysis of a negotiations process.     

Bargaining When the Future of an Industry Is at Stake: Lessons from UAW–Ford Collective Bargaining Negotiations

The 2007 American automobile industry labor negotiations involved fundamental challenges for labor and management, including a historic shift of responsibility in the management of retiree health care, a need for new approaches to core employment security issues, identification of ways to create new unionized jobs in the industry, and a joint commitment to the competitive viability of U.S. operations. Less visible, but no less important in the United Auto Workers–Ford case, has been unprecedented levels of information sharing and unique innovations in the bargaining process designed to enable problem solving even when tough issues were on the table. More than 300 people were directly involved in the negotiations, serving at the main table and on twenty‐four subcommittees. This case study covers the context for the negotiations, key events leading up to the bargaining, a unique process of “bargaining over how to bargain,” the actual negotiation process, and the results achieved. Implications are generalizable to the broader concept of pattern bargaining and many other types of negotiations when transformation is on the table.     

Panacea or Snake Oil? Interest‐Based Bargaining in the U.S. Airline and Rail Industries

This study of interest‐based bargaining (IBB) examined past usage, current preferences, and future intentions to use this approach in U.S. airline and railroad labor negotiations. Based on a survey of eighty‐four union and management chief negotiators, we found that the personal attributes of the chief negotiator (orientation toward relationships, personal conflict handling style, and competency in IBB approaches) were strong predictors of the past use of IBB. However, personal affinities and styles became irrelevant as experience with IBB accumulated. The negotiator's preferences for IBB in general were strongly correlated to his or her awareness of other carriers' and unions' experiences with IBB, as well as to his or her own direct experience. The negotiator's intention to use IBB in the future was also related to the quality of the contract personally obtained through IBB practices. The study also revealed the unpopularity of IBB among labor negotiators relative to their management counterparts.     

The Rotten Carrot: US-Turkish Bargaining Failure over Iraq in 2003 and the Pitfalls of Social Embeddedness

Side-payments are commonly used in international relations to alter the foreign policies of states. Despite their frequent usage, however, our understanding is very limited as to why certain side-payment negotiations succeed, while others fail. This article tries to remedy this shortcoming. It argues that social embeddedness between actors involved in the negotiations has a major bearing on bargaining outcomes. Under ideal circumstances, social relationships can be used to reduce information asymmetries and increase trust. But in the presence of fractured social networks, social ties can foster information bias and distrust, ultimately increasing the likelihood of bargaining failure. The US-Turkish bargaining failure over the Iraq intervention in 2003 is used to illustrate and test this theory.     

The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership in International Cooperation

This article addresses the influence wielded by the formal leaders of international cooperation—those state or supranational representatives that chair and direct negotiations in the major decision bodies of multilateral organizations and conferences. This is a topic that so far has received limited systematic attention by IR theorists, who have tended to treat bargaining parties as functionally and formally equivalent, leaving little theoretical space for formal leadership. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, I introduce a theory that develops a coherent argument for the delegation of authority to the chairmanship, the power resources of negotiation chairs, and the influence of formal leaders over outcomes. I assess the explanatory power of this theory through evidence on formal leadership in three alternative organizational settings: the European Union, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations environmental conferences. I find in favor of the chairmanship as a source of independent influence in international cooperation. Formal leaders perform functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation that make it more likely for negotiations to succeed, and possess privileged resources that may enable them to steer negotiations toward the agreements they most prefer.     

Small states in multilateral negotiations. What have we learned?

There are many small states in the international system, which have considerably fewer capacities than their bigger counterpart. The study of multilateral negotiations in the European Union (EU), conferences taking place under the umbrella of the United Nations (UN), negotiations on the set up of an International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as the compliance bargaining in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) reveals that small states can sometimes be very influential—despite their size. Small states tend to be most likely to punch above their weight if the negotiations take place in an institutionalised arena with majority-based decision-making rules in which each state has one vote or in contexts in which decisions are made unanimously, if they are selective in negotiations and concentrate their capacities on the most important issues, engage in capacity-building activities to maximise their ideational resources, if they make use of institutional opportunity structures such as chairing meetings and engaging in agenda-setting, and if they individually or collectively apply persuasion strategies from early on.     

The Interaction Effects of Bargaining Power: The Interplay Between Veto Power,Asymmetric Interdependence,Reputation, and Audience Costs

In international relations, different rationalistic theories have developed to explain negotiators’ behavior and the outcomes of negotiations. The compatibility and interaction effects between the different forms of bargaining power, however, remain unexplored. In this article, I seek to fill this gap by connecting four rationalistic concepts of bargaining power: veto power, asymmetric interdependence, reputation, and audience costs. By showing that domestic veto players are only semiveto players in international politics – because they can veto an improvement but not a deterioration of the status quo – threats based on asymmetric interdependence to disrupt a mutually beneficial cooperative relationship can be connected to veto power; the incompatibility of the factors concerned would otherwise make this impossible. The combination of veto power and asymmetric interdependence, however, raises a theoretical question: Will rational actors ever approve a deterioration of the status quo? Theories of reputation and audience costs can help answer this question. According to these approaches, threatening parties suffer ex post costs when they back down from their own threats. This theoretical analysis sheds new light on how different forms of bargaining power interact with each other and also helps to address some of the theoretical inconsistencies of the original individual concepts. Finally, this analysis suggests some of the weaknesses of empirical studies that have neglected these interaction effects.     

National Unification and Mistrust: Bargaining Power and the Prospects for a PRC/Taiwan Agreement

Can states that mistrust each other as much as the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan reach unification agreements? Unification agreements are most feasible when one of two conditions holds: the unification bargain does not independently erode the bargaining power of the weaker state, or the more powerful state can commit credibly not to use its increased bargaining power to restructure the agreement ex post. Our argument accounts for two historical cases—the nineteenth century Argentine and German unifications—and helps to explain why the PRC has found it difficult to make progress on achieving a peaceful bargain with Taiwan. We describe several possible future scenarios for cross-Strait relations and show that democratization in the PRC is not a necessary prerequisite for a unification agreement between the mainland and Taiwan.     

The impact of international conflict and detente on bargaining in arms control negotiations: An experimental analysis

This paper reports on a laboratory experiment which investigated the impact of conflict and cooperation in a hypothetical international environment on the bargaining processes and outcomes of a simulated arms control negotiation. A method called Bargaining Process Analysis was employed for measuring the content of bargaining behaviors in this experiment where free verbal interactions were permitted.

The results suggested that a heightening of international tensions tended to increase the perceptions of mutual hostility among negotiators, to increase the employment of “hard‐line” bargaining strategies such as threats and retractions, to increase the proportion of negative relative to positive affect and disagreements relative to agreements. These changes in bargaining behavior, in turn, detracted from the ability of negotiators to identify a solution to the bargaining problem and from the level of agreement attained. Conversely, increased cooperation in the international environment had no consistent, strong effects on either the bargaining process or outcomes of negotiations.     

Hard Bargaining in the Classroom: Realistic Simulated Negotiations and Student Values

Empirical research into the negotiation practices of lawyers shows that “hard bargaining,” including at least some unethical conduct, is an inescapable fact of a lawyer's life. To prepare students for legal practice, negotiation instructors must expose them to hard bargaining in the classroom. In doing so, however, instructors should be sensitive to the moral and ethical values of their students, so that the classroom experience does not unduly pressure students to compromise their values. The simulation is the primary tool of negotiation instruction. By selecting and manipulating simulations, a negotiation instructor can expose students to a wide range of negotiating behaviors, from distributive negotiations marked by the use of power tactics to value‐creating negotiations in which participants must consider many interests and collaborative strategies predominate. With that flexibility, however, comes the potential for classroom exercises to pressure students, in ways both subtle and overt, to adopt behaviors that feel uncomfortable. In this article, I examine the use of simulations to teach different types of negotiating behavior, including hard bargaining. Referring to a number of widely available simulations, I suggest ways to focus student attention on three dimensions of negotiation behavior — the issues over which the parties are bargaining, the objectives the parties seek, and the tactics the parties use to achieve their objectives — in order to push students to reflect on their own negotiation behaviors and to prepare for the tactics of others. I assess the potential for simulations to pressure students to compromise their values, and I conclude with my own thoughts on the goals of a negotiation course.     

The Paradox of Weakness in European Trade Policy: Contestation and Resilience in CETA and TTIP Negotiations

Over the last decade, trade negotiations with Canada and the United States met with considerable resistance from non-governmental organisations (NGO). Moreover, the negotiation mandates given to the European Commission were so broad as to include topics falling under so-called mixed competence of the EU and the member states, necessitating not only ratification by the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, but also member states’ parliaments. At some point, these two factors almost seemed to paralyze the EU as a trade negotiator. In the end, however, the EU concluded an agreement with Canada, renegotiated its agreement with Mexico (while also concluding agreements with Singapore and Japan amongst others), while negotiations with the US were suspended. Three factors can account for this puzzling combination of apparent incapacity and blockage and surprising resilience of EU trade policymaking. First, the NGO contestation campaigns did not muster pan‐European but rather only varying degrees of support. Second, in addition to scrutiny by the European Parliament, consensus decision-making in the Council fosters accommodation of the demands of all member states. This leads to a low degree of negotiating autonomy on the part of the European Commission, yet large bargaining power for the European Union, as long as the other side wants agreement. Finally, a recent ruling by the Court of the EU facilitated the decoupling of agreements on portfolio investment and investment arbitration (one of the most difficult hurdles), from all other matters of trade and regulatory cooperation, making it easier to reach agreement.     

Integrative and Distributive Bargaining Situations in the European Union: What Difference Does It Make?

Despite the distinction made between integrative and distributive bargaining situations in European studies literature, few studies have focused specifically on how these two situations differ. This article attempts to close this gap by examining two key bargaining situations involving fisheries that led to the Europeanization of this policy field. The integrative bargaining situation dealt with the negotiations about the structural policy and common organization of the market for fish products. In contrast, the distributive bargaining case focused on the protracted negotiations over resource conservation and management policies. The article focuses primarily on how the unanimity decision rule may affect negotiation patterns in the European Union and on how the specific type of bargaining situation affects policy outcomes. The thesis is that different bargaining tools are used to reach an agreement.     

Is the Sum Greater than the Parts? The Terms of Civil War Peace Agreements and the Commitment Problem Revisited

The dominant theoretical approaches to civil war negotiations in the field of political science have sought to explain both the scarcity and high failure rates of negotiated agreements in civil conflicts. This historical pattern, however, has fundamentally changed in the last two decades as changes in international norms and laws, as well as the increased prevalence and competence of peacebuilding professionals, now require conflict actors to have a greater commitment toward negotiations and the enforcement of agreements. While actors in interstate wars seek to avoid accountability, civil war actors seem to embrace the opportunities that these new dynamics create to achieve broad‐based reforms across numerous areas of policy and government. The result, we suggest, is that stakeholders evaluate agreements based on their potential to accomplish an array of sociopolitical objectives. In addition, for strategic and practical reasons, they perceive that those agreements that include more reforms across multiple policy sectors will have the greatest potential. Our examination of nearly two hundred agreements found evidence that the peacemaking potential of a negotiated agreement between civil war adversaries is greatly enhanced when reforms are pursued across many different policy domains. Conversely, our analysis suggests that the greater the number of policy areas left untouched by a peace agreement, the more likely the stakeholders will be to follow that agreement with additional negotiations to enhance that agreement, or, alternatively, the more likely that violence will resume.     

Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations

Why might public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations generate bargaining constraints that provoke stalemate? Previous scholarship points to aroused public opinion. Yet in many cases where hard-line bargaining stances develop and talks collapse following public acknowledgment, it is not domestic political pressures that tie leaders’ hands. This article examines instead an international constraint attendant to publicity: opposition by third-party states. I argue that international power position shapes the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. The act of official acknowledgment can constrain the more vulnerable partner by enabling third-party states to credibly scrutinize its intentions. By threatening strained relations, such scrutiny can create a security dilemma that reduces the weaker partner's bargaining range to a choice between cooperation on its terms and noncooperation. I evaluate this argument by studying foreign military basing negotiations. Statistical analyses and a comparative case study produce strong support for my argument.     

Focal Points and Turning Points in Negotiation: A Comparative Analysis

In this article, we examine the roles of focal points and turning points in negotiation. Both concern impasses in negotiation, and negotiators can exploit them to move past impasses. Each term uses the word “point” differently, however. A focal point refers to a single salient coordinating concept shared by the parties. A turning point is a departure that takes place during the course of a negotiation, when the course seems to change. Precipitants precede turning points and consequences follow them. In this article, we focus on the relationship of these two negotiation concepts. We raise the following questions: Does the development of focal points precipitate departures, and, if so, how? Do departures lead to the development of focal points, and, if so, how? Are there circumstances in which focal points do not precipitate turning points and vice versa? Do negotiations that feature focal points create more or less durable agreements? Do negotiations that include turning points create more or less durable agreements? To help answer these questions, we have analyzed four cases. In the German Foundation Agreement negotiation, the development of focal points precipitated turning points. In the South African Interim Constitution negotiations, turning point departures precipitated the development of focal points. And in the negotiations to end the Burundi civil war and to reach the Nouméa Accord between France and New Caledonia, parties shared focal points that did not precipitate turning points. These case analyses provide insights into the role of focal points in producing effective and durable agreements. They also suggest opportunities for further research on the interaction between these concepts.     

Sequencing Negotiating Partners: Implications for the Two‐Level Game?

In the late 1990s, Japan and South Korea concluded their first bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in completely opposite sequences despite similar domestic pressures. Japan concluded an "easier" FTA with Singapore first and then concluded a more "difficult" FTA with Mexico. South Korea concluded a more difficult FTA first with Chile and then moved on to negotiate with Singapore. In this article, I analyze these cases and review the literature on bargaining and two-level games to develop a model of how these differences in sequence account in part for the relative differences in each country's bargaining strength in their more difficult negotiations. The preexistence of the Singapore FTA eased domestic pressures to reap the benefits of entry into the bilateral FTA game. Thus, Japan could approach the more difficult FTA negotiation knowing that a "no-agreement" outcome would not fundamentally increase domestic pressure to get into the free trade "game." This alternative to no agreement put the Japanese in a stronger international bargaining position. South Korea negotiated its harder case knowing that the relative domestic pressure to get in the FTA game would increase without an agreement. This relatively worse bargaining position created a context in which South Korea conceded more internationally at the expense of higher side payments domestically.     

Success or Failure in the Peace Processes of Aceh and Sri Lanka: A Comparative Study

Abstract

This study examines why some internal conflicts end in negotiated agreements, while negotiations fail in others. In order to address this question, I compare the cases of Aceh, where some 30 years of armed conflict ended in a 2005 peace agreement between Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, the Free Aceh Movement) and the government of Indonesia; and Sri Lanka, where 2002–2006 negotiations between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam broke down. This study adopts ideas from bargaining theories of war, focusing on the adversaries’ power perceptions in relation to actions that led to the civil war settlements. It identifies three variables as decisive: (1) information revealed by war, (2) control over spoilers, and (3) divisions in the ranks of the rebel organization.     

The European Union’s trade and investment policy in Asia: new challenges and opportunities in a changing global environment – or: following individual roadmaps

Asia is Europe’s largest trading partner and EU-Asia trade relations have undergone a rapid change since the global financial crisis. On a global scale, the new multilateral trade agreements such as the now stalled Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) involving European Unions’ (EU) major trading partners such as Japan, Singapore and Vietnam also have the potential to change the trade equations. In this paper, we evaluate the new EU trade policy which has been designed to ensure that the EU benefits from the changing global trade scenario and also look at the steps which have been taken by the EU to promote trade relations with its major trading partners in Asia in the predicted ‘Asian century’. We look into the Free Trade Agreements, which are being negotiated with its Asian partners and seek to understand the reasons which have resulted in delays in their signing and negotiations. We evaluate new policies pushed forward by its Asian partners such as the One Belt One Road policy by China and Japan’s policy of securing a large number of trading agreements in the America. Moving ahead, we also shed light on the indirect factors that may influence the success of EU trade negotiations in Asia such as the EU policy on granting China market economy status and the commencement of the ‘Brexit’ process. Lastly, we try to present a list of immediate priorities for EU in Asia, which will ensure that it secures a toehold in trade with the region. All in all, it is shown that the EU has not one and the same approach for all Asian countries but it negotiates flexibly and individually country by country. Because of this “country by country approach” the EU is also not ready to enter into general EU-ASEAN trade negotiations again.