Local government consolidations: The impact of political transaction costs

Local government in Norway comprises a large number of small municipalities. Cost efficiency can be improved by consolidating local authorities, and central government has designed a framework to stimulate voluntary mergers. Existing theories suggest that political transaction costs will impede consolidations. (1) Generous grants compensate diseconomies of scale. Central government has promised small municipalities that grant levels will be maintained, but policy promises may not be credible. (2) Property rights to local revenues are nullified when consolidations have been implemented. High-revenue municipalities will therefore go against merger with a poorer neighbor. (3) A consolidated local council may be composed of different political parties, and it may therefore pursue other policies than an existing council. Expected changes in party strength can lead municipalities to oppose a proposed consolidation. (4) Senior politicians are less likely to support mergers, particularly if they come from small polities. We offer an explicit test of these propositions based on data for Norwegian local government. Elected politicians and administrative leaders are more interested in consolidating when efficiency gains are large. Local revenue disparities and to some extent dissimilar party preferences are significant impediments to voluntary mergers. Additionally, smaller municipalities are often prepared to sacrifice some efficiency gain to remain independent polities.     

The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs

This paper explores the proposition that political parties reduce the ‘transaction costs’ of electoral participation. Political parties provide a low cost signal of a candidate's policies and personal characteristics and, in this way, reduce voters' information costs. With reference to ‘transaction cost economics’, political parties offer an ‘implicit contract’ between voters and politicians and thereby reduce the scope for opportunism by politicians. This impact on transaction costs is important in any evaluation of public policy towards political parties.     

Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey

This paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach. It has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that Coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario, i.e., voluntary as well as coercive exchange. However, voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power. This means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid, and that the ??political Coase theorem?? lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory.     

Electoral competition and the oversight game: A transaction cost approach and the Norwegian experience

Abstract. The central question addressed by this article is whether the absence of active competition changes the forces that shape the institutional landscape at the parliamentary level, and thereby the landscape itself. Based on a transaction cost approach, the study investigates whether the bolstering of parliamentary oversight procedures occurs in situations in which there is no credible alternative to the incumbent government, and whether opposition impotence contributes to the development of oversight institutions. The article argues that the strengthening of parliamentary oversight procedures is most likely to occur when there is a minority government but the opposition MPs are not in a position to form or envisage a credible alternative. An analysis of changes in oversight arrangements in Norway during 1993—1996 strongly supports this argument.     

FDI and the costs of contract enforcement in developing countries

This article examines the relationship between foreign direct investment and host countries’ contracting institutions, the rule systems which govern commercial transactions between private actors. Given their liability of foreignness and costly exit options, we suggest that multinational corporations have incentives to influence the formal contracting environment in host countries. Further, host governments are more likely to respond to multinationals’ wishes when they are more dependent on foreign capital markets. We draw on the World Bank’s Lex Mundi dataset (Djankov et al. 2003) on micro-level contracting environment for private actors. Our analysis of a cross section of 98 developing countries suggests that FDI is associated with lower contract enforcement costs, particularly when the host country is more indebted.     

Understanding the role of technology in reducing corruption: a transaction cost approach

Prior research suggests that computerization of government services can help reduce corruption involved in government transactions, but there is no clear understanding of the process through which computer‐mediated transactions reduce corruption. We attempt to fill this gap by using a transaction cost economics framework, and argue that uncertainty and asset specificity associated with government transactions allow bureaucrats to act opportunistically and demand bribes. Therefore, those computerization initiatives that reduce uncertainty and asset specificity of government services lead to lowered perceptions of corruption. Our findings, based on a survey of 101 managers of domestic and multinational enterprises in India, support our hypotheses. We also compare the websites of Indian government organizations with European government websites on the dimensions of transparency and interactivity, and find that the Indian websites do not provide as much interactivity as the European websites. Our multi‐method study offers important theoretical and practical insights on effectively using technology to reduce corruption. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Policy and regulatory design for developing countries: a mechanism design and transaction cost approach

The first-generation literature on policy design has made considerable contributions over the last 30 years to our understanding of the process, politics and implications of policy design and instrument choice. This literature, however, has generally treated institutions as a black box and has not developed a coherent set of frameworks, theories and models of how institutions matter to policy design. In this paper, I unpack the black box of institutions using transaction cost and mechanism design to show how regulations can be better designed in developing countries when institutions are weak, unaccountable, corrupted or not credible. Under these conditions, I show that efficient regulatory design has to minimize transaction costs, particularly agency problems, by having incentive compatible (self-enforcing) mechanisms. I conclude with a second-generation research agenda on regulatory design with implications for environmental, food and drug safety, healthcare and financial regulation in developing countries.     

Managing the grassroots and assessing its performance

This paper examines the increasingly popular advocacy activity of grassroots management. The success of many US government relations programmes depends heavily on the involvement and support of the organisation's grassroots networks. This paper provides a brief introduction to the grassroots, provides a number of methods for understanding and assessing grassroots performance and examines some of the key organisational considerations for institutionalising grassroots performance assessment into an organisation. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications     

The problem of regulatory arbitrage: A transaction cost economics perspective

Regulatory arbitrage, or the ability of financial firms to circumvent or neutralize rules, is a classic problem of financial regulation. This article draws on transaction cost economics (TCE) to reformulate this old problem, thus defining regulatory arbitrage as a contracting hazard arising from interactions between the regulator and regulated firms, given bounded rationality and opportunism. Following standard TCE, the article first characterizes the implicit regulatory contract in finance, focusing in particular on the mobile and elastic nature of regulated actors and financial assets as well as the contested utility of financial innovation. It is then argued that this incomplete and hazard-prone regulatory bargain must be matched with a governance structure that both adapts to unforeseen circumstances and avoidance strategies and copes with radical uncertainty about the welfare consequences of financial innovation. To that end, the article discusses how a governance structure here termed “relational regulation” might facilitate such ex post governance under uncertainty.     

The performance framework: a systems approach to understanding performance management

The article presents a framework for better understanding the nature of performance in organisations involved in the provision of overseas development assistance (ODA). It uses a case study to illustrate the three main features of the framework which are: goals, performance assessment and performance management. It is asserted that a vibrant performance culture is one which links these features together to form an organisation capable of continual improvement through producing effective learning. Organisational culture determines the nature of linkages between the three sub‐systems. The article stresses how the notion of performance may extend beyond various forms of evaluation and scrutiny to being part of a sentient learning system rooted in an organisation's culture and structure. The article concludes with consideration of key issues associated with the generation of a reflexive learning organisation operating in the ODA sector. These are concerned with understanding the role and nature of systems, organisational vision, the embracing of diversity, training and accountability. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing the fight against corruption: A case study

Corruption is one of the foremost problems facing policy-makers and managers in developing countries, but it is a remarkably difficult one to study. This case study—an actual episode that has been disguised to preserve confidentiality—provides a vehicle for illustrating both the application of analytical tools to corruption and the importance of practical issues of implementation and politics. The case suggests that anti-corruption policies should carefully assess (1) the relative severity of various kinds of illicit activities, including who gains and loses; (2) the relative susceptibility of the various activities to feasible changes in policies and procedures; and (3) the strategic importance of politics, in the narrow sense of bureaucratic politics as well as the wider political realities.     

Reduce transaction costs? Yes. Strengthen property rights? Maybe: The First Nations Land Management Act and economic development on Canadian Indian reserves

Economic development on Canadian Indian reserves is hindered by the fact that aboriginal peoples living on these reserves lack efficient and effective property rights. In 1999, the federal government passed the First Nations Land Management Act, which allows participating First Nations to develop their own land codes for administering their reserve lands. After analyzing two First Nation land codes in Ontario and Saskatchewan, this paper finds that land codes are effective mechanisms for addressing drag on on-reserve development.     

Compliance costs,regulation, and environmental performance: Controlling truck emissions in the US

When explaining regulatory policymaking and the behavior of regulated business firms, scholars have supplemented economic models by emphasizing the role of public‐regarding entrepreneurial politics and of normative pressures on firms. This article explores the limits of such entrepreneurial politics and “social license” pressures by examining regulation of emissions from diesel powered trucks in the US. We find that the economic cost of obtaining the best available control technology – new model lower emissions engines – has: (i) limited the stringency and coerciveness of direct regulation of vehicle owners and operators; (ii) dwarfed the reach and effectiveness of the governmental programs that subsidize the purchase of new less polluting vehicles; and (iii) elevated the importance of each company’s “economic license”– as opposed to its “social license”– in shaping its environmental performance. The prominence of this “regulatory compliance cost” variable in shaping both regulation and firm behavior, we conclude, is likely to recur in highly competitive markets, like trucking, that include many small firms that cannot readily either afford or pass on the cost of best available compliance technologies.     

Assessing the (eco)macroeconomic performance index of India: A data envelopment analysis approach

The prime objective of this article is to construct a robust macroeconomic performance (MEP) index of the Indian economy using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach. Seven major macro indicators, namely, economic growth, employment rate, terms of trade, inflation rate, fiscal deficit, pollution, and climate change are used to compute MEP and Eco‐MEP indices of the Indian economy from 1980–1981 to 2018–2019. Overall, both the MEP and Eco‐MEP index scores have quite similar best performing years worst performing years, and have also captured the major events that affected adversely the Indian economy during the past decades. The trend in the overall performance of the Indian economy was better in the 1980s and the 1990s but has deteriorated since 2000. The autoregressive distributed lag bounds testing approaches to cointegration methods are used to test the robustness/utility of these indices. The estimated results show that MEP and Eco‐MEP have a positive impact on private investment, foreign investment inflows, foreign direct investment, and a negative effect on the current account deficit. Hence, the suggested composite MEP index is stable, robust and truly captures the economic performance of India. The constructed MEP composite index may be used by foreign investors, rating agencies, private investors, and policymakers for their planning and decision‐making processes.