The acceptance,relevance and dominance of lobbying the EU Commission — a first‐time survey of the EU Commission's civil servants

Among public affairs techniques lobbying is by far the most mystifying one — at least in Europe. Lobbying comes from the Latin word ‘labium’ and means ‘entrance hall’ or ‘lounge’. Therein the essential meaning can be seen: today political decisions are not made in plenary assemblies but primarily in the pre‐political phase of balancing the various interests. Lobbying is to be understood as the ‘diverse intensive activities of social groups, chambers and companies in the political and bureaucratic vestibule’ (Beyme 1980). Modern lobbying on the EU level is an intermediary policy for the support of political decision making — even if some critics refuse to believe it. Lobbying at EU level has become a politically realistic dimension. Even if the mass media still take a very sceptical and negative view of lobbying in Brussels, based on the existing European taboo on influencing politics, an in‐depth analysis reveals various lobbies at work in EU institutions. Lobbying today is an essential part of all EU decision areas. This paper describes the functional theory approach of lobbying known as ‘cooperation as confrontation through communication’. For the first time, recipients of lobbying in the EU Commission are demonstrating their acceptance of lobbying efforts. The paper is based on the doctoral thesis ‘The acceptance, relevance and dominance of lobbying the EU Commission’ by Peter Koeppl, University of Vienna (unpublished). Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Sliding doors in Brussels: A career path analysis of EU affairs managers

This article investigates the revolving doors phenomenon in the European Union (EU). It proposes a management approach that treats this phenomenon as a form of corporate political activity through which companies try to gain access to decision makers. By using sequence analysis to examine the career paths of almost 300 EU affairs managers based in public and private companies across 26 countries, three different ideal‐typical managers are identified: those EU affairs managers coming from EU institutions and public affairs; those who make a career through the private sector; and those who establish themselves in national political institutions. This identification confirms that EU institutions need different types of information and companies need EU affairs managers with different professional backgrounds able to provide it. Rather than observing a revolving door of EU officials into EU government affairs, what the authors term ‘sliding doors’ – namely the separation of careers, especially between the public and private sectors – is discerned.     

Are they listening? Public opinion,interest groups and government responsiveness

What is the role of interest groups in the transmission of issues between the public and government policy? While government responsiveness to voters has received widespread scholarly attention, little is known about the role of interest groups in the transmission of public opinion to government. It is argued here that interest groups importantly influence government responsiveness to public opinion, but that the effect varies by type of interest group: while cause groups increase the responsiveness of governments to their electorate, sectional groups decrease government responsiveness. Drawing on a new and unique dataset, this article examines the relationship between public opinion, interest groups and government expenditure across 13 policy areas in Germany from 1986 until 2012 and shows that interest groups indeed have a differential effect on the responsiveness of governments. The article’s findings have important implications for understanding political representation and the largely overlooked relationship between public opinion, interest groups and government policy.     

Agenda control in EU referendum campaigns: The power of the anti‐EU side

European Union (EU) referendums provide unique opportunities to study voters’ attitudes toward a distant level of governance. Scholars have long tried to understand whether EU referendum results reflect domestic (dis‐)satisfaction with the incumbent governments or actual attitudes toward the Union. Finding evidence supporting both domestic and European factors, the recent focus has thus turned to referendum campaigns. Recent studies emphasise the importance of the information provided to voters during these campaigns in order to analyse how domestic or European issues become salient in the minds of voters. These studies nonetheless overlook the asymmetrical political advantage in such campaigns. The broader literature on referendums and public opinion suggest that in a referendum, the ‘No’ side typically has the advantage since it can boost the public's fears by linking the proposal to unpopular issues. This article explores whether this dynamic applies to EU treaty ratification referendums. Does the anti‐EU treaty campaign have more advantage than the pro‐EU treaty campaign in these referendums? Campaign strategies in 11 EU treaty ratification referendums are analysed, providing a clear juxtaposition between pro‐treaty (‘Yes’) and anti‐treaty (‘No’) campaigns. Based on 140 interviews with campaigners in 11 referendums, a series of indicators on political setting and campaign characteristics, as well as an in‐depth case study of the 2012 Irish Fiscal Compact referendum, it is found that the anti‐treaty side indeed holds the advantage if it engages the debate. Nonetheless, the findings also show that this advantage is not unconditional. The underlying mechanism rests on the multidimensionality of the issue. The extent to which the referendum debate includes a large variety of ‘No’ campaign arguments correlates strongly with the campaigners’ perceived advantage/disadvantage, and the referendum results. When the ‘No’ side's arguments are limited (either through a single‐issue treaty or guarantees from the EU), this provides the ‘Yes’ side with a ‘cleaner’ agenda with which to work. Importantly, the detailed data demonstrate that the availability of arguments is important for the ‘Yes’ side as well. They tend to have the most advantage when they can tap into the economic costs of an anti‐EU vote. This analysis has implications for other kinds of EU referendums such as Brexit, non‐EU referendums such as independence referendums, and the future of European integration.     

Media as Moderator of “the Sympathy Effect”

SUMMARY

How does public opinion respond when faced with the tragic death of a political candidate in the midst of an election campaign? The concept of the sympathy vote suggests that media coverage of the tragedy and the unification of public opinion carry the party of the deceased to victory on Election Day. Yet, the emotional dynamics of public opinion may not be so simple. This study argues that the relationship between emotion and candidate support hinges largely on behavioral expectations and media coverage. If messages violate expectations, media will focus on controversy leading to a dissipation of the sympathy effect in public opinion. This investigation elaborates on the mechanisms governing the relationship between campaigns and public opinion by emphasizing the significant link of media coverage in the process, and by defining boundaries of the concept of the sympathy vote for further theoretical consideration.     

对公共政策制定的政治哲学思考

公共政策制定是社会政治生活中公共决策系统的经常性活动。在现代社会,由于公共政策的巨大作用和影响,公共政策制定问题引起了广泛的关注。从政治哲学的角度审视,以公意为价值取向、以政治权力为基本依托,以政治秩序为最终归宿,才能建立起人民期待的合理、公正、有效的公共政策,从而进一步推进决策的科学化、民主化。     

Capital united? Business unity in regulatory politics and the special place of finance

While organized business is a key actor in regulatory politics, its influence is often conditional on the level of unity or conflict occurring within the business community at any given time. Most contemporary regulatory policy interventions put pressure on the normal mechanisms of business unity, as they are highly targeted and sector‐specific. This raises the question of how business unity operates across a highly variegated economic terrain in which costs are asymmetric and free‐riding incentives are high. In this paper, we empirically assess patterns of business unity within regulatory policymaking across different regulated sectors. Our analysis utilizes data from hundreds of regulatory policy proposals and business community reactions to them in the telecommunications, energy, agriculture, pharmaceutical, and financial sectors over a variety of institutional contexts. We find considerable empirical support for the “finance capital unity” hypothesis – the notion that the financial sector enjoys more business unity than other regulated sectors of the economy. When the financial sector is faced with new regulations, business groups from other sectors frequently come to its aid.     

Sharing the burden in a free riders’ land: The EU migration and asylum policy in the views of public opinion and politicians

New divisions have emerged within the European Union over the handling of the recent migration crisis. While both frontline and favoured destination countries are called upon to deal with the number of migrants looking for international protection and better living conditions, no consensus has been reached yet on the quota-based mechanisms for the relocation of refugees and financial help to exposed countries proposed by the EU. Such mechanisms pose a trade-off for member states: the EU's response to the crisis offers help to countries under pressure, but it inevitably requires burden-sharing among all EU members and a limitation of their national sovereignty. Within this scenario, the article compares how public opinion and political elites in ten different EU countries view a common EU migration policy grounded on solidarity and burden-sharing. By tracing both within- and cross-national patterns of convergence (and divergence), the article shows that contextual factors influence policy preferences, with support for solidarity measures being stronger in countries with higher shares of illegal migrants and asylum seekers. While individuals’ predispositions, identity and ideological orientations account for both masses’ and elites’ attitudes towards burden-sharing measures, subjective evaluations and beliefs concerning the severity of the crisis provide additional and alternative explanations when looking at the public's preferences. In particular, it is found that concern about the flow of migrants to Europe consolidates the impact of contextual factors, whereas the overestimation of the immigrant population fosters hostility against solidarity measures, with both effects more pronounced as the country's exposure to the crisis increases. In the light of these results, the main implication of this study is that EU institutions have to primarily address entrenched beliefs and misperceptions about immigrants to enhance public support for a joint approach to migration.     

When do politicians listen to lobbyists (and who benefits when they do)?

This article provides an empirical test of an informational model of lobbying. The model predicts when lobbyists provide useful information to policy makers and when policy makers follow lobbyists' advice. The predictions are assessed against data on the policy positions and lobbying activities of firms and other organised groups in the context of 28 policy proposals advanced by United Kingdom governments between 2001 and 2007. The results suggest that the interactions between policy makers and lobbyists are driven mainly by the expected policy costs for policy makers, providing lobbyists with strong incentives to provide correct advice to policy makers. There is little support for the expectation that lobbyists can successfully persuade policy makers to take a course of action that is beneficial to the lobbyist at the expense of wider constituencies.     

Australia's Political Institutions and the Corruption of Public Opinion1

This article explores structural causes for the decline in the quality of Australia's political and policy conversations. Three are nominated. The first concerns the changing role of the major party organisations. These no longer contribute to agenda setting; they are no longer forums for activist and interest mobilisation; they no longer mobilise and cue a mass base. The second structural change concerns the rise in the role of the media. This is now the primary bridge between the formal political system and the surrounding society, a role for which it is singularly ill‐equipped. The third change concerns the misalignment between the formal political system and Australian society. The formal system was formed in the early twentieth century when Australian society was broadly divided by class allegiance. Those days are long gone. Class has decomposed. A variety of new concerns differentiate and pluralise social attitudes. Possible remedies are then discussed.     

Deny and Attack or Concede and Correct? Image Repair and the Politically Scandalized

In the wake of recent political scandals, pundits have argued that the way a politician reacts to a scandal can make or break said politician's relationship with constituents and future in elected office. Some politicians concede guilt immediately, apologize, promise to take corrective action, and possibly open the door to moving on with their careers. Others deny culpability and attack their accusers, hoping to quickly put accusations behind them, change the subject, and channel public attention in a different direction. Does conceding guilt after a scandal breaks and offering to take corrective action to solve the problem help ameliorate the issue, or does it push the public away even further? Does denying involvement in a scandal and attacking the accuser compound the problem, or can it evoke positive feelings? This research uses an experimental design to test individuals’ reactions to how politicians act after being accused of a personal scandal (in this case, an inappropriate relationship with a staffer). Results illustrate that a strategy involving denial and attacking accusers can spur positive evaluations of who a politician is and what that politician will do in the future, while the performance of conceding and taking corrective action is mixed at best.