Politics of the precautionary principle: assessing actors’ preferences in water protection policy

This paper analyzes the prospects for introducing the precautionary principle in water protection policy. In situations where a problem enters the political agenda and scientific uncertainties remain about causes or effects, political actors can justify state intervention based on the precautionary principle. It allows for public action even if risks related to the problem remain unclear. While the precautionary principle is widely applied in health and environmental policy fields all over the world, the mechanisms leading to its adoption are not fully understood. To close this gap, the paper investigates decision-makers preferences for the precautionary principle and further asks: Which factors promote political actors’ preferences for precautionary policy measures? In order to answer this question we study the case of emerging micropollutants—a water quality issue that recently entered political agendas, where many uncertainties remain about sources and effects. We rely on data gathered through a standardized survey among the political elite in Switzerland, which represents one of the first countries that adopted policy measures to reduce micropollutants in water bodies, despite the uncertainties that remain. Results analyzed through a temporal network autocorrelation model reveal that actors embedded in collaborative governance arrangements have the tendency to prefer precautionary action. Certain aspects of policy design, such as problem prioritization and target group membership, also impact the prospects for introducing the precautionary principle.     

The Political Economy of Public Reform Adoption: Patterns in Twenty Indonesian Districts

ABSTRACT

New Public Management (NPM) reforms are often perceived as technical, with little attention to political and institutional factors. Comparing choices in 20 Indonesian districts, we explore which of four political economic factors influence uptake of NPM-based service delivery reforms. We find that democratic political competition laid the groundwork for political alliances, patterns of patronage, and party provision of benefits that condition reform choices. State-led policy entrepreneurship was evident from education agency technocrats. Public sector modernization may have increased orientation towards performance, with education reforms adopted by districts already achieving relatively good sectoral results. Health reforms were more common in districts providing greater opportunities for citizen participation. The complex interactions among the factors argue for working within these realities, rather than seeing them as impediments to be avoided in a drive for reforms. Education technocrats’ dominance, bolstered by central policy priorities, argues for more nuanced mechanisms for meeting national goals to avoid crowding out responsiveness to local citizens.     

Knowledge Matters: Policy Cross-pressures and Black Partisanship

Black Americans are a core Democratic constituency, despite holding views on social issues that put them in conflict with the party. Conventional wisdom attributes this partisan commitment to the salience of race and concerns about racial inequality. This paper considers whether the Democratic bias derives in part from low levels of political knowledge. Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study, this paper examines how political knowledge moderates the relationship between social issue cross-pressures and partisan attitudes among Black Americans. I demonstrate that the extent to which Democratic allegiance persists despite policy disagreements depends on whether blacks are sufficiently knowledgeable to act on their policy views, and not simply on the importance that blacks assign to their racial commitments. It is only among politically knowledgeable Black Americans that social issue cross-pressures are at all politically consequential; for them, Democratic partisanship is resilient but not immune to policy disagreements. For blacks with low levels of political knowledge, partisan support is unaffected by policy disagreements. This pattern is most pronounced among religiously active Black Evangelicals, for whom social issues are highly salient.     

Lobbying,political connections and emergency lending by the Federal Reserve

This paper tests whether the political connections of banks were important in explaining participation in the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending programs during the recent financial crisis. Our multivariate tests show that banks that were politically connected—either through lobbying efforts or employment of politically connected individuals—were substantially more likely to participate in the Federal Reserve’s emergency loan programs. In economic terms, participation in these programs was 28–36% more likely for banks that were politically connected than for banks that were not politically connected. In our final set of tests, we attempt to identify a proper explanation for this peculiar relationship. While a broad literature speaks of the moral hazard associated with receiving bailouts, we test whether another type of moral hazard exists in the period preceding the bailout. In particular, we argue that, to the extent that political connections act as synthetic insurance, banks may have engaged in more risky behavior that lead them to the Fed’s emergency lending facilities. Tests seem to confirm this explanation.     

农村党建新课题:重点解决农民党员政治入党问题

农村党组织是新农村建设的领导核心,也是维护农村稳定的第一道防线。由于各种原因,目前农村部分党员政治信念淡薄、政治意志衰退等问题日渐突出。在坚持思想入党原则的基础上,明确提出党员政治入党的要求,采取有效措施重点提高农民党员政治素质,已经成为加强农村党建的新课题。     

Does politics crowd out professional competence? The organisation of ministerial advice in Denmark and Sweden

The use of politically appointed ministerial advisors has increased noticeably in many Western countries, but we know little about how this development has affected the civil servants recruited on merit. The article asks whether political appointees accentuate or blur the line between politics and administration. Do political appointees take over political-tactical advice and leave policy advice to the permanent civil service, or do they cause permanent civil servants to be even more influenced by political considerations? And do political appointees make it easier or more difficult for the permanent civil service to be politically responsive? A Most Similar Systems Design comparison of Denmark and Sweden allows an assessment of the effects of political appointees. It is found that a large number of political appointees decreases functional politicisation of the permanent civil service; that functional politicisation tends to crowd out tasks related to more classic policy advice; and that functional politicisation increases political responsiveness.     

Defining and classifying technocrat‐led and technocratic governments

Governments led by technocrats remain a nebulous category in political science literature, with little clarity about how they differ from party governments, how many have existed and how we can differentiate between them. This article aims to provide that conceptual and empirical clarity. Having proposed an ideal type definition of ‘technocratic government’, it sets out three conditions for an operational definition of a ‘technocrat’ and, on that basis, lists the 24 technocrat‐led governments that have existed in 27 European Union (EU) democracies from the end of the Second World War until June 2013. It then classifies these according to their partisan/technocrat composition and remit. This allows for the presentation of a typology of four different types of technocrat‐led governments and the definition of ‘full technocratic governments’ as those which contain a majority of technocrats and – unlike caretaker governments – have the capacity to change the status quo. The article concludes that full technocratic governments remain extremely rare in EU democracies since there have been only six cases – of which three have occurred in the last decade.     

The "common sense" of the nonprofit hospital tax exemption: a policy analysis.

Although rarely discussed prior to the 1985 Utah Supreme Court ruling against Intermountain Health Care Inc., the question of whether to grant tax exemptions to nonprofit hospitals is currently being debated by federal, state, and local legislators, and by the courts. Changes to current policy seem likely. This policy analysis: (1) presents the historical and legal background; (2) examines the economic, political, and organizational implications of current tax-exemption policy; and (3) offers three alternatives to this current policy. The analysis indicates that the current policy provides little incentive for nonprofit hospitals to make contributions of charity care. Of the alternatives, eliminating the exemption is not politically feasible at this time; regulating hospital operations and outputs portends an implementation nightmare; and tying tax subsidy levels to output levels of charity care--perhaps the strongest and most efficient incentive--would require an unlikely political consensus on what constitute valid and reliable measures of charity care. If there is a movement toward subsidies, then linking subsidy amounts to levels of charity care will depend on whether policy analysts can design satisfactory empirical measures. With the advent of universal health coverage, the demand for charity care will decrease. The problem for tax-exempt hospitals will then become justifying the exemption by demonstrating the extent to which they generate community benefits at no or reduced cost to society.     

Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises

Why do prime ministers or presidents appoint non-elected experts, also known as technocrats, during economic crises? Do they appoint them for their expertise or for their commitment to pro-market reforms? Answering this question is crucial for understanding and predicting the longer-term role of technocrats in democracies. With the aid of unique data on the political and personal background of finance ministers in 13 parliamentary and semi-presidential European democracies this article shows that commitment, not expertise is the primary driver of technocratic appointments during major economic crises. Technocrats are preferred over experienced politicians when the latter lack commitment to policy reform. An important implication of the findings is that technocratic appointments to top economic portfolios in West European countries are unlikely to become the norm outside economic crises, assuming economic crises are short-lived and not recurring.     

Isolating the effect of compulsory voting laws on political sophistication: Leveraging intra-national variation in mandatory voting laws between the Austrian Provinces

Compulsory voting laws introduce a legal requirement to vote that substantially increases in voter turnout. Additionally, this study provides evidence that a legal requirement to vote also generates a more politically informed population. A comparative case study leverages intra-national variation in mandatory voting regulations across the Austrian Provinces over time. The analysis constructs novel measures intended to quantify recent and accumulated exposure to compulsory voting laws. The results suggest that exposure to mandatory voting laws caused Austrian citizens to increase their political interest and attention to political news, as well as their level of information about party platforms on whether or not to expand EU integration. As a whole, the study suggests that compulsory voting not only increases voter turnout; it also leads to an increase in political information.     

Looking for leverage in PAC markets: Corporate and labor contributions considered

In this paper we explore the popular perception that political action committees (PACs) have substantial influence over elected legislators. We question whether the leverage in the PAC market is on the side of the contribution-maker or the contribution-taker. Analysis of the structure of PAC markets suggests most markets are sellers' markets, not buyers' markets. PAC contributions then may be more like protection money than attempts to buy votes or access. The leverage of the politician (seller) may be tempered if a substantial number of large PACs have homogeneous interests, and the ability to concentrate their contributions to the same legislators. This contention is supported by analysis of differences in labor and corporate PAC giving in the 1980 and 1984 general elections. Labor PACs, which are much larger than corporate PACs, have more homogeneous interests, give virtually all of their money to one party, and appear to have more discretion in making contribution decisions than do corporate PACs. An implication of this analysis for corporate executives is that using political action committees at the federal level may not be a strategy where corporations have a comparative advantage. — Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) — Senator Thomas Eaglecton (D-Mo.)     

Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Executive Branch Revenue Forecasts in the American States

Scholarship on executive politics provides conflicting views about whether staffing administrative agencies through politicized or (politically) autonomous means is the best method for maximizing bureaucratic competence. We offer a theoretical account which maintains that obtaining a proper balance between both types of personnel systems across the supervisory and subordinate levels of an organization will best foster bureaucratic competence. We evaluate our organizational balancing thesis using data on executive branch general revenue fund forecasts in the American states from 1987 to 2002. States with a combination of politically appointed agency executives and merit-selected subordinates generally provide more accurate revenue forecasts than states that possess uniformly politicized personnel selection systems. Conversely, states with a combination of department head–appointed executives and subordinates chosen from an at-will system (i.e., nonmerit) produce more accurate forecasts than states with uniformly autonomous personnel selection systems. Our statistical findings underscore the positive consequences associated with balancing politicized and autonomous means of selecting personnel within hierarchies of political organizations.     

Parliament and Political Disengagement: Neither Waving nor Drowning

Concern about political disengagement is prevalent in British politics, and this article seeks to examine what the Westminster Parliament has been doing to address it. Recent reforms and recommendations from various parliamentary committees are examined, including increased use of the Internet to disseminate information about Parliament, the use of online consultation mechanisms, and the tentative extension of parliament's petitioning processes. The discussion is couched in the representative origins of Parliament, its adaptation to democratic politics and the extent to which its response to political disengagement is contextualised by its representational, rather than its democratic, role. The article addresses whether Parliament can approach these issues in a 'holistic' fashion, and as a 'unified' institution within the political system.     

A tale of two policies: The politics of climate forecasting and drought relief in Ceará, Brazil

This paper evaluates the use of climate-based information in drought mitigation in Ceará, Northeast Brazil. It examines two policies – a seed-distribution program (Hora de Plantar) and the Emergency Drought-Relief Program – that use climate information produced by FUNCEME (Cearás Foundation for Meteorological and Hydrological Resources) to implement drought planning. It argues that, in politically charged policy-making environments, the use of climate forecast information may go beyond its problem-solving function to influence broader issues of accountability and democratization. In Cearás politically charged environment, technocrats rely on scientific information about climate to insulate policy-making from both political meddling and public accountability. However, insulation afforded by the use of climate information has played different roles in the policy areas examined in this study. While in drought emergency-relief planning the use of climate information critically contributed to the democratization of policy implementation, in agricultural planning, it worked towards further insulating decision-making from public accountability and client participation. Thus, the use of climate information is context-dependent, that is, the distribution of costs and benefits associated with information use in policymaking depends on the social, political, and cultural context in which information producers and users work. Moreover, climate information can be used in ways – positive or negative – significantly different from the use that information producers intended.     

Should the Voting Age be Lowered to Sixteen? Normative and Empirical Considerations

This article is an examination of the issue of whether the age of electoral majority should be lowered to sixteen. We consider and reject several arguments raised by both sides of the voting age debate. The key issue, we claim, is the political maturity of young people. Drawing on empirical data collected in nationally representative surveys, we argue that the weight of such evidence suggests that young people are, to a significant degree, politically less mature than older people, and that the voting age should not be lowered to sixteen.     

Political Homophily and Collaboration in Regional Planning Networks

We study the extent of political homophily—the tendency to form connections with others who are politically similar—in local governments’ decisions to participate in an important form of intergovernmental collaboration: regional planning networks. Using data from a recent survey of California planners and government officials, we develop and test hypotheses about the factors that lead local governments to collaborate within regional planning networks. We find that local governments whose constituents are similar politically, in terms of partisanship and voting behavior, are more likely to collaborate with one another in regional planning efforts than those whose constituents are politically diverse. We conclude that political homophily reduces the transaction costs associated with institutional collective action, even in settings where we expect political considerations to be minimal.     

The gradual transformation? The incremental dynamics of macroprudential regulation

This article focuses on the transformatory potential of macroprudential ideas following the financial crash of 2008, examining how they are being mediated by existing institutional contexts and how and why the task of building a new body of technical macroprudential knowledge is proceeding slowly. It is argued that the movement toward a form of macroprudential regulation has a distinctly incremental dynamic that means any macroprudential transformation will be a gradual process that is likely to span a decade or more. Using Peter Hall's framework of three orders of policy change across substantive and temporal dimensions, the article argues that the macroprudential ideational shift can be compared to third order change. In this sense, it was intellectually radical and took place rapidly in a period of around six months. However, intellectual radicalism does not automatically translate into a radical change in regulatory practice, because of a variety of countervailing political, institutional, and informational variables. In this respect, the task of developing first and second order macroprudential policy is proving to be a much more politically contested process. Furthermore, macroprudential policy is being developed by cautious technocrats who rely on the gradual accumulation of data and evidence to justify policy. The result is a distinctly incremental dynamic to macroprudential policy development that displays many of the features of a process that historical institutionalists refer to as “layering.”     

The impact of complexity and reform on congressional committee output

Some investigators argue that recent reforms in Congress have made it more difficult for Congress to do its job, while others contend that growing complexity in the larger congressional environment has had this result. We test these competing explanations using selected measures of congressional committee inputs and outputs over a period of eight Congresses, 1961–1975. Analysis based on pooled time-series and cross-section data reveals that reform had no direct impact on our measures of committee inputs and outputs once the effects of underlying trends attributable to complexity in the external environment are controlled. Similar conclusions emerge when we compare committees in complex and noncomplex environments and also when we compare committees differentially affected by reform. We discuss methodological and policy implications of our findings.     

Muffling the swing: STV and the Irish general election of 1981

This article explores alternative hypotheses for variation in the political salience of unemployment. The differences between the political opinions of employed and unemployed people are used as a proxy for the qualitative importance of unemployment. Unemployment is not found to be more politically salient when government support of the unemployed is more generous or when jobless spells are shorter. Far more important is the character of employment. Unemployment is more politically salient in countries where employment guarantees a basic livelihood. The data also suggest that unemployment has greater salience in countries where the unemployed are more likely to use state employment exchanges in searching for work. Two conclusions are suggested. First, public toleration of high unemployment in recent decades may be partly the result of the rise of atypical work arrangements. Second, while it is debatable whether social‐democratic protections of employment standards increase unemployment rates, such efforts may inadvertently increase the political costs of high unemployment.     

Congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays

The literature on the organization of the United States Congress has been dominated by “distributive” and “informational” theory. One important source of disagreement between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can engage in pork-barrel activities. Here we provide evidence which indicates that the pork-barrel is alive and well in the contemporary United States Congress. We focus on whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate federal expenditures to their districts. Finding strong and systematic evidence of pork-barrel activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of legislative organization.