The hijacking of a new corporate form? Benefit corporations and corporate personhood

Benefit corporations are a new type of corporate entity developed to remedy antisocial corporate behaviour by enabling mission-driven investors, managers and entrepreneurs to prioritize social values and contest the idea that profits are the only and best measure of corporate performance. To resocialize the corporate entity, the benefit corporation movement built enabling discourses and evaluation practices into the dominant model of corporate governance, shareholder value ideology. These discourses and practices expand both the purpose of the corporate entity and shareholders’ power to enforce that purpose. However, this paper argues that the effort to ‘re-embed’ the corporate entity by making it subject to non-economic claims expands the scope of corporate personhood and that doing so within extant power relations of the firm opens the door to alternative projects that undermine the benefit corporation movement's goal of fostering corporate social responsibility.     

Mixing business with politics: Does corporate social responsibility end where lobbying transparency begins?

Scholars increasingly have argued that the future effectiveness and legitimacy of firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities are dependent on more transparent forms of lobbying to ensure firms' policy positions are aligned with their CSR commitments. Very little empirical work, however, has systematically analyzed firms' lobbying disclosures or examined how these firms coordinate their lobbying and CSR activities. We address these empirical questions by analyzing the CSR reports of 150 corporations from Germany, the UK and the US over an 18-year period and by conducting interviews with the CSR managers of these firms. We find that corporations have become more transparent about their public policy advocacy over time, thus acknowledging that lobbying is a CSR issue. For most firms, however, this commitment to transparency appears to be largely ceremonial. Few firms disclose the specific policy positions they advocate or sufficiently coordinate the work of their lobbying and CSR units to foster greater alignment of these activities. These modest changes in lobbying transparency appear to be driven by legitimacy concerns and, in a few instances, by governance gaps firms perceive to be relevant to their future business interests.     

政府在社会信用体系建设中的作用探讨

本文从建设社会信用体系是发展市场经济的战略性制度安排入手,阐述了起步阶段的中国社会信用体系建设必须要由政府协调和引导,及政府在该体系建设中的具体作用.最后从政府也是社会信用活动参与者的角度出发,论证了政府守信和相关约束监督机制.     

Fragmented or cohesive transnational private regulation of sustainability standards? A comparative study

Literature on private regulation recognizes the proliferation of competing regulatory organizations and approaches in various industries. Studies analyzing why fragmentation arises so far focus on single‐case studies, the exploration of single variables, or variation in types of fragmentation. This article analyzes why in certain industries and for certain issues regulatory organizations proliferate, while in others a single regulatory organization emerges which covers the entire industry. Through a comparative case study of private regulation of sustainability standards in the forestry, clothing, IT‐electronics, and chemicals industries, we show how a combination of low industrial concentration, civil society involvement in governance, and stringent standards of a first‐moving regulator offer the strongest explanation for a fragmented private regulatory field, while high industrial concentration, business‐driven governance, and lenient standards of a first‐moving regulator lead to cohesive regulation.     

The Effect of Corporate Governance on Corporate Performance in the Financial Industry in Nigeria

The business environment in which the financial industry operates is full of uncertainty and limitations. The inability of some firms in this sector to produce capable management that can guide the interests of shareholders in the light of ethics and values has generated frequent cases of business downturn. This has compelled the industry to adopt the strategy of corporate governance which hinges on the intellectual honesty of directors and management to promote transparency, equity, and accountability, and provide leadership that will guide the industry in the right direction. The major objective of this paper is to ascertain whether corporate governance is a strategy for corporate performance. The study made use of both primary and secondary sources of data. The survey research method and the data analysis techniques comprised of simple percentages and chi-square derived from Kendal coefficient. It discovered that corporate governance is a strategy for corporate performance and the financial sector has failed to improve their performance using this strategy. It was recommended that the regulatory agencies should constantly review the acts that ensure good corporate governance and embark on constant monitoring in order to sanction any defaulting bank.