Institutional law and economics

Behavioral economics provides one of the foundation for institutional law and economics (ILE). Improvement in predicting the performance of alternative laws will be built on ILE insights into how distribution affects productivity of labor and realization of joint gains. Our understanding of obedience to law as well as other categories of failure to be opportunistic (such as in high exclusion-cost situations) will be better understood from an ILE perspective that investigates learning to supplement specific sanctions.The boundaries of ILE inquiry encompass private property rights, regulation, and public spending and taxation since these are complements and substitutes. Public spending is not a good measure of the size of government, and regulation is not the opposite of freedom in the aggregate. This framework of ILE can usefully be seen as distinctive, even if all of its practitioners do not use the label and several of its propositions are shared with other paradigms. A better label might simply be institutional economics or political economy.     

Law and economics of the European multilingualism

The economics of language applied to multilingualism in the European Union (EU) has only recently come to the fore. Languages economics and Law and Economics disciplines both emerged in the 1960s. However, no study has, hitherto, linked these disciplines. This paper intends to fill that void. Language barriers are the last major remaining barriers for the EU??s ??single?? market. The lack of coordination of multilingualism in the EU stems from a taboo crystallized by a dilemma between economic efficiency and linguistic diversity??i.e., the maximization of wealth versus the maximization of utility. The EU Member States (MSs) do not hasten to coordinate their language policies at the EU level inasmuch as they overestimate the benefits of the current EU multilingualism while drastically underestimating its costs. Coordination shall occur when MSs evaluate the costs and benefits of the current EU multilingualism. This will uncover the aforementioned dilemma, that will only be resolved when both Law and Economics are applied. In pursuing this objective a ??Linguistic Coase Theorem?? adapted from the work of Parisi and the Nobel Prize winner, Ronald Coase is elaborated. Having outlined the basic notions deriving from the EU Law of Languages and the Economics of Languages (Introduction), the paper scrutinizes the costs and benefits incurred by the current non-coordinated EU multilingualism (Part I). Subsequently, a ??Linguistic Coase Theorem?? is elaborated in order to reach a Pareto-optimal outcome, thereby solving the dilemma??both economic efficiency and the linguistic diversity being enhanced (Part II).     

On the economics of plagiarism

Cheating and plagiarism can involve the transgression of intellectual property rights across many areas of life. When a direct financial benefit from such practices is identifiable, the opportunity to seek legal redress is available via civil court action. When it is undertaken by a public official it may constitute malfeasance. Yet in the case of breaches of university regulations (from the growing number of student cheating and plagiarism incidents) subsequent legal intervention may be characterised by situations where the university is the defendant and the alleged plagiarist is the plaintiff (seeking compensation for interrupted study and/or tarnished reputation). University defences can flounder around the issue of proving intent to deceive. What can they do to try to prevent such occurrences? This paper uses economic analysis to examine such issues. Economic models of plagiarism motivated primarily by (i) time-saving and (ii) dishonesty are developed to help frame the discussion. Both model approaches overlap in their implications, namely, ensuring that sufficient resources are devoted to monitoring coursework (to increase the probability that cheating and plagiarism are detected) and of providing sufficiently clear and severe institutional penalties (to counter-balance any expected benefits that the student may perceive to be available from cheating and plagiarism). Policy proposals are raised for further debate and consideration.     

Co-determination and the market economy

In this article attention is paid to Böhm's ideas on codetermination and on the related subject of public industrial organization. According to Böhm the government has to take care of the institutional framework of the market economy. The coordinating function of prices has to be improved by competition policy and by monetary and financial policy. Public industrial organization and codetermination based on the parity principle are thought by him to be incompatible with the market economy because they frustrate price formation.     

Justice at the confluence of law and economics

Law has long been combined with economic thought, but only recently has law been combined with economic theory. This article explores the implications of this development for theories of justice and interdisciplinary research. Value in economics is usually measured by price (the market tradition) or by satisfaction (the utilitarian tradition). The relationship of these concepts to equity in law is explored. Also explored is the relationship between bargaining theory and contractarian theories of justice. The article examines the possibility that methods and concepts developed in the economic analysis of law will prove useful to sociologists and social psychologists by contrasting the study of rational choice and the study of attitudes.     

Social murder and conservative economics

Abstract

The hallmark of conservative economic theory is that firms should not be constrained by the state in their pursuit of profit. State intervention is not necessary because firms must obey the will of ‘the market’. Companies must please their consumers or they will not sell anything, and they must treat their workers well or they will have no labour force. Conservative economics assumes that decisions reflect individual preferences and free choice. In this world of voluntary actions, firms and individuals stand on pretty much equal footing; no one has any more power than anyone else.     

The morality of law and economics

The moral heart of normative law and economics is efficiency, especially dynamic efficiency that takes incentive effects into account. In the economic theory, justificatory argument is inherently at the institutional- or rule-level, not an the individual- or case-level. InMarkets, Morals, and the Law Jules Coleman argues against the efficiency theory on normative grounds. Although he strongly asserts the need to view law institutionally, he frequently grounds his criticisms of law and economics in arguments from little more than direct moral intuition about individual cases. He evidently holds that consent provides a better normative basis for law than does efficiency and he uses consent arguments to attack recommendations from scholars in law and economics. His own chief contribution, however, is to law and economics rather than to any alternative theory.     

The economics of notaries

In civil law legal systems, notaries fulfill two crucial roles, acting as both law enforcers and court officers, and as facilitators and enforcers of private transactions. In these countries, notaries achieve economies of scope by simultaneously providing private and public services and substituting both parties' lawyers. This arrangement is subject, however, to serious conflicts of interest that could prejudice the provision of public services that have attributes of externalities, as well as the notary's independence from all parties to the transaction. This paper shows how this notary system may be efficient in this context. Focusing on Spanish notaries, it analyzes the legal and economic nature of the services, the incentives that control their provision, and the cost in terms of competitive restraints that could be generated by the organizational patterns making up such incentives. Supporting empirical evidence is also provided.