The New President Makes a Budget: From Eisenhower to Bush

Beginning with Eisenhower in 1953, newly elected presidents have proposed revisions to the budgets their predecessors submitted just before leaving office. Only Eisenhower and Reagan enjoyed substantial success in these efforts; the other four soon found that Congress has become increasingly determined to work its own will in budgetary matters. While we have only six cases of new presidents who tried to revise their predecessors' budgets, it seems clear that the two most significant determinants of success have been the personal popularity of the president and a favorable ideological (not partisan) balance in Congress.     

The procedural presidency of George Bush

He is author of Searching for Safety; Risk and Culture; Budgeting; Speaking Truth to Power; The Beleaguered Presidency;and coauthor of Presidential Elections.     

Facing reality in the George Bush era

where he is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor. He was Ronald Reagan’s first chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. He is author of the recently published Rendezvous with Reality: The American Economy After Reagan,and coauthor of Public Policy toward Corporate Takeovers.     

American Federalism: From Johnson to Bush

Intergovernmental developments for more than twenty-five yearshave produced a nation-centered federalism—strongly sofrom 1964 to 1978, somewhat less so from 1969–1988, anda little more so during the past two years. The reasons forthis fundamental systemic transformation include: (1) the demiseof the earlier, 150-year old, confederative party system andthe rise of a new political system with weak federative parties,but other more powerful political actors; (2) an operationaland local representational renaissance of the states, but alsoa concomitant decline of state and local political influencein Washington; (3) a steadily centralizing Supreme Court, withonly a few pro-state decisions until 1989; and (4) a rapid risein national preemptions and of a "new social regulation" thatwas aimed at state and local governments as much as at the privatesector, even as the states were used to implement them. Theonly real constraint on national activism since 1982 has beenbudget-driven federalism, not planned reform efforts. The currentsystem then requires political, representational, judicial,and constitutional reforms if the centralizing, cooptive, andpermissive features of contemporary federalism are to be corrected.     

Postmodern War in the Age of Bush II

This study charts the genealogy and development of new trends in high-tech warfare that have emerged in the past decade, focusing on both the challenges and dangers. Attention is devoted to the Bush administration's military program and foreign policy moves, highlighting the ways Bush II intensifies the dangers of high-tech war while undermining efforts at collective security, environmental protection, and global peace. The argument here is that the volatile mixture of highly regressive, unilateralist, and militarist tendencies combined with high-tech weapons provides a clear and present danger of a protracted and frightening period of war. This mixture dramatically erupted in Bush's military response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 and is currently intensifying dangers to world peace in the campaign some are labeling "World War III."     

The Politics of Coercive Federalism in the Bush Era

During the period of the Bush Presidency, the federal governmentproceeded to centralize and nationalize policy in major areasformerly controlled by states and localities. The extensionof federal goals and standards to such areas as education testing,sales tax collection, emergency management, infrastructure,and elections administration were among the areas of significantmandates and preemptions. The continuation of policy centralizationin areas under a conservative and unified political regime showshow strong and deep the roots are for centralizing policy actionsin our intergovernmental system.     

Bush, China, Taiwan: A triangular analysis

This paper reexamines American policy toward China, Taiwan, and their ambivalent bilateral relationship, focusing on the period since Washington’s shift from strong (but not unconditional) support of Nationalist China to the role of balancer in the early 1970s, particularly on the most recent period under George W. Bush. We analyze the relationship from a strategic triangular perspective. The China-Taiwan-US relationship is triangular in the sense that each actor’s relations with the other two depend on its relations with the third. It is strategic in its focus on security. The United States has been the consistent “pivot” of this triangle, having better relations with both “wings” than they have with each other. Washington has retained this structurally advantageous position partly because of its disproportionate strategic weight, and partly because of the inherent difficulties Taipei and Beijing have had forging a cooperative bilateral relationship. This structure has been quite stable since the Cold War, as Washington has periodically shifted its balance from one wing to the other without altering the triangle’s basic configuration. Yet so long as the configuration is maintained, the basic problem on which the triangle is based — the contested independence of Taiwan — cannot be resolved. This creates a sense of national identity frustration that will continue to generate attempts at resolution, either by Taiwan’s declaration of independence or China’s forced reunification (or both). editor ofAsian Survey, has written or editedSino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications (1992),China’s Quest for National Identity (with Samuel Kim, 1993), and many other analyses of Chinese domestic and foreign policy. His most recent book (with Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee) isInformal Politics in East Asia (Cambridge, 2000).     

Congressional Preemption During the George W. Bush Administration

President Bush approved 64 preemption acts during 2001–2005.Fifteen acts were responses to the September 11, 2001, terroristattacks, and five acts extended sunset provisions. The otheracts removed specified powers from states in the fields of banking,commerce, energy, environmental protection, finance, foreigncommerce, health, intellectual property, safety, taxation, telecommunications,and transportation. Only the two Internet taxation prohibitionacts have a major impact on state governments by depriving themof billions of dollars in tax revenues that could be used toexercise their reserved powers. The other acts are minor oneson the periphery of state exercised powers compared to lawsenacted in the period 1964–1999.