Do voters learn? Evidence that voters respond accurately to changes in political parties’ policy positions

A premise of the mass–elite linkage at the heart of representative democracy is that voters notice changes in political parties’ policy positions and update their party perceptions accordingly. However, recent studies question the ability of voters accurately to perceive changes in parties’ positions. The study advances this literature with a two-wave panel survey design that measured voters’ perception of party positions before and after a major policy shift by parties in the government coalition in Denmark 2011–2013. Two key findings extend previous work. First, voters do indeed pay attention to parties when they visibly change policy position. Second, voters update their perceptions of the party positions much more accurately than would have been expected if they merely relied on a ‘coalition heuristic’ as a rule-of-thumb. These findings imply that under some conditions voters are better able to make meaningful political choices than previous work suggests.     

Confused or competent? How voters use the STV ballot paper

STV is often extolled because it allows voters to express a nuanced choice, but is criticised for being too confusing. In practice the system is little used, but evidence from where it is indicates much depends on how voters choose to use it. STV was used for the first time in Scottish local elections in 2007, providing valuable new evidence on how voters respond to the system. We use survey data to examine the incidence of various indicators of apparent failure by Scottish voters to exploit STV, and compare both the levels and patterns of incidence with equivalent data for Ireland. We find little sign of confusion in either country, but significant evidence of ballot order effects in Scotland.     

Do voters prefer educated candidates? How candidate education influences vote choice in congressional elections

Previous research shows that democracies are more likely to produce educated politicians, but is this because voters prefer educated representatives or because of other features of the democratic process? Education may serve as a signal of candidate quality to voters or it may simply be associated with other factors, such as access to campaign funds, that help candidates win elections. We address this puzzle by analyzing head-to-head matches between candidates in US House elections from 2002 to 2012 along with a conjoint experiment. We find evidence that candidates with higher levels of education win more votes than candidates with lower levels of education, even after we account for standard indicators of candidate quality and campaign spending. This education premium not only garners more votes, but it also translates into higher probabilities of winning. The experimental results and sensitivity analyses show that it is unlikely that these results are explained by a hidden confound. The experiment also illuminates that the education premium flows from perceptions of candidate qualification and ability to pursue respondent interests.     

Caught in the middle? How voters react to spatial indifference

According to one of the tenets of the Spatial Theory of Voting (SToV), spatial indifference is positively associated with abstention. However, the political behaviour literature has not yet fully settled whether this is always the case and, if not, why individuals still vote despite the differential utility they extract from the two closest candidates equals zero. In this letter we explore the effect of spatial indifference on political behaviour by analysing survey data from American elections since 1972 and through a survey experiment that randomizes candidates’ ideological position on different dimensions. Findings show that spatially indifferent individuals are more likely to abstain—mainly moderate voters. Yet, around two-thirds still vote for a candidate. We advance two tentative explanations: First, when spatially equidistant, individuals that vote are more likely to consider valence attributes. Second, they are more likely to resort to a directional logic. Results have implications for our understanding of the spatial models and, in particular, of the behaviour of spatially equidistant individuals, which represent a non-negligible group of the electorate.     

Stay or exit: How do international nongovernmental organizations respond to institutional pressures under authoritarianism?

International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are increasingly important players in global politics and development. However, they are undergoing significant adaptations as governments worldwide have instituted restrictions to regulate their activities. What explains the various ways in which they respond to these institutional pressures? In our study of INGO responses to a new restrictive law in China, we identify four strategic responses with varying levels of compliance: legal registration, provisional strategy, localization, and exit. The institutional pressures—strategic responses link is influenced by INGOs' adaptive capacity, which is in turn shaped by an organization's issue sensitivity, value-add, government ties, and reputational authority. The integrated framework we develop for INGO strategic responses can shed light on state-INGO relations in other countries, many of which are subject to increasingly stringent regulations and a closing political environment.     

How do established voters react to new parties? The case of Italy, 1985–2008

The Italian party system largely collapsed in the early 1990s, providing us with a natural experimental situation in which voters were confronted with new parties – indeed, with an entirely new party system. How did they react? This paper develops a number of expectations on the basis of existing theory and tests these expectations using a dataset consisting of election studies conducted in Italy between 1985 and 2008. We find that a new party system causes confusion as to where parties stand in left-right terms, making it difficult for voters to make their choices on the basis of ideological cues. The confusion is greatest among older voters – those already set in their habits of voting, but only the very oldest cohorts (containing voters over 60 years old) are significantly debilitated.     

Does party polarization mobilize or de-mobilize voters? The answer depends on where voters stand

What effect does party polarization have on voter turnout? Focusing largely on polarization as a (negative) indicator of party indifference, the existing empirical work has found mixed results. We re-examine this question, recognizing that polarization influences voters through perceptions of both alienation and indifference; we argue that the effect of polarization depends on the position of the voter relative to the party options. We introduce a new relative measure of polarization and test its effect on turnout in the two-rounds of the French presidential elections. We find that where a voter stands relative to the spread of party options is a significant predictor of turnout. If parties are either far away from the voter or are indistinguishable from each other, there is little incentive to turn out. On the other hand, party polarization leads to higher participation when the voter is close to one party and far from another.     

How (often) do voters change their consideration sets?

The consideration set model posits that in multi-party elections voters decide in two stages. We expect that in the consideration stage, when voters select viable options, ideological proximity is a key determinant, while in the choice stage election-specific factors become particularly important. This would imply that consideration sets are rather stable and that changes in voting preferences occur mainly within ideologically coherent consideration sets. This study examines both claims by analyzing panel survey data from Sweden and the Netherlands. Consideration sets were indeed rather stable, more so than voting intentions. After one year, voters still considered the same party in 81% of cases and only 13% of respondents shifted between ideological camps. This indicates that voters changed electoral preferences primarily within the boundaries of relatively stable consideration sets and ideological camps. These findings help to understand how elections can be volatile, despite the strong impact of highly stable ideological orientations.     

Policy responsiveness to all citizens or only to voters? A longitudinal analysis of policy responsiveness in OECD countries

A close connection between public opinion and policy is considered a vital element of democracy. In representative systems, elections are assumed to play a role in realising such congruence. If those who participate in elections are not representative of the public at large, it follows that the reliance on elections as a mechanism of representation entails a risk of unequal representation. In this paper, we evaluate whether voters are better represented by means of an analysis of policy responsiveness to voters and citizens in democracies worldwide. We construct a uniquely comprehensive dataset that includes measures of citizens’ and voters’ ideological (left–right) positions, and data on welfare spending in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries since 1980. We find evidence of policy responsiveness to voters, but not to the public at large. Since additional tests suggest that the mechanism of electoral turnout does not cause this voter-policy responsiveness, we outline alternate mechanisms to test in future research.     

Do parties respond? How electoral context influences party responsiveness

How responsive are political parties to the issue priorities of voters? While there are numerous studies that examine policy position congruence between parties and voters or government responsiveness, we know little about the extent to which parties adjust their policy priorities to the issue concerns of voters. Following saliency and issue ownership theory, we argue that political parties listen to their voters by emphasizing policy issues in their election manifestos that have been prioritized by citizens. However, in line with second-order election theory, we expect that issue responsiveness varies with the electoral context. To test our theoretical expectations, we generated a novel dataset that combines data on issue attention of political parties from the Comparative Manifesto and the Euromanifesto projects with data on policy priorities of voters from the European Election Studies, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and various national election studies. We empirically test our theoretical claims based on a comprehensive analysis of 104 parties from 17 countries competing in 84 national and European elections from 1986 to 2011. Our findings have important implications for political representation in Europe.     

To adapt or to defend? Comparing position shifts among Bundestag candidates between 2013 and 2017

In this research note, candidate survey data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) is used to analyse positional shifts of German Bundestag parties between 2013 and 2017. Two developments make Germany a particularly interesting case: (1) the liberal but also controversial policies of the Merkel cabinet during the European refugee crisis and (2) the change of leadership within the right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Applying scaling techniques to locate candidates of both elections in the same two-dimensional policy space, the analysis demonstrates that in 2017 the AfD took a distinct radical right position in the party system of Germany. Moreover, the study finds that almost all parties moved to the right on the cultural left–right dimension in 2017, whereas for the economic left–right dimension this has not been the case. Contrary to the mantra of an ideological delineation against right-wing populism, there has been a robust socio-political conservative shift in the German party system.     

Policy or person? What voters want from their representatives on Twitter

Social media have the potential to transform democracies as they allow for direct contact between representatives and represented. Politicians can use social media to show their policy positions but they can also give insight into their private lives. Based on survey experiments in Germany and Switzerland we show that social media messages about politicians’ private lives rather deter voters. Instead, we find that voters prefer candidates that communicate policy positions. The effect of a policy-oriented communication style on Twitter can even lead to appreciating a politician from a different party in Switzerland, which has an electoral system that gives a strong incentive to cultivate a personal vote.     

(When and how) do voters try to manipulate?

We study strategic voting in a laboratory experiment using a Borda mechanism. We find that manipulation rates are surprisingly low, even for individuals who know that they possess superior information about the other agents’ preferences. Exploring possible explanations, we find that manipulation rates rise significantly if individuals are not only informed about the other agents’ preferences but also about their actual votes. This suggests that uncertainty plays a key role in understanding strategic behavior in elections. By contrast, distributional concerns, e.g., in the form of inequality aversion, are found to play a negligible role in our context.     

Representation or abdication? How citizens use institutions to help delegation succeed

Abstract. Modern democracy requires delegation. One problem with delegation is that principals and agents often have conflicting interests. A second problem is that principals lack information about their agents. Many scholars conclude that these problems cause delegation to become abdication. We reject this conclusion and introduce a theory of delegation that supports a different conclusion. The theory clarifies when interest conflicts and information problems do (and do not) turn delegation into abdication. We conclude by arguing that remedies for common delegation problems can be embedded in the design of electoral, legislative, and bureaucratic institutions. The culmination of our efforts is a simple, but general, statement about when citizens and legislators can (and cannot) control their agents.     

Public subsidies and charitable giving: Crowding out,crowding in,or both?

Abstract Whether government subsidies to nonprofit organizations leverage (crowd in) private donations, or rather crowd them out has been actively debated for some time. A third hypothesis, explored theoretically and tested empirically in this paper, is that the two phenomena are actually not inconsistent with one another: At low levels of subsidies, government support may stimulate private giving, whereas at high levels it could have just the opposite effect. The model presented is based on this idea, which yields implications relevant to nonprofit management and public policy, and tests it with data on symphony orchestras. The conclusion is that the maximization of private donations and total “unearned” revenues are not compatible goals. Further, nonprofits that suffer from short‐term liquidity problems or managerial shortsightedness may face a “subsidy trap,” in which they are forced to rely on suboptimal levels of subsidies in terms of maximizing the firm's revenues. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Does moral rhetoric fuel or reduce divides between parties and non-copartisan voters?

Political parties at times use moral appeals to voters outside of their support base, i.e., non-copartisan voters. Yet, morality is typically considered a divisive force in politics. Does moral rhetoric actually alleviate or exacerbate divides between parties and non-copartisan voters? The paper addresses this question by focusing on non-copartisans’ attitudes towards the party. Insights from previous work on moral persuasion and attitudinal bias suggest a conflicting picture. On the one hand, moral rhetoric is likely to make morally aligned non-copartisans more favourable towards the party. On the other hand, moral rhetoric is unlikely to make even the morally aligned favourable towards the party. In fact, moral rhetoric may further push away non-copartisans with pre-existing hostility. Using original, representative survey experiments from Britain, the paper finds that moral rhetoric can increase favourable attitudes and that it does not further promote hostility. Morality in party competition does not necessarily fuel division.     

Does anybody notice? How policy positions of coalition parties are perceived by voters

Does governing in coalitions affect how coalition parties’ policy positions are perceived by voters? In this article, the authors seek to understand the relationship between parties’ participation in coalition governments and their perception by voters. Policy positions are an important instrument through which parties compete for the support of voters. However, it is unclear to what extent voters can correctly perceive the positions of parties when they govern together with other coalition partners. It is argued here that because of the blurred lines of responsibility in multiparty cabinets, it is difficult for voters to correctly perceive the positions of coalition parties. What is more, it is expected that the internal functioning of coalition cabinets affects the extent to which coalition parties struggle to get their message out to voters. It is hypothesized in the article that intra‐cabinet conflict is negatively related to misperception. To test their theoretical expectations, the authors combine data on the left‐right policy positions of political parties from the Comparative Manifestos Project with data on how these positions are perceived by voters gathered from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems from 1996 to 2011. The findings shed light on the relationship between party competition and coalition governments, and its implications for political representation.     

Is the Democratic Party’s superdelegate system unfair to voters?

Among the reasons for the historic nature of the 2008 Democratic primary race was the attention paid to the “superdelegates”. The competitiveness of the primary and the important role the superdelegates played has led to calls for reform. This paper develops a formal model that explains why superdelegates selected one candidate over the other and why some superdelegates committed early in the primary season while others waited. Hypotheses are tested using an original dataset collected during the 2008 Democratic primary. The results suggest that although some superdelegates made their decision based on personal, idiosyncratic factors, for many superdelegates, Democratic voters played the most important role in their commitment process.     

How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and their voters veered to the radical right, 2013–2017

Until 2017, Germany was an exception to the success of radical right parties in postwar Europe. We provide new evidence for the transformation of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) to a radical right party drawing upon social media data. Further, we demonstrate that the AfD's electorate now matches the radical right template of other countries and that its trajectory mirrors the ideological shift of the party. Using data from the 2013 to 2017 series of German Longitudinal Elections Study (GLES) tracking polls, we employ multilevel modelling to test our argument on support for the AfD. We find the AfD's support now resembles the image of European radical right voters. Specifically, general right-wing views and negative attitudes towards immigration have become the main motivation to vote for the AfD. This, together with the increased salience of immigration and the AfD's new ideological profile, explains the party's rise.     

Quantity,quality, or both? Explaining investment test scores in federal community reinvestment act examinations

Abstract

Banks and thrifts are major actors in the affordable housing and community development arenas. They are often relied on to invest in low‐income housing tax credits and other projects as well as provide operating support. Banks and thrifts are explicitly encouraged to invest in such activities by the Community Reinvestment Act's (CRA's) Investment Test. Regulations require examiners to consider both quantitative and qualitative criteria in determining a large bank's Investment Test rating. The qualitative criteria are particularly important for organizations seeking investments for projects that are more innovative or complex or that offer less than stellar financial returns.

An analysis of CRA performance evaluations reveals that, of the two qualitative criteria, only responsiveness to needs has a significant impact on Investment Test scores. Moreover, controlling for investment activity leads to higher Investment Test scores for larger banks. Implications for CRA policy and implementation are discussed.