Comparing Implementation Processes in Sweden and the United States

This article attempts a systematic comparison of how policy is implemented in Sweden and the United States. We suggest that differences might be explained by examining policymaking processes, policy content, and governmental structure. The comparison reveals differences in 'incentive structure'. Both Sweden and the U.S. have responded to the complexity and uncertainty that accompanies increased demands on central government by adopting 'softer' mechanisms for implementation. The effect of these shifts in both systems is to devolve important decisions to lower levels of government. In Sweden, this devolution is still accompanied by strong incentives for national policymakers to undertake implementation, although the incentives may not be as strong as they were in the past. In the U.S., it is accompanied by a radical weakening of incentives to carry out implementation and increasing instability in policy content and relations among key actors.     

Austerity or welfare state transformation? Examining the impact of economic crises on social regulation in Europe

This article provides an encompassing analysis of how economic crises affect social regulation. The analysis is based on an innovative dataset that covers policy output changes in 13 European countries over a period of 34 years (1980–2013) in the areas of pensions, unemployment, and child benefits. By performing a negative binomial regression analysis, we show that economic crises do matter for social policymaking. Our main empirical finding is that crises impinge on social regulation by opening a window of opportunity that facilitates the dismantling of social policy standards. Yet crisis‐induced policy dismantling is restricted to adjustments based on existing policy instruments. We do not find significant variation in policymaking patterns across different macroeconomic conditions for the more structural elements of social policy portfolios, such as the envisaged social policy targets or the policy instruments applied. This suggests that economic crises do not lead to a profound transformation of the welfare state but to austerity.     

Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective

We explore the impact of institutional design on the distribution of changes in outputs of governmental processes in the United States, Belgium, and Denmark. Using comprehensive indicators of governmental actions over several decades, we show that in each country the level of institutional friction increases as we look at processes further along the policy cycle. Assessing multiple policymaking institutions in each country allows us to control for the nature of the policy inputs, as all the institutions we consider cover the full range of social and political issues in the country. We find that all distributions exhibit high kurtosis values, significantly higher than the Normal distribution which would be expected if changes in government attention and activities were proportionate to changes in social inputs. Further, in each country, those institutions that impose higher decision-making costs show progressively higher kurtosis values. The results suggest general patterns that we hypothesize to be related to boundedly rational behavior in a complex social environment.     

Innovation traditions,energy conditions,and state energy policy adoption

From 1974 to 1980, many conservation and renewable energy policies were adopted at the state level in the United States. Some states were particularly active in enacting such policies while others were totally inactive. The variation in state policy activity is only modestly related to the states' past policy innovation traditions and conservation/renewable energy opportunities. Differences in energy vulnerability, and the relative hardship imposed by the energy crisis, have apparently had even less impact on the adoption pattern. These weak or insignificant relationships are typical of other efforts to explain state energy policy variations and are attributed to six qualitative factors: Federal preemption and inconsistency, ambivalent public opinion, conflicting values, lack of information on state energy conditions, and ignorance of the impacts of renewable energy and conservation policies. The findings identify several actions to increase sensitivity toward state energy conditions in policymaking.     

Regulatory Competition and the Politics of Financial Market Reform in Britain and Japan

This article examines the impact that the internationalization of jnance has had on the regulation of domestic securities markets in Japan and Britain. In particular, it seeks to explain the apparent incompatibility of two distinct trends: deregulation (and state retreat) on the one hand, and increased regulation and state involvement in markets on the other.
Much of the literature about the efects of internationalization on domestic policymaking has drfjculty explaining these two distinct regulatory frends. First, there has been no uniform "competition in regulatory laxity." Second, the United States does not appear to have exerted hegemonic influence over outcomes. Finally, domestic-level explanations which deny the importance of systemic-level influences on domestic policy choices are unable to explain the similarity of policy choices undertaken by governments with very different regulatory traditions.
I argue instead that regulatory reforms have been undertaken primarily for the benefit of a particular set of private economic actors—mobile consumers of financial services, including both holders of liquid investment capital and large multinational borrowers. Internationalization has systematically strengthened their influence over the policymaking process by making "exit" from one political marketplace to another a more realistic and more potent bargaining strategy than the alternative of exercising "voice."     

Abortion policy in the post-Webster age

Abortion policy will not change significantly as a result ofthe U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. ReproductiveHealth Services. The decision was not as expansive as generallyreported. Cases considered during the October 1989 term arenot likely to bring significant changes in abortion jurisprudence.A typology of post-Roe state legislative policymaking suggeststhat most states are unwilling to enact severe abortion restrictions.This is largely confirmed by the state legislative action thathas followed Webster. The Florida Supreme Court decision invalidatingthe state's parental-consent statute accentuates the importanceof state courts in setting abortion policy in the post-Websterperiod. In the highly charged political atmosphere followingWebster, state legislators have been reluctant to tackle abortion.These factors suggest that devolution of abortion policymakingauthority to states will not bring about fundamental changequickly.     

Fragmented Welfare States: Federal Institutions and the Development of Social Policy

Despite political scientists' growing appreciation of the ways in which institutions influence political processes, the “new institutionalism” has so far had a limited impact on the comparative study of welfare state development. This article discusses some broad issues concerning institutions and public policy by exploring the implications of one set of institutions — those associated with federalism — for the politics of social policy. Federal institutions encourage three distinctive dynamics: they influence the policy preferences, strategies, and influence of social actors; they create important new institutional actors (the constituent units of the federation); and they generate predictable policymaking dilemmas associated with shared decision-making. Comparisons between social policy development in Canada and the United States are used to demonstrate that while federalism clearly matters, how it matters will depend on the characteristics of a particular federal system and the ways in which federal institutions interact with other important variables.     

Territorial Representation and the Opinion–Policy Linkage: Evidence from the European Union

A key feature of federal systems is the representation of subnational units by “territorial representatives” in policymaking at the federal level. How do such arrangements influence the linkage between public opinion and policy outputs? I argue that policymaking under territorial representation should be systematically skewed toward opinion in those states where citizens care about a policy issue and have a uniform view on it. This claim is tested using a novel data set of policy change in the European Union (EU), covering 211 policy issues and 6,506 observations of opinion–policy dyads. Results show that measures weighting opinion across member states by how much national citizens care about an issue are better predictors of policy change than EU‐wide mean opinion. Moreover, congruence between state‐level opinion and EU‐level policy becomes more likely, the more salient and clear‐cut opinion in a member state is. These findings refine our understanding of the opinion–policy linkage under territorial representation.     

The Diffusion of Human Trafficking Policies in the Post-Soviet Region: A Comparative Analysis of Policy Adoption in Ukraine,Latvia, and Russia

This paper analyzes how human trafficking policies diffused in the post-Soviet region. By adapting the diffusion of innovation framework to fit the international context, I examine whether human trafficking adoptions in the post-Soviet region were due to internal determinants and/or diffusion effects. A comparison of Russia, Latvia, and Ukraine found that internal determinants such as state commitment to human trafficking policy and interest group strength were more important to policy adoption than external pressures from the international community while state capacity and bureaucratic restructuring impeded policy adoption. I argue that policymaking, even in authoritarian regimes, is more nuanced than blind compliance with international treaties and shows that interest groups and policy entrepreneurs work within the constraints of national policymaking to adopt human trafficking policies.     

The changing role of social experiments in policy analysis

Since 1968 more than thirty-five social policy experiments have been conducted in the United States. During this period through 1976 these experiments were generally long-term, large-scale tests of major new programs; thereafter, experiments became markedly more modest in scope. Although hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on the earlier programs, the experiments probably had only a negligible impact on policies. This result stemmed from a variety of factors: Social testing actually tends to exert a conservative influence on policymaking; and the time required to complete experiments and interpret results is often incompatible with the needs of policy makers. In addition, test results are often not effectively communicated to Congress, the administration and the public, and even when the results are conveyed, policy makers are frequently skeptical about the soundness of the methodologies employed. If recent experimental programs are to exert more influence on policymaking, program oficials will need to address these dificulties.     

JAPANESE BUREAUCRATS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: LESSONS FOR AMERICA?

In recent years, American business has attempted to learn the secrets of Japanese business success. This paper asks whether it would be equally useful to examine Japanese public administration to determine why the Japanese government seems to be so much more successful than American government in implementing public policies. It is widely agreed that policy implementation in the United States involves considerable "slippage" between policy intent and achievement. By contrast, scholars agree that Japanese public policy is usually implemented effectively and efficiently. This paper argues that the Japanese case has three important implications for the United States: effective policy implementation is possible, better implementation would result from allowing civil servants to participate more fully in policy formulation, and the development of an elite corps of top civil servants could make a major contribution to better policymaking and implementation.     

For fear of popular politics? Public attention and the delegation of authority to the United States executive branch

Legislators are thought to delegate policymaking authority to administrative actors either to avoid blame for controversial policy or to secure policy outcomes. This study tests these competing perspectives and establishes that public attention to policymaking is a powerful predictor of the extent to which significant United States statutes delegate authority to the executive branch. Consistent with the policy‐concerns perspective, by one calculation statutes dealing with high‐attention issues entail 48 percent fewer delegating provisions than statutes dealing with low‐attention issues – a far stronger relationship than is typically found in the delegation literature. As per the blame‐avoidance perspective, a number of additional analyses yield results consistent with the notion that fears about future public attention motivate statutory delegation if legislative conflict is sufficiently great. Overall, however, the results suggest that conflict typically is not sufficiently great and that legislators are generally more inclined to limit statutory delegation when the public is paying attention.     

Centralization, Access, and Influence: The Reagan Administration and the Semiconductor Industry's Trade Complaints

This article explores how the relative centralization of decisionmaking authority can affect a societal group's ability to achieve its interests. It examines the US semiconductor industry's efforts to persuade the Reagan administration to press Japan on its import barriers and its firms' trade practices. I find that the industry's eventual success was facilitated by an institutional change that centralized the structure of decisionmaking authority. Centralization proved more favorable to the industry's influence in this case because it reduced the number of competing state interests involved in policymaking and concentrated authority in state units that shared the industry's preferences. To account for the change in this structure I focus on the interplay between government officials and policy windows. The analysis suggests that centralization may under some conditions be more conducive than decentralized structures to societal influence, and that modest institutional changes can have significant policy implications.     

Crafting and dismantling the egalitarian social contract: the changing state-society relations in globalizing Korea

Abstract

Between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, the Korean developmental state implemented a series of drastic egalitarian educational policies that were primarily geared toward social integration. While promoting social mobility and educational expansion, they provided the basis of the egalitarian social contract in Korea's educational policymaking for decades. Since the 1990s, however, the Korean state has implemented neoliberal education reforms that led to the rapid dismantling of the egalitarian framework for the country's educational policymaking. These neoliberal reforms were strongly supported by the affluent middle class that prefer elitist education and can afford expensive private education. The general direction of change in Korea's educational policymaking suggests both significant change and continuity in the character of the Korean state and its relations to society since the 1990s. The contemporary Korean state still maintains a highly strategic and activist orientation in adopting and implementing policies although its policies are increasingly neoliberal in content. In doing so, the Korean state is gradually abandoning its broad social base and mobilizational capacity, while increasingly connecting with the upper segments of the middle class.     

The Institutionalization of Environmental Attention in the United States and Denmark: Multiple- versus Single-Venue Systems

The European countries have surpassed the United States with regard to comprehensive and stringent environmental regulation. This policy pattern has become very visible in the international debate about reduction of CO₂ emissions. From a comparative public policy perspective, the recent difference is interesting because it restates the question about policy consequences of political institutions. This article addresses this theoretical question from the perspective of policy agenda-setting theory. We present the argument that while the U.S. political system, with its many "venues" that are relatively open to internal and external competing forces, might be quicker in generating attention to new issues like the environment, the institutionalization of attention is also less strong than in a European parliamentary system. The article substantiates this argument with empirics by comparing attention to and policymaking for environmental issues in the United States to Denmark.     

Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the American States

Motivated by recent work suggesting that low‐income citizens are virtually ignored in the American policymaking process, this article asks whether a similar bias shapes the policy positions adopted by political parties much earlier in the policymaking process. While the normative hope is that parties serve as linkage institutions enhancing representation of those with fewer resources to organize, the resource‐dependent campaign environment in which parties operate provides incentives to appeal to citizens with the greatest resources. Using newly developed measures of state party positions, we examine whether low‐income preferences get incorporated in parties’ campaign appeals at this early stage in the policymaking process—finding little evidence that they do. This differential responsiveness was most pronounced for Democratic parties in states with greater income inequality; it was least evident for Republicans’ social policy platforms. We discuss the implications of these findings for representation in this era of growing economic inequality.     

Predictions, Patterns, and Policymaking: A Regional Study of Devolution

This article examines state welfare policy choices since thepassage of the Personal Responsibility and Work OpportunityReconciliation Act(PRWORA) of 1996. IT argues that neither priorpredictions nor existing explanations of welfare policymakingfully capture the realities of reform. Using data from nationalstudies and comparisons of policymaking in six states, thisstudy demonstrates that diversity, not uniformity, characterizesstate responses to devolution. Accounting for these choicesrequires an understanding of the context of policymaking. Conventionalanalyses of welfare reform have ignored the institutional structuresthrough which policy is formulated and thus miss an importantdeterminant of choices: the actions of administrative officials.Analyses that ignore institutional settings, and the actionsof administrators within such settings, will continue to missmuch that is crucial to our efforts to understand policy decisions.     

Public Management Policymaking in Spain: The Politics of Legislative Reform of Administrative Structures, 1991–1997

This case study focuses on extending research knowledge about the politics of public management policymaking in Spain. The case involves legislating to change politically sensitive features of the central government and administration. The study explains such analytically significant event conditions as: an agenda‐setting process that made a policy issue of the formal, structural attributes of state administration, an alternative‐specification process that proceeded without complication, and a decisional process that lasted five years and in which political leaders' positions on the issue flip‐flopped. Broadly speaking, the case analysis demonstrates that when policy proposals take the form of legislation, the politics of public management policymaking in Spain are highly influenced by political stream factors, themselves reflecting Spain's parliamentary form of government and relations between statewide and regional political parties.     

Policy Legacies,Visa Reform and the Resilience of Immigration Politics

Comparative scholarship tacitly assumes immigration politics to be relatively rigid. A state's immigration policy legacy is said to institutionalise policy preferences, thereby making it difficult to implement lasting reforms that are inconsistent with that legacy. This presents difficulties for states with restrictionist legacies wanting to implement liberal reforms in response to the emergence of labour shortages or demographic problems. The supposed rigidity of immigration politics is scrutinised in this article through a systematic process analysis of developments in the United Kingdom over the past decade, where the Blair government confounded the UK's characterisation as a ‘reluctant immigration state’ to implement various liberal work visa reforms. The uncoordinated nature of policymaking and implementation, and the limited involvement of state and societal institutions in the reform process, reflect the UK's historical experience with restrictionist policies, and help to explain the subsequent reintroduction of strict visa controls. The case demonstrates that policy legacies indeed play a significant role in defining the character of the policymaking institutions that shape a state's immigration politics.     

When does the multiple principals hypothesis hold? The politics of U.S. agency policymaking autonomy

When the bureaucracy's political principals hold different preferences for policy, does this increase the bureaucracy's policymaking autonomy? Existing theory strongly suggests “yes.” We, however, argue that this pattern will materialize only when the bureaucracy's principals are all on the same side of the political divide. (i.e., unified government). Using data gathered from the American states at two time points, we capture preference divergence by measuring the ideological distance between the bureaucracy's key political principals—legislators, governors, and courts—on the common left–right dimension. We measure policymaking autonomy through multi-faceted surveys of state agency leaders. In keeping with our argument, we demonstrate that greater preference divergence across the bureaucracy's principals is associated with increased agency policymaking autonomy under unified—but not under divided—government. The results shed new light on when, and why, the bureaucracy's political principals may provide an oversight check on the policymaking power of the modern administrative state.