Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies

The search for regulatory alternatives to command and control has led many commentators to promote, or at least contemplate, the use of self-regulation to improve the environmental performance of industry. However, much of the current debate has been characterized by a choice between two mutually exclusive policy options: "strict" command and control on one hand, and "pure" self-regulation on the other. In fact, there is a much richer range of policy options, with most falling somewhere between theoretically polar extremes. This article demonstrates that there are a number of "regulatory variables" which policymakers can use to "fine-tune" regulatory options to suit the specific circumstances of particular environmental issues. In the vast majority of circumstances, a combination of self-regulation and command and control will provide the ideal regulatory outcome.     

VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT

Enforcement strategies that encourage "voluntary compliance" can improve regulatory efficiency by reducing unnecessary enforcement and compliance costs associated with legal confrontation between firms and agencies. This article analyzes the enforcement dilemma that causes confrontation and describes a "Tit for Tat" strategy capable of increasing socially beneficial cooperation. The strategy requires agencies to be reasonable toward cooperative firms, vengeful toward cheaters, unrelenting in pursuit of chronic evaders, but conciliatory toward repentant firms. Reforms in this neglected and poorly understood part of the regulatory process could yield considerable social benefits.     

The Professionalization of Public Accounting: A Social Dilemma Perspective

This study uses a social dilemma model of auditing and a model of cooperative regulatory enforcement to provide a framework within which the evolution of self-regulation in the U.S. accounting profession is studied. From a social dilemma perspective, individual public accounting firms are best off, in a single period sense, by providing a low quality audit product, which is defined in terms of the degree of auditor acquiescence to managers' accounting method discretion. However, firms' collective welfare is maximized by high quality auditing. The cooperative regulatory model employed is premised on the existence of a plausible government threat of punishments and invasive regulations, which motivates self-regulation in an industry. We argue that prior to enactment of the securities acts, public accounting firms faced a social dilemma in which there were limited incentives for high quality auditing either voluntarily or through the establishment of self-regulation. The securities acts provided a plausible threat to which the accounting industry responded by implementing self-regulation in order to avoid invasive and costly government regulation. After the emergence of the accounting profession, there occurred a long period of cooperative regulation with the SEC. Management discretion over accounting methods increased during this time period and audit quality correspondingly decreased, suggesting possible inefficient capture of the SEC. Evidence of an evolution towards a tripartite form of regulation appeared in the 1970s when the SEC and public accounting began to be critically reviewed by Congress. From this time to the present, new regulatory threats have motivated a series of self-regulatory responses by public accounting to improve audit quality.     

Business Response to Regulation: An Economist's Perspective

This chapter presents an economist's perspective on the interrelationship of the compliance and enforcement decisions of business and regulators in the context of regulations governing occupational health. Assuming profit-maximizing firms and harm-minimizing enforcement agencies, it is argued that a degree of preventive activity would be undertaken by businesses even in the absence of regulation. However, if employees are not fully informed about the risks of the workplace, it is likely that the profit-maximizing level of prevention will be less than socially optimal, and consequently there will be a need for regulation. An enforcement agency which attempts to minimize harm through inducing compliance with regulatory standards will be faced with similar informational difficulties to individual employees, and this suggests some scope for cooperative gains with individual firms through negotiated compliance, rather than prosecution.     

Greening Industry Without Enforcement? An Assessment of the World Bank's Pollution Regulation Model for Developing Countries

The best comparative and overview source now available for knowledge about pollution regulation in developing countries is the 2000 World Bank policy research report called Greening Industry . The World Bank finds that there is a new model for pollution regulation in lower- and middle-level income countries that is an alternative to "traditional" command and control regulation. The new model stresses flexible norms and nonstate pressures on regulated enterprises coming from communities and markets. This article presents an investigation into this new model. It finds that the prevalence of weak law enforcement may undermine the new model's potential to control pollution in developing countries. It also contends that social and market pressures only occur under certain circumstances often not found in lower- and middle-level income countries. Therefore, the article concludes that developing countries require smart mixes of various regulatory instruments appropriate in the given state and nonstate regulatory capacities, instead of contrasting state and nonstate regulation.     

Editor's Introduction: Understanding Regulatory Enforcement

This issue of Law & Policy adds to the growing body of empirical case studies of decision-making and enforcement in regulatory agencies. Summarizing that research, regulatory enforcement styles can be described in terms of two dimensions, one concerning the ways in which regulatory violations are defined and punished, the other concerning outcomes, described in policy-evaluative terms. In explaining variation in enforcement style, existing studies point to three sets of factors: characteristics of the regulatory "legal design"; features of agencies' "task environment"; and the regulatory "political environment." Weighting the relative importance of these factors, however, is difficult because of the number and fluidity of variables and the adaptiveness of regulatory agencies.     

管制行业反垄断执法权配置分析——以管制度为视角

管制行业在不同程度上存在着反垄断执法问题,其执法权配置有多种模式可供选择,但从管制度的角度看,这一执法权配置应是从行业管制机构向反垄断专门执法机关逐步移转的过程,这也是大多数国家或地区立法与实践的发展趋向,因此,我国相关立法也应作相应完善.     

Multijurisdictional drug task forces: An analysis of impacts

In the past decade, municipal police organizations have devoted significant resources toward drug enforcement. One popular strategy in addressing the American drug problem is the formulation of multijurisdictional drug task forces. Despite their popularity, the impact of these cooperative ventures on law enforcement agencies has not been adequately evaluated. The research reported here examined the effect of membership in a drug enforcement task force on levels of drug enforcement outputs and perceptions of effectiveness by comparing law enforcement agencies participating in drug task forces to agencies which do not participate. Results suggest that task force membership impacts perceptions, but does not appear to influence objective measures of drug enforcement outputs.     

Regulatory Disclosure of Offending Companies in the Dutch Financial Market: Consumer Protection or Enforcement Publicity?

Regulatory disclosure of names of offending companies is increasingly popular as an alternative to traditional command and control regulation. The goals and intended effects of disclosure are not always clear, however. Do regulators wish to increase their transparency, or do they intend to name and shame? This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the underlying working mechanism of regulatory disclosure of offenders' names through a case study of the Dutch Authority for Financial Markets' disclosure policy. It distinguishes two types of disclosure strategies: consumer oriented and firm oriented. The case study shows that although informing consumers was the primary purpose of disclosure as intended by the Dutch legislature, the purpose in practice has shifted to informing companies about the regulators' enforcement policy. The nature of the disclosed information makes it unlikely that disclosure adequately prevents financial risk taking by consumers. Instead of empowering consumers, disclosure has been incorporated in a traditional deterrence logic, turning out not to be an example of new governance but instead a modern version of command and control enforcement publicity.     

Regulation and In-Company Environmental Management in the Netherlands*

This paper addresses the relationship between preventive systems of social control and regulation of the behavior of public bodies and private organizations. Illustrated with material on new developments in self-regulation concerning environmental management in companies in the Netherlands, the author argues that a combination of stimulated (or “regulated”) self-regulation and stringent enforcement policies is feasible and should lead to company compliance with environmental regulation. The article discusses the assertion that to reduce the social distance between government and individual citizen, between regulator and regulated, a mixture of policy instruments is needed, ergo: by involving societal groups of interested people in policy formation and self-regulation, enhancing the creation of normative systems (involvement “by association”) on the one hand and the availability of adequate law enforcement procedures on the other, corporations, through responsive government regulation, could promote an adequate and successful preventive system of social control.     

Integrating Management Systems and Occupational Health and Safety Regulation

'Best practice' in occupational health and safety (OHS) performance needs to recognize the declining emphasis that is being placed on the capacity of the regulatory state. This article argues that there are more appropriate forms of OHS regulation than direct command and control. The development of a systems-based approach acknowledges the importance of continuous improvement, benchmarking, and internal self-regulation. In order to encourage a systems-based approach, it is suggested that some form of persuasion by coercion by means of law remains a necessary condition for the establishment of an incentive-based 'voluntary' regime.     

The General Data Protection Regulation and the rise of certification as a regulatory instrument

The endorsement of certification in Article 42 and 43 of the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter GDPR) extends the scope of this procedure to the enforcement of fundamental rights. The GDPR also leverages the high flexibility of this procedure to make of certification something else than a voluntary process attesting the conformity with technical standards. This paper argues that the GDPR turned certification into a new regulatory instrument in data protection, I suggest to call it monitored self-regulation, seeking to fill the gap between self-regulation and traditional regulation in order to build a regulation continuum.     

Applying game theory to the protection of public funds: Some introductory notes

Regulatory agencies responsible for preventing misuse of public funds do not all operate in the same fashion. Some carefully weigh the costs and benefits associated with various enforcement policies, but others do not. We use game theory to suggest that (1) regulatory agencies actually have a range of enforcement options at their disposal and (2) these enforcement options can have quite different cost-benefit ratios, depending on the resources of the enforcement agency, the nature of its connection to principals, and the strategies adopted by opportunistic actors. We conclude that enforcement organizations must be flexible in order to be effective.     

作为规制与治理工具的行政许可

源于私人生活中财产权人授权他人分享自己财产权实践的行政许可,正成为一种引人注目的政府规制与治理工具。作为治理工具,行政许可承载了一系列不同的社会目标,规制有时只是其中一个主要目标。当行政许可被限定为规制工具时,可以假定其核心是实现对特定行为的控制,具体机制包括信息收集、准入控制、行为监管以及许可的执行。尽管许可制度具有筛选市场主体并对他们进行识别和规制等积极作用,但同时也存在巨大的负面作用,如限制和阻碍竞争、可能导致权力滥用,而且许可制度是有成本的。政府在采取许可制度过程中,应考虑其他能够达成相同制度目标的替代性工具。     

The Response of Business to Social Regulation in England and Wales: An Enforcement Perspective*

This paper considers business adaptation to legal regulation from an enforcement perspective. It is argued that regulatory agencies and business have a reflexive relationship in which there is a continual process of adaptation and readaptation by one party and then the other. This reflexivity and its implications are discussed with reference to socio-legal research into the regulation of occupational health and safety and environmental pollution in England and Wales.     

Business Responses to the Regulation of Health and Safety in England*

The material in this article is extracted from an empirical study of industrial and agricultural businesses' responses to regulation of health and safety in the workplace. The study critically assesses the philosophy of self-regulation which underpins the regulatory framework in England and within the context of the expectations of employers built into that philosophy, attempts to distinguish between different models of employers in relation to their levels of motivation toward health and safety issues; their knowledge and comprehension of the law; their general approach to compliance with regulations; and their response to inspectors' enforcement activities. The article concludes that self-regulation is only capable of operating under very narrow conditions. It is at its most successful within the largest and most hazardous companies, despite the fact that the inspectorates devote the greatest concentration of enforcement and advisory resources to these sites. Companies which do not have a natural interest in safety require considerable advice, encouragement and coercion. In some situations deterrent penalties may be required in order to achieve a sustained improvement in standards. The research suggests that greater attention should be paid to the variety of employers and their compliance strategies, and to the potential for better targeting of regulatory efforts.     

Prevention and health standards: American, Soviet, and European models

This paper explores some significant sources of variation in the way health standards are derived and used in various countries: differences in biological and regulatory philosophies, in enforcement strategies, and in institutional arrangements. Such cross-national variations raise a number of questions about the process of standard-setting. Among the issues discussed here are the nature of the trade-off between long-run goals and feasibility criteria that merely codify current technical and economic practice, and the possibility of replacing statutory regulation by self-regulation and non-statutory codes and standards.     

Regulatory beneficiaries and informal agency policymaking

Administrative agencies frequently use guidance documents to set policy broadly and prospectively in areas ranging from Department of Education Title IX enforcement to Food and Drug Administration regulation of direct-to- consumer pharmaceutical advertising. In form, these guidances often closely resemble the policies agencies issue in ordinary notice-and-comment rulemaking. However, guidances are generally developed with little public participation and are often immune from judicial review. Nonetheless, guidances can prompt significant changes in behavior from those the agencies regulate. A number of commentators have guardedly defended the current state of affairs. Though guidances lack some important procedural safeguards, they can help agencies supervise low-level employees and supply valuable information to regulated entities regarding how an agency will implement a program. Thus far, however, the debate has largely ignored the distinct and substantial interests of regulatory beneficiaries--those who expect to benefit from government regulation of others. Regulatory beneficiaries include, among others, pharmaceutical consumers, environmental users, and workers seeking safe workplaces. When agencies make policy informally, regulatory beneficiaries suffer distinctive losses to their ability to participate in the agency's decision and to invoke judicial review. This Article argues that considering the interests of regulatory beneficiaries strengthens the case for procedural reform. The Article then assesses some possible solutions.     

Moving Beyond Command-and-Control: Reflexivity in the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health and the Environment

Direct or "command-and-control" regulation has had limited success in dealing with occupational health and safety and with environmental regulation. This lack of success has led policymakers to experiment with self-regulation as an alternative means of achieving the goals of social regulation. The economic subsystem fails to acknowledge its social identity and, therefore, appears to be blind to its negative performance regarding the environment and the workplace. The authors of this paper argue that moving beyond command-and-control can be feasible and desirable, at least to a certain extent, but that pitfalls are omnipresent. "Regulatory dilemmas" need to be solved, sound empirical studies need to be conducted, and a guiding theory needs to be drafted. To achieve these goals, the authors suggest use of the key concept of "reflexivity," which refers to the economic organization's relationship with itself. The practical usefulness of this theoretical concept is explored against the background of regulatory practice in the areas of occupational safety and health and the environment. It is concluded that a mode of reflexive administrative law requires a "negotiating government," which adopts a mixture of strategies and learns to cope with issues like third-party interests, access to information, and enforcement.     

On Explaining the Development of 'Emissions Trading' in U.S. Air Pollution Regulation

Over the past decade the legal-administrative framework of United States air pollution regulation has changed from one based almost entirely on "command control" mechanisms to one allowing considerable use of "transferrable pollution permits." This article traces the process of that change, suggests why it may be a very significant one, and proposes a social explanation for it. Perhaps its most important explanatory proposition is that market mechanism regulation may reflect the formation and rise of a new "regulatory culture" likely to affect the form and substance of regulation more generally.