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1.
Since the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the violence that followed, many scholars have reflected upon the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Most of this analysis has focused on official negotiations without considering the substantial role that unofficial peace efforts have played in peacebuilding, both prior to and after Oslo. This article, in contrast, seeks to better understand the application of “track two” diplomacy to the Israeli–Palestinian case. It reports on a self‐reflection effort by numerous Israeli–Palestinian peace practitioners to better understand what has worked, what has not, and how new initiatives could be more effectively organized and carried out in the future. The research presented is based on an inventory of seventy‐nine track two projects that occurred between Israelis and Palestinians between 1992 and 2004, personal interviews with many of those who organized and oversaw these projects, and two focus group meetings that brought together a total of forty practitioners. In this article, we seek to better understand two issues: (1) how track two initiatives have changed in scope, organization, and intent; and (2) how track two practitioners have sought to disseminate their work beyond the participants of those initiatives. Our findings present an overall picture of the Israeli–Palestinian second track practice and identify a number of trends and common types of practice. Among the trends we have identified are the following: during the peace process years, more track two initiatives were undertaken with elite/professional participants than with representatives of the grassroots, but in the subsequent decade‐and‐a‐half, Israeli–Palestinian grassroots, track two initiatives gradually replaced senior‐level track two exchanges; most of the grassroots initiatives we studied were relationship focused, whereas those involving elite participants are outcome focused; the track two community subscribes to a set of theoretical propositions about which conditions and contexts facilitate the transmission of track two insights and ideas to the political process, but these propositions have yet to be validated; and track two specialists do little strategic planning about ways to most effectively transfer track two insights and ideas to the political process. Our research also identified four distinct, but not mutually exclusive, approaches to practice: the psychological, the constructivist, the capacity building, and the realistic interest. 相似文献
2.
Peter Jones 《Negotiation Journal》2014,30(4):347-366
This article reviews and assesses United States–Iran track two diplomacy over the nuclear issue from 2005 to 2011. It asks why during what should have been a “ripe” moment for discussions, in the first years of the Obama Administration, track two processes were able to contribute so little to any official progress on the issue. The article concludes that the moment was not so ripe, after all, and that officials on each side were less willing to receive the ideas generated by track two than their rhetoric would have indicated. 相似文献
3.
Carolin Goerzig 《Negotiation Journal》2016,32(2):151-163
Numerous efforts to solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through diplomacy have taken place over the last four decades. To shed light on this dilemma in this article, the role that private actors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can play to enhance the negotiation willingness of nonstate armed groups was examined. It was argued that the NGOs in particular could play key roles in promoting the negotiation willingness of nonstate actors and also in influencing their internal dynamics and increasing their cohesion. Specifically, we examine two pairs of efforts to resolve the conflict in Israel and Palestine: the “Road Map” and the track two Geneva Initiative of 2003, and the Olmert Peace Plan and Jimmy Carter's visit to the Middle East in 2008. In the first pair, NGO efforts yielded unexpected results. The Palestinians were ready to compromise even though the deal offered by the Israelis did not seem very generous. In the second pair, the reaction of the Palestinians to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's generous peace offer seemed especially puzzling, illustrating, the internal dynamics between the Palestinian factions. Negotiation willingness was closely related to cohesion, and that cohesion plays an important role in conflict negotiations. President Jimmy Carter's efforts in 2008 to enhance cohesion among the Palestinians illustrated the potential that NGOs have to complement official negotiations. 相似文献
4.
In this study, we examined real‐world sales negotiations by collecting data in collaboration with a large Taiwanese eyeglasses company. We found, as has been established previously, that higher first offers predict higher company profits and that the impact of high opening offers can be muted by greater customer awareness of prices at other stores. When we investigated a more qualitative outcome, customers’ perceptions of service quality, a different set of predictors emerged. Our results indicate that salespeople who spent more time introducing the products and services were perceived by the customers as providing higher service quality, but this effect only occurred for those salespeople who reported high levels of job satisfaction. Also, price reduction by salespeople did not improve customer satisfaction. Our results indicate that customer satisfaction does not require negotiated price concessions, but rather depends on extensive interaction with salespeople who are happy in their work. This is the first study to show that negotiator job satisfaction can affect important negotiation outcomes. 相似文献