Racism: Less is More

Racism has been in sharp decline in recent decades yet the word, as accusation, is used more than ever. The word/idea needs to be more restrictively defined and kept for when it is really needed. When almost everyone is a racist, no one is. To this end we need to distinguish more clearly between the greater comfort people often feel among familiar people and places and active hostility towards outsider ethnic groups. We also need a more discriminating language to describe the spectrum of discrimination. Prejudice, clannishness—even in some instances discrimination itself—should be regarded as sentiments and behaviours that are distinct from proper racism.     

Calling Out the Persistence of Racism

In this issue New Political Science begins a new tradition, printing an extended review essay of the book that received the Michael Harrington Book Award at the most recent American Political Science Association Meeting. The Michael Harrington Award is given for an outstanding book that demonstrates how scholarships can be used in the struggle for a better world. In 2011, the award went to Michelle Alexander for her book The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in an Age of Color-Blindness. Sanford Schram, a member of the award committee, has contributed the below review.     

Explaining political sophistication

Debates over the political sophistication of mass publics smolder on. The more fundamental question, however, is why people become as politically sophisticated or unsophisticated as they do. This paper develops a nonlinear simultaneous equation model to weigh explanations of three general sorts: the politicalinformation to which people are exposed, theirability to assimilate and organize such information, and theirmotivation to do so. The estimates suggest that interest and intelligence, representing motivation and ability, have major effects, but that education and media exposure, the big informational variables, do not. I consider the reasons and sketch some implications for the sophistication of mass publics, for the study of sophistication and other variables of extent, and for democratic theory.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 9–11, 1987. The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Douglas Arnold, John Bolland, Thad Brown, Carol Cassel, Philip Converse, George Kateb, Jan Kmenta, Kathleen Knight, James Kuklinski, Kenneth Langton, Melvin Manis, Diana Owen, Thomas Rochon, Marianne Stewart, Paul Sniderman, James Stimson, and Herbert Weisberg have provided feedback and encouragement. James Gibson relayed his results on the intelligence measures, even as they came off the printer. Mary Lee Luskin helped in many ways. If errors remain, they are mine.     

Explaining welfare spending

Welfare expenditures are difficult to explain within a pure public choice-framework. In this article, I shall argue that the difficulties may be resolved by assuming that the main purpose of welfare schemes is to provide the electorate — in their capacity of different risk categories — with insurance against various social risks, rather than to redistribute economic resources towards weak and destitute groups in society. This solution not only explains the scope of existing welfare arrangements, but may also hold the key to an explanation as to how public welfare policies change and evolve across time.     

The Agent–Structure Problem and Institutional Racism

My aim here is to demonstrate the relevance of meta-theoretical speculation to policy design and implementation through an examination of the agent–structure problem. I then apply this problem to the concept of institutional racism as developed in the Macpherson inquiry into the death and subsequent police (mis)investigation of black teenager Stephen Lawrence. When considered through the lens of the agent–structure problem, the account of institutional racism developed in the Macpherson inquiry still lacks a solid analysis of the structural causes that help explain the phenomenon. Policies developed on the basis of the account will necessarily fail to address some of the causes of institutional racism. Careful attention to the agent–structure problem can help illuminate potentially unexplored areas of the social field that might help in controlling or eradicating racism.     

Explaining institutional amnesia in government

This article explains why different government agencies experience variations in organizational memory loss. It first explains institutional amnesia theoretically by expanding the formal‐institutional view of organizational memory to include agential and structural‐contextual properties, revealing a broader range of novel explanations for amnesia. Institutional amnesia is then explained empirically through an international analysis of memory loss in four Westminster systems (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). This analysis, which principally relies on 100 interviews with ministers, policy officials, and public‐sector leaders across the four countries, leads to the introduction of four explanations for amnesia, relating to: organizational churn, absorptive capacity, strategic‐instrumental decision making, and historical storytelling.     

Explaining a health care paradox

The paradox of a statistically weak linkage between physician density and measures of health based on outcome has recently received much attention because of its importance to health planning policy. It is demonstrated here that the linkage is stronger than indicated by previous studies if the statistical model is more carefully specified. A single case-type is chosen so that the impact of physician services is not filtered out by the aggregation process and a quantitative variable measuring case severity is derived. When statistical techniques are applied to correct for case-risk and for the inherent heteroscedasticity in observed mortality rates across states and time, the positive effect of physician density on health is shown to be statistically highly significant. Thus the apparently paradoxical findings in previous studies may be a result of failing to correct not only for differences in case severity but also for variations in sample errors. Also, even though the magnitude of physician impact is small compared to non-medical variables, an exploratory estimate of the impact of government programs focused on prevention suggests that present allocations between prevention and treatment may approximate optimality.The project upon which this paper is based was performed pursuant to Research Grant HS01036 from the Bureau of Health Services Research and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The author wishes to acknowledge the advice and encouragement of Llad Phillips and H. E. Frech.     

Explaining Contextual Effects on Vote Choice

How are individual voters influenced by their social surroundings? Though numerous studies establish that voting behavior can be influenced by the social context, we lack a full understanding of how the actions of individual voters can be influenced by the composition of their social environment. In this paper, I develop and test a micro-level model of the operation of contextual influences on political behavior. The model specifies the effects of both personal contact and individual perception of the partisan nature of the local environment. The data show little support for personal contact as a mechanism of contextual influence, but reveal that perception of partisan dominance markedly enhances the impact of partisan identification on vote choice.     

青年概念的当代阐释

青年概念是青年研究的基本问题。现实中存在多种青年概念的定义。从综合研究青年的角度,根据人们对青年概念的认识发展,根据当代社会发展变化了的客观实际,定义当代青年是处在身体发育已经成熟、人格基本形成和社会自立初期阶段的人;当代青年的年龄界定在18至35岁之间。当代青年概念的内涵和外延都有了新的变化,其根本原因是由青年与现实社会的实际联系决定的。     

Explaining collective action with rational models

We note the failure of a rational egoist model of human behavior to generate successful predictions of important economic and political behaviors including collective action. Alternative models are presented that combine rational, utility-maximizing features with concerns about collective welfare. The performance of these models in explaining contributing behavior in an experimentally-induced public goods game is compared to the performance of a rational egoist and collective welfare model. The results indicate that a model in which subjects are presumed to trade off benefits to self with benefits to others provides a better explanation of actual contributing behavior than either the rational egoist or collective welfare models, but still explains only a small amount of the individual variance in contributing behavior.The Institute for Political Economy, Utah State University provided important financial support for this study. Donald Cundy, Alan Huston, Joe Oppenheimer, John Orbell, and Randy Simmons provided valuable comments on earlier drafts.