融贯性论证的整体性面向

法律论证的正确性宣称,一方面要求一个正确的司法决定应当能够根据有效法逻辑地推导出来,另一方面要求所适用的法律规范本身是合理或公平的。前者需满足逻辑一致性的要求,表现为演绎式的线性证立方式;后者需满足融贯性的要求,表现为各个理由之间的相互支持关系,是一种整体性的证立方式。坚持融贯性标准的法律论证,在本质上是一种整体性的证立方式。     

诱惑侦查合法性的阶段化认定:日本经验与中国路径

日本对诱惑侦查的合法性认定采取主客观混合的阶段化判断标准,分为启动阶段的合法性审查和实施阶段的正当性审查,具有清晰的阶段化特征和鲜明的实践指引功能。相较而言,我国在诱惑侦查合法性认定的问题上,既存在由法律规定的模糊性所导致的概念范围不明、法律性质不清等问题,也存在过度重视判断标准中静态要素的设置,忽视对诱惑侦查的行为阶段进行区分的倾向。解决问题的出路是,在概念界定上应明确诱惑侦查作为事前侦查、任意侦查的法律性质,并以指导案例的形式对诱惑侦查的行为方式、合法性判断要素进行解释说明;在司法认定上应在肯定主客观混合标准的同时,对判断标准中的主观要素和客观要素进行动态审查,进而形成启动阶段合法性审查和实施阶段正当性审查的区分,以凸显判断标准的实践指引功能。     

Implementing Prior Judicial Decisions as Precedents: The Context of Application and Justification

The paper concerns the conditions and methods of using previous judicial decisions as a kind of precedents in the processes of application of law within the statutory legal order. The use of such decisions, not announced by the legislator, depends on the courts, undertaking such actions on the grounds of similarity of cases or of decisional processes. Such decisions do not become an exclusive validation argument and may create a situation of their potential conflict with legal regulations as well as an inferential supplementation of their content. Dissemination of such activity of the courts leads to the development of precedential practice (relevant to the statutory legal order), though, its actual jurisdictional role depends on proper justification of decisions, within which reference to these decisions should be adaptive (in relation to the elements of the current case), generalizing (forming elements of ratio decidendi) as well as argumentative and discursive (in respect of the way in which the decisional reasoning and arguments expressed in the prior justification are used).

     

论犯罪规定的正当化理论之缺失

犯罪规定的正当化理论在刑法学中至今仍无一席之地，犯罪规定的正当化问题或者湮没于刑法的机能之中，或者在刑罚的正当化理论中若隐若现，即使在罪刑法定主义的时代呼唤下，它也仅有微弱的回应。这是刑法裁判规范优先观念的产物，建立市民刑法，应树立行为规范优先的理念，重视犯罪规定的正当化问题，为此必须转变观念，必须反思法益之概念。     

裁判上之类比推论辨析

裁判上类比推论的妥当性,取决于裁判者对类比点的选择,以及如何确定被比较个案的特征。与一般类比不同的是,裁判者必须考察法规范所隐含的价值判断,运用评价才能展开法律上的类推。因此,虽然类推适用具有逻辑推论的形式,但其实质是一种可辩驳的论辩性论证。类比推论的关节和难点,是规范事实和个案事实之间的"相似性"判断,这需要裁判者观照构成要件理论和类型理论,综合各种与类推相关的司法技术,在规范与事实、方法与结果之间寻求一种反思性平衡。     

合宪性推定的正当性

合宪性推定是宪法审查中一种重要方法。其最初起源于美国，尔后逐渐被德国、日本、澳大利亚等法治国所采用。国内目前对于合宪性推定方法的认识尚有不足，在一定程度上影响了宪法审查制度的有效运作。对于合宪性推定方法的借鉴，不在于简单移植，重点在于从一般原理的角度来探求其所存在的正当性基础。从人权价值、规范体系、经济理性等多角度对合宪性推定的正当性进行论证，可发现合宪性推定是一种原理性的宪法方法，根基于宪法的最高性、法官的经济理性、人权的目的性、国家权力的手段性等。合宪性推定的正当性论证，在折射出目前宪法方法的贫瘠的同时，也有助于摆脱宪法文本浪漫主义的方法论困境，进而体现出宪法方法兼具政治与法律的特性。     

Justification and Application of Norms*

Abstract According to the author there is no doubt that one has to distinguish between the justification and the application of norms. Problems are seen only to arise if one asks what exactly the distinction is and which consequences have to be drawn from it. Recently, Klaus Günther, in particular, has searched for this distinction and connected it with far-reaching conclusions concerning the theory of norms, arguments, and morals. His theses are the object of the author's considerations.     

The Social Life of Regulation in Taipei City Hall: The Role of Legality in the Administrative Bureaucracy

This article explores the role of legality in conceptions of state and society among bureaucrats in the Taipei, Taiwan city government. When administrators confront the global arena, the existence of law emblematizes modernity and the ability to participate in the international system. In interactions among administrators, law is laden with impossible ideals and fraught with assumptions of hypocrisy. In dealings with people outside the government, legality often signals the breakdown of other, more valuable social norms. Far from legitimating administrative action, legality itself is legitimated by reference to the same values as other social action: it is held up to an ideal of consensus and cultural coherence and judged by its ability to fulfill obligations and nurture relationships. Law does not hegemonically structure administrators’ conceptions of state and society. Rather, it defines one aspect of governance at the margins of legitimacy, dependent on justification through other ethical norms.     

The role of coherence in legal reasoning

Many contemporary philosophers of law agree that a necessary condition for a decision to be legally justified, even in a hard case, is that it coheres with established law. Some, namely Sartorius and Dworkin, have gone beyond that relatively uncontroversial claim and described the role of coherence in legal justification as analogous to its role in moral and scientific justification, on contemporary theories. In this, I argue, they are mistaken. Specifically, coherence in legal justification is sometimes specific to a branch of law, and there is nothing isomorphic to this in the models of moral and scientific justification. Although Dworkin and Sartorius rely on the concept of coherence, they do not explicate it. In the course of examining their views, this essay offers a partial analysis of coherence on their models. Finally, two canons of relevance, governing when global coherence considerations are appropriate to legal justification, are presented.     

美国模范刑法典导论

美国法学会1962年通过的《模范刑法典》在美国刑法法典化的历史中发挥了最重要的作用。自颁布至今,该法典一直是美国刑法典改革的主导力量,也是美国刑法学研究的催化剂。该法典内容上包括总则、具体犯罪的规定、处遇和矫正、矫正组织四编,总体上采用了“原则性实用主义”的进路。该法典的创新之处体现在:全面的总则、分析性的结构、充分界定犯罪、使用限定的术语、法典条款的解释体系、犯罪体系,以及某些具体规则的创新,如犯罪要件、不完整犯罪和同谋犯、正当事由、免责事由等。     

Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

Contempt of Court <Emphasis Type="Italic">In Facie Curiae</Emphasis>; Problems of Justification,Application and Control with Reference to the Situation in Botswana

The existence and exercise of the power to order summary punishment for contempt of court is a much contested terrain. Its antiquity and ubiquity pervade many states across the globe, and in particular in the Anglo-American legal system. This state of affairs has much to do with its very nature and justification. The procedure itself potentially compromises time honoured requirements and practices of due process of law, and also potentially sanctions the fusion of characteristics of an aggrieved person, prosecutor and judge in the same person. Notwithstanding these misgivings, it has continued to be practiced in many parts of the world. Given these exceptions to norms, its scope has been very difficult to delineate, to an extent that although attempts have been made to lay down general principles for its application, the range of conduct necessary for its invocation is so amorphous, malleable and indefinite as to present a difficulty in justification. This has raised many questions both as to its legality and or justification. This article is just but one attempt to answer the questions raised, to the extent possible, and later on to survey its exercise in the context of the jurisdiction of Botswana.     

Moving Children through Private International Law: Institutions and the Enactment of Ethics

This article examines how the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co‐operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Adoption Convention) plays a central role in justifying the institution of legal adoption. The Hague Adoption Convention has often been regarded as a response to the challenges that the “global situation” brings to adoption practice. Based on private international law, the agreement contains protocols and norms to ensure the protection of the child in intercountry adoption. In the article, I propose that the Hague Convention can be understood as a “transparency device”; a complex assemblage working in pursuit of global “good governance.” The device, however, also operates as justification within the institutional domain, allowing adoption agencies to make distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate adoptions. Idemonstrate how the logic of transparency disguises as much as it promises to reveal. While the doctrine's aim is to validate adoptability and combat trafficking, it also helps to mainstream Euro‐American adoption knowledge to other parts of the world.     

论国家义务的价值基础

人性尊严是最高位阶的客观价值,是人类永远追求的目标。人性尊严之彰显,将促进生成民众合法性信念,达成普遍利益认同与共识,从而形成有普遍约束力的规范,成为最高判断标准与根本规范,是全体法规范价值体系的根源。人性尊严为国家义务提供了坚实的合法性与正当性基础,是国家义务的妥当性规范。     

The Case of the Hypocritical

This paper analyzes the idea of critique as an idea, in relation to the problematic fiction of legal foundations. In doing so, it refers to the work of Giorgio Agamben and Jean-Luc Nancy. In particular, Jean-Luc Nancy’s concept of the lapsus of right (jus) is explored in relation to the fiction of a Law of law and the notion of the Right to have rights. The paper argues for the conception of an immanent critique of law that seeks to have done with foundational judgments as primary to critique. To have done with judgment as primary is crucial as judgment is the way in which philosophies of law have attempted to establish their own justification while claiming that such a ground or justification comes from an external source. Instead, what is to be reconceived and in a preliminary way is that critique and its concepts are intimate to their problems and vice versa. I wish to thank each of the participants to this issue for their effort and their kind collaboration and V. Kelley for her invaluable assistance in the final editing process. I thank C. Douzinas for introducing me to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and P. Fitzpatrick and S. Motha for sharing their paths of reading. Especial thanks to A.␣Schütz, E. Loizidou, N. Moore, J.á. Bellido Anon and A. Bottomley for discussions on disagreement. Gratitude is owed to J.-L. Nancy for inspiring thoughts and writings and for the sweetness in response to my suggestion that there are no antidotes to the poisons we write. This is for the wonderful Elene.     

Two Misunderstandings About Public Justification and Religious Reasons

Two important objections have been raised against exclusivist public reason (EPR). First, it has been argued that EPR entails an unjust burden for citizens who want to appeal to non-public reasons, especially religious reasons. Second, it has been argued that EPR is based on a problematic conception of religious reasons and that it ignores the fact that religious reasons can be public as well. I defend EPR against both objections. I show that the first objection conflates two ideas of public justification (public justification as a conception of political legitimacy and public justification as an ideal of civility) and that the second objection conflates two ways to understand and identify religious reasons. Ultimately, it turns out that those who defend such objections actually share the concerns that justified EPR in the first place. In other words, if we are clear about the idea of public justification and the kind of religious reasons that EPR is really about, it appears that justificatory liberals are in fact all exclusivists.     

刑法学中事实概念与规范概念之嬗变——基于刑法信条学上犯罪构造理论的考察

犯罪构造理论在刑法学历史上占据举足轻重的地位。它标志着现代刑法的诞生,自此犯罪被牢牢地与刑法法规连在一起,罪刑法定原则亦从宣言走向实践。可以说,作为刑法学支柱的犯罪构造理论,其重要性体现在对刑法学知识体系的正当性建基。回顾刑法学的发展沿革,从古典犯罪论体系到新古典犯罪论体系、目的主义犯罪论体系再到目的理性主义犯罪体系,犯罪构造理论走出了一条从纯粹的事实到不断融入规范因素的轨迹,而对于犯罪构造理论中事实概念与规范概念的廓清在当下刑法学界显得尤为必要。     

刑罚的内部功能解释

刑罚的内部功能,是指刑罚作为刑法系统的一个基本要素,它在刑法系统的建构中所能产生的作用.这是刑罚权以象征性的符号形式作用于刑法系统的其他要素时所发生的功能,它表征刑罚在刑法系统中的地位和作用.刑罚的内部功能主要包括规范定性功能、评价功能、予效功能,它们体现的是刑罚要素在刑法规范构造过程中的原理性的价值,所以,其意义主要在立法过程中得以彰显.     

论标准对法律发挥作用的规范基础

标准对法律规范社会行为具有重要的作用,这种作用建立在标准的规范性基础之上。《标准化工作导则第1部分:标准化文件的结构和起草原则》(GB/T1.1-2020)为我们认识标准的规范、分析标准的规范性进而解释标准对法律所起的作用提供了路径指引。通过标准的构成要素、标准的表达方式和标准的体系构成三个层面的分析,可以系统地阐释标准对于法律所起作用的规范基础。