THE NATIONAL COORDINATION OF EU POLICY IN HUNGARY: PATTERNS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Although European Union (EU) membership generates similar functional pressures for national administrations, member states developed institutional arrangements that show marked cross‐country variation in the coordination of EU policy. This article examines and assesses the institutions and mechanisms established in Hungary for formulating policy positions on the domestic level. In line with the general features of central government, the system is highly centralized and hierarchical, and has been characterized by a comprehensive coordination ambition from its inception. The case confirms the primary importance of national institutional factors for shaping coordination systems, but also the relevance of more actor‐centered explanations for accounting for changes in the top decision‐making tier. At the same time, the Hungarian experience also draws attention to power relations within governing parties and prime ministerial involvement as important variables so far relatively neglected in the literature.     

EXPLORING CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS' COORDINATION OF EUROPEAN UNION AFFAIRS

This study explores the coordination mechanisms managed by the central governments of the European Union (EU) in order to develop negotiation positions for their plenipotentiaries in the Council. Utilizing novel data from an expert survey, the first part examines the relationships within and between the structures and processes of EU coordination, the actors involved, and the mechanisms' efficacy. The analysis shows that highly formalized coordination mechanisms are associated with developing timely, clear and consistent negotiation positions. The second part allocates the 28 member states' EU coordination mechanisms into different clusters, including unicentric, pluricentric, decentric, proactive, reactive, politicized, depoliticized, high efficacy and low efficacy. Intriguing differences are identified, such as the fact that the Central and Eastern European member states' mechanisms are typically more reactive where coordination centres on the national capital and the Council negotiations.     

WHY STRONG COORDINATION AT ONE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH STRONG COORDINATION ACROSS LEVELS (AND HOW TO LIVE WITH IT): THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union (EU) inherited ‘indirect administration’ from classical international organizations: policies adopted by the international organization are subsequently to be implemented nationally by member states themselves, and not by bodies owned by the international organization. This arrangement has often led to legislation being incorporated and applied rather differently across countries. In order to harmonize implementation practices within the EU, we have witnessed a development from ‘indirect administration’ to more ‘direct administration’ in the sense that national agencies work closely with the European Commission, EU agencies and sister agencies in other member states, partly bypassing national ministries. Thus, stronger coordination across levels may counteract strong coordination at the national level. This ‘coordination dilemma’ seems to have been largely ignored in the literatures on EU network governance and national ‘joined‐up government’, respectively. The ambition of this article is twofold: first, the coordination dilemma is theoretically and empirically illustrated by the seeming incompatibility between a more direct implementation structure in the multilevel EU administrative system and trends towards strengthening coordination and control within nation states. Second, the article discusses organizational arrangements that may enable systems to live with the coordination dilemma in practice.     

NEGLECTED FACES OF EUROPEANIZATION: THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF THE EU ON THE DISMANTLING AND EXPANSION OF DOMESTIC POLICIES

The objective of this article is to clarify the extent and the conditions under which the European Union (EU) induces changes in the policy arrangements of its member states. For an accurate measurement of our dependent variable, we distinguish between EU-induced policy expansion and EU-induced policy dismantling. We argue that the extent to which European requirements lead to an expansion or dismantling of national policy arrangements is crucially affected by the respective governance logic underlying the regulatory activities at the European level, that is: (1) compliance with EU rules; (2) competition between national administrative systems to achieve EU requirements; and (3) communication between regulatory agents across national levels arranged in an EU legal or institutional framework. To illustrate our theoretical argument, we develop hypotheses on the likelihood and direction of national policy change under these three modes of governance, in addition, providing empirical examples from different policy areas.     

CORE EXECUTIVES AND COORDINATION OF EU LAW TRANSPOSITION: EVIDENCE FROM NEW MEMBER STATES

This article compares cabinet institutions for coordinating the transposition of EU legislation in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. It examines how national executives have adapted to European integration and what factors have shaped institutional variation across countries and over time. During pre‐accession, the Hungarian, Polish and (to a lesser extent) Czech cabinets established strong core executives for tracking EU‐related legislative commitments, monitoring progress and reviewing the quality of transposition. After accession, the cores in all three cabinets loosened the grip on transposition, although to different degrees. The analysis shows that, if sectoral factors are kept constant, variation in the patterns of national adaptation can be explained with reference to external incentives and constitutional rules. High benefits of transposition before accession encouraged centralization, particularly in prime‐ministerial cabinets. Fewer incentives under full membership contributed to a halt or reversal in core executive ascendancy, especially in ministerial‐type cabinets.     

Macro‐economic coordination and elusive ownership in the European Union

The notion of ownership is well known in relation to global governance. In the realm of EU macro‐economic coordination, it has become a buzzword since the revamping process of the European Semester in 2015. This article investigates how ownership by four types of domestic actors (governments, administrations, parliaments and social partners) manifests itself in the European Semester. We conceptualize three types of ownership, namely institutional, political, and cognitive. Using network analysis, semi‐structured interviews, and a small‐scale survey, we find that ownership is strongest among governments and administrations which are able to shape the outputs of the European Semester (institutional ownership) with little political disagreement (political ownership). While national parliaments display low levels of all types of ownership, employers and unions exhibit relatively strong cognitive ownership. We conclude that the European Semester remains a bureaucratic process contributing to building a multi‐level administrative space rather than an arena for political debates.     

NETWORKING FOR AUTONOMY? NATIONAL AGENCIES IN EUROPEAN NETWORKS

The environment of national agencies has changed considerably in recent years as they increasingly become engaged in European Union networks. This article contributes to a growing body of literature on those networks and their effect on executive politics at the national level by asking whether and how the EU involvement of national agencies affects the agencies' autonomy in policy formulation. We develop an analytical model for explaining the effect of EU involvement on agency autonomy. Analyzing data from a comprehensive survey of federal agencies in Germany, we find that EU involvement has a positive effect on national agencies' policy autonomy. Moreover, we find a somewhat stronger effect of agency involvement in sectoral networks on autonomy than in intergovernmental networks, which is attributed to information asymmetries between ministries and agencies. Yet this effect is weaker than initially expected, which can be explained by a considerable degree of overlap between different types of EU involvement.     

EUROPEANIZATION IN MANAGING EU AFFAIRS: BETWEEN DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE,A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ESTONIA,HUNGARY AND SLOVENIA

Scholarly research into Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia has shown that the idiosyncrasies of the new EU countries (especially with respect to institutionalizing and centralizing the co‐ordination of core executives in managing EU affairs at home) persist. They are complemented by trends toward convergence (such as growing co‐ordination efforts and a common tendency: that of the prime minister to be the centre of co‐ordination). In this article external Europeanization pressures, national administrative traditions (the legacies of both pre‐communist and communist systems), and the patterns of party competition that cause variations in politico‐administrative relations, are tested as possible explanatory variables of differences seen in the three countries when managing EU affairs. While national administrative traditions play similar roles to those seen in old(er) member states by filtering the EU‘s impacts, the effect of patterns of party competition on politico‐administrative relations when managing EU affairs has been filtered by the accession states’ national priorities of integrating with the EU.     

For Business,for Pleasure or for Necessity? The Czech Republic's Choices for Europe

Drawing on scholarly accounts from the study of Western Europe which seek to explain national preference formation in European Union member states, this article explores the factors which shape the Czech Republic's policy preferences at the EU level. It argues that whilst ideology, dependency and powerful economic interest groups have explanatory power, the key to explaining national preference formation in the Czech case lies in vulnerabilities and (perceived) weakness.     

SOCIAL TRUST,IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS

In this article, we investigate whether differences in social trust and impartial public administration have an impact on public confidence in EU crisis management institutions. Our assessment is based on a cross‐country comparison using aggregate country‐level data of the member states in the European Union. Earlier studies on the EU as a crisis manager have not carefully studied to what extent differences in social trust and administrative culture may or may not matter. Our analysis shows that in countries where citizens are treated impartially by their own national public administration institutions, people are less likely to support EU‐coordinated civil protection efforts. In contrast, in places where citizens perceive their government's treatment of them as partial and unfair, citizens will tend to support EU‐coordinated civil protection.     

TIME FOR EU MATTERS: THE EUROPEANIZATION OF DUTCH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

To what extent does the European Union (EU) affect national governments? This article seeks to answer this question by assessing the Europeanization of Dutch central government. Using data from a large‐scale survey among civil servants, we assess to what extent the EU affects the structure and culture of governmental organizations, as well as the activities of individual civil servants. On the basis of this analysis, we conclude that the impact of the EU both on individual civil servants and on organizations in Dutch central government is two‐sided: a small core of civil servants and organizations are deeply involved in EU‐related activities and this exists alongside a much broader base of civil servants and organizations that are less affected by the EU. These differences appear more clearly on the level of daily working practices than on the level of formal organizational structures. Nevertheless, the impact of European integration on government organizations remains limited to particular organizations and particular civil servants within central government.     

EU agencies' involvement in transboundary crisis response: Supporting efforts or leading coordination?

EU agencies have emerged as entities offering technical coordination to member states and support to the European Commission in different policy areas. Their expertise may play a role in responding to unexpected crises. Against this backdrop, we examine under which circumstances EU agencies, through their specialized expertise, are involved in transboundary crisis responses, and when they acquire a leading position in coordinating those responses. To do so, we study four agencies which faced crises: the EBA and the 2012 banking crisis; the ECDC and the 2014 Ebola outbreak; EFSA and the 2011 E. coli outbreak; and Frontex and the 2015 refugee crisis. Our findings discuss to what extent agencies' involvement in transboundary crises is related to functional (sector characteristics) and institutional (delegation of authority) variables. We also identify that under certain political conditions EU agencies' coordination capacity is activated, allowing them to emerge as leading institutions in transboundary crisis resolution.     

ARE ICTs IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EU REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

This paper conducts an empirical study about the effect of e‐government on transparency, openness and, hence, accountability in 15 countries of the EU. Thus the effects examined cover over 84 per cent of EU population. The population also represents the different types of public administration styles that exist in Western developed countries. The paper compares the development and sophistication of 318 government web sites at sub‐national level and tests the impact of contextual and organizational factors. The study refers to regional and local governments since they play a key role both in the national pattern of government and in administering welfare policies. Benchmarking studies of e‐government are undertaken regularly by consultancy firms. Most of this literature focuses on central and federal governments in terms of examining trends in digital government. However, little research has been conducted from a comparative perspective on analysing the movement of EU countries to digital government at a sub‐national level.     

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL DISCRETION IN POST‐COMMUNIST CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF HUNGARY

This article addresses the discrepancy between attempts to establish professional, de‐politicized civil services and the politicization of personnel policy at the central government level of post‐communist countries. It develops the concept of formal political discretion as an analytical tool for the assessment of how and to what extent legislative frameworks governing civil services provide institutional conditions for the de‐politicization of personnel policy. The case of Hungary shows that since the change of regime in 1989/90, four civil service reforms have led to the adoption, implementation and revision of civil service legislation that has gradually reduced the possibilities for government ministers to exercise political discretion over personnel policy. Civil service reforms have also led to the institutionalization of various discretionary instruments which ministers can and have used to politicize civil service affairs. The adoption and implementation of civil service laws therefore does not necessarily lead to the de‐politicization of civil services.     

Coordinated European Governance: Self‐Organizing or Centrally Steered?

Now that it is widely accepted that the European Union (EU) constitutes a system of governance, analysts need actively to explore precisely how it may affect the continuing struggle better to coordinate national and European administrations. In its 2001 White Paper on governance, the European Commission interpreted governance to mean less central control and more network-led steering. Its interpretation of such networks is that they are self-organizing. Drawing upon an empirical study of environmental policy integration (EPI) in the EU, this article shows that this vision may not adequately fit the multi-actor, multi-level coordination challenges associated with some EU problems. By studying the administrative capacities that the European Commission and three member states have created to achieve better environmental coordination, this article shows significant administrative weaknesses. It concludes that the coordination challenges now troubling the EU require a more thoughtful discussion of network management than the White Paper suggests.     

SELF‐SERVICE SOCIETY: PARTICIPATIVE POLITICS AND NEW FORMS OF GOVERNANCE

The purpose of this paper is to identify ‘participative politics' and what is here called ‘self‐service politics' as distinct political themes in many advanced democracies, in order to investigate their main elements and chart their interrelationships. These two themes are examined from the viewpoint of politicization and depoliticization tendencies. Participative politics consists of three main forms, defined as active citizenship, citizen networks and co‐production. Self‐service politics, in turn, connects each of these forms to a larger political transformation by pitting themes of activating politics, social governance and accountability against them. The paper investigates what bearing participative politics, and self‐service politics as its inevitable attendant, have on the sphere of democratic deliberation.     

NATIONAL AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE: GOVERNMENT DRIVEN,COMMISSION DRIVEN OR NETWORKED?

In terms of national agencies in the European administrative space, case studies indicate that national governments may be partly split so that national (regulatory) agencies operate in a ‘double‐hatted’ manner when practising EU legislation, serving both ministerial departments and the European Commission. Applying large‐N questionnaire data, this article follows up these studies by investigating how important various institutions are with respect to influencing national agencies when they are practising EU legislation. How discretion is exercised at this stage of the policy process is not trivial; we demonstrate that, in addition, this activity is highly contested. Our main conclusion is that implementation of EU policies at the national level is neither solely indirect via national governments (as the standard portrayal says), nor solely direct (through Commission‐driven national agencies), nor solely networked (through transnational agency clusters). Implementation is instead compound with several sources of power represented more or less simultaneously.     

Putting power into practice: Administrative and political capacity building in the European Parliament's Committee for International Trade

As the formal powers of the European Parliament have increased with successive treaty changes, its committees' administrations have seen a parallel growth. We argue that such administrative capacity is necessary but not sufficient for acting on formal treaty powers. Administrative capacity has to be combined with political capacity in order to muster policy impact in European Union decision‐making. By differentiating between intra‐institutional administrative and inter‐institutional political capacity, we offer a fine‐grained conceptualization of policy capacity while broadening the theoretical and empirical understanding of the European Parliament's administration as an organizational structure of formal and informal working practices, intra‐institutional coordination and inter‐institutional relations. Based on expert interviews, document analysis and participant observation, the case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership illustrates how societal politicization of a specific policy issue triggered the European Parliament to exploit the latent potential of its post‐Lisbon administrative capacity by transforming it into a more readily deployable political capacity.     

THE EUROPEAN UNION ‘MODEL’ AND ADMINISTRATIVE CO‐OPERATION: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

This article examines the relevance of the European Union (EU) model of governance in explaining the innovative administrative arrangements established by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the North‐South Ministerial Council (NSMC), and in particular its joint secretariat. The first section of the article sets out five models of the EU that may be applied to the NSMC. The second section provides an overview of the cross‐border relationship until 1998 and the third section examines the administrative relationship since 1998. In conclusion, the similarities between the NSMC secretariat and the open coordination model of the EU are highlighted.     

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EU AGENCIES: AGENCIES AS ‘MINI COMMISSIONS’

A stream of reviews that take stock of EU governance trends shows that the EU's governance agenda produces mixed results. EU agencies are part of the EU's search for new governance mechanisms. They have not proven to be a break with EU policy‐making processes – underpinning administrative stability rather than reform. This article explores the institutionalization of EU agencies. Using the case of the EU's human resources (HR) policy, it concludes that administrative details are important in order to understand the development of EU agencies turning into institutions. The influence of the EU's institutional environment on their operations is so strong that they must operate as ‘mini Commissions'. This tight control hinders their institutionalization.