Britain’s holocaust memorial day: A case of post-cold war wish-fulfillment, or brazen hypocristy?

This article considers why institutionalized commemoration of the Holocaust in the United Kingdom developed in the 1990s. It finds that the answer may have less to do with Jewish lobbies, or the influence of a “Holocaust Industry” and much, more to do with state political objectives in the ebb of the Cold War. It argues that by repackaging and ritualizing the Holocaust into a “sacred” event in which Western states themselves were absolved of responsibility but also sought to come to Jewish rescue, it became an invaluable prop with which to promulgate Western values while at the same time acting as a moral alibi for interventions against anti-Western regimes. By focusing on the example of specifically British relations with Iraq, it is demonstrated that the moral high ground which Western states have attempted to milk from a Holocaust association is meretricious cant. Appalling and inhuman acts of genocide changed the course of history in the twentieth century. Millions of people perished or had their lives hideously damaged. This is an opportunity for us to recognize and act upon the lessons of the past. Our aim in the twenty-first century must be to work towards a tolerant and diverse, society which is based upon the notions of universal dignity and equal rights and responsibilities for all citizens. The Holocaust Memorial Day is a symbol of this. I would like to thank Prof. Dave Cesarani and two other unknown readers for extremely assiduous and helpful comments on the original draft of this article.     

Integration of strategic and operational intelligence during the Peninsular war

Wellington is well known for his understanding of the importance of intelligence, but so far history has recorded that he presided over a one-man intelligence department, himself being the only analyst of what proved to be a massive quantity of raw information. New research highlighted in this article reveals that this has been an inaccurate interpretation. The British government also acted to establish a civilian network of correspondents and agents communicating with the British ambassadors to Spain and Portugal. Wellington's main priority was to integrate the ‘strategic intelligence’ collected by government agents with his own ‘operational intelligence’. Instead, analysis was conducted more by Wellington's subordinates in the field, applying their personal localized expertise to the information they received. In this way, an early and primitive form of the staff system later developed by the Prussians was created in the Peninsular War.     

A vision for sociology

His most recent books are Foundations of Social Theory,and Equality and Achievement in Education.He is also the author of Power and The Structure of Society,and The Asymetric Societyamong many other books.     

Horst Hesse: A cold war military intelligence mole

Drawing upon East German Stasi archives, this article presents the story of Horst Hesse's penetration as a double agent into a US Military Intelligence office in Würzburg, Germany during 1955 and 1956. While military personnel were celebrating a German holiday, Hesse broke into the office with two accomplices and absconded with two safes containing the names of MI agents in East Germany. Many were arrested and some were sentenced. The account provides important positive and negative lessons for intelligence tradecraft.     

A commentary on strategic land promotion in the UK

The supply of land for new housing within the UK is an important and a contested issue. Strategic land promotion, namely, the identification, acquisition, and promotion of land through the planning system, has become a major element in contributing to government targets for new housebuilding in the UK. This brief commentary paper outlines the characteristics of strategic land promotion, provides illustrations of the range of schemes land promotion companies have pursued within the UK, and concludes with some wider reflections on the process.     

Provoking a civil war

Nondemocratic governments under the rule of weak institutions use repression against the opposition to remain in power. Repression both muffles the opposition’s voice and strengthens the government’s supporters. Nevertheless, when repression becomes strong enough, it becomes intolerable to its victims who revolt and initiate a civil war. The government is aware of the mechanism and determines the level of repression accordingly. This paper studies the circumstances in which the ruler’s best alternative is to intensify repression to the point of provoking civil war. Although the model is abstract, its implications are discussed using the recent civil war in the Ivory Coast as a case study.     

Brunei's strategic dilemmas

Abstract

This paper compares health policy trends in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand with the purpose of drawing usable lessons in reform. The study finds that governments in the region are rapidly privatizing the provision of healthcare at the same time as they are expanding the government's role in financing. The paper argues that expansion of public financing at the same time as private provision is misconceived as the combination would aggravate instances and severity of market failures peculiar to the sector. The dysfunctional trend is particularly evident in Indonesia and the Philippines. In Thailand, in contrast, the expansion of public financing has occurred in the context of a health system dominated by public providers, which has had the effect of restraining healthcare costs. Malaysia occupies a mid position between Indonesia and the Philippines on the one hand and Thailand on the other. All four cases underline the value of state capacity in designing optimal policies and implementing them effectively.     

After the cold war

He is co-editor (with Kenneth W. Thompson) of Truth and Tragedy: A Festschrift for Hans J. Morgenthau,and editor of The Political Morality of the IMF.He is currently writing a book on Understanding Ethics.