物权法定原则批判——兼评《中华人民共和国物权法》第五条

物权法定原则下的物权体系是封闭性的,不能及时吸纳经济生活实践中涌现出来的新型物权。物权法定原则限制了民事主体的财产自由,违背了私法自治原则,而且没有充分、正当的立法理由。我国《物权法》第五条明确规定了物权法定原则,这是一个不明智的立法选择,将来应当予以废弃,代之以实行物权自由创设主义,以公示性作为物权与债权的区分标准,使物权体系由封闭走向开放。     

可登记财产利益的交易自由——从两岸民事法制的观点看物权法定原则松绑的界线

刻意把债法和物法放在对立面的传统民法典体例,形成了许多似是而非的逻辑,把财产法的释义学弄得没有必要的复杂。因此在检讨物权法定原则的立法政策之前,有必要再一次厘清限制物权的"关系权"本质。至于法定还是自由,比较有说服力的讨论恐怕也只有成本一效益的分析,这部分同样需要对一些很基本的观念先有共识,才不至于沦为各说各话。本文即接续过去两度提出的经济分析观点,参考后来的一些文章,再作一点补充。我国台湾地区的立法者已经采取了行动,在不动产所有权上交易者已经可以依其需要自由建立对世性的财产关系。大陆因为土地迄未开放私有,使得这个问题的讨论变得格外复杂,必须从社会主义市场经济体制的语境,重新检视物权的性质,并验证自由化的成本效益。本文也尝试在极有限的信息基础上,作一些最初步的探讨。     

南京师范大学法学院

南京师范大学法学院下设理论法学、宪法与行政法学、诉讼法学等7个教研室,法制现代化研究中心、现代司法研究中心等5个科研机构,另设有法学专业图书馆和行政教辅机构。法学院现有教职工67人,其中教师52人,教授18人,副教授14人,博士生导师10人,硕士生导师29人,在职教师中具有博士学位(含博士在读)35人。学科带头人公丕祥     

体系化视角中的物权法定

物权法定是传统物权法的基本原则。但从体系化的视角分析,它的内涵具有高度的不确定性,不能跟上物权公示制度的变化,还背离了民法体系的开放性。这三重缺陷决定了它不能有机地融入民法体系。为了维护民法体系的稳定性和开放性,应在公示基础上采用物权自由的立场,在立法技术上则要兼顾有名物权和无名物权。     

Constitutional law

Recent decisions of New Zealand courts illustrate that domestic proceedings may not be effective to recognise indigenous property rights, nor to address grievances that stem from breaches of customary indigenous rights. One possibility for Māori to have their rights enforced is to consider using international law. Gains have been made in international law with regard to indigenous rights; one noteworthy decision is Mayagna (sumo) Awas-Tingni Community v The Republic of Nicaragua. In this case, a universal and generic property right was extended consistently with emerging indigenous rights to include an indigenous right to customary land tenure. This paper considers whether the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can carry a property right for indigenous peoples in New Zealand.     

Rights and Resources—Libertarians and the Right to Life

The author addresses Robert Nozick's claim that: “The particular rights over things fill the space of rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition.” Hence Nozick insists that rights are violated if citizens are compelled to contribute to others' welfare, however urgent their needs may be. The author argues that it is characteristic of libertarian theories that they invoke the moral sanctity of private property against welfarist or egalitarian conceptions of social justice. Nozick's version of the libertarian critique has three conceptual pillars–“right,”“thing” and “space.” On that basis Nozick claims that talk of welfare “rights” can be condemned on the plane of rights. This is true, Nozick maintains, even of “the right to life.” The author contends that this argument fails. It equivocates over the idea of “rights”; and it misconceives crucial features of property. Nozick deploys exclusive “domain rights,” whilst attacking “important‐interest rights.” His historical‐entitlement theory fails as a justification of private property. The author argues that, so far as material objects are concerned, private property institutions depend upon trespassory rules which do not impose morally binding obligations unless basic needs are catered for. Furthermore, private property institutions also comprise monetary resources to which the spatial metaphor of exclusive rights does not apply. Holdings vested in any particular person at any particular time are stamped, morally, with a mix of contestable and mutable property‐specific justice reasons. Hence it is fallacious to suppose that ownership rights together exhaust all normative space over “things.” The major objection to speaking of everyone's having a right to various things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, is that these “rights” require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other people may have rights and entitlements over these. [≡] The particular rights over things fill the space of rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition. (Nozick 1974, 238)     

物权法定主义存废论——以检讨物权法定主义之批判为视角

尽管物权法定主义自罗马法以来被大陆法系国家普遍奉行,成为其物权法的基本原则。但该原则仍饱受质疑,对其存废问题一直争议不断。到了近代特别是20世纪以来,更是惨遭猛烈的批判,尤其是在日本和我国台湾,在祖国大陆否定者也不在少数。学者们的批判意见可归为废弃说和缓和说两类。通过对这些批判观点的检讨,发现并无力击倒物权法定主义,于是一一回应,边破边立,最后表明观点:必须继续坚持物权法定主义不能动摇,这是人类交易所需,是由物权的特性决定的,物权法定之“法”不能包括习惯法也不能从宽解释,仅指狭义的“法律”。以回答物权法定主义应向何处去(存或废)的问题。     

When More than Property Is Lost: The Dignity Losses and Restoration of the Tulsa Riot of 1921

Bernadette Atuahene's We Want What's Ours focuses on deprivations that go beyond property losses. Her focus is on the dignity harms to South Africans over centuries, such as denial of citizenship, that accompanied the theft of their land. I focus here on one grotesque episode of violence, the Tulsa race riot of 1921, to gauge dignity takings in a US context. Thousands were, in the parlance of the times, run out of town in a “negro drive.” They lost property, but also their community, and they could not assert their rights after the riot. This article turns to the ways in which African Americans in Oklahoma obtained rights through the courts that should have been protected around the time of the riot. This expands our sense of the range of responses, from apologies and compensation, to additional judicial process and substantive rights, that are needed for past racial crimes.     

Propertisation and Commercialisation: On Controlling the Uses of Human Biomaterials

Third parties, such as researchers and biotech companies, can and do legally acquire property rights in biomaterials. They are protected by the law of property in their use of these. Recent legal decisions have seen a move towards the tentative explicit recognition of some property rights in biomaterials vesting in the source of the materials. However, this recognition has not included income rights. This article discusses the interests that parties have in controlling the uses of biomaterials and the commercial interests that stem from those uses. The article argues that concerns regarding the allocation of property rights to the source generally elide property rights in biomaterials with the right to derive income from the transfer of those materials. Propertisation does not analytically entail commercialisation. It is therefore questionable whether it is reasonable to protect third parties' income rights, while excluding the source of the biomaterials from such protection.     

论新财产概念

随着社会的发展，不断有新型财产的产生，传统的财产概念把财产看成是物权、债权和知识产权的总括性权利，既没有准确反映财产的内涵，也不能囊括现代社会的新型财产，新型财产权利没有得到应有的保护，有必要树立一个既能反映财产的本质，又能适应新型财产不断出现的新财产概念。本文通过对两大法系的财产概念进行比较，找到财产的本质内涵，提出了新的财产概念。     

Paradoxes of Urban Housing Informality in the Developing World

This article addresses a series of paradoxes regarding informal settlements in cities in the developing world and their relation with the legal system. The first paradox regards the penalization of illegal land occupations on the one hand versus the legalization of that same practice on the other. Second, it looks at the relationship between land occupations as systematic violations of property rights, but with the goal of forming new property rights and thus paradoxically supporting private property as a substantive principle. Third, the reasoning behind the fact that the same system that denies legal access to housing for poor sectors simultaneously attempts to incorporate informal settlements in an ad hoc manner through legalization schemes is examined. It is shown that there is a logic to these paradoxes, which, although contradictory from standard legal perspectives, can be accommodated within a theoretical framework that distinguishes an internal normative order operating within informal settlements, from the state legal system, operative outside it. The proposed framework not only settles the paradoxes, but, this article concludes, can also guide attempts to deal with the enormous anticipated growth of informality in the developing world.     

财产权的宪法地位评析

我国现行宪法对财产权的规定具有主体多元化、财产权对象明确、实现方式多样及救济手段概括等特征 ;同时还存在财产权主体地位不平等、对公民财产权宪法地位不明确、公民财产权保障不充分及公有财产权保障规定不全面等问题。在我国 ,全面评价财产权的宪法地位必须协调好公有财产权与私人财产权的关系 ,同时还需要健全、完善与国情相适宜的宪法监督制度     

民法草案与知识产权篇的专家建议稿

民法草案规定了知识产权的保护范围 ,同时又没有将“知识产权”按照原计划作为专篇列入其中 ,是一个十分令人满意的选择。在多数情况下 ,知识产权保护适用民法一般原则 ;在为数不少的重要场合 ,知识产权保护不适用一般民法原则。与民法起草同步地研究知识产权在其中的位置及作用 ,能够促进而不是妨害民法典的不断完善。 2 0 0 2年 1 2月的民法草案 ,对于我国的知识产权保护 ,非常突出的一点就是明确了要保护“传统知识”和“生物多样化”。     

Is Law Unbounded? Property Rights and Control of Social Groupings

This review essay follows up on a suggested model for resolving problems of neighborhood externalities and exclusionary associational patterns in metropolitan areas. The model is based on a property rights regime of “alienable entitlements,” as articulated by Lee Anne Fennell in The Unbounded Home (2009). The essay frames this model as promoting a groundbreaking approach to the fundamental quandary over the role of law as a tool for broad-based social change and asks if legal rules can fully absorb the multiple types of societal effects that influence the nature of contemporary homeownership. It assesses the normative desirability and practical feasibility of controlling social exclusion through property rights.     

物权的本质

物权的本质为何,千百年来吸引许多私法学者尝试提出一家之言。然而,大陆法系多数学者执着干物权乃人与物之关系,走入歧途;普通法主流学者把物权看成一束权利,同样是打迷糊仗。本文主张物权（或本文之名词“财产权”）有三种核心效力：对世、排他、追及。任何与物有关之权利若具备三种核心效力,就是物权。财产是人与人间关于物之法律关系之组合,而非人对物之关系。此种财产关系又可分成四种典型：人对国家、人对定限物权人、人对特定人如邻居、人对所有其他人。除了人面对国家徵收高权时外,财产关系都有或强或弱的排他本质;而此关系乃自动生成,此正是对世效力之本意。追及效力虽然有时隐而未显,但在财产权移转时会当然发挥作用。此外,所有权是财产权,但非后者之同义词。所有权（而非物权）才是一束权能。     

浅议我国知识产权基本理论体系的战略构建

随着我国知识产权事业的蓬勃发展,知识产权基本理论体系作为实施知识产权法制和知识产权战略的重要基础,将更加凸显其重要的价值.然而,一直以来知识产权基本理论体系的内涵仅限于知识产权法制的范畴,尚不适应实施知识产权战略的需要.为此,提出了加快知识产权法制基本理论向知识产权战略基本理论的拓展与融合,构建完整的知识产权基本理论体系,以更好地适应我国知识产权事业发展的需要.     

论知识产权的私权属性——关于“知识产权的公权化理论”的置疑

知识产权与其他民事权利一样具有私权的属性。知识产权的私权属性区别于其他民事权利而有其特殊性,以致于有些学者在不否认知识产权的私权属性的前提下提出了知识产权的公权化理论,并试图用该理论来解释一些知识产权面临的新问题。知识产权的公权化理论是对私权理论的一种错误的解读,知识产权的私权属性不会也不可能改变或者会具有双重属性。     

Historical Entitlement and the Practice of Bequest: Is There a Moral Right of Bequest?

Entitlement theorists claim that bequest is a moral right. The aim of this essay is to determine whether entitlement theorists can, on their own grounds, consistently defend that claim. I argue that even if there is a moral right to self-appropriated property and to engage in inter vivos transfers, it is a mistake to contend that there exists an equivalent moral right to make a bequest. Taxing or regulating bequest does not violate an individual’s moral rights because, regardless of whether bequest safeguards certain interests, those interests are not the interests of a living, morally inviolable being. Instead, they are the interests of a deceased entity that has lost the ability to track what it values and pursue projects in accord with those values – a quality that by entitlement theorists’ own arguments renders persons morally significant and deserving of rights in the first place.     

Specifying Rights Out of Necessity

It is the purpose of this article to make the positive casefor an under-appreciated conception of rights: specified rights.In contrast to rights conceived generally, a specified rightcan stand against different behaviour in different circumstances,so that what conflicts with a right in one context may not conflictwith it in another. The specified conception of rights thuscombines into a single inquiry the two questions that must beanswered in invoking the general conception of rights, identifyingthe content of a right in light of what is justifiable to dounder the circumstances. I present the case for specificationismin four sections, focusing on property rights. First, I arguethat rights are based upon more fundamental reasons, and thatthis instrumentalism is compatible only with specificationism—afact necessity cases illuminate. Next, I explain how specificationismembodies a fully moralized understanding of rights, and pointto a dilemma that one faces in denying this. Third, I arguethat the gap in property rights exposed in necessity cases entailsthat there is no right-based duty to compensate in such cases.Finally, I offer an error theory to explain the (false) attractionof the general conception of property rights.     

财产权多元论与知识产权的非人权性

知识产权的核心特征在于它的虚拟性。以物质财产（权）为基础与核心,以财产权的物质性与消费性特征为参照,财产权分为实物性、可预期性和机会性财产权三类,构成财产权＂三元论＂体系。以人类生活之必需性为参照,财产可区分为基本与非基本财产两部分;进而,在基本人权的框架下,两种财产分别属于人类基本权与非基本权,这是＂二元论＂财产权体系。知识产权分别属于三元论体系中的机会性财产权和二元论下的非基本权。人权即人类基本权,是自然人之生存所必需的、普遍的、不可移转或剥夺的权利,是人人生来就有的生存与生活的资格,而不是源自法律的赋予。知识产权不具有这些属性。